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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20160209T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20160211T053000
DTSTAMP:20261109T015701
CREATED:20231223T125434Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250120T222918Z
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SUMMARY:18th Asian Security Conference - Securing Cyberspace: Asian and International Perspectives
DESCRIPTION:Concept Note\n\n\nThe Asian Security Conference (ASC) is a major calendar event of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA)\, New Delhi. Since 1999\, when the conference was first held\, the ASC has emerged as an important platform for debating issues relating to Asian Security. For the last ten years\, the ASC has been providing a forum for security analysts\, practitioners and policy makers from around the world to share their views on the challenges facing the Asian continent. The eighteenth conference in this series is being held on the topic “Securing Cyberspace: Asian and International Perspectives”. \nCybersecurity is increasingly drawing attention from policy makers as the world becomes increasingly interlinked and dependent on digital pathways. Use of cyber space by governments\, businesses and individuals has provided economic benefits and helped connect the world in beneficial ways. Simultaneously\, however\, there are attempts being made by state and non-state actors to deny its legitimate use by others. Use of cyber space for espionage\, both commercial and security-related\, are common. Its use by criminals and extremists is no less dangerous. Managing this nascent and rapidly developing threat has proved to be problematic given that it now touches almost every aspect of human existence\, from communication to commerce. It equally impact on a variety of stakeholders\, individuals\, corporations and states\, all with differing priorities and perspectives. The large number of users and actors involved\, and their varying perceptions of the threats and responses to emanating from cyber space have led to conflicting voices on how best to mitigate and overcome them. \nEven as the connected systems and networks have grown more intertwined and complex\, Cyberspace is being used for a variety of malicious activities\, from crime to state-sponsored attacks on critical infrastructure. The interconnectedness of cyber networks means that even the most basic responses end up having a ripple effect or unintended consequences. Maintaining a balance between security and benefitting from the many opportunities provided by the deployment of new cyber technologies is proving to be one of the most vexatious issues of the 21st century. \nThe risk from cyber threats to government agencies\, private enterprises\, public sector undertakings and research institutions of strategic importance can manifest in many forms. A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack can disrupt business operations or it may cause severe outages\, thereby having a direct impact on their revenue and reputation. Companies also face the risk of losing trade secrets or intellectual property rights. Moreover\, a massive data breach for companies or governance portals storing data of customers or citizens can compromise personal information. A cyber-attack on entities that are part of critical infrastructure can have a debilitating impact on national security. The risk increases manifold for electricity grids\, nuclear installations\, and telemetry/command and control network of space assets. Surprisingly\, social media\, as a threat vector\, has become a channel of least resistance for threat actors to conduct reconnaissance\, identity thefts and gather information on employees\, projects\, systems and infrastructure\, besides spreading hateful propaganda and enticing impressionable youth to follow extremist ideologies.\nCyberspace has become an intricate constituent of national power. The strategies for the development of Cyberspace are not just restricted to civilian purposes; rather\, this domain now falls well under the ambit of the armed forces. With the advent of Network Centricity in military operations and Revolution in Military Affairs\, armed forces are at elevated risk of cyber incidents. The integrated use of land\, air\, maritime and space assets for enhanced domain awareness or real-time information access warrants the armed forces to build expertise in both defensive and offensive cyber operations. Nation states have documented their Cyber Strategies and executed them in the form of Cyber Commands\, both overt and covert. With the military dimension\, Cyberspace is witnessing a race for development and deployment of cyber weapons. An arms control regime\, the Wassenaar Arrangement has enlarged its controls list in consonance with the way Cyberspace has altered present day security landscape. The development of cyber weapons and their potential usage against high value targets has been one of the major security concerns for nation states.  \nThe threats in Cyberspace are varying in nature and intensity. Leading companies operating in the domains of energy\, telecommunications\, finance\, and transportation sectors are targets of Advanced Persistent Threats (APT). Non-state actors\, such as terrorist organizations and criminal syndicates have become tech-savvy\, thereby employing human resources to develop malware.  These tools are used extensively in committing Cybercrime. Terrorist organizations leverage the benefits of Cyberspace\, harnessing it for ideology propagation\, recruitment and communication. The terrorist organization\, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has been a prime case study.  It has tremendous presence on social media helps spread its propaganda and recruit sympathizers across the globe.  Al-Qaeda is also reported to have developed encryption software to secure their communication in Cyberspace. \nAs the extent of commerce transacted over Cyberspace grows\, along with increasing reliance on information technology to drive cost-efficiencies\, the risk exposure to enterprises have increased. According to the 2013 Security Threat Report published by the cyber security company\, Sophos\, Asia accounted for eight of the top-10 countries most vulnerable to Cybercrime. Asia\, the largest continent on earth\, represents 60 percent of the world’s population. It is the fastest growing economic region globally. On the other hand\, the unprecedented growth of rising economies\, rapid industrialisation\, rising demand for energy\, expanding markets and\, depleting natural resources have led to competition and confrontation with respect to the access and control of resources. As Asia continues to grow its share of the global trade and commerce\, the threats from cyber-attacks are expected to increase in tandem. \nCyber-attacks\, like many of the new security challenges\, are transnational in origin and nature\, and no nation can combat them alone. Despite variations in ethnic\, economic and government systems\, Asian countries need robust security architecture to resolve the issues specific to the geographical region as well as international issues detrimental to Asia’s economic and societal growth. \nWith the shift of power towards Asia\, its representation in the rule-making mechanisms and inputs towards creating a secure cyberspace is critical to international politics\, the world economy\, and the credibility of international institutions and cybersecurity regimes. Within Asia\, cyber threats have altered the security perceptions of institutions and government systems. Against this backdrop\, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi will organise the 18th Asian Security Conference focusing on the emerging threats and challenges from cyber domain to national and regional security. The two-and-a-half-day conference will consider international and regional responses to cyber security and the scope for cooperation amidst varying national policy frameworks and legislations. \nThe major themes to be discussed include the following:  \n\nThe Global Cybersecurity Environment\nInternational and Regional Responses to issues in Cybersecurity\nNon-State Actors and Cyberspace\nSecuring Strategic Critical Infrastructure\nCybersecurity and the Digital Economy\nRole of Military in Cybersecurity\nDisruptive Technologies and Cybersecurity\n\n\n\n\n\nProgramme Schedule\n\n\nTuesday\, February 9\, 2016 (DAY ONE)\n09:15-09:40	Registration \n09:45-10:15	Inaugural Address\nWelcome Remarks: Shri Jayant Prasad\, Director General\, IDSA\nKey Note Address: Air Marshal PP Reddy VM\, ADC\, Chief of Integrated Defence Staff\nVote of Thanks: Brig. Rumel Dahiya (Retd)\, Deputy Director General\, IDSA \n10:15-10:45	Tea \n10:45-13:00	Session 1: The Global Cybersecurity Environment\nChairperson:	Nitin Desai\nAmmar Jaffri – Cyber Security Challenges & Opportunities in the Fast Changing World Today\nVarun Sahni – Cyber Redefinitions and the Challenged State: Security Implications\nGreg Austin – Mutual Restraint in the Cyberspace Diplomacy of Great Powers\nCuihong Cai – Global Cybersecurity Environment: Perspectives of the US and China in Comparison\nYasuaki Hashimoto – Present Situation of Japanese Cyber Security \n13:00-14:00	Lunch \n14:00-15:30	Session 2: International and Regional Responses to Cybersecurity Challenges\nChairperson:	Latha Reddy\nAlexandra Kulikova – Working out the Rules of Global Cyberspace Governance\nNandkumar Saravade – International and Regional Responses to Cybersecurity Challenges\nCandice Tran Dai – Economic Dimensions of National Cybersecurity Strategies in the Asia-Pacific Region\nMunish Sharma and Cherian Samuel – A South Asian Regional Cybersecurity Cooperation (SARCC) Forum: Prospects and Challenges \n15:30-16:00	Tea \n16:00-17:30	Session 3: Non-State Actors and Cyberspace\nChairperson:	Ravi Kant\nAlok Vijayant – Asymmetrism in the Cyberspace: State vs. Non-state Actors\nSanjeev Relia – Non-State Actors and Cyberspace: An Overview\nArun Mohan Sukumar – State and Non-State: Residual Actors in Cyberspace\nGillane Allam – Non-State Actors & Cyberspace- A North African Perspective \nWednesday\, February 10\, 2016 (DAY TWO)\n10:00-11:00	Keynote Address by Dr. Arvind Gupta\, Deputy National Security Advisor\n11:00-11:30	Tea\n11:30-13:00	Session 4: Securing Strategic Critical Infrastructure\nChairperson:	Alhad G. Apte\nTed Lewis – Challenges of Cybersecurity: Malware and AS-level Structure\nKah-Kin Ho – Evolving Role of Government in Critical Infrastructure Protection\nJana Robinson – Governance Challenges at the Intersection of Space and Cybersecurity\nCaroline Baylon – Cyber Security Threats to Critical Infrastructure: A Case Study of Nuclear Facilities\nA. Vinod Kumar – Securing Critical Infrastructure from Cyber Threats: Developing Defence\, Deterrence and Norms \n13:00-14:00	Lunch \n14:00-15:30	Session 5: Cybersecurity and the Digital Economy\nChairperson:	V. K. Saraswat\nLiam Nevill – Challenging Opportunities for Asia-Pacific’s Digital Economy\nMadan M. Oberoi – New Technologies and New Forms of Crime: Need to Recalibrate Law Enforcement Strategy / Procedures / Law\nIL Seok\, OH – Korean Legal Initiatives to Combat Cybercrime and Enhance Digital Economy\nUchenna Jerome Orji – Regionalizing the Cybersecurity Governance in Africa: An Assessment of Responses \n15:30-16:00	Tea \n16:00-17:30	Session 6: Role of Military in Cybersecurity\nChairperson:	Prakash Menon\nLiina Areng – Role of Military in Cybersecurity\nAmit Sharma – The Triad Theory of Cyber Warfare: A Framework for Strategic Cyber Warfare\nCaitriona Heinl – International Military Cyber Cooperation in Asia\nLi-Chung Yuan – Role of Military in Cyberspace: Case of Republic of China (Taiwan) \nThursday\, February 11\, 2016 (DAY THREE)\n10:00-11:30	Session 7: Cybersecurity Futures\nChairperson:	K. Santhanam\nTobby Simon – Cybersecurity Futures\nSico van der Meer – Defence\, Deterrence\, and Diplomacy: Foreign Policy Instruments to Increase Future Cybersecurity\nJohn Ellis – Disruptive Technologies and the Trusted Cyber Future\nJonathan Reiber – Cybersecurity Futures and the U.S.-India Strategic Partnership \n11:30-12:00	Tea \n12:00-14:00	Session 8 – Panel Discussion on Way Forward \nVote of Thanks \n14:00-15:00	Lunch\n \n\n\n\nConference Booklet\nRapporteurs Report
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/18th-asian-security-conference-securing-cyberspace-asian-and-international-perspectives-2
CATEGORIES:Asian Security Conference,Previous ASC,CONFERENCES
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20160210T053000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20160210T053000
DTSTAMP:20261109T015701
CREATED:20231223T123945Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240229T000247Z
UID:62621-1455082200-1455082200@idsa.in
SUMMARY:Keynote address by Dr Arvind Gupta\, Deputy National Security Advisor at the 18th Asian Security Conference on "Securing Cyberspace: Asian and International Perspectives"
DESCRIPTION:I would like to thank Ambassador Jayant Prasad\, Director General of IDSA for inviting me to address the participants of 18th Asian Security Conference.  With its eighteenth edition ASC has truly come of age.   \n2.	The theme chosen for this year’s conference is apt.  The world is becoming increasingly turbulent.  The unstoppable march of globalisation\, facilitated by ICTs\, has raised many troubling questions concerning the maintenance of peace and stability.  Cyber security is now an international security concern.  It is also a top concern for most countries and figures high in their national security priorities.  The focus is on managing the threats in cyberspace which affect everyone.  The key question before a state is how to defend itself from the ever increasing occurrences of cyber-attacks. \n3.	The year 2015 saw a number of important developments in the field of cyber security.  President Xi’s visit to the US in September 2015 will be remembered for some outspoken public comments by President Obama on US concerns over on-line theft of intellectual property.  Aware that cyber concerns\, if unresolved\, can create misunderstanding and destabilise the bilateral ties\, the two countries agreed to bilateral cyber security dialogues.  In President Obama’s words\, the two governments agreed that “neither the US nor the Chinese government will conduct or knowingly support cyber related theft of intellectual property including trade secrets or other confidential business information for commercial advantage”.  President Obama\, according to reports\, took up strongly with President Xi the issue of cyber threats.  On his part\, President Xi\, declared that “China strongly opposes and combats the theft of commercial secrets and hacking attacks”.  The meeting took place in the backdrop of a well-publicised cyber-attack on the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) resulting in the stealing of the fingerprints of 5.6 million people in December 2014 and compromising records of some 22 million people.  Acknowledgement by both sides that cyber security is an issue between them was in itself a remarkable development.  During the same year\, China and Russia also signed a comprehensive agreement on cyber security. \n4.	In 2015\, the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE) came out with its 3rd Report which was an advance over the previous report.  As a result of the efforts of the UNGGE\, there is now a growing recognition that international law\, particularly the UN charter\, applies as much as to cyberspace as to other domains.   The UNGGE   emphasises that principles of sovereign equality; settlement of international disputes by peaceful means; refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms including the freedom of expression; and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states are some of the principles which also apply to the ICT security.  In other words\, international law is technology neutral.  One of the main observations of the report is that states have jurisdiction over the ICT infrastructure located within their territory.  \n5.	The international law has many aspects including intervention in self-defence\, economic sanctions\, counter measures and so on.  A debate has broken out whether intervention through cyber means in other countries’ networks\, under certain circumstance\, is justified or not.   The debate is sharp but inconclusive.   \n6.	Cyber security issues are contentious and are proving to be difficult even as the incidents of cyber-attacks\, cybercrime\, cyber terrorism grow exponentially. Every year new types of attacks are invented and carried out.  The toolkit of attackers is expanding.  It is quite possible that states may be clandestinely developing arsenal of tools of cyber-attack even as they discuss the need for accepted norms in cyberspace. \n7.	The challenge before states is how to defend their critical\, military and civilian infrastructure from destabilising cyber-attacks.   Cybercrime is on the increase.  Theft of personal information and intellectual property is rampant.  The distinction between state and non-state actors in cyberspace is blurring.  Even as technologies of active defence are developed\, the attackers are several steps ahead. \n8.	While most states are engaged in implementing strategies to defend their networks from cyber-attacks\, they are also toying with the idea of developing capabilities which would deter potential attackers.  Efforts have been made to develop a theory and practice of “cyber deterrence” on the lines of nuclear deterrence.    \n9.	Drawing analogies from the nuclear arms control vocabulary\, it is argued that both denial and punishment are essential for deterring cyber aggression.  The idea is to make it clear to the potential attacker that the cost of cyber aggression will outweigh the benefits. An effective cyber deterrence strategy will include deterrence by denial as well as penalty by punishment.   Deterrence by denial will rely on strong defences.  The efforts of the attacker would be rendered futile if defences and resilience i.e. the capability to bounce back are strong.  Deterrence by punishment\, on the other hand\, relies on the ability to counter attack.  It is argued that the attacker should know that retaliation should be “certain\, severe and immediate”.  This will deter him. \n10.	The question is whether cyber deterrence can work in the way similar to nuclear deterrence.  Nuclear deterrence works because both sides know fairly accurately the nature\, size and scope of each other’s nuclear arsenal and the means of delivery.  Over decades\, arms control negotiations were focussed on issues such as transparency and verifiability of each other’s arsenals.  Detailed nuclear CBMs\, based on verification\, were developed.  Attempts were made to understand each other’s nuclear doctrines.  In the nuclear cease\, actors were few.  Non-state actors did not possess nuclear weapons.  In cyberspace\, the situation is vastly different.  As yet\, there is no clarity even on what cyber-attack means.  There is no agreed definition of a cyber- weapon.  There are no means of verification.  Multiple actors operate in cyberspace with complete anonymity. \n11.	Sceptics point out that cyber deterrence will fail because of the lack of attributability in cyberspace.  In cyberspace\, where anonymity is the key\, it is difficult to identify precisely who the attacker is.  Non-attribution is the fundamental weakness of the cyber deterrence argument.  There is\, however\, some literature which suggests that the problem of attribution may be overcome sooner or later.  Such claims are\, however\, unverifiable at present. \n12.	For cyber deterrence to be meaningful\, a state would have to define its thresholds through appropriate signalling.  It will need to indicate its cyber thresholds.  Some ambiguity will no doubt be deliberate.  Yet\, a potential attacker should know that retaliation would be severe and unacceptable if a redline is crossed.  Indicating redlines will depend upon a country’s capabilities\, intents and interests.  Today\, the redlines are absent.  For instance\, should cyber espionage\, directed against military and non-military targets\, be treated as an act of cyber warfare?  Is an attack on the banking networks\, stock exchanges\, power grids an act of war?  Does cyber espionage merit a counter attack?  Should retaliation be in cyberspace or by other means?  With key questions unanswered\, to have a cyber-deterrence on the lines of nuclear deterrence seems difficult. \n13.		The Tallinn Manual 1.0\, originally called Tallinn Manual on the International Law applicable to cyber warfare\, deals with conflict scenarios in cyberspace where international law would apply.  While Tallinn Manual is not an official document\, its work is sponsored by NATO and other countries.  Presently\, a second version of the Tallinn Manual\, Tallinn Manual (2.0)\, is being worked out.  The Tallinn Manual 2.0 deals with the application of international law to cyberspace during peacetime.  A recent meeting held in the Hague on 2-3 February dealt with these issues.   During discussions\, attempts were made at defining a diplomatic law for cyberspace.  It was suggested that attack on the computer systems of a foreign embassy should be prohibited by law.  It was also professed that intervention in cyberspace may be permitted under certain circumstances. \n14.	In India’s point of view\, Tallinn Manual\, while being a useful exercise\, does not reflect the existing law on the subject because of the absence of state practice which is critical for development of customary international law. \n15.	These difficulties notwithstanding\, states are going ahead with incorporation of cyber security in to their military doctrines.  Such doctrines postulate that a state\, exercising its right to defend itself\, could retaliate to a cyber-attack by cyber or any other means.  The US national strategy of 2015 says that US could use cyber tools or other means to retaliate against cyber-attacks.   \n16.	The problem of cyber-attacks cannot be seen in isolation. Today\, cyberspace is inter-twined with other domains of warfare\, namely\, land\, water\, air and space.  This inter-twining implies that cyber-attacks will not be seen as mere cyber-attacks.  The retaliation in non-cyber form i.e. retaliation through non cyber means including possibly military means cannot be ruled out.  Cyber-attacks\, as means of warfare\, would only enlarge the battle domain.  Cyber warfare may induce states to opt for full-spectrum deterrence. \n17.	Cyber warfare is a contested concept.  Cyber espionage\, attack on critical infrastructures etc are routine happenings in cyberspace.  So far military means have not been used to deter attacks.  Nor have economic sanctions been used because attributing a cyber-attack has been so difficult.  Further\, many victims feel shy of reporting cyber-attacks.  Such incidents have not been regarded as acts of warfare so far because no definition of cyber warfare exists so far.  Whether a cyber-attack is seen as a component of cyber warfare will depend upon the context of the attack.  The authors of the Tallinn Manual have grappled for many years to come up with some acceptable definitions but so far the progress has been slow. \n18.	India cannot be oblivious to these developments.  Internet usage is spreading rapidly in India.  Even though internet penetration in the country is still low\, nearly 400 million people are using the internet.  Digital India will take broadband internet to every village Panchayat.  With one billion SIM card subscribers\, a revolution in connectivity is sweeping India.  India’s future progress and growth is linked with the expansion of the digital network\, overcoming digital divides and ensuring that robust cyber security policies are adopted right from the beginning.   \n19.	India has taken several steps in the recent past to strengthen its cyber defensive capabilities.  To mention a few:  \n\nA national cyber security policy has been announced and is being implemented.\nAn elaborate national cyber security assurance framework is under implementation.\nThe National Cyber Security Coordinator appointed last year is coordinating the Indian cyber security effort spread across the various agencies. \nCoordination amongst various agencies has improved.  \nA National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC) has been set up.  There is a regular dialogue with the key sectors of the economy.\nPublic-private partnership is being constructed.  There is an active dialogue between the government and the private sector.\nA National Cyber Coordination Centre (NCCC) is being set up.  \nEfforts are being made to develop cyber security skills in the country.  New cyber security curricula are being introduced in the colleges.  \nCyber security R&D policy has also been under active consideration of the government.\nCERT-India\, an organization that was set up in 2004\, has done significant work in dealing with cyber incidents as well as spreading awareness. \nIndia is pursuing active cyber diplomacy with cyber security dialogues having been set up with several countries and is participating in several international fora including the UN on cyber security.  \n\n20.	All these synchronized and coordinated efforts are already showing results.  But we cannot be complacent in the face of growing threats and evolving technologies.  Due to the explosive growth of ICTs\, cyber security scenario is likely to remain challenging.  We will need to work hard on the various aspects of cyber security including the emerging challenges.   \n21.	Like other countries\, India also faces the daunting task of stopping and preventing cyber-attacks on its networks. India will have to closely study the evolution of cyber deterrence idea.   Building cyber deterrence capability would entail building robust networks that can be defended\, encouraging comprehensive R&D in the area of cyber security and strengthening indigenous manufacture of ICT products and technologies.   It will also require strong cyber diplomacy to ensure that India is not at the receiving end of the emerging ICT Export Control regime under the Wassenaar Agreement.     We also need to closely analyse the patterns of cyber-attacks against us and build suitable response measures including the capability to conduct cyber operations if required.  India would need to take note of the increasingly assertive cyber security doctrines that are being adopted by other countries.  This will help in working out our own cyber security doctrines.  The inputs from the Conference like this would be most useful. \n22.	In conclusion\, I would like to point out that there is a lack of consensus in the international community on norms of behaviour in cyberspace.  We are at a stage where technology is far ahead of our thinking on cyber laws and cyber norms.  The UN Group of Governmental Experts has proved to be a useful platform to discuss these issues but the absence of a broader representative platform where contentious issues can be hammered out and consensus arrived at is conspicuous by its absence.  Ad-hoc groups adopting ad-hoc procedures to deliberate over ad-hoc cyber security agendas will not necessarily build a consensus.  The international community needs to come together to discuss how to deal with threats in cyberspace which are growing by the minute.  The task may seem daunting but states should seriously reflect whether the world needs a Cyber Convention on cyber security.  Unlike in the other commons like the land\, the sea and space\, where international law has grown immediately\, cyberspace is still largely lawless.  This Conference\, where leading experts have assembled\, can generate ideas on the way forward towards building a consensus on cyber security issues.   \nThank you!
URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/keynote-address-by-dr-arvind-gupta-deputy-national-security-advisor-at-the-18th-asian-security-conference-on-securing-cyberspace-asian-and-international-perspectives
CATEGORIES:Asian Security Conference,ASC Key Speeches
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