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TZID:Asia/Kolkata
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DTSTART:20230101T000000
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240801T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240801T053000
DTSTAMP:20261122T035813
CREATED:20240819T190042Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240819T190131Z
UID:82308-1722490200-1722490200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Interaction with Dr. Michael Malley\, US Naval Postgraduate School
DESCRIPTION:On 1 August 2024\, Dr. Michael Malley\, Senior Lecturer\, Department of National Security Affairs at the US Naval Postgraduate School\, Monterey\, California\, visited MP-IDSA to deliver his remarks on multilateral maritime security cooperation. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director-General MP-IDSA\, chaired the meeting\, which was attended by scholars from various centres. \nAmb. Chinoy commenced the proceedings with a brief introduction of Dr. Malley and the circumstances of their acquaintance at the recently-concluded Indian Ocean Defence and Security Conference in Perth\, Australia. He then turned the floor over to the Speaker. The Speaker also gave a brief introduction of the Naval Postgraduate School and his own educational background. He cited particularly the NPS’ role in training and capacity-building of the militaries of other countries as germane to his remarks. \nThe Speaker informed the audience that his remarks would primarily revolve around the challenges of maritime cooperation in the region and how they create opportunities for allies and partners of the US to work together. He held maritime security cooperation to be the product of the immediate post-Cold War era\, when the threat of global nuclear conflict as an expression of superpower confrontation receded.  At the same time\, he argued\, maritime trade boomed as a result of the economic modernisation and integration of China and India\, which in turn led to the growing convergence of trade and security agendas on the high seas. These trends led the spotlight to fall on navies\, which were now tasked not to manage superpower conflict\, but to prevent non-traditional security threats such as pirates\, traffickers\, terrorists and fishers engaged in Illegal\, Unregulated and Unrecognised (IUU) fishing. \nDr. Malley noted that the world was now experiencing the ‘rapid proliferation of maritime security cooperation initiatives’ in which the US was involved to varying degrees. He pointed to some concrete examples in the form of initiatives mounted in the Caribbean against drug trafficking\, the Indian Ocean against piracy\, and the Southeast Asian region. All these initiatives\, he pointed out\, have been designed to be flexible in terms of membership and interoperability in light of the desires of several states in the region to preserve their sovereignty and strategic autonomy. \nGrey zone conflict challenges this model of maritime security cooperation seriously\, the Speaker noted. This is because grey zone activities may be present as classical non-traditional security threats\, but in actuality are likely to have a state actor pulling the strings in the background. An example offered by him in this regard was the Chinese Coast Guard’s recent violent clashes with Philippine law enforcement personnel\, where water cannons were used to disperse the latter\, vis-à-vis the protection offered by it to the so-called ‘maritime militia’ which often forms the spearhead of China’s intrusions into disputed waters. \nBroadly speaking\, Dr. Malley noted\, maritime security cooperation can be divided into three forms. The first form is interdiction or kinetic action cooperation\, where the US along with its allies and partners uses its ships to actually interdict vessels conducting illegal actions. The second form is that of information-sharing\, where states agree to collect\, analyse and disseminate relevant intelligence to improve maritime domain awareness. Finally\, the third type of cooperation involves capacity-building\, where states such as the US (and increasingly Japan) help smaller countries which are presently incapable of monitoring their vast maritime domains to be able to do so. He concluded his remarks by expressing an interest in understanding how India approaches these forms of security cooperation and the concerns it has relating to them. \nAmb. Chinoy thanked Dr. Malley for sharing his remarks and presented his view of India’s stance on these issues. He noted that while major power contestation is well underway in the modern era\, there is a space for like-minded countries to band together. This may involve strengthening the traditional alliance structure in some cases\, but goes beyond these to the creation of an ‘era of quasi-alliances’\, which are not predicated on close synchronicity of thought on every count to achieve cooperation. Nevertheless\, issues of sovereignty have the potential to create friction and present limits to cooperation. \nIn light of his previous remarks\, Amb. Chinoy posed a few questions to the Speaker. Firstly\, he invited the Speaker to clarify whether the US commitment to international legal instruments such as the UNCLOS could be relied upon in light of the US’ non-ratification of UNCLOS. Secondly\, on the issue of Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS)\, he invited the Speaker to remark on whether friendly nations are expected to condone\, or at least tolerate\, US FONOPS conducted against them in the same manner as when they are conducted against countries such as China. Finally\, he urged the Speaker to comment on the reasons behind the US’ absence from the International Seabed Authority. \nDr. Malley answered the last question first by noting that the US’ stance on the ISA and global efforts to codify common norms on seabed mining are rooted in the peculiar worldview of 1980s US politics\, as is its stance on UNCLOS. He confessed that there should not be any expectation of a sudden change in the US position on this issue given the vagaries of US domestic politics\, though there is ample support within the US armed forces as well as sections of its defence bureaucracy for ratification. He encouraged the audience to think of statements regarding the ‘rules-based international order’ made by US officials as forms of signalling support of UNCLOS as an element of that order. \nSimilarly\, Dr. Malley characterised FONOPS as another ‘oddity’ of US foreign policy\, devised as a legalistic effort to deny any other country in the international system the right to any exclusive national claim to the maritime commons under the belief that silence on such claims-making would be construed as assent. He also argued that there were significant doubts on the deterrence potential of FONOPS in the South China Sea region\, where it acts a ‘tool with various impacts’ on the concerned countries. \nThe Chair then invited questions from the floor. Scholars from the Indian side obliged by asking the visitor a host of questions on topics ranging from particular policy stances adopted by the US government to the modalities of the India-US relationship. He answered most of them fully and frankly\, engaging the audience for their views on the issue. \nOn a question from the Indian side regarding backlash to the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) programme from certain countries in Southeast Asia\, the Speaker answered that behind such attitudes may lie a perception that existing information-sharing structures operating in Southeast Asia\, which these countries happen to host presently\, may be supplanted by a broader structure that could cause them to lose their primacy in the information supply chain. \nTo a question on the perception in many Asian countries that the US is steadily losing focus on the Indo-Pacific as it invests gargantuan amounts of aid in Ukraine and Israel\, the Speaker answered that this only seemed to be the case. He noted the coming together of the naval chiefs of the United Kingdom\, US\, Australia and Japan at Perth to set up a mechanism to host a nuclear submarine maintenance base in the region as a promising development. He also offered the analysis that the differing policy preferences of various incumbent Presidents may also be a factor in creating this impression. \nIn response to a question concerning the US Armed Forces’ preparation for combatting climate change\, the Speaker stated that the US Armed Forces\, especially the Navy\, are extremely cognisant of the dangers of climate change and have set up varying mechanisms to account for it in their strategic plans\, such as appointing an Assistant Secretary on Climate Change at the Pentagon and conducting apolitical studies on the likely impacts of climate change. \nAnother question posed to Dr. Malley concerned the US military’s assessment of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s exercises around Taiwan Strait. He replied to the question by agreeing that the US was closely monitoring such exercises\, and that its conclusion is that the PLAN’s capacity to blockade Taiwan is increasing. This is true not only of its maritime interdiction capacity\, but also the capacity to mount shore-based attacks. This has ensured that US forces concentrated in Japan and the Republic of Korea are also within range of land-based missiles. As a result\, the US military is now preparing to enact a strategy of ‘distributed lethality’\, by which these US forces are being broken up into smaller detachments and distributed across the First Island Chain so as to ensure their survivability. \nIn a second round of questions\, the Chair Amb. Chinoy inquired of the Speaker as to what he would consider as a ‘red line’ for the US military that would trigger intervention by it against China in the SCS. He noted that the lack of a red line is cause for concern on the part of several actors across the region\, as it does not encourage confidence in the US’ commitments. \nThe Speaker in his response first flagged the criticality of the question posed\, but could not reassure the audience that any such ‘red line’ could be clearly defined at present. He argued that while an attack on the Senkaku Islands would trigger Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Treaty\, making US intervention inevitable\, it is not at all clear whether an attack on Taiwan’s offshore islands (such as Jinmen and Matsu) would constitute grounds for intervention. He hypothesised that the trigger for intervention in Taiwan would most likely be legal-political. \nAfter Amb. Chinoy delivered his closing remarks\, the meeting came to an end. \nReport was prepared by Dr. Arnab Dasgupta\, Research Analyst\, East Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/interaction-with-dr-michael-malley-us-naval-postgraduate-school
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240805T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240805T053000
DTSTAMP:20261122T035813
CREATED:20240818T183936Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240818T183936Z
UID:82304-1722835800-1722835800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on “Saudi Foreign Policy in the Emerging Regional Order in West Asia”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Prasanta Kumar Pradhan\, Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) made a presentation on “Saudi Foreign Policy in the Emerging Regional Order in West Asia\,” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 5 August 2024. The session was moderated by Dr. Deepika Saraswat\, Associate Fellow at MP-IDSA. Scholars of MP-IDSA attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nThe Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an important player in the West Asian region. Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy has been shaped by a number of factors including its perception of national security\, regional stability\, geopolitical developments in its neighbourhood and its ambition to play a leadership role in the region. It has established strategic partnerships and alliances with important regional and global powers in order to achieve its foreign policy objectives. As the situation in the West Asian region continues to remain tense\, it has adopted a more pragmatic and cautious approach in its foreign policy. \nDetailed Report\nIn her introductory remarks\, Dr. Saraswat observed that the Gulf States are emerging as key power brokers in the Arab world. She reflected on Saudi Arabia’s target of achieving Vision 2030 goals and its navigating through the regional order which saw changes from a ‘militaristic turn’ of intervention against the Houthis in Yemen\, and involvement in Syria to a preference for de-escalation with key players including Turkey and Iran\, and normalisation efforts with Israel\, which have been complicated by the ongoing Israel-Palestine war. Further\, Dr. Saraswat also commented on the dynamics of Saudi Arabia’s interactions with external powers and increasing engagement of the Gulf States with China. \nIn his presentation\, Dr. Pradhan highlighted that the regional order in West Asia continues to remain fragile. The region suffered significantly during the Arab unrest with protests and regime changes. The region has always remained prone to external intervention. But recently\, the Abraham Accords and Saudi-Iran rapprochement have been positive developments with potential for further cooperation. The Israel-Hamas War and the involvement of Houthis and Hezbollah have further complicated the regional situation. The whole region has become even more volatile since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas War and its spillover effect in the Red Sea\, the Strait of Hormuz\, involvement of Iran\, Lebanon and the neighbourhood along with significant involvement of Hamas\, Houthis and Hezbollah. \nDr. Pradhan noted that the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran\, the two regional powers has been a pivotal determinant in the regional order in West Asia. After decades of hostility\, both the countries signed an agreement in March 2023 that restored their diplomatic ties. However\, both states have serious differences when it comes to regional security in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia vouches for a Western security architecture in the Gulf. On the contrary\, Iran believes that the regional security framework of the region should be controlled by the regional players only and perceives the American military presence in the West Asian region as a threat. He also stated that Turkiye and Israel\, the two other major non-Arab players in the region also have a major influence in the region. \nDr. Pradhan outlined that when it came to the Israel-Palestine issue\, Riyadh’s position has undergone a significant change over the decades. The Saudi-Israeli talks to explore the normalisation of relations between them is an indication of Saudi Arabia’s changing perception towards Israel. However\, since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas War\, Saudi Arabia has reaffirmed that there will be no diplomatic relations with Israel until an independent Palestinian state is established. Saudi Arabia supports the Arab Peace Initiative which proposes a two-state solution with the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine. \nYemen has always been a major concern for Saudi Arabia since it has a long and porous border and the former has also mostly been a very unstable state with presence of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. The Houthi capture of Sana’a was a red line for the Kingdom since Riyadh believes that the group is backed by Iran. Thus\, Houthis presence on the Saudi-Yemeni border is an obvious national security threat for the Saudis. Houthis have launched several attacks on Saudi Arabia including sensitive infrastructure such as airports and oil installations. \nDr. Pradhan noted that Saudi Arabia’s position towards Bashar Al- Assad in Syria has also undergone a change. There has been a gradual course correction in recent years with the intent of engaging with the Assad regime and bringing Syria back to the Arab world. \nSaudi Arabia has adopted mediation as a foreign policy tool. The Kingdom has mediated between different factions in Palestine\, Yemen\, Lebanon\, Sudan and for prisoner exchange between Russia and Ukraine. \nThere has been a significant change in Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy thinking since Mohammed bin Salman became the Crown Prince. The Kingdom has been making efforts to improve its global image by undertaking a number of social reforms including improvement in the human rights situation. \nDr. Pradhan argued that when it comes to Saudi-US relations\, there have been many ups and downs. Bilateral ties have been interdependent and strategic in nature\, with defence and security being given a significant focus. But Biden Administration’s stopping of arms supply to Riyadh at a time when the Kingdom was fighting a war against the Houthis became a major irritant for Saudi Arabia. He outlined that when the oil prices were crashing\, in the middle of the Arab Spring\, Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing countries were severely hit by the loss of revenues. The OPEC and non-OPEC oil-producing countries came together to form the OPEC+. As a major non-OPEC oil producer\, Russia also played a big role in the oil market and forged close cooperation with Saudi Arabia.  This energy cooperation between the Russia and Saudi Arabia was perceived as having the potential to change the global oil market and growing Saudi-Russia cooperation. Saudi Arabia maintains a neutral position in the Russia-Ukraine War. \nDr. Pradhan stated that Saudi Arabia’s relationship with China is also growing significantly. Saudi-China ties are mainly propelled by bilateral trade and energy as China is a key importer of Saudi crude. There is a mutual convergence of interests between the two countries\, as Saudi Arabia has expressed its support for the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China has expressed its support for Saudi Vision 2023. \nWith reference to India-Saudi Arabia bilateral relations\, Dr. Pradhan stated that both countries are strategic partners and are moving beyond the traditional buyer-seller relationship. Total bilateral trade between the two stands at approximately US$ 45 billion and Saudi Arabia is also a source of energy for India. West Asia is India’s ‘Extended Neighbourhood’ and Saudi Arabia is an important country in India’s ‘Think West’ policy. Both the countries have a convergence of interests in fighting terrorism\, extremism and piracy. The signing of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) has the potential to further enhance connectivity between the two countries. \nDr. Pradhan concluded by stating that the regional order in West Asia continues to remain fragile and tense; and thus Saudi Arabia has recalibrated its approach accordingly. It is gradually adopting a more accommodative and pragmatic foreign policy approach in recent years than ever in the past. \nQuestions and Comments\nScholars at MP-IDSA engaged in a question and answer session that focused on US-Saudi relations\, Russia’s support to the Houthis\, China-Saudi Arabia collaboration to produce military drones\, prospects of the IMEC project\, potential of India-Saudi defence cooperation and the Saudi policy towards the Syrian Crisis. Dr. Pradhan provided insightful responses to the questions and comments from the floor. \nReport was prepared by Ms. Sandra Sajeev D Costa\, Intern\, West Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-saudi-foreign-policy-in-the-emerging-regional-order-in-west-asia
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240812T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240812T053000
DTSTAMP:20261122T035813
CREATED:20240826T184540Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240826T184540Z
UID:82349-1723440600-1723440600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on “Military Takeover in Bangladesh: What Next?”
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Smruti Pattanaik\, Research Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar IDSA (MP-IDSA)\, spoke on “Military Takeover in Bangladesh: What Next?” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 12 August 2024. The session was moderated by Dr. Pushpita Das\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA. The MP-IDSA scholars attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary \nThe session provided a comprehensive analysis of the ongoing crisis in Bangladesh\, with a focus on the military’s role\, the dynamics of the protest movement\, and the broader implications for Bangladesh’s political future. The discussion underscored the complexities of the situation and the challenges ahead as Bangladesh navigates this period of transition. The meeting concluded with reflections on the potential outcomes and the importance of monitoring the developments closely. \nDetailed Report\nIn her opening remarks\, Dr. Pushpita Das offered an overview of the recent political developments in Bangladesh\, particularly the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the formation of an interim government led by Dr. Mohammad Yunus. She highlighted the significance of the ongoing protests in Bangladesh\, which originated from discontent over the country’s quota system but soon escalated into a broader political movement demanding Sheikh Hasina’s resignation. \nDr. Smruti Pattanaik\, began her presentation by showcasing posters that were widely circulated on social media\, which became symbols of the resistance. Dr. Pattanaik informed the audience that the protests began in June 2024 in response to the decision taken by the High Court of Bangladesh reinstating a 30 percent quota for descendants of freedom fighters\, reversing the government decision made in response to the 2018 Bangladesh quota reform movement. She assessed that the order made students insecure about getting a government job based on merit. However\, these protests soon escalated into a nationwide demand for Sheikh Hasina’s resignation. She acknowledged that the situation intensified and Hasina was allegedly forced to resign and flee to India. The interim government\, led by Dr. Mohammed Yunus\, took charge amidst demands for immediate elections. Dr. Pattanaik highlighted that these protests resulted in the killing of more than 200 people including students and children. \nDr. Pattanaik highlighted the military’s preference for behind-the-scenes control rather than direct governance\, a strategy reminiscent of the 2007 crisis when the military took over in Bangladesh. She pointed out that the military’s refusal to fire on protesters and its cautious approach were significant factors in the events that have occurred. Dr. Pattanaik assessed that the protests\, initially focused on reservation reforms\, gained momentum due to the government’s inability to engage constructively with students\, civil society and the killing of Abu Saeed\, who was the only educated person in his 13 member family who aspired to get a government job and became a symbol that the protesters rallied around. She noted that the killing of student leaders and the police’s heavy-handed response further fueled public anger. The protest movement\, which saw participation from students\, teachers\, and various political factions\, led to widespread mobilisation against the government. The role of the government-backed student organisation\, Chhatra League\, in countering the protests with violence along with the police who used brutal methods was also discussed. \nDr. Pattanaik acknowledged the increased attacks on minorities\, particularly Hindus\, in the aftermath of Hasina’s ouster. These attacks\, driven by both communal and economic motives\, were reminiscent of past violence in Bangladesh. She noted that the potential for further violence\, especially against minorities\, remains a concern as the interim government and military navigate the transition. \nDr. Pattanaik drew parallels between the current crisis and previous student-led movements in Bangladesh\, such as the 1952 Language Movement\, the 1969 anti-government protests\, 2013 Shahbagh Movement\, 2018 anti-quota movement\, and safe road movement which was started by the school students. She emphasised that student activism has historically played a crucial role in Bangladesh’s political landscape. Dr. Pattanaik also compared the current situation to the events of 1971 and 2007\, highlighting the cyclical nature of political unrest in Bangladesh. \nThe interim government’s composition\, including student leaders\, BNP sympathisers\, religious party leaders and one from the minority community was discussed as a new development. However\, uncertainties remain regarding the timeline for elections and the interim government’s ability to handle the ongoing crisis in the country. Dr. Pattanaik questioned the participation of Jamaat-e-Islami leaders which remains a banned political party and the exclusion of other political parties in the swearing-in ceremony of the interim government. The circumstances surrounding Hasina’s resignation and exile to India were also debated. Dr. Pattanaik analysed the impact of Hasina’s departure on her political legacy and the perception of her as a grassroots leader. \nComments and Q&A\nFollowing the presentation\, the moderator\, Dr. Pushpita Das opened the floor for questions and comments. Scholars of MP-IDSA emphasised the need to closely monitor the role of other political parties in the evolving situation. They also inquired about the role India should play in the evolving situation\, about the upcoming elections in the country and the ability of the interim government to handle the current situation in the country. \nScholars also inquired about the role of foreign powers in the current situation that has unfolded in Bangladesh leading to the resignation of Sheikh Hasina and how the foreign media is looking at it. \nDr. Pattanaik responded to the comments and questions raised by the scholars of MP-IDSA. \nReport prepared by Ms. Puspa Kumari\, Intern\, South Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-military-takeover-in-bangladesh-what-next
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240819T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240819T053000
DTSTAMP:20261122T035813
CREATED:20241004T035225Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241004T035236Z
UID:82767-1724045400-1724045400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning on An Overview of China’s Cognitive Warfare Capabilities
DESCRIPTION:Dr.  Abhishek Kumar Darbey\, Associate Fellow\, spoke on “An Overview of China’s  Cognitive Warfare Capabilities” at the Monday Morning Meeting. The session was  chaired by Dr. M.S. Prathibha\, Associate Fellow and was followed by insightful  remarks by the Director General MP-IDSA\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy and other  scholars.  \nExecutive Summary\nResearch about cognitive  warfare is increasing in China. Through cognitive operations\, China aims to  control brains of the target population primarily by means of digital platforms\,  thereby influencing the decision making of the target country. As China aims to  increase its diplomatic clout and geopolitical standing\, Chinese military scholars  are vigorously researching on means and ways to develop cognitive warfare  capabilities. Given the increasing applications of non-kinetic warfare in  contemporary times\, China is building its cognitive operation capabilities  considering it as the highest form of non-kinetic warfare. Taiwan and Hong Kong  remain two important testing grounds of China’s cognitive warfare capabilities.  \nDetailed Report\nThe session began with brief  introductory remarks by Dr. Prathibha. She noted that Chinese researchers and  academics for a longtime have been interested in warfare capabilities in the cognitive  domain that can be used in warfare and have been closely studying the United  States’ (US) cognitive warfare capabilities since the 1990s. Highlighting that  cognitive warfare is often confused with information warfare and psychological warfare\,  she contended that both China and the US make a distinction among these  concepts and apply them accordingly. Cognitive warfare is primarily understood  as attempts to affect the cognition of the enemy and make them take actions that  are not in their interests.  \nDr. Darbey’s presentation consisted  of two parts. In the first part he explained the concept of cognitive warfare.  He noted information\, cyber\, and psychological warfare are subsets of cognitive  warfare. For instance\, information warfare is the attack and destruction of the  adversary’s information system and gaining advantage over the enemy’s  information system. On the other hand\, cyberwarfare deals with attacks on the  physical network of a particular organization to disrupt their activities.  However\, cognitive warfare targets the brain and combines cyber\, information\,  psychological and social engineering capabilities of mind that alter the  adversary’s cognitive process and exploit their mental biases.  \nElaborating on the  difference\, Dr. Darbey noted that the key  difference between cognitive\, information and psychological warfare is that  unlike the other forms of warfare\, cognitive warfare operates on weaponisation  of neuroscience that intends to control the brain through environmental stimulation.  Also\, cyber and information technologies make cognitive warfare very fast and  powerful. He highlighted that subjects such as philosophy\, psychology\,  anthropology\, artificial intelligence\, nano technology\, biotechnology and  information technology are part of cognitive science.  \nHe observed that the  initiator decides the plan and strategy about cognitive warfare according to  the interest and goal they want to achieve. Accordingly\, there are three kinds  of cognitive warfare; First is the strategic cognitive warfare which is a long-term  systematic influence operation carried out on the cognition of the targeted group  to subvert or control the politico-economic system\, military power or  ideological orientation of a country. The second is campaign cognitive warfare which  is undertaken for a medium time period\, targeting the social cognition of the  population to primarily disrupt the social solidarity of the enemy country.  Finally\, there is tactical cognitive warfare which is a short-term attack on  the target population to mislead and manipulate political views. Further\, the  implementation of cognitive warfare is a five-step process; first is  intelligence collection\, second is target analysis\, third is decision-making\,  fourth is information design and the last is evaluation.  \nMoving to the second part of  his presentation\, that is\, China’s cognitive warfare capabilities\, Dr. Darbey contended that this is a new domain for the  People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its capabilities are at a nascent stage  compared to that of the other major powers like the US and Russia. He argued  that the PLA intends to use  cognitive  warfare as an invisible hand to control the opponent’s will as Chinese  researchers talk about four tactics to control the adversary’s mind\, that is\,  perception manipulation\, changing the historical memory and imposing new values  on the target population\, changing the line of thought and finally  deconstructing symbols and challenging identity. Also\, it is noteworthy that  while earlier writings in PLA focussed on using cognitive warfare capabilities  only to affect adversaries’ decision-making during war\, present scholarship has  turned towards discussing ways to utilise cognitive warfare capabilities in peacetime.  \nWith regard to the  theoretical basis of China’s cognitive warfare\, Dr. Darbey noted that it is  based on Sun Tzu’s Art of War and I Ching: Book of Changes. These two  texts have been the basis of the ‘Three Warfare Doctrine’ adopted by the  Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2005. Notably\, the doctrine mentions cognitive  warfare. Further\, in 2010 when the document was revisited\, the amended version  instructed that the PLA members will have to train in three warfares\, that is\,  develop a discursive power where the CCP will have the power to influence the  target audience\, control narratives and improve one’s own version of facts. \nElaborating on PLA’s approach to cognitive warfare\, he observed that Chinese  military scholars contend that PLA’s offensive potential is greater than  originally assessed. At present PLA has been using intimidation and  disinformation as part of its cognitive warfare and key PLA units directly  under the Central Military Commission including PLA Information Support Force  are responsible for cognitive warfare operations. Similarly\, within the  government\, the State Security Department\, Taiwan Affairs Office and Ministry  of Foreign Affairs are responsible for cognitive warfare.  \nDr.  Darbey concluded his presentation by stating that China’s cognitive warfare projects  are still in the initial stages as Beijing is in the process of developing its  ‘Network Information System’ by means of its newly established PLA Information  Support Force (PLA ISF) which will be able to acquire\, transmit and assess  massive amounts of data required to conduct cognitive warfare. Further\, as  Beijing aims to expand its domain of cognitive warfare\, the study of metaverse  will play a key role in strengthening China’s cognitive warfare capabilities.  \nFollowing the presentation\, Amb.  Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director-General\, MP-IDSA\, observed that cognitive warfare has  been employed for generations and is becoming increasingly relevant in the  present era\, characterized by a world that has imploded\, globalized\, and  interconnected through unparalleled data flows. As we progress towards  artificial intelligence\, the complexity will continue to escalate. Referring to  Japan’s cognitive warfare against its own citizens\, he contended that it  remains one of the most exemplary instances of cognitive warfare\, perpetrated  not by an adversary but by one’s own system. Amb. Chinoy noted that America  also used cognitive warfare against China to bring about change in their  political system. He concluded his remarks by highlighting that currently a lot  of cognitive warfare is at play\, especially as being witnessed in the Ukraine  and Gaza War.  \nQ & A Session\nAs the floor was opened for  questions scholars queried about the possible parameters that are used to  assess the success and failure of cognitive influence operations in Hong Kong  and Taiwan; lessons China was adopting from the Ukraine war and how technology  controls could affect China’s cognitive warfare capabilities. Scholars also  queried about the difference between cognitive and psychological warfare\, means  to identify cognitive warfare and counter measures that can be used to combat  such operations.  \nReport was prepared by Dr.  Mayuri Banerjee\, Research Analyst\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-on-an-overview-of-chinas-cognitive-warfare-capabilities
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240827T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240827T053000
DTSTAMP:20261122T035813
CREATED:20240926T230335Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250828T053301Z
UID:82713-1724736600-1724736600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of Fellows Seminar on "The Necessity of Military - Civil Technology Fusion (MCTF) for Making India a Global Drone Hub@2030"
DESCRIPTION:The MP-IDSA Fellow’s Seminar presentation by Gp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang (Retd.)\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, on “The Necessity of Military – Civil Technology Fusion (MCTF) for Making India a Global Drone Hub@2030” was held on 27 August 2024. It was chaired by Dr. V.K. Saraswat\, former Secretary\, Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)\, currently Member NITI Aayog. The External Discussants for the paper were Professor Hari Babu Srivastava\, former DG DRDO\, currently Professor of Practice at IIT Delhi\, and Cmde. Jaideep Maolankar (Retd.) from Newspace Research & Technologies Pvt. Ltd. The Director General\, MP-IDSA\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, the Deputy Director General\, Gp.Capt. (Dr.) Ajey Lele (Retd.) and scholars of the Institute participated in the Seminar. \nExecutive Summary\nThe session deliberated on making India an atmanirbhar (self-reliance) drone hub @2030\, emphasising military-civil drone technology development initiatives\, challenges and the way forward. Key challenges include reliance on imports\, lack of civil drone R&D ecosystem\, gaps in defence UAV development programs and reducing import dependence of critical systems. Recommendations by the speaker included military-civil technology fusion (MCTF)\, designating an existing ministry as a nodal ministry for drone technology\, launching civil drone R&D initiatives\, fostering design capabilities\, building testing infrastructure\, creating indigenous content certification mechanism and formulating Indian standards among others\, on which further discussion took place. \nDetailed Report\nAmb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA opened the session by introducing Dr. V.K. Saraswat\, Member of NITI Aayog\, as the Chairperson. He highlighted India’s progress towards greater self-reliance\, emphasising that this does not equate to self-sufficiency. Self-reliance\, he explained\, allows ample room for international collaboration. India has actively engaged with countries such as the United States\, the United Kingdom\, France and others. It is negotiating with global partners on the development of aero engines and other technologies. \nDr. V.K. Saraswat noted thatIndian industry’s efforts toward aatmanirbharta (self-reliance) in the field of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have been limited\, particularly in the development of those with strategic value. However\, he acknowledged significant progress in civilian drone technology\, with applications ranging from entertainment and agriculture to logistics. The core technology behind drones remains consistent\, with variations primarily in payloads and command and control systems. In the civilian sector\, however\, the understanding of drone technology in India is limited\, with only a few companies excelling in this area. \nFurthermore\, Dr. Saraswat underlined that due to lack of focus\, the civilian sector has largely depended on import of critical components. There are also distinct differences in the requirements for civilian versus military applications. As future warfare is likely to involve large-scale deployment of unmanned systems\, achieving self-reliance in UAV technology requires a mission-driven approach to develop all critical components. \nGp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang (Retd.) began his presentation by highlighting the critical role of the Semi-Conductor Laboratory (SCL) in Chandigarh in hand-holding of the drone startups\, aimed at exploring the feasibility of developing chips to enhance security. He noted that his presentation addresses four key areas: military-civil drone policies\, technology development\, ecosystems and military-civil technology fusion (MCTF). He emphasised the need for significant reforms in the civilian drone sector\, as well as some improvements in the defence sector. \nAccording to Gp. Capt. Narang\, while India has set the ambitious goal of becoming a global drone hub\, the definition of what this entails remains unclear. He defines it as a “technology and innovation-driven\, high-tech\, high-value civil-military drone industry\, where India is self-reliant in critical technologies\, while also being a global leader in certain niche technologies.” \nThe growth of the Indian drone industry\, he explained\, will depend on proactive R&D\, innovation and the creation of drone technologies. Additionally\, the formulation of Indian standards\, standardisation and trial-based certifications of emerging and enabling drone technologies will play a crucial role in achieving this vision. With standards for drones still evolving\, India must adopt a proactive approach to formulate Indian standards to remain competitive in this sector. \nGp. Capt. Narang further elaborated on the contribution of civil drone policy initiatives\, beginning with the Drone Rules 2021\, which significantly transformed India’s drone sector by addressing operations\, certification\, training\, and Production-Linked Incentives (PLI). He also highlighted certain gaps and limitations in the drone policies. He observed India does not have a policy on certification by a drone technician. The PLI scheme supported drone manufacturing by domestic industry while simultaneously easing the import of drone components\, which\, in turn\, made the industry reliant on imports. Although India has an airworthiness certification mechanism\, there is no indication of whether products or components are indigenous. He also called for reforms in certification of drone batteries by citing an example where an Indian company developed innovative batteries\, but the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) found it difficult to deviate from predefined standards to give them certification. \nGp. Capt. Narang pointed out that policy initiatives were focused on facilitating drone operation and not on development or the validation of indigenous drone technologies. Notably\, the Ministry of Civil Aviation lacks policies\, structures and mechanisms for atmanirbharta in civil drone technologies. Discussing development challenges\, he emphasised the lack of focus of innovation hubs on addressing the technology gaps. Furthermore\, civil drone development initiatives by the Department of Science and Technology\, MeitY and others are not focused on developing specific drone technologies. Globally\, civil aviation entities are leading development of enabling technologies and integration of drones into their national airspace; however\, similar initiatives by Ministry of Civil Aviation/Directorate General of Civil Aviation are lacking. \nGp. Capt. Narang explained that a major limitation in India is the absence of an R&D vertical within the Ministry of Civil Aviation. In the private sector\, investment in R&D is alarmingly low—that generally varies between 1 to 5 percent in most companies as compared to 10-20 % by global leaders—indicating a lack of focus on technological innovation. He stressed the need for greater demands on industry bodies and the private sector to drive meaningful technological progress. \nGp. Capt. Narang explained that India must also prioritise building an ecosystem for civilian drone test sites\, as some Indian companies are currently forced to test their drones abroad. Accreditation remains a challenge for the Indian drone industry\, and there is a pressing need to archive civil drone test data to facilitate the validation of technologies. Currently\, drone education in India is limited\, with only a few courses like the M.Tech program at IIT Kanpur and a handful of other universities offering specialised education. Strengthening higher education in the drone sector is essential to foster deep research in critical drone technologies within the country. \nFocusing on the defence UAV sector\, Gp. Capt. Narang mentioned that significant policy measures have been implemented\, such as the MAKE-1\, MAKE-2\, and Indigenously Designed\, Developed\, and Manufactured (IDDM) categories in the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP). Initiatives like iDEX and the Mehar Baba Competition have also played a key role in advancing technological development in the drone sector. Additionally\, he recommended induction of test pilots and test engineers by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)\, National Aerospace Laboratories (NAL) and industry to help them in bridging the gap between drone designs and user expectations in UAV programs and the broader development of aviation technologies. \nOn the issue of indigenous content (IC)\, Gp. Capt. Narang emphasised the need for an expert body dedicated to IC certification\, which is currently lacking. India does not have a mechanism to identify indigenous content\, and he stressed the importance of creating one. He drew attention towards the need for archiving indigenous designs and content within Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) and the DRDO. He recommended reforming the Development Cum Production Partner (DcPP) model to a Development Production and User (DPU) model\, where the user becomes a partner in the process rather than merely a reviewer of technology. \nGp. Capt. Narang also suggested that platforms like GeM should include verticals for iDEX\, Mehar Baba\, or IDDM to promote indigenous technologies. Also\, there is a need to standardise trial methodologies that are universally accepted\, which would help reduce challenges faced by startups in the drone industry. \nGp. Capt. Narang further highlighted the long-standing lack of interest in developing drone engines\, emphasising the urgent need to address this gap. According to him\, internal combustion (IC) engines\, in particular\, remain a weak area for India\, with challenges in commercialisation\, as well as competing with global Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) in terms of quality and efficiency. Another issue is the increasing acquisition of promising Indian startups and talent by foreign companies and VCs\, which calls for concerted efforts to prevent the loss of domestic talent and innovation. \nGp. Capt. Narang proposed the development of a mechanism to test the indigenous content (IC) of materials and software components for greater transparency and clarity. Moreover\, he advocated for the creation of a National MCTF initiative\, alongside a policy for aatmanirbharta in civil drone technology. He also called for designation of an existing ministry as a nodal ministry for civil UAV technology\, a National UAV Technology Mission\, and a National UAV Technology Fund to focus efforts in this critical domain. Additionally\, there is a need for a Positive Indigenisation List across all ministries and the creation of civil drone testing corridors and sites. \nLastly\, he proposed introducing an “IC 1” rating\, in addition to L1 and T1 criteria\, to recognise the highest levels of Indigenous Content in drone technology. \nProf. Hari Babu Shrivastava made several observations and recommendations\, raising key questions such as what defines a “hub” and how the MCTF initiative would benefit society\, industry\, and the economy as a whole. He referenced a report by Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry\, expressing concern that India’s indigenisation process may not keep pace with the country’s projected capabilities by 2030. He also noted that countries like Turkey and Iran have made significant advances in drone exports\, emphasising the need for India to accelerate its efforts in this sector to remain competitive on the global stage. \nCmde. Jaideep Maolankar (Retd.) expressed concern that specific recommendations may not be effective if the mechanisms and processes for implementation remain unchanged. He also raised concerns on the draft of the Military Airworthiness Bill\, pointing out that many issues stem from deep-rooted cultural challenges\, such as a risk-averse mindset and siloed working practices. He noted that many countries are already ahead of India in drone technology\, and instead of following the same path\, India should think ahead and adopt a different approach. \nFor instance\, he suggested that India should focus on collaborative robotics rather than UAVs. He emphasised the importance of understanding business models and advised companies to prioritise customer needs over their own preferences\, highlighting the necessity of focusing on requirements engineering to align with real market demands. \nQuestions and Comments\nAmbassador Chinoy\, in his remarks\, posed the question of how drone technologies can be developed to meet the specific needs of infantry\, particularly in terms of supply delivery and stock management. He also said that regarding engine testing\, the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) already has robust facilities\, such as those used for the Kaveri engine. If India’s private sector develops its own engines\, these testing facilities can be made available to support the testing and validation of their designs\, encouraging collaboration between public and private sectors. \nIn his concluding remarks\, Dr. Saraswat said that in India\, the technological lag often leads organisations to import new technologies for commercial use\, rather than focusing on developing their own innovations. This approach creates challenges in increasing indigenous content\, especially in critical technologies. Indigenous content should be measured in terms of critical technology development\, not merely by the percentage of cost of local components in a product. \nAnother issue is India’s reliance on foreign designs\, which are re-engineered and manufactured locally\, highlighting the need to strengthen domestic design capabilities. Additionally\, India should aim to leapfrog technological advancements rather than merely trying to catch up with advanced technologies. \nReport prepared by Mr. Rohit Kumar Sharma\, Research Analyst\, North America & Strategic Technologies Centre.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-fellows-seminar-on-the-necessity-of-military-civil-fusion-mcf-for-making-india-a-global-drone-hub2030
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