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DTSTART:20230101T000000
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240401T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240401T053000
DTSTAMP:20261122T050122
CREATED:20240506T225254Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240514T025328Z
UID:81020-1711949400-1711949400@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting on Khalistan Movement Overseas: A Case Study of Canada
DESCRIPTION:Mr. Abhishek Verma\, Research Analyst at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, made a presentation on “Khalistan Movement Overseas: A Case Study of Canada” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 1 April\, 2024. The session was chaired by Mr. Shantanu Sinha\, Research Fellow\, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA\, Gp. Capt. (Dr) Ajey Lele (Retd.)\, Deputy Director General\, MP-IDSA and the scholars of the Institute were in attendance. \nExecutive Summary\nIndia’s relationship with Canada has been impacted by the recent surge in pro-Khalistan-related activities in Canada. The Government of India needs to follow a dual approach\, keeping diplomatic engagement intact while putting pressure on the Canadian Government to address India’s security concerns. \nDetailed Report\nMr. Shantanu Sinha began the meeting by mentioning the surge in pro-Khalistan activities in recent years. He further alluded to the recent developments in North America that have impacted India’s relations with the United States and Canada. Subsequently\, he invited the Speaker to make his presentation. \nMr. Abhishek Verma began his presentation by noting India’s response to recent allegations made by Canada\, which have been widely covered in the media and which led to diplomatic tension between the two sides. Subsequently\, he classified pro-Khalistan and anti-India activities into three categories- protests\, referendums and vandalism. Further\, he explored the demographic dimension of the Sikh diaspora in Canada and traced the community’s migration from India. The migration of the Sikh community has taken place in four distinct phases. \nThe first phase started in 1897 when Sikhs in the British Indian Army migrated to Canada for the coronation ceremony of Queen Victoria. The migration of Sikh soldiers (especially those stationed overseas) became more prominent after the end of First World-War. This phase of migration was driven by aspirations for a better quality of life in Canada\, in addition to the adverse fiscal and economic conditions prevailing in India. \nThe second phase of Sikh migration began during the 1950s and 1960s. In this phase\, educated and trained professionals started migrating to western countries in pursuit of employment opportunities. Subsequently\, the third phase commenced in the 1970s as a result of the agrarian transition brought about by the Green Revolution. The Green Revolution led to an increase in the number of large landowners\, alongside a steep decline in the small and medium landholders. The semi-skilled\, unemployed and educated youth from the distressed farming community started migrating overseas in search of opportunities. The fourth and the largest phase of migration took place during the phase of Punjab militancy. During this phase\, Sikhs charged with terrorism\, predominantly the youths\, started migrating to Canada.   \nSubsequently\, Mr. Verma traced the genesis of the Khalistan movement overseas to religious mobilization in the 1950s. At the time\, Sikh industrial workers in the United Kingdom started facing restrictions to profess their religion and to display their religious identity. To put forth their grievances\, the Sikh community started organising themselves under Sikh Home Rule Movement led by Sardar Charan Singh Panchi. Following this\, Mr. Verma elaborated on the evolution of Khalistan movement overseas from 1970s to late 1980s\, including the bombing of Air India Flight 182 in 1985 that killed 329 passengers on board. With the end of militancy in Punjab in the mid-1990s\, support for the Khalistan project also dwindled among the Sikh community overseas. Following the attacks on 11 September\, 2001 in the United States and subsequent War on Terror\, the United States\, Canada and the United Kingdom banned terrorist groups like Babbar Khalsa International and International Sikh Youth Federation. \nIn the light of a major crackdown on their functioning\, the pro-Khalistan elements in Western countries shifted their strategies and continued their secessionist activities through the politics of grievances and human rights. One of the prominent organisations that emerged as an international advocacy and human rights group was ‘Sikhs for Justice’. Since its inception\, “Sikhs for Justice” has been engaged in frivolous anti-India activities\, including filing cases against Indian leaders and celebrities in US courts as well as issuing security threats related to flight travel. \nFurther\, Mr. Verma explained the Canadian Government’s approach towards pro-Khalistan and anti-India activities in Canada. At the outset\, he asserted that Canada’s approach toward pro-Khalistan activities was largely influenced by three overarching factors: Cold War politics\, political freedom of expression\, and vote bank politics. During the Cold War\, successive Canadian Governments\, irrespective of parties\, provided least priority to India’s sensitivities. While tolerating anti-India activities on Canadian soil\, they adopted a lenient approach towards pro-Khalistan elements. However\, the political dynamics changed since the end of Cold War. Although India’s relationship with the west improved\, in general\, the Canadian Government maintained that the right to freedom of expression was important and advocating Khalistan’s homeland in Punjab was not illegal. By providing a synoptic overview of the current political dynamics in Canada\, Mr. Verma concluded that vote bank politics largely influences the current Justin Trudeau Government’s attitude towards the Khalistani movement. \nThe Government of India has responded proactively to such anti-India activities. In addition to consistently and explicitly taking up the issue of Khalistan with the Canadian Government\, successive Indian Governments have also pursued extradition of Khalistani and anti-India elements. However\, extradition of Khalistani terrorists has remained negligible even after the signing of an extradition treaty in 1987. Domestically\, the Government of India has taken measures such as banning pro-Khalistani websites and social media platforms. Furthermore\, amendments to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967 have been implemented to designate individuals as terrorists and to streamline the process of investigation and asset seizure. \nQuestions and Comments\nWhile appreciating the Speaker’s presentation\, Mr Sinha invited the Director General and Deputy Director General to make their comments. \nAmbassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, DG\, MP-IDSA\, complimented Mr. Verma for making an informative presentation while emphasising the fact that it is not unusual for foreign communities to influence domestic policies. Further\, he made observations concerning the adverse implications of migration during the Punjab militancy phase\, as well as the non-secular tradition of western countries. \nAdditionally\, scholars raised pertinent points concerning the ineffectiveness of the Extradition Treaty of 1987\, the nexus between Pakistan and Canada\, and the role of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in the Khalistan movement. Inquiries regarding recent events in Canada and the United States were also made. \nDuring the Session\, both the Speaker and Moderator addressed the questions raised by the scholars. Mr. Sinha provided insights into the legal and investigation-related complexities inherent in the extradition process. He underscored that the success of an extradition treaty hinges not only on legal intricacies but also on bilateral relations between the involved countries and political will. Regarding the role of the ISI\, Mr. Sinha mentioned that the territorial boundaries of the fictitious state of “Khalistan” do not include Pakistani territories which have Sikh history\, for example\, Nankana Sahib\, the birthplace of the first Sikh Guru\, Guru Nanak Dev. This absence within the purported territorial extent of “Khalistan” was highlighted by Mr. Sinha as indicative of the ISI’s involvement. \nReport prepared by Ms. Julia Jose Thachil\, Intern\, Counter Terrorism Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-on-khalistan-movement-overseas-a-case-study-of-canada
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240422T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240422T053000
DTSTAMP:20261122T050122
CREATED:20240506T223247Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240514T025321Z
UID:81017-1713763800-1713763800@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Report of Monday Morning Meeting on Iran-Israel Confrontation: Escalation Amid the Gaza War
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Deepika Saraswat\, Associate Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar IDSA\, presented on “Iran-Israel Confrontation: Escalation Amid the Gaza War” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 22 April 2024. Dr. S Samuel C Rajiv\, Associate Fellow\, Manohar Parrikar IDSA\, moderated the session. Scholars of the Institute attended the meeting. \nExecutive Summary\nThe tit-for-tat exchanges between Israel and Iran starting 1 April 2024 have heightened tensions in the region. The presentation gave an overview of the escalation of the ‘Shadow War’ between the two countries. It provided an understanding of Iran’s strategies of the ‘Axis of Resistance’ and the ‘Unification of Arenas’ and Israel’s strategy of ‘Octopus Doctrine’ and threat perception of a ‘Ring of Fire’. The recent events have displayed that Iran is willing to take the risk of directly striking Israel\, and this constitutes the new normal. \nDetailed Report\nDr. Saraswat began the presentation by providing an understanding of Iran’s strategies from the ‘Axis of Resistance’ to the ‘Unification of Arenas’. The Iranian strategy of Axis of Resistance\, an asymmetric strategy\, emerged as a counter to the US designation of Iran as a member of the ‘Axis of Evil’. Iran has made the Israel-Palestine issue the centrepiece of its Axis of Resistance strategy\, where it has supported groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad since the early 1990s\, and Hezbollah since the 1980s. The Axis of Resistance allows Iran to expand its deterrence way beyond its geographical borders. Iran wants to fight threats even before they reach its borders. Iran also follows a strategy of war avoidance\, where it wants to avoid any direct war with the US\, but at the same time deter its adversaries from attacking. Dr. Saraswat noted the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) mobilisation of Shia militias in Iraq and Syria to fight ISIS\, which posed a threat to Iran. \nThe Speaker observed that in the absence of a proper air force\, the Iranian missile program is a key pillar of its forward defence strategy. The IRGC’s missile force has emerged as a major branch over the years. Iran has focused more on enhancing the precision strike capabilities of its missiles. The missiles have a range of around 2000 km so as not to antagonise the Europeans\, but the range covers the whole of the Middle East region thus placing the US military bases in the region within its strike capability. \nDr. Saraswat noted that the Iranian strategy of the Unification of Arenas is more visible in the aftermath of the 7 October 2023 attacks by Hamas on Israel\, which was followed by the integration of Hezbollah from Lebanon\, the Shia militias in Iraq\, and the Houthis in Yemen into the campaign against Israel. Iran has supplied precision missiles to Hezbollah\, while Hamas has demonstrated its capacity to launch thousands of unguided rockets. \nThe Speaker then highlighted Israel’s ‘Octopus Doctrine’ and threat perception of a ‘Ring of Fire’. Israel’s Octopus Doctrine is based on the principle that Iran is the head of the octopus\, while the proxy militias that it supports are its tentacles. This strategy has now evolved into directly attacking Iranian personnel in Syria and Iraq\, and not just proxies like Hezbollah. Israel has opposed the Iranian nuclear program and has always portrayed Iran as a threat so as to keep the US involved in the region alongside Israel. The concept of Ring of Fire is based on the surrounding of Israel by Iranian-backed forces\, with Hezbollah in Lebanon\, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza\, and foreign militias in Syria\, and it is the Israeli counter to Iran’s Axis of Resistance. \nDr. Saraswat spoke at length about the Shadow War tactics applied by Israel on Iran\, which gathered pace in the wake of the US’s ‘Maximum Pressure’ campaign against Iran. She flagged the July 2020 explosion that hit a centrifuge assembly facility near the city of Natanz. Israel has also carried out targeted assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists over the past decade. Israeli intelligence seems to have penetrated Iranian society as shown by attacks and assassinations of security figures inside Iran. Shadow war has been persistent in the cyber domain with tit-for-tat cyberattacks on civilian infrastructure. The shadow war has also played out in the sea where Israel has attacked Iranian oil tankers and also shipments of weapons to Syria and Hezbollah. Iran has also retaliated with attacks on Israeli-linked shipping companies like the Zodiac Maritime in the Gulf of Oman. \nIsrael’s attack on the Iranian Consulate has set new rules of engagement\, as per the Speaker. Iran’s retaliatory strikes on Israel have shown Iranian capability to directly strike Israel. The Israeli counter response has not majorly escalated the existing tensions\, and has been seen as ‘de-escalatory’ in Iran. \nDr. Saraswat concluded by stating that the situation remains de-escalatory as of now\, as the US wants to avoid any regional war at this time. She stated that recent events have ensured that Iran’s asymmetric strategies seems to have run their course and in response to Israel’s direct targeting of Iranian soil\, Iran is willing to take the risk of directly striking Israel\, and this constitutes the new normal. \nQuestions and Comments\nDr. Rajiv Nayan in his remarks pointed out that the Iran-Israel conflict retains significant asymmetric contours given that non-state armed groups still constitute a critical element of Iran’s strategy to counter Israel. The Houthis and the Hezbollah were also involved in the direct coordinated attacks against Israel. \nA number of important queries and comments were made regarding Iran’s nuclear capability\, its missile defence program and its aspiration for the leadership of the Islamic world. Questions were also raised about why Israel’s retaliatory attacks were non-escalatory and why it did not take the chance to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities. The role of the US in the conflict and whether Israel wanted the involvement of the US in a larger way was also questioned. \nDr. Deepika Saraswat gave comprehensive responses\, addressing the comments and questions from the Institute’s scholars. She emphasised that the decision to develop a nuclear weapon is a political one and Iran might not be willing to take that risk easily. She also emphasised on how the Iranians have put their best bet on their missile defence systems for their security. She reiterated that the current situation displays the new normal and also points out that the US does not want to risk a regional war at the moment. \nAfter the Q&A session\, the Chair gave his closing remarks and ended the meeting. \nReport was prepared by Mr. Farhan Khan\, Intern\, West Asia Centre\, MP-IDSA.
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/report-of-monday-morning-meeting-on-iran-israel-confrontation-escalation-amid-the-gaza-war
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240429T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20240429T053000
DTSTAMP:20261122T050122
CREATED:20240514T025031Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240514T025202Z
UID:81193-1714368600-1714368600@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Monday Morning Meeting Report on Ethiopia’s Maritime Aspirations and Regional Implications
DESCRIPTION:Mr. Mohanasakthivel J.\, Research Analyst\, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) made a presentation on “Ethiopia’s Maritime Aspirations and Regional Implications” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 29 April 2024. The session was moderated by Dr. Abhishek Mishra\, Associate Fellow\, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy\, Director General\, MP-IDSA and the scholars of MP-IDSA attended and enriched the discussions. \nExecutive Summary\nTensions in the already volatile Horn of Africa have increased as a result of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Somaliland signed on 1st January 2024 that grants landlocked Ethiopia access to the Red Sea. Any international recognition of Somaliland is interpreted by Somalia as an affront to its sovereignty\, because Somalia considers the autonomous region of Somaliland as an integral part of its territory. Consequently\, Somalia rejected the Agreement and demanded that it be terminated. This declaration comes at a critical moment when attacks against commercial shipping by Houthi rebels in the Red Sea have increased\, which has subsequently caused a severe reduction in marine traffic and commerce in the region. The Agreement is expected to impact Somalia’s bilateral relations with Ethiopia and neighbouring Somaliland\, but also the Horn of Africa region as a whole. Regional organisations such as the African Union\, Arab League\, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have expressed concerns about the Agreement and the possibility of escalating tensions and regional instability.  \nDetailed Report\nIn his introductory remarks\, Dr. Abhishek Mishra underlined that the Horn of Africa is on the verge of rising geopolitical tensions and realignment with a number of deals like the Ethiopia and Somaliland deal and the Somalia and Turkiye Agreement taking shape. Mr. Mohanasakthivel J. commenced his presentation by mentioning Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s address to the Ethiopian Parliament in October 2023 on Ethiopia’s marine access.  \nPrime Minister Abiy Ahmed proclaimed that the Red Sea was Ethiopia’s “natural boundary” and that its people could not live in a “geographic prison.” He underlined the existential issues linked with access to the Red Sea region\, which is becoming increasingly volatile and unpredictable\, attracting more actors from far and near due to its strategic economic and political importance. Thus\, the Speaker highlighted that being landlocked poses a risk to Ethiopia\, as it relies on other littoral states for marine access\, protecting its interests\, and defending against any national security danger emanating from the Red Sea. Within a week after PM Ahmed’s speech\, the Ethiopian Ministry of Peace issued an outline statement\, declaring that Ethiopia will take all necessary steps to safeguard port access. Ethiopia’s Prime Minister agreed with protecting port access peacefully but cautioned that force may be used if required.  \nSubsequently\, on 1 January 2024\, Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)\, giving Addis Ababa direct access to the Gulf of Aden. This strategic Agreement cleared the way for Ethiopia to construct commercial and military sites along the coastline. Under this arrangement\, Somaliland has leased to Ethiopia 20 kilometres of its coastal land for 50 years. Ethiopia has agreed to provide Somaliland an interest in one of its profitable state-owned firms\, Ethiopian Airlines. It is also considering recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. However\, neighbouring coastal governments of Somalia\, Djibouti\, and Eritrea\, have raised concerns regarding the Agreement.  \nThe Speaker highlighted the history of Ethiopia’s maritime quest by mentioning that since Eritrea’s 1993 secession from Ethiopia\, the latter has remained landlocked\, thereby putting an end to the Ethiopian Navy which was started in 1950’s. At first\, Ethiopia was compelled to transfer its maritime resources to ports in Yemen. However\, Ethiopia’s naval presence was completely disbanded by the mid-1990s due to its eventual ejection from Yemen and failure to uphold its leasing Agreement in Djibouti.  \nEthiopia remains reliant on the stability of its coastal neighbours due to a lack of its direct access to the sea. Since then\, it has attempted a variety of methods to secure access to the ocean. It entered into an Agreement with Djibouti in 2002. As a result\, over 95 per cent of its import-export traffic now passes through Djibouti’s port via the Addis-Djibouti corridor. Ethiopia also purchased a 19 per cent share in Somaliland’s Berbera Port in 2018 as a means of diversifying its maritime access points. \nMr. Mohanasakthivel J. emphasised on the importance of ports for Ethiopia\, stating that Ethiopia’s trade is strongly dependent on access to ports for international commerce. This is owing to the bordering countries’ insufficient capacity to absorb Ethiopian goods. Despite having several potential ports\, logistical obstacles prevent their use. In his overview of potential ports for Ethiopia\, he mentioned the Ports of Sudan\, Djibouti\, and Tadjourah\, Eritrea’s Massawa and Assab\, Somaliland’s Berbera\, Somalia’s Mogadishu and Kismayo\, and Kenya’s Mombasa and Lamu.  \nEthiopia relies on the Port of Djibouti for 95 per cent of its foreign trade\, with the Ports of Berbera and Sudan accounting for the remaining 5 per cent. Ethiopia’s principal economic channel has been the Red Sea port of Djibouti\, giving Djibouti a virtual monopoly on Ethiopian trade. However\, Djibouti costs Ethiopia over a billion dollars in port fees each year. This is a large sum considering that over one-fifth out of Ethiopia’s 120 million population relies on food aid.  \nWith respect to Somalia\, the Speaker noted that the arrangement will have an impact on the dynamics of the country’s relations with its two neighbours – Ethiopia and Somaliland\, with whom it has a history of intra-regional disputes and conflicts. The Somali Government asserts that Somaliland is an autonomous state within Somalia\, and that only the Somali Government has the authority to lease its land to foreign forces.  \nSomalia considers the Agreement to be an infringement of its sovereignty\, and in reaction it has expelled the Ethiopian Ambassador and recalled its Ambassador from Ethiopia. The Somali Administration also insists that there is no intention of negotiation with Ethiopia and has threatened serious escalation if Ethiopia proceeds with the Agreement. However\, a clash between Ethiopia and Somalia seems unlikely.  \nWhile discussing regional dynamics\, the Speaker mentioned that Egypt has been critical of the transaction as an obvious infringement of Somalia’s sovereignty. President Sisi emphasised that Egypt stands shoulder to shoulder with Somalia and has urged Ethiopia to seek benefits from seaports in Somalia and Djibouti through transitional measures rather than attempting to control another country’s territory. Egypt’s objection to Ethiopia’s deal with Somaliland is partly affected by its ongoing dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile River. \nFurthermore\, if this Agreement is implemented\, Djibouti will experience a decrease in commercial transit as well as a loss of Ethiopian annual fees\, as revenues from ports and foreign military bases are Djibouti’s principal source of income. Djibouti’s port handles more than 95 percent of Ethiopia’s trade\, contributing to about 75 per cent to its GDP. Djibouti is dissatisfied with the fact that Somaliland has become Ethiopia’s preferred maritime and commercial partner.  \nWith regard to Eritrea\, the Speaker mentioned that no other country felt the threat as much as the Eritreans did as both countries have a history of hostility. In 1998\, both the countries went to war\, which ended in 2000 with the signing of the Algiers Agreement. Nevertheless\, tensions developed\, as Ethiopia refused to abide by the Agreement\, which required Ethiopia to cede territory to Eritrea. \nBetween 2002 to 2018\, both countries were in a state of no conflict or peace. Eventually\, Abiy Ahmed and Isaias Afwerki met in 2018\, this signified the end of the state of war\, resuming diplomatic ties\, trade\, and travel between the two states. However\, cooperation deteriorated as unsolved issues and antagonism persisted.  \nEthiopia’s loss of the Red Sea coast to Eritrea fuels fear of encirclement by Arab powers as the Arab League members\, including Egypt\, Djibouti\, and Sudan\, control key ports. Potential Arab attacks from the Red Sea ports have seemed to heighten Ethiopia’s security concerns. Moreover\, Ethiopia has been consistently denied an observer status by the Council of Arab and African Littoral States of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Since all the coastal countries have denied Ethiopia access to sea\, the Speaker noted that the littoral states must develop a regional mechanism for the Red Sea rather than relying on their Arab neighbours\, who may exploit the current rift. Although the Maritime Treaty may include certain concessions in favour of Ethiopia\, the littoral states are unlikely to be interested in providing a naval base other than Somaliland. \nIt is worth noting that Ethiopia is the security guarantee for Somaliland\, although it is yet to recognise Somaliland since the Agreement was signed. Formal recognition could strengthen the UAE’s relationship with Somaliland\, potentially leading to increased investments and development projects in the region. Recognition by Ethiopia\, Kenya\, and the UAE may persuade other countries to consider Somaliland as a state.  \nLastly\, the Speaker stated that there is no possibility of war in the near future because Ethiopia had lost many of its officers during the Tigray Battle. The country’s military is thinly scattered and faces numerous obstacles\, particularly in the Amhara and Oromia areas. Its economy is still struggling to recover from a civil war in the northern Tigray region that ended in 2022. Moreover\, it is facing a severe foreign-currency shortage. \nQuestions and Comments\nAmb. Sujan R. Chinoy\, congratulated Mr. Mohanasakthivel J. for providing a detailed picture of regional dynamics in the Horn of Africa\, focusing on Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions. He stated that\, in theory\, landlocked countries have the right to reach the sea under Article 126\, Clause 10. However\, this must be negotiated and transit states must be confident in their own security. As a result\, the issue boils down to negotiating with neighbouring countries. Amb. Chinoy inquired about India’s stance on the port\, considering that the Agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland has significant complications.  \nDr. Deepika Saraswat\,observed that the UAE plays an important role in the changing dynamics of the region. \nCmde. Abhay Singh explained the intricacies of the UNCLOS with respect to the status of the landlocked states and transit rights. In addition to that he further explained that Djibouti’s economic reliance on Ethiopia is 75% of its GDP. \nDr. Abhishek Mishra inquired about the international response to the port arrangement. He further enquired about the position of Somalia and the Arab Council on the Agreement. He also inquired how the citizens of both Somalia and Somaliland have reacted to the port arrangement.  \nMr. Mohanasakhtivel J. provided insightful answers to the questions and comments raised by the Director General and the MP-IDSA scholars. \nThe report was prepared by Ms. Anusha Khurana\, Intern\, ALACUN Centre\, MP-IDSA. 
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/monday-morning-meeting-report-on-ethiopias-maritime-aspirations-and-regional-implications
CATEGORIES:EVENT REPORT
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