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DTSTART:20230101T000000
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240603T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240603T053000
DTSTAMP:20261122T042034
CREATED:20240701T230817Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240701T230817Z
UID:81740-1717392600-1717392600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on Alignments and Realignments in Armenian Foreign Policy since the Velvet Revolution
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Wahlang noted that the current leadership’s attempts to find a long-term solution to peace\, particularly by delimitating the border\, have not been received positively by the Armenian public. Protests against the regime in Armenia have been linked to the government’s foreign and neighbourhood policy\, i.e.\, Azerbaijan. The local populace within Armenia is active and has coordinated protests in the past regarding Armenia’s policies\, particularly on Azerbaijan. Thus\, the domestic situation does relate to foreign policy and impacts the popularity of the leadership. \nDr. Jason further explained Armenia’s foreign policy in four phases. First\, the “Rise of Un-Sovietised Nationalistic Foreign Policy after 1991”\, under President Levon Ter Petrosyan. This policy was based on the first war of Nagorno-Karabakh\, wherein the leadership tried to establish Armenia’s own image by shedding its former Soviet image. However\, it still maintained strong relations with Russia. The second phase focused on “Shift in the Nature of Foreign Policy towards Multi-Vectorism”\, under President Robert Kocharyan. During this time\, there were attempts to create a feeling of diversification which also included trying to improve relations with European nations. The third phase saw “Disconnect between European Aspirations and Security-driven Russian/Eurasian Constraints”\, under President Serzh Sargsyan. During this phase Armenia joined Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) instead of furthering improved relations with Europe. The fourth phase is “Diversification due to Rising Geopolitical and Regional Complexities”\, under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Under his leadership\, Armenia tries to engage with countries of the West\, and countries like Iran and India. \nFocusing on current developments within the Armenian State\, Dr. Jason stated that the current protests against Armenia’s political leadership led by Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan have gained great prominence. According to Dr. Wahlang\, the domestic populace has been more active in this protest as compared to the previous demonstrations. This is because the delimitation process would transfer territory from Armenia to Azerbaijan and is being seen as a compromise on Armenian sovereignty. The Armenian leadership\, on the other hand\, is attempting to find a solution for perpetual peace in the region. The main effort is based on the Armenian leadership’s focus on the Crossroads of Peace Project\, which aims to connect the neighbourhood through various connectivity projects and\, in return\, bring about peace in the region. \nAs mentioned before\, Armenia is trying to diversify its relations with various major powers. Dr. Jason highlighted that the Armenia-Russia relationship is based on three key sectors – security\, economy\, and natural resources. Russia is the security provider and the main arms importer of Armenia and has long been Armenia’s principal supplier of weapons and ammunition. In recent times\, due to Russia’s pre-occupation in Ukraine\, there have been certain issues\, like Russia’s inability to meet the demands for the supply of arms. Moreover\, the presence of the 102nd military base in Gyumri and the presence of Russian troops protecting the borders near adversarial neighbours such as Türkiye and Azerbaijan show the relevance and importance of the security and military aspects in this relationship. Dr. Wahlang pointed out that both nations are economically linked\, with about 40 per cent of the Armenian economy being dependent on Russia. Moreover\, Russia dominates the gas distribution outlets in Armenia\, with Gazprom Armenia owning all the gas distribution infrastructure. Russia also has a monopoly over grain and petroleum products. In 2023\, the trade volume between the two nations reached a record high of USD 4.16 billion\, the highest since the Soviet collapse. \nHowever\, the two former Soviet Republics’ leaderships have been at loggerheads with one another since the second Nagorno-Karabakh war\, with the Armenians accusing Russia of not supporting and not providing assistance to them. This clash is due to the Collective Security Treaty Organisation’s (CSTO’s) inability to involve itself in both Nagorno-Karabakh and when Armenian territory was under threat. This has led to Armenia suspending its participation in CSTO and even threatening to leave the organisation altogether. Despite these disagreements\, the two leaders have maintained contact and made attempts to bring about solutions. \nDr. Wahlang noted that the European Union (EU) has sought to increase its presence and carve a space of its own in Armenia. There have been significant attempts to strengthen this partnership\, like Armenia joining the European Union Eastern Partnership and the signing of the Armenia–EU Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2017. There have also been discussions in Armenia about joining the EU\, particularly after the War in Karabakh\, but these discussions have not moved forward. He also highlighted that the EU is Armenia’s second-largest trade partner after Russia. Moreover\, in the recent conflict with Azerbaijan\, the EU has been proactively trying to forge a peaceful solution. These steps have been seen positively by Armenia. \nWith regard to Armenia’s relations with France\, Dr. Wahlang pointed out that France has been Armenia’s second-largest foreign investor since 2016\, totalling €229 million. Its investments are primarily in agri-food\, water and banking sectors. In recent times\, this relationship has been further strengthened by the growing defence cooperation\, which includes the sale of air defence systems\, radars and sensors. Apart from Defence\, Armenia has gained support from France in Nagorno-Karabakh\, including aid for looking after the refugees. \nEmphasising Armenia’s relationship with Türkiye and Azerbaijan\, Dr. Wahlang noted that they have a history of conflicts and discontent. Türkiye’s constant and unwavering support for Azerbaijan since the start of the first Nagorno-Karabakh conflict till current times has been seen as further evidence of Armenia’s anti-Türkiye stance. Moreover\, Türkiye’s military and drone support for Azerbaijan became a decisive factor in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. There has\, however\, been a change in approach\, with attempts at peace-building\, including the opening of the Armenian-Türkiye border after thirty years to supply aid to Türkiye during a major earthquake in 2023. The new leadership in Armenia under Pashinyan is attempting to find permanent peace in the region through new avenues of diplomacy and connectivity. \nAccording to Dr. Wahlang\, Armenia and Iran are important allies\, with both sharing a border and common interests and threats. Iran is important for Armenia in connectivity projects\, including assisting and cooperating with India. Armenia\, Iran and India have also recently met for trilateral cooperation. Given Armenia’s landlocked status\, its terminal in Chabahar Port could help assist Armenia in connecting with the world. He emphasised that with Armenia attempting to diversify its foreign policy and resource allocation\, Iran can be a good option. However\, Iran’s fractured relationship with the West and Armenia’s diversification attempts towards the West could become a stumbling block for long-term cooperation. \nWith regard to Armenia-India relations\, Dr. Wahlang stated that the two nations share a historical relationship\, with trade being the base for it in the past. Armenia has also long supported India’s territorial integrity and sovereignty on the issue of Kashmir. The two nations share a robust defence relationship as well. In recent years\, India has decided to appoint its own defence attaché to Yerevan. When it comes to defence trade\, India has exported the Swathi weapon-locating radar system and Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers\, as well as anti-tank munitions and artillery guns. Additionally\, the two nations have scope for cooperation in the field of Information Technology and pharmaceuticals. The only deterrent in the relationship is the lack of connectivity. \nLastly\, Dr. Wahlang concluded his presentation by emphasising that Russia is still a prominent player in the region\, and it may view the Armenian attempts at diversification towards Europe negatively. He also stressed that considering the gains to both sides\, India could emerge as a long-term partner to Armenia. \nComments and Questions\nAmb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, complimented Dr. Wahlang on his comprehensive presentation highlighting the complexity surrounding Armenia’s geopolitical\, geostrategic and geoeconomic situation. He pointed out that this is the first time in the history of Azerbaijan that all the territories historically claimed by them are under their control. He stressed that Armenia finds itself in a dilemma as its traditional supporter\, Russia\, is not able to do much. This raises concerns about Armenia exploring other options and the obstacles involved in it. Regarding relations of Iran and Türkiye\, Amb. Chinoy stressed on their influence in the region. He also mentioned the memorial for the Armenian Massacre in Isfahan\, highlighting Iran’s sympathy for the Armenians. He noted that it is important to look at Azerbaijan’s relations with Israel and the US\, predicated on oil and gas pipelines\, and their traditional relations with Türkiye. \nDr. Swasti Rao\, enquired about Russia’s weapons supply to Azerbaijan\, value of connectivity with countries like Georgia and how Azerbaijan could impact the future of India-Armenia relations. \nGp Capt. (Dr.) RK Narang (Retd.)\, enquired about the payment process of the weapons trade between India and Armenia. \nDr. Wahlang responded to the comments made by the Director General and the questions raised by MP-IDSA scholars. \nReport has been prepared by Ms. Anusua Ganguly\, Intern\, Europe and Eurasia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-alignments-and-realignments-in-armenian-foreign-policy-since-the-velvet-revolution
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240610T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240610T053000
DTSTAMP:20261122T042034
CREATED:20240627T230937Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240701T225701Z
UID:81715-1717997400-1717997400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on 46th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting: Key Takeaways
DESCRIPTION:Mr. Bipandeep Sharma\, Research Analyst\, Non-Traditional Security Centre\, Manohar Parrikar IDSA (MP-IDSA)\, made a presentation on “46th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting: Key Takeaways” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 10 June 2024. The Session was moderated by Comdt. M. Srivastava\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA and other scholars of the Institute attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary:\nIndia successfully hosted the 46th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) and the 26th Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) meeting from 20-30 May\, 2024 at Kochi. Key discussions focused on Antarctic Tourism\, bio-security measures to combat avian influenza\, issues related to Emperor penguins\, and utilizing renewable energy in Antarctica. The successful hosting marks India’s growing role in Antarctic affairs and its dedication to scientific collaboration and environmental stewardship in the region. \nDetailed Report:\nComdt. M. Srivastava introduced the Speaker and set the stage by introducing the audience to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM). He mentioned that ATCM meetings consist of representatives of the Consultative parties\, the non-consultative parties\, observers such as the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR)\, Commission for Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)\, the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs (COMNAP) and invited experts like the International Association of Antarctic Tour Operators (IAATO). Comdt. Srivastava pointed out that India became a consultative party to the Antarctic Treaty in 1983.  Comdt. Srivastava noted that the ATCM serves as an important forum for exchanging information and discussions on matters of common interest pertaining to Antarctica. He stated that during the ATCM\, a meeting of the Committee for Environment Protection (CEP) is also conducted. India had earlier conducted the 30th ATCM and 10th CEP in 2007 at New Delhi. The 46th ATCM and 26th CEP was hosted by India at Kochi between 20 to 30 May 2024. He highlighted that the recent initiatives by India such as the Antarctic Act 2022 and its support for protecting the Antarctic Environment by designating East Antarctica and the Weddell Sea as MPAs (Marine Protected Areas) shows its active involvement in Antarctica. \nMr. Bipandeep Sharma commenced his presentation by explaining the Antarctic Treaty System. He highlighted India’s proactive diplomacy and success in hosting the ATCM-46 and CEP-26 meeting. Mr. Sharma mentioned that the participation of parties in ATCM and CEP meetings witnessed the reaffirmation of the Antarctic Treaty (1959) and the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (the Madrid Protocol\, 1991). He highlighted  ATCM and CEP to be crucial global forums for Antarctic affairs. Mr. Sharma mentioned that this year ATCM witnessed the creation of an additional working group which discussed the development of a ‘tourism framework’ for Antarctica. Mr. Sharma pointed out that CEP-26 discussed and addressed multiple issues that contributed to the implementation of the Environmental Protocol in Antarctica. He further highlighted that some of the priority issues highlighted in CEP 26 included issues of climate change and their implications for Antarctic Sea ice; environmental impact assessment of major activities in Antarctic; protection of the Emperor penguin\, and developing of an international framework for environmental monitoring in Antarctica. Mr. Sharma mentioned that as per the CEP recommendations this year\, Parties adopted 17 revised and new management plans for ASPAs (Antarctic Specially Protected Areas) and several modifications and additions to the list of Historic and Monument sites were undertaken. In his presentation\, Mr. Sharma highlighted that in ATCM-46 serious efforts to increase parties focus towards renewable energy use and to ensure robust implementation of biosecurity measures to minimise the risks of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in the Antarctic were prioritised. \nCommenting on India’s part\, Mr. Sharma pointed out that the inaugural remarks at 46th ATCM were made by Shri Kiren Rijiju the then Union Minister of Earth Sciences\, who was accompanied by Ambassador Pavan Kapoor\, Secretary (West)\, Ministry of External Affairs and Dr. Shailesh Nayak\, former Secretary of MoES and Director\, National Institute of Advanced Studies\, Bengaluru. Mr. Sharma highlighted that India’s traditional philosophy of “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” (one Earth\, one family\, one future) resonated well in India’s inaugural remarks. He further pointed that India’s plans of setting up of a new Antarctic research station\, Maitri-II were also discussed in these initial remarks. He highlighted that India informed the parties regarding its future plans of submission of comprehensive environmental evaluations for establishing Maitri-II in Antarctica. \nIn the final part of his presentation\, Mr. Sharma highlighted the need for enhancing collaboration and cooperation between Indian and other like-minded countries in the Antarctica. He further pointed that there is need for promoting interdisciplinary research in polar regions by engaging Indian higher institutes of excellence in research from both scientific and social science domains. Mr. Sharma pointed that India needs to prioritise its efforts in fast-track construction/acquisition of polar infrastructures of which construction/acquisition of an independent Indian Polar Research vessel remains most important. Lastly\, he stressed that Indian representation in all future ATCM and CEP meetings\, needs to have polar domain experts from both scientific and policy spheres. This would further enhance India’s position in negotiating and raising India’s view point on matters of scientific and broader national interests in future ATCM and CEP platforms. \nQuestions and Comments\nAmbassador Sujan R. Chinoy complimented Mr. Bipandeep Sharma for providing a detailed account of ACTM-46 and CEP-26 meetings. He pointed that in the age of Anthropocene\, the Antarctic region remains vulnerable to multiple human induced transformations. Ambassador Chinoy in his remarks also questioned the basis of territorial claims of different states in the region. He further highlighted that India needs to prioritise the development of independent polar infrastructures to meet the country’s long term national interests in the region. \nMr. Tatsat Pati\, Intern\, made a query regarding the role of CCAMLR in the Antarctic region. He also asked the Speaker about the use of unmanned systems in undertaking various activities in extreme Antarctic climatic conditions. \nGp. Capt. (Dr.) R.K. Narang\, asked the Speaker to comment on the status of India’s planned Polar Research Vessel. \nMr. Bipandeep Sharma gave detailed remarks to all the questions and comments raised. \nReport prepared by Ms. Dorothy Vaanmalar C.\, Intern\, Non-Traditional Security Centre\, MP-IDSA\, New Delhi.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-46th-antarctic-treaty-consultative-meeting-key-takeaways
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240611T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240611T053000
DTSTAMP:20261122T042034
CREATED:20240627T025808Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240701T225626Z
UID:81693-1718083800-1718083800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Roundtable Discussion on India-Iran Relations: Chabahar and Recent Developments in Iran
DESCRIPTION:On 11 June 2024\, a Roundtable Discussion on “India-Iran Relations: Chabahar and Recent Developments in Iran” was organised at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA). The discussion was chaired by the Director General\, MP-IDSA\, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy. The Speakers were Ambassador Yashvardhan Kumar Sinha\, former Central Information Commissioner\, Ambassador Gaddam Dharmendra\, Dean\, Sushma Swaraj Institute of Foreign Service (SSIFS)\, Ministry of External Affairs\, and Dr. Deepika Saraswat\, Associate Fellow\, MP-IDSA. \nExecutive Summary\nThe strategic importance of the Chabahar Port is crucial in strengthening India-Iran cooperation and enhancing regional connectivity. The Port’s development is central to India’s endeavors to establish a reliable trade route to Afghanistan and Central Asia. The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)\, with Chabahar Port as a crucial link\, holds immense significance. The recent long-term contract between India’s India Port Global Ltd (IPGL) and Iran’s Ports and Maritime Organisation (PMO) underscores India’s commitment to furthering the port’s development and operations. Despite U.S. sanctions\, the Chabahar Port’s operational viability has been facilitated through sanctions waivers\, enabling the shipment of essential commodities like wheat and pulses from India to Afghanistan. Iran remains a close regional partner for India\, particularly in enhancing connectivity and economic cooperation with Afghanistan and Central Asia. \nDetailed Report\nAmbassador Sujan R. Chinoy madeopening remarks at the roundtable discussion. He provided a comprehensive overview of the close India-Iran bilateral relations\, emphasising their importance and evolving dynamics. He highlighted the historical context\, noting Iran’s support for India at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) against Pakistan’s attempt for a resolution on human rights violations. \nAmb. Chinoy underscored the significance of the development of the Chabahar Port as a cornerstone of Indo-Iranian cooperation. He referenced the 2016 bilateral agreement worth US$ 85 million for Phase-I development of the Shahid Beheshti Port. A long-term 10-year contract signed in May 2024 between India Port Global Ltd (IPGL) and Iran’s Ports and Maritime Organisation (PMO) was highlighted. This agreement\, involving an Indian investment of approximately US$ 120 million\, aims to develop further and operate the port\, demonstrating India’s commitment to enhancing regional connectivity and economic cooperation. \nThe importance of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) was emphasised\, with Chabahar Port as a crucial link to Central Asia and Eurasia. Amb. Chinoy illustrated the Port’s operational significance by citing the shipment of 2.5 million tons of wheat and 2\,000 tons of pulses from India to Afghanistan\, facilitated by U.S. sanctions waivers. He noted that India’s position regarding connectivity with Afghanistan aligns with the U.S. vision. Amb. Chinoy also mentioned the geopolitical implications of the joint naval exercises conducted by Iran\, Russia\, and China in the Gulf of Oman in the Western Indian Ocean\, outlining potential ramifications for India’s critical interests in the region. \nAmbassador Yashvardhan Kumar Sinha provided a historical overview of India’s relations with Iran\, emphasising the deep-rooted cultural and historical ties between the two nations. Amb. Sinha noted that in 2002 when Iranian President Khatami offered Chabahar port development to India\, there were discussions in India of the strategic importance of Chabahar. The progress on India’s involvement in Chabahar gathered momentum in 2011-12. He recalled the then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Iran during the 16th NAM Summit in August 2012\, when an action plan on Chabahar was discussed\, which later provided the basis for the 2016 Chabahar Agreement. \nAmb. Sinha emphasised the significant importance of the Chabahar Port for India\, particularly in light of India-Pakistan adversarial relations\, which have hindered direct overland connectivity\, one exception being India’s wheat shipment to Afghanistan under the World Food Programme going through Karachi. He also elaborated on the financial arrangements between India and Iran\, noting that the Reserve Bank of India had an arrangement with the Central Bank of Iran to open Rupee accounts with the UCO Bank\, facilitating smoother financial transactions between the two countries. \nAmb. Sinha noted that Chabahar is geographically closer to India and Central Asia than Bandar Abbas\, making it a more strategic and accessible option for reaching Afghanistan and Central Asia. Additionally\, he observed that quick development of transport infrastructure\, especially roads linking to Chabahar\, has taken place. He also mentioned India’s construction of the Zaranj-Delaram Highway connecting to the Garland Highway in Afghanistan. On a comparative note\, he noted that the Baloch insurgency in Pakistan imperils the prospects of Gwadar as a trans-shipment hub. He noted that other partners of India will have the opportunity to utilise this infrastructure\, thereby enhancing regional cooperation. \nAmbassador Gaddam Dharmendra stated that Iran has been at the centre of multiple developments\, especially following the 7 October 2023 attack by Hamas on Israel. He noted that Iran has been linked to various actors\, including Hezbollah\, Hamas and the Houthis. Additionally\, he discussed the role of Egypt and the U.S. in the Israel-Hamas conflict. Amb. Dharmendra provided a detailed overview of the functioning and power dynamics of multiple power structures operating in Iran under the Supreme Leader\, specifically emphasising the increasing role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in various domains\, from politics to economy. \nAmb. Dharmendra outlined the recent progress in bilateral relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia\, highlighting efforts to bridge long-standing geopolitical divides and China’s role as a guarantor of the process. He elaborated on Iran’s forward defence strategy\, which involves using a decentralised network of non-state actors to secure its homeland. Iran has achieved significant success in training and mobilising these actors. However\, while Iran has the capability to initiate escalatory dynamics\, it lacks the power to dominate such escalations. This was exemplified in the recent attack on Israel\, where approximately 300 drones and missiles were launched. Despite this\, Iran’s influence remains substantial but not overwhelming in terms of maintaining prolonged dominance in conflict scenarios. \nAmb. Dharmendra also discussed the strained relations between Iran and the European Union\, particularly in the context of the United States’ withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018. Following this withdrawal\, Iran has gradually undermined nearly all provisions of the JCPOA\, including dismantling surveillance cameras and limiting access to inspectors\, which has resulted in complicated relations with Europe. He also observed that Iran’s nuclear latency acts as a deterrent against potential Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. \nDr. Deepika Saraswat remarked that the 2016 Chabahar Agreement and the latest long-term contract exemplify India’s commitment to maintaining strong ties with Iran\, driven by enduring strategic logic. She argued that both countries share a common strategic and security environment in South-West Asia. She noted that Pakistan’s obstructionism gives certain inexorability to Iran’s gateway role. Dr. Saraswat noted that\, unlike the United States\, India views Iran as a regional partner with which it would seek to engage on the basis of convergence of interests. \nDr. Saraswat noted that despite significant developments in Iran-China relations\, particularly after the Iran-China 25-year agreement\, India would not like to see Iran fall into China’s geopolitical orbit. She also discussed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s administration-led “Look East” doctrine\, which emerged in 2005. This doctrine emphasised Iran’s pivot towards the East\, diversifying its international partnerships beyond traditional Western allies. Dr. Saraswat underscored Iran’s historical importance in fostering North-South connectivity since the completion of the Trans-Iranian railway in 1938. She specified that under the Look East doctrine\, Iran positioned itself as an ‘Asian country\,’ prioritising geoeconomic considerations over the conflict-ridden geopolitics of the Middle East. \nDr. Saraswat discussed that Iran’s geopolitical thinking had been shaped by its historical experience in the great game between Britain and Russia\, leading to a quest for independence and a nuanced understanding of imperialist geopolitics. Dr. Saraswat emphasised Iran’s self-perception as a regional power\, actively engaged in countering the U.S. in the Persian Gulf while also viewing Russia and China as strategic counterweights to the U.S. Iran’s full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in July 2023 has shown Iran’s approach towards multilateralism. However\, she noted that despite these alliances\, Iran maintains its identity as a civilisational state and does not consider itself a junior partner to Russia and China. Moreover\, Iran is cautious about China’s increasing dominance in Central Asia\, a sentiment shared by India as well. She also briefly spoke of the competitive dynamics between Iran and Pakistan in inter-regional connectivity between Central and South Asia. \nComments and Questions\nGp. Capt. (Dr.) Ajey Lele (Retd.)\, Deputy Director General\, MP-IDSA\, asked about Iran’s deteriorating economy and its options to navigate challenges. Dr. Ashok K. Behuria\, Senior Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, shared his views on the Baloch rebellion in both Pakistan and Iran and its repercussions. He suggested that India’s anxiety about China-Pakistan nexus needs to be commensurate with India’s broader strategic vision. Dr. Rajiv Nayan\, Senior Research Associate\, MP-IDSA\, remarked on the need to study the technological progress of non-state actors and inquired about the multifaceted role of various authorities in the election of Iran’s new President. Dr. Smruti S. Pattanaik\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, posed questions regarding sector-specific investments in Iran and the Taliban’s proposal to invest in the Chabahar project. Dr. P. K. Pradhan\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA\, asked about evolving bilateral trade amid the potential for closer Iran-Saudi Arabia relations. \nAll three speakers comprehensively responded to these comments and questions. \nReport prepared by Mr. Abhishek Yadav\, Research Analyst\, West Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/roundtable-discussion-on-india-iran-relations-chabahar-and-recent-developments-in-iran
CATEGORIES:ROUND TABLES / WORKSHOPS,EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240624T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240624T053000
DTSTAMP:20261122T042034
CREATED:20240912T123400Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240912T123400Z
UID:82547-1719207000-1719207000@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of Monday Morning Meeting on China-Russia Relationship: A Greater Alignment?
DESCRIPTION:Dr. M.S. Prathibha\, Associate Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) spoke on “China-Russia Relationship: A Greater Alignment?” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 24 June. The session was moderated by Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA. MP-IDSA scholars attended the meeting.    \nExecutive Summary\nThe growing cooperation between China and Russia visible at the international level has evoked considerable discussion regarding the extent of strategic alignment between the two countries as they perceive considerable strategic and economic pressure from the West. Dr Prathibha in her presentation underlines the factors motivating China-Russia cooperation\, the extent of cooperation between the two countries and finally the challenges to greater alignment between Russia and China. \nDetailed Report\nThe session opened with introductory remarks from Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh. Deliberating on the long history of Sino-Russia relations and its trajectory he observed that Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a watershed event. Following Crimea’s annexation\, Russia’s reliance on China deepened in an unprecedented way because of US-led sanctions. Bilateral ties further advanced in 2020 and in 2022 a few days before the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis\, the two countries declared a ‘no-limits partnership’. Dr. Singh noted that although China and Russia are not treaty bound allies\, the West views them as such. However\, delving deeper\, differences over a range of issues are perceptible including Russia’s limited support to Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Further\, questions remain about the depth of their partnership and the extent of their cooperation on geopolitical issues vis-à-vis the West. For instance\, China did not recognise Russia’s annexation of Crimea and has been very careful in its support for Russia in order to avoid disruption of economic and diplomatic ties with Europe. Moreover\, with regard to military cooperation\, although the number of joint exercises is increasing\, there is little interoperability between the militaries of the two countries. Also\, Moscow has been reluctant to export sensitive military technology to Russia. Highlighting the differences between Russia and China’s perception of the world order\, he queried if Russia-China cooperation is driven by anti-US sentiment and whether the seeming closeness between Russia and China will have any implications for India. \nDr. M.S. Prathibha in her presentation explained the factors motivating China-Russia cooperation\, the extent of cooperation between the two countries and finally the challenges to greater alignment between Russia and China. \nDr. Prathibha noted that there is a surge of interest regarding Russia-China relations\, following the signing of the joint communique where they declared a no-limits partnership. The joint statement implying that there are no forbidden areas of cooperation between the two countries led observers in the West to conclude that Moscow and Beijing are likely to remove the previous constraints that impinged on bilateral cooperation. Apprehensions about unrestrained cooperation deepened as China aligned its position with Russia on the Ukraine crisis in the UN\, refused to condemn Moscow’s actions and Chinese media openly supported Russian narratives. Further\, increase in Russia’s exports to China\, naval exercises in South China Sea and Sea of Japan solidified the perception of growing strategic coordination between the two countries on the world stage. \nTurning to factors underpinning Russia-China cooperation\, Dr. Prathibha noted that strategic and development interests\, highlighted in the 2024 China-Russia joint talks are the two major factors driving cooperation between the two countries. She explained that strategic interests referred to limiting US primacy in international affairs to give Russia and China more manoeuvrability. Developmental interests are focused on accelerating economic development through access to modern and strategic technologies. She added that it is a strategic choice on the part of Russia and China to develop bilateral ties; first\, both countries perceive that the West is bent on denying them access to strategic technologies required for economic modernisation. Accordingly\, the two countries are looking into collaboration on sensitive and emerging technological domains. Second on the economic front\, while Russia is desperately looking for imports\, Chinese companies are also interested in tapping into the Russian market. \nWith regard to whether China and Russia are really cooperating\, Dr. Prathibha explained that there are indications of the two countries cooperating in the strategic and economic domain. For instance\, China and Russia are planning to work closely to jointly expand the influence of BRICS and the SCO as a counter to US-led organisations. Also\, China has become an economic lifeline to Russia by exporting dual use components. At the same time\, Beijing is using considerable influence to support Moscow while maintaining its neutrality. Additionally\, China and Russia are moving to cooperate in Central Asia to stabilise the region and enhance its economic potential through BRI and other Russian led initiatives. Similarly\, they are also looking into ways of implementing the pre-2030 plan which aims to modernise industrial supply chains between the two countries. In this context\, it is noteworthy that the ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Cooperation in the New Era’ plan is a long-term view which extends till 2049. \nDiscussing whether the growing cooperation indicates alignment\, Dr. Prathibha noted that there are historical and structural challenges to strategic alignment between the countries. She observed that throughout history\, China and Russia have been imperial and hegemonic rivals. China holds the historical memory of losing territory to Russia and considers the latter to be an expansionist power. On the other hand\, current China-Russia cooperation is happening because of deterioration in China-US relations. Therefore\, if China and US relations improve\, the urgency from Chinese side to cooperate with Russia might reduce. She added that there is considerable mistrust on the Chinese side vis-à-vis Russia and cooperation with Moscow is dictated primarily by norms of Chinese foreign policy rather than any feeling of kinship. Furthermore\, the Chinese view is that the US is traditionally more willing to make concessions to improve bilateral ties. In contrast\, Russia is less accommodating\, making concessions only when compelled by pressure or threats\, rather than as a gesture of goodwill. \nDr. Prathibha concluded her presentation by stating that there could be greater coordination on the political and economic side to face Western pressure and formulate mutually favourable industrial policies respectively. However\, historical and structural factors will limit cooperation at least from the Chinese side. \nQ&A Session\nThe presentation was followed by a Q&A Session. Deputy Director General Gp. Capt. (Dr.) Ajey Lele queried about China’s reaction to Russia-North Korea cooperation and Russia’s stance in a possible conflict on Taiwan Straits. One of the scholars queried about the possibility of renewed competition between Russia-China and the US in Central Asia. Reflecting on Chinese mistrust towards Russia\, another scholar asked about Russia’s perception of Chinese expansionist tendencies and extent of Sino-Russian cooperation on military technology. \nDuring the Q&A session it was observed that Russia-China cooperation is not directed at India and Russia is unlikely to allow China to have a veto over its foreign policy. However\, it is in India’s interest to deepen India-Russia relations by adding more pillars to bilateral ties. \nReport prepared by Ms. Mayuri Banerjee\, Research Analyst\, East Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA\, New Delhi.
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