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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240902T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240902T053000
DTSTAMP:20261122T034811
CREATED:20240917T113529Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240917T113529Z
UID:82557-1725255000-1725255000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on The Paradox of South Korea’s Quest for Nuclear Weapons
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Ranjit Kumar Dhawan\, Associate Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, New Delhi spoke on “The Paradox of South Korea’s Quest for Nuclear Weapons” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 2 September 2024. The session was moderated by Mr. Niranjan Oak\, Research Analyst\, MP-IDSA. MP-IDSA scholars attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Korean Peninsula is of strategic importance for the United States in its efforts to balance China as well as Russia. The resurgence of the debate whether South Korea should develop its own nuclear arsenal has gained much attention in the recent times. President Yoon Suk Yeol also made a statement in favour of developing nuclear weapons in 2023\, however\, retracting the same later. This move has sparked a discussion whether South Korea should go nuclear. The session focused on various aspects regarding concerns about the nuclear development of South Korea\, providing a comprehensive analysis of the topic. \nDetailed Report\nThe session began with opening remarks by Mr. Niranjan Oak\, giving an introduction of the topic wherein he shared a brief history of South Korea’s move towards nuclear technology. Further\, he discussed drivers that led to the current contemplation of South Korea’s seeming necessity for nuclear weapons. Some of the drivers were the exponential rise in tests by North Korea and its increasing proximity towards China and Russia\, its discussion on employment of tactical nuclear weapons\, and development of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) with the ability to reach continental United States. The aforementioned factors have ignited the discussion on the need for owning nuclear weapons in South Korea\, wherein numerous surveys have revealed the public opinion in favour of developing the nation’s own nuclear weapons\, given its credible civil nuclear industry. \nDr. Ranjit Kumar Dhawan began his presentation by explaining that a major reason behind the requirement of nuclear warheads in South Korea is North Korea’s strengthening of its conventional and nuclear weapons capability and its cooperative alliance with Russia in the past few years. Another concern is America’s withdrawal of its armed forces from South Korea. Highlighting the history briefly and the events consequent to the Korean War\, he described how geopolitics has evolved over the decades. He focused on nuclear development in North and South Korea\, the strength and numbers of the armed forces of both the nations and the consecutive nuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. \nApart from security aspects\, political considerations including government policies and public opinion regarding the development of nuclear weapons were discussed. Citing the data in the “KINU Unification Survey 2024: North Korea’s Two-State Claim/US Presidential Election Outlook and ROK-US Relations”\, published by Korea Institute for National Unification in June 2024\, Dr. Dhawan stated that it showed public demand for South Korea’s own nuclear warheads surpassing the comparative percentage of people wanting US nuclear umbrella. Consequent to the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Pyongyang\, Seoul signed an agreement on the Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula with the US on 11 July 2024. Pyongyang reacted by threatening to increase its nuclear arsenal against the agreement between US and South Korea. \nFurther into his presentation\, Dr. Dhawan pointed out challenges that might impact the current situation and further policies of South Korea. He pointed out four possibilities resulting from South Korea’s nuclearisation\, on the basis of the existing literature: \n\nA domino effect in the East Asian region\, specifically in Taiwan and Japan\nWithdrawal from the Non – Proliferation Treaty\, resulting in economic sanctions\, making it a costly affair for South Korea\nSouth Korea continuing to benefit from the US nuclear umbrella\nLack of acceptability of South Korea’s own nuclear weapons program to the US\n\nExplaining each of the apprehensions\, Dr. Dhawan pointed out that South Koreans are doubtful about the reliance on US for nuclear weapons\, thereby fuelling the need for South Korea’s nuclear program. The reason behind it is the apprehension of the US needing to protect its own territories against North Korean ICBMs with nuclear capacity. US might be found at a crossroads while protecting South Korea and that could give strategic advantage to its adversaries. Furthermore\, US cannot let its control in East Asia slip away so easily\, weakening its presence against China\, as the increasing influence of the Chinese in the Peninsula has significantly impacted its diplomatic stronghold in the region. South Korea giving up US protection might prove to be the last nail in the coffin. Another impact might be the trigger effect on the nuclear arms race in the East Asian region. \nConcluding his presentation\, Dr. Dhawan also specified the potential ideas that might benefit Seoul. Having already established a thriving civil nuclear program for technological and industrial purposes\, it could be relatively easy to understand and analyse the dynamics and technicalities of the development of nuclear weapons in South Korea according to Dr. Dhawan. He added that the analyses of Project 890 shall also act as a guidebook for future endeavour\, which will imperatively arm and strengthen South Korea against North Korea. However\, regional political dynamics and the alliance with the US could prevent South Korea from going nuclear. \nScholars at MP-IDSA posed a diverse range of questions to which the speaker gave detailed answers. \nReport was prepared by Ms. Shipra Dwivedi\, Intern\, Nuclear and Arms Control Centre\, MP – IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-the-paradox-of-south-koreas-quest-for-nuclear-weapons
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240909T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240909T053000
DTSTAMP:20261122T034811
CREATED:20241004T035405Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241004T035405Z
UID:82769-1725859800-1725859800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on ‘India’s Engagement With Taliban-ruled Afghanistan: Three Years On’
DESCRIPTION:Mr. Vishal Chandra\, Research Fellow\, South Asia Centre\,  MP-IDSA\,  spoke on ‘India’s Engagement With Taliban-ruled Afghanistan: Three Years On’ at  the Monday Morning Meeting held on 9 September 2024. The session was moderated  by Dr. Priyanka Singh\, Associate Fellow\,  South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA. MP-IDSA scholars attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary \nIndia’s approach towards Afghanistan has evolved  pragmatically in response to shifting power dynamics in the country over the  past decades. India’s commitment to developmental projects and humanitarian  assistance has remained consistent\, and its people-centric approach continues  to foster ties with Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic groups. These long-lasting  ties with the Afghan people have endured\, with India adapting to another power  shift in Kabul in August 2021. Looking ahead\, India needs to broaden its  engagement\, recognising that Afghanistan will remain a critical cog in the  broader interplay of geopolitics and geoeconomics around it.  \nDetailed Report\nThe session began with moderator Dr.  Priyanka Singh highlighting India’s historically fraught relationship with the  Taliban\, notably influenced by the execution of President Najibullah\, who was  an ally of India\, in 1996\, and the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC–814  in 1999. India had aligned itself with the Northern Alliance\, opposing the  Pakistan-backed Taliban’s rise to power in the late 1990s. Dr. Singh stated  that these events\, among others\, have shaped India’s cautious approach towards  engaging with the Taliban-led interim government. Over the past two years\, diplomatic  engagements with the Taliban have occurred\, signalling that India is open to  dialogue while ensuring that its national interests are safeguarded. \nMr. Vishal Chandra’s presentation  revolved around India’s evolving approach towards a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan  over the past three years. His presentation highlighted India’s continued  humanitarian outreach and assistance to the people of Afghanistan; reflected  upon the security landscape of Afghanistan\, the state of India’s relations with  an Islamist Kabul\, and the level of bilateral trade; and India’s approach  moving forward. The Speaker\, Mr. Chandra\, began his presentation by quoting  Prime Minister Narendra Modi from his address delivered at the inauguration of  the India-constructed Afghan Parliament building in Kabul in December 2015\,  where he emphasised the centuries-old ‘timeless relations’ between the peoples  of the two countries. Mr. Chandra was of the opinion that the Prime Minister’s  speech aptly captured the spirit of what is termed as “Indo-Afghan”.  Elaborating on the point\, he stated that “Indo-Afghan” is a much broader  historical dynamic\, and has its momentum\, than the formal state-to-state  “India–Afghanistan” relations. It has long guided India’s people-centric  approach towards Afghanistan\, particularly in times of political uncertainty  and instability in the country\, and is well-reflected in India’s current policy  pronouncements.     \nReflecting upon the state of  relations with Kabul\, Mr. Chandra noted that the Taliban regime has variously  signalled its interest in building ties with New Delhi. A working understanding  of sorts on non-interference and non-threat appears to have been attempted over  the past two years. He also referred to visits by Indian delegations to Kabul  in June 2022 and March 2024\, and the deployment of officials and staff at the  Indian mission in Kabul in June 2022 to coordinate the delivery of much-needed  humanitarian aid and assistance to the Afghan people. He referred to the people  of Afghanistan as India’s longest-standing partner in the country.  \nOn the changed security landscape in  Afghanistan\, Mr. Chandra remarked that from Herat in the west to Peshawar in  the east\, one finds only Pashtun Sunni Islamist groups—the Afghan Taliban;  Haqqani network (both as a distinct entity and as part of the Taliban  ‘emirate’); the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)\, mainly comprising of  former elements from Pakistani and Afghan Taliban; and the Tehreek-e-Taliban  Pakistan (TTP) or the Pakistani Taliban—collaborating\, competing and warring to  establish their power dominance and ideological hold in the region. He further  noted that the underlying interlinkages\, and convergences and divergences among  them and their global and regional affiliates\, point to a complex maze of  resurgent Sunni Jihadist entities seeking to dominate and transform the social  and political landscape in the region. \nMr. Chandra highlighted India’s  pragmatic approach to Afghanistan\, adapting to shifts in power and priorities.  He pointed out the faultlines within the Taliban and their so-called ‘emirate’\,  which is marked by competing power centres. The Taliban chief\, Hibatullah  Akhundzada\, governs from Kandahar\, where there is an extreme concentration of  power\, while the Haqqani Network holds sway in Kabul. Additionally\, prominent  figures like Sirajuddin Haqqani (acting Taliban interior minister and leader of  the Haqqani Network) and Mullah Yaqoob (acting Taliban defence minister and son  of founder chief Mullah Omar) have questioned some of Akhundzada’s governing  policies and decisions\, including the restrictions imposed on girls’ education.  Mr. Chandra informed that the Taliban have allowed women to work in select  sectors\, particularly health and education. However\, it cannot be regarded as a  major policy shift\, for the Taliban had allowed women to work in these sectors  earlier during their first regime in the late 1990s. \nMr. Chandra underscored India’s  broad-based role in Afghanistan\, spanning two decades of developmental projects  and aid delivery. He informed that between 2002 and 2021\, India committed USD 3  billion in aid and assistance\, making India the largest regional development  partner of Afghanistan. India’s reconstruction assistance was multi-sectoral:  education\, health services\, transportation\, telecommunications\, civil aviation\,  agriculture\, irrigation\, power generation & transmission\, industry\, and  rural development. After the power shift in Kabul in August 2021\, India quickly  resumed humanitarian aid and relief assistance\, dispatching 50\,000 metric  tonnes of wheat\, 50 tonnes of essential medicine\, and 28 tonnes of disaster  relief assistance. India has also supplied 1100 units of female hygiene kits  for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime female rehabilitation centres  in Afghanistan.  \nMr. Chandra added that India  continued to annually allocate a budget of Rs. 200 crore for ‘Aid to  Afghanistan’ through the financial years 2022–23\, 2023–24\, and 2024-25. The  annual trade between the two countries stood at USD 889.85 million in 2022–23  and USD 997.74 million in 2023–24. As per the World Bank’s latest data\, India  remains the second-largest export market for Afghan products.  \nHe further informed that educational  ties continue through initiatives like the 1\,000 online annual scholarships for  Afghan students in undergraduate and postgraduate courses offered by the Indian  Council for Cultural Relations. The New Delhi-based South Asian University\,  through a South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation initiative\,  continues to give admission and provide scholarships to Afghan students in  postgraduate and doctoral courses.  \nIn his concluding observations\, Mr.  Chandra stated that India must step up its people-centric engagement with  Afghanistan to deal with the long-term impact of the changed political and  security landscape in the country. He also highlighted the fact that none of  India’s projects or diplomatic properties were harmed by the Taliban\,  underscoring the Taliban’s intent to normalise relations with New Delhi. He  argued that the Taliban regime may not come across as a relatable entity or  authority\, but an independent Taliban is preferable to one exiled and under  Pakistan’s tutelage. He noted that India’s development assistance and capacity  building programmes facilitated engagement with Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic  groups\, including Tajiks\, Uzbeks\, Hazaras\, and Pashtuns. This outreach helped  counter anti-India propaganda by certain state and non-state actors. India  needs to constantly monitor and assess the evolving ground situation in  Afghanistan.  \nLooking ahead\, Mr. Chandra argued  that if the engagement is to expand\, then developments in Afghanistan will have  to be viewed in its social-political context\, which has been upended multiple  times over the past five decades\, to better deal with its layered complexities. \nQuestions and Comments\nThe presentation was followed by  comments and questions from the floor\, focussing on India’s national interests  in Afghanistan; prospects of Indian investment in Afghanistan’s mineral  resources and access to Afghan and Central Asian markets; and Taliban’s  regional diplomacy. The approach of Central Asian Republics\, particularly that  of Tajikistan\, and China’s growing engagement with the Taliban regime were also  discussed. \n  The Speaker\, Mr. Chandra\, responded  to the questions and comments from the MP-IDSA scholars. \nReport prepared by Ms Puspa Kumari\, Intern\, South Asia  Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-indias-engagement-with-taliban-ruled-afghanistan-three-years-on
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240923T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240923T053000
DTSTAMP:20261122T034811
CREATED:20241011T030550Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241011T031016Z
UID:82839-1727069400-1727069400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on Presidential Election in Sri Lanka
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Gulbin Sultana\, Associate Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar  IDSA (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “Presidential Election in Sri Lanka” at the Monday  Morning Meeting held on 23 September 2024. The session was chaired by Dr.  Ashish Shukla\, Associate Fellow\, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, the  Director General of MP-IDSA and the scholars of the Institute attended the  meeting.  \nExecutive Summary \nAnura  Kumara Dissanayake won Sri Lanka’s 2024 Presidential Election after a historic  second round of counting\, marking the closest election in the country’s  history. In the first round\, no candidate secured over 50 per cent of the vote  required to win the election. Dissanayake received 42.31 per cent and his  opponent Sajith Premadasa obtained 32.7 per cent of votes. This was the first election  since the 2022 ‘Aragalaya’ –  mass  protests ousted former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa following a severe economic  crisis.  Dissanayake’s promises of good  governance and anti-corruption resonated with voters\, leading him to victory.  He also pledged to revive the economy by developing the manufacturing\,  agriculture\, and IT sectors while continuing the International Monetary Fund  bailout agreement with modification of some of the clauses to provide economic  justice to the people.  With 17 million  eligible voters\, the poll was one of the most peaceful in Sri Lankan electoral history.  \nDetailed Report \nIn his opening remarks\, Dr. Ashish Shukla provided a  concise overview of the recent political developments in Sri Lanka. He noted  Sri Lanka’s period of economic crisis and widespread protests in 2022\, which  led President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to flee the country. Dr. Shukla also  highlighted the positive role of Sri Lanka’s leadership in securing an International  Monetary Fund bailout to navigate the crisis\, and said that this move\,  nevertheless\, generated substantial public resistance. Additionally\, he  stressed the importance of the 2024 Presidential Election\, focusing on voter  turnout and the competition among three prominent candidates. He mentioned that  for the first time in Sri Lankan history\, preference votes were counted to  declare the winner. He concluded by emphasising the election’s crucial role in  shaping the nation’s future political landscape. \nDr. Gulbin Sultana began her presentation by contextualising  Sri Lanka’s 2024 Presidential Election within the nation’s ongoing economic  crisis and public dissatisfaction with traditional leadership. She  characterised this election as a pivotal moment in Sri Lankan politics\, marked  by the emergence of new political dynamics as citizens sought alternatives to the  traditional political culture and leadership\, reflecting a widespread demand  for transformative change. She highlighted the competitive nature of the  election\, where multiple prominent candidates contended for power amid economic  challenges and social unrest.  She noted  a complex interplay of opinions within the electorate\, with differing views on  the newly elected leader\, Aruna Dissanayake’s ability to lead the country  towards economic recovery. \nDr. Sultana drew attention to the contrasting  perspectives of the elites and masses regarding the leadership’s capacity to  navigate both domestic and international political landscapes. She also  examined the divided political support among minority communities\, noting that  while some candidates received their backing\, there was a concern about the  persistence of existing power structures and the potential for change. Dr.  Sultana further analysed the electoral strategies of the leading candidates\,  noting that while promises of significant policy shifts were made\, many  candidates’ historical affiliations with the existing political establishment  raised doubts about their ability to enact meaningful change. She emphasised  that the new leadership would need to manage public expectations carefully\,  particularly in relation to economic recovery and governance reforms\, to ensure  political stability in the future. \nRegarding the new President\, Anura Kumara Dissanayake\,  Dr. Sultana observed that while he is traditionally seen as aligning with leftist  ideology\, his party’s (National People’s Power) manifesto is not based on pure  Marxist-Leninist principles. Rather the manifesto takes a pragmatic approach to  deal with  political\, economic\, social  and foreign policy issues. Despite his pragmatism\, there is scepticism among a  section of electorates about his ability to deliver on election promises. \nOn the issue of devolution of power\, Dr. Sultana noted  that past administrations have been reluctant to pursue significant changes.  Dissanayake\, however\, has expressed a commitment to decentralising power and  granting local communities political and administrative authority by drafting a  new constitution. He has acknowledged the need to address Tamil issues and build  a unified Sri Lankan nation that respects diversity. She concluded by stressing  that Dissanayake’s handling of sensitive issues and projects\, particularly  relations with India\, will be critical to his ability to meet the electorate’s  expectations. \nComments and Questions \nFollowing the presentation\, Ambassador Sujan R.  Chinoy\, DG\, MP-IDSA complimented Dr. Sultana for a comprehensive presentation  and raised key questions. He inquired about the potential impact of unresolved  issues like the Tamil question on Sri Lanka’s internal dynamics and its  long-term political cycles. He also questioned how the election outcomes might  affect India-Sri Lanka relations\, noting the gap between pre-election promises  and post-election actions. Furthermore\, he sought clarity on Sri Lanka’s debt  to China\, comparing it to the situations in Bangladesh and Pakistan\, and  questioned why India’s larger financial aid has received little media  attention.  \n The scholars  inquired about the pragmatic approach needed by the new government in Sri Lanka  to maintain diplomatic and economic relations\, alongside discussions about Sri  Lanka’s sensitive stance on foreign influence and internal reforms\, including  ethnic and land rights issues. The discussion also touched upon China’s  increasing presence and Sri Lanka’s balancing act between foreign assistance  and national autonomy. \nDr.  Gulbin Sultana responded to the comments made by the Director General and the  questions raised by MP-IDSA scholars.  \nReport prepared by Ms. Sneha M\,  Research Analyst\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-presidential-election-in-sri-lanka
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240930T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240930T053000
DTSTAMP:20261122T034811
CREATED:20241011T030916Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241011T030916Z
UID:82841-1727674200-1727674200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on India’s Evaluation by the FATF: Results and Implications
DESCRIPTION:Col. Vivek Chadha  (Retd.)\, Senior Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and  Analyses (MP-IDSA)\, New Delhi spoke on “India’s Evaluation by the FATF: Results  and Implications” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 30 September 2024. The  session was moderated by Dr. Ashok K. Behuria\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA. Amb.  Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General MP-IDSA and scholars attended the meeting.  \nExecutive Summary \nThe Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an international body  combating money laundering and terror financing. Its mandate has evolved over  time\, and there is a need for better regulation of new technologies\, public information dissemination\, and private sector involvement. FATF’s  mutual evaluation reports have influenced amendments in India’s anti-money  laundering and counter-terror measures.India has made strides in strengthening its Anti-Money Laundering  and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) framework but faces  vulnerabilities.Some key  themes under consideration include the exploitation of gaming platforms for  cyber fraud\, the relationship between global economic structures and FATF  reports\, and the role of cryptocurrencies in terror financing and money  laundering activities. \nDetailed Report \nThe session began with  the moderator\, Dr. Ashok. K. Behuria’s opening remarks\, who commented on the  historical context and the purpose behind creating the Financial Action Task  Force (FATF) as an international watchdog to monitor and assess threats and set  global standards regarding issues such as money laundering and terror  financing. He emphasised that FATF was primarily set up to reduce the  vulnerabilities of the international system\, which faces the risk of being  exploited by terrorists and criminal networks.\nCol. Chadha began his  presentation by explaining the necessity behind the creation of FATF and  highlighted how its mandate has evolved since 1989. He pointed out that it  initially began looking into terror financing in the immediate aftermath of the  9/11 attacks and more formally in 2003\, marking a shift from its narrow focus  on money laundering. Later\, the organisation weaved counter-terror measures  into its anti-money laundering guidelines and examined how to enforce them  effectively.\nCol. Chadha also distinguished  between terror financing and money laundering and highlighted how  terror-related activities are often financed through legitimate avenues. He  also underscored FATF’s mandate\, organisational structure\, the scope of its  activities\, and the impact of countries like Pakistan being placed on the grey  list. He also explored how the organisation conducts mutual evaluations\, their  relevance\, the process of publication of such reports\, the review process  following their publication\, the reasons behind some countries being placed on  grey and black lists\, and how India’s counter-terror measures and anti-money  laundering legislations have been amended based on past mutual evaluation  reports.\nHe also shed light on the  findings of the mutual evaluation report released in 2024 about India’s efforts  to counter money laundering and terror financing and provided insights on its  achievements and the vulnerabilities it continues to face. In addition\, he drew  comparisons between India\, the United States\, Australia\, Japan\, Singapore\, China\,  South Africa\, Brazil\, Türkiye\, and Pakistan in terms of their effectiveness in  curbing terror financing and money laundering.\nAt the same time\, he  also underlined the main conclusions that could be derived from the risk  assessment conducted by India before FATF’s mutual evaluation\, and the findings  of India’s National Strategy for AML/CFT\, and the critical regional threats  faced by the country. He emphasised that the challenge to India posed by  illicit financial flows can be primarily attributed to cross-border threats  from the Western front.\nAdditionally\, he assessed  the successes and limitations of India’s Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the  Financing of Terrorism strategies\, its successes since 2010\, and how they have  not been effectively implemented due to the slow pace of persecution of those indicted  on such charges. He also spoke about how virtual currencies can be exploited by  terrorists.\nFinally\, he emphasised  the need for regulating new-age technologies\, disseminating relevant information  in the public domain\, and involving the private sector in addressing the  challenges related to terror financing and money laundering.  \nQ/A Session\nThe Q/A Session  broadly delved into themes such as the exploitative use of gaming platforms to  carry out cyber fraud\, the linkage between a dollar-driven or a G-7-driven  economic order and the mutual evaluation reports\, and the potential impact of de-dollarisation  efforts on future evaluation reports released by FATF. Furthermore\, issues such  as the role of bitcoin in terror financing and money laundering-related  activities\, the link between tax evasion and money laundering\, reasons behind  the international legitimacy granted to FATF reports\, India’s involvement in  Pakistan being placed on the grey list in 2018\, the scope of FATF’s involvement  in reviewing non-state actors’ financial dealings\, and use of hawala networks  to transfer money by expatriates were also discussed.\nCol. Chadha provided insightful  responses to the questions and comments raised.\nThis report was  prepared by Ms. Saman Ayesha Kidwai\, Research Analyst\, Counter-Terrorism  Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-indias-evaluation-by-the-fatf-results-and-implications
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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