BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//MP-IDSA - ECPv6.15.12.2//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://idsa.in X-WR-CALDESC:Events for MP-IDSA REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Asia/Kolkata BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0530 TZOFFSETTO:+0530 TZNAME:IST DTSTART:20130101T000000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140219T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140221T053000 DTSTAMP:20261109T063112 CREATED:20231223T125534Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250309T041528Z UID:62776-1392787800-1392960600@idsa.in SUMMARY:16th Asian Security Conference: Emerging Strategic Trends in Asia and India’s Response DESCRIPTION:Concept Note\n\n\nThere is little doubt that Asia – stretching from the Eurasian landmass to the maritime reaches of Australia and the South Pacific – is experiencing a major shift in the global balance of power. Expressions like the ‘Indo-Pacific’ and ‘Asia-Pacific’\, contested they maybe\, capture Asia’s expanse and dynamism. But for one brief and dramatic financial crisis in 1997\, growth rates in Asia have been averaging well above the rest of the world. The rise of China along with the increasing global footprint of Russia and India in G20 and the ASEAN states soaring economies have made Asia the powerhouse and centre of gravity. Yet\, Asia struggles with numerous conflicts in spite of its ‘alphabet soup’ of regional organisations and security structures. \n Changes are happening fast in Asia and changing not only the geo-political landscape but also the mindset of the people who are pushing for political reforms and accountability. The global power shifts being witnessed is also potentially prising up Asia to confrontation as well as convergence as states compete. China is an important piece of the puzzle and its rise is a defining line of the changing landscape. How will China define its national interest in the future? Will it pursue an assertive\, even aggressive policy in Asia to back up its territorial claims? Or will China\, assured of its great power status practice moderation and restraint? Importantly\, how should India and other key states in Asia respond to China’s continuous rise and influence – should the response be as a strategic competitor with a policy of confrontation or a containment approach through active cooperation? \n From a strategic grand view\, the balance of power is uncertain in Asia. A sizeable US military presence continues and the Obama administration´s policy involves strengthening US military alliance and strategic partnerships and simultaneously repositioning forces. China would be far from assured that the ‘rebalancing’ is not directed towards it thus opening up the region to power play and rivalry in the East China Sea and South China Sea. A resultant increase in military expenditure and modernisation and a thrust towards new technologies will spur many countries. \n The numerous stress-lines and fault-lines expose Asia to many potential flash-points. Unresolved territorial issues stand between India and China\, Vietnam and China\, China and Russia\, Russia and Japan. North Korea and Taiwan may trigger-off unmanageable crises. West Asia continues to be restive threatening to tear apart the socio-political fabric. Of the four Asian nuclear powers\, North Korea and Pakistan are highly suspect nuclear proliferators involved in covert supply of missile technology. The China-Japan rivalry reveals dangerous chauvinism. At the same time\, the two largest populated countries – China and India – referred to as ‘planetary powers’ surging need for energy and raw materials for its 2.5 billion people creates new areas of resource friction. Resource scarcity will not only be related to physical shortage but more possibly from failure of governance. \n Asia’s economies are increasingly vital to each other and to the world with both the US and Europe continuing to post low GDP growth. The economic shift is shaping two different approaches to trade liberalization in Asia. One paved by the ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the other by the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and it has to be seen how these approaches will determine the economic choices in the coming years. While\, at one level\, certain investment and trade barriers will continue to hinder business in Asia\, at another\, poverty eradication will have to remain an essence of economic growth for Asian countries. The economies in Asia have to continuously grow fast along with being sustainable and inclusive. Other challenges that equally impact the economy are an increased number of natural disasters that interrupt the supply chain\, security concerns emanating from terrorism and cyber security\, where hacking\, espionage and lack of privacy fuel concerns for companies as well as politicians and governments. \n For India\, the emerging geopolitical and geo-economic trends raise questions as to how it will lock into the new continental power matrix and how it will respond and reappraise to the changes. \n Asia is on the threshold of change — the known and unknown; opportunities and uncertainties abound. Such times also offer an excellent chance to concentrate on the dynamics of change\, to search for new ways of understanding\, and to prepare for a future that is certainly set to surprise. \n Against this backdrop\, the 16th annual Asian Security Conference (ASC) to be held at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses\, New Delhi\, in February 2014 will deliberate the emerging strategic trends in Asia and unravel the challenges and opportunities. \nDay One\n Session1: Asia’s Geopolitical Future\n Central to the future of stability in Asia is how the rise of China is impacting the balance of power. China is now strong enough to challenge US’ leadership in Asia. But it is not clear as to what kind of new order would emerge. One possibility is a contested order framed by US and China strategic rivalry. The Chinese dominance might push other Asian powers into alliance with US making the landscape polarized. On the other hand\, the US stays engaged in Asia\, without being assertive and allowing for a ‘concert of powers’ as a counter weight to China’s power in the Indo-Pacific. Regional institutions are important prescription for bolstering Asia’s stability but raises doubts on whether such multilateral structures have the capability to absorb the shocks and resolve conflicts. This session will explore Asia’s geopolitical future\, the various scenarios that might emerge and the conditions for stability. \n Session 2: Military Trends in Asia \n While Asia has seen a growth of regional institutions yet\, Asian countries’ military expenditures tell a tale of escalating security competition and the recent claims in South China Sea suggest that regional mechanisms don’t necessarily lower the temperature. China’s military budget accounts for nearly half of all the military spending in the region. Japan\, on the other hand\, has increased its defence spending\, partly as a reality check to China and partly as a response to US defence cuts. Many of the US allies in Asia under US protection will have to accept more risks and boost their military capabilities. How will the Asian countries military modernisation impact the region? What are the perceived external threats and how is it impacting the military doctrines? What implications does the military expenditure have on future force structure and strategic posturing? \n Session 3: Economic Global Shift towards Asia\n The world’s economic centre of gravity has shifted to Asia with the rapid economic development seen in China\, India and other Asian countries along with the economic problems experienced in Europe and the US. Urbanization will be a key trend of the rapidly growing economies in Asia. The global economic shift is bringing forth opportunities and challenges. What are the responses of key economic and political institutions in Asia\, particularly in India and China? Should India follow China´s example and turn its attention towards boosting domestic consumption rather than foreign trade? Questions about how the old developed economies (the West) will react and whether Asia’s current economic model is sustainable will equally emerge. Will there be a slowing with major adjustments or a collapse? What levels of impact will the changing demography particularly the growing middle class and the aging population have on the economy? This session will examine how the changes will shape the economic and business contours in Asia? \n Day 2\n Session 4: Resource Stress in Asia\n One of Asia’s major concerns centres on resource security. Food\, energy\, water and climate are intricately linked and further impacted by price\, availability and quality. Population growth\, urbanization\, and industrialization are exacerbating resource-related stresses. Asia includes about 56 per cent of world’s population and depends on 31 per cent of arable land and by 2030 the continent will have 5 billion people. Understanding the resource dynamics is useful to the political economy particularly as competition for natural resources among Asian nations intensifies. Will it bring the continent to a dangerous crossroads of dependence\, geopolitical tension and environmental degradation? What trade-offs and at what appropriate scale (regional\, national\, sub-national) will be required to ease resource pressure? Is the framing of resource policies particularly complementary to rights-based development approaches? \n Session 5: Ocean Governance in the Indo-Pacific\n With the economic power shift to Asia\, the Indo-Pacific region is fast becoming the centre of trade\, investment and cooperation. The region contains close to half the world’s population and provides several of the world’s most important choke-points for global commerce including the Strait of Malacca. Clearly the region is recognised for its economic dynamism and geo-strategic importance. Many inter-state disputes are maritime in nature\, both due to the many unsettled maritime boundaries as a consequence of the enactment of UNCLOS\, and the tendency towards unrestrained exploitation of maritime resources with little regard for territorial jurisdictions. A legal framework and multilateral agreements are critical in managing communal global resources such as the high seas but fear of regional hegemony is likely to hinder support for the establishment of ocean governance\, particularly among the weaker countries. The session will discuss the legal obligations\, impact of institutional arrangements and strengthening governance over maritime resources. \n Session 6: Assessing Risks: Cyber and Critical Infrastructure\n In today’s interconnected world\, states share risks and vulnerabilities. Some of the biggest security challenges will come from the cyber space. Singapore and Indonesia have already taken steps towards setting up cyber commands. As cyber-attacks and hacktivism increase\, challenges to information sharing will mount. Against this backdrop\, how then will governments and policing bodies cooperate on law enforcement and sharing information? Policies towards preventions\, precautions and preparedness plans will be examined. The session will also explore critical infrastructure protection and government coordination highlighting in particular the increased reliance upon technology systems in public and private infrastructure and hence vulnerability to new forms of cyberterrorism and attacks. The lens will also shift to civil-military cooperation and how ‘calling out the troops’ to combat emergencies occurs in countries. \nDay 3\n Session 7: India’s ResponsePanel Discussion\n The big question is how India is responding to the strategic changes in Asia? China sits atop the power pyramid with its physical size\, military capability and economic clout that combines to assert regional dominance. Powers like India would not like to easily cede the hegemonic space to China but\, at the same time\, would realise that its power is pervasive and difficult to counter balance. The arrangement possibly would be for India to trade and invest intensely with China while seeking a security alliance with the US. Will India follow this path? How is India as an emerging power looked at in the region? Can India be a guarantor/balancer or will it be seen as an opponent? A careful reappraisal of Asia’s emerging strategic dynamics\, a hard-headed assessment of what India’s interests are and a considered approach to fulfilling these interests should deeply engage academia and policy makers. The session will explore the pillars on which India can build a more comprehensive\, forward-looking and proactive Asia policy. \n\n\n\n\nProgramme Schedule\n\n\n\n\n\nDay 1: February 19\n\n\n\n10.00-10.35\nInaugural Session\n\n\n10.00-10.05\nWelcome Address by DG\, IDSA\n\n\n\n\n\n\n10.05-10.30\nAddress by the Hon’ble Governor of West Bengal\n\n\n10.30-10.35\nVote of Thanks\n\n\n \n \n\n\n10.35-11.00\nTea\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n \n\n\n11.00-13.00\nSession 1: Asia’s geopolitical future\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \nChairperson: Arvind Gupta \nYan Xuetong : The bipolarization in East Asia\nSujit Dutta: Asia’s power transition: uncertain future of stability and peace\nTakenori Horimoto: How is power transition in Asia taking place?\nMichael Wesley: Restless giants: Asia’s new geopolitics\n\n\n\n \n \n\n\n13.00-14.00\nLunch\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n \n\n\n14.00-16.00\nSession 2: Military trends in Asia\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \nChairperson: Satish Nambiar \nFumio Ota: Chinese military expansion and other Asian states’ reaction\nAndrew Scobell: What is driving Asian aircraft carrier programs? The case of China\nNguyen Hung Son: Vietnam naval modernisation: causes and trends\nPrakash Menon: India’s military – modernising not militarising\n\n\n\n \n \n\n\n16.00-16.15\nTea\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n \n\n\n16.15-16:45\nSpecial Address by Hon’ble Defence Minister\n\n\n \n \n\n\n16.45-18.30\nSession 3: Economic global shift to Asia\n\n\n \nChairperson: US Bhatia \nHu Shisheng: Economic global shift toward Asia: realities and challenges\nRajat Kathuria: China and India: the benefits of co-opetition\nKristy Hsu: Opportunities and challenges in China and India: Taiwanese investors’ perspectives \n\n\n\n \n\n\n\nDay 2: February 20\n\n\n\n \n \n\n\n10.00-10.30\nTea\n\n\n \n \n\n\n10.30-13.00\nSession 4 Resource Stress in Asia\n\n\n \nChairperson: Uttam Sinha \nBobby A. Tamaela Wattimena: Energy security challenges under limited resource pressure in Asia region\nMukul Sanwal: Why water politics matters\nHuang Ying: Urbanisation and water security in China\nYashika Singh: India’s resource economy: possible choices and probable outcomes\n\n\n\n \n \n\n\n13.00-14.00\nLunch\n\n\n \n \n\n\n14.00-16.00\nSession 5: Ocean Governance in Indo-Pacific\n\n\n \nChairperson: Sudhir Vyas \nKV Bhagirath: The geo-strategic importance of the Indian Ocean\nYou Ji: Meeting the challenge of a la carte maritime disorder in the Indo-Pacific region\nLan-Anh T Nguyen: The quest for effective ocean management in the South China Sea\nAnup Singh: Time to discipline the sea lawyers\n\n\n\n \n \n\n\n16.00-16.15\nTea\n\n\n \n \n\n\n16.15-18.00\nSession 6: Assessing Risks: Cyber and Critical Infrastructure\n\n\n \nChairperson: Nehchal Sandhu \nGulshan Rai: Cyber security threat and states’ initiatives for securing cyber space\nTimothy Legrand & Saskia Hufnagel: Risk and resilience: international approaches to vulnerable infrastructure protection\nSimon Bronitt & Ashutosh Misra: Use of lethal force and military aid to civil power Australia and India: sharing lessons in counter-terrorism\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\nDay 3: February 21 \n\n\n\n \n \n\n\n10.00-10.45\nSpecial Address by the National Security Advisor (NSA)\n\n\n \n \n\n\n10.45-11.00\nTea\n\n\n \n \n\n\n11.00-13.00\nSession 7: India’s Response: A Panel Discussion \nPatrick Suckling \nSD Muni\nYan Xuetong \nP Stobdan \nRajiv Nayan\nSrikanth Kondapalli \nTakenori Horimoto \nNguyen Hung Son\n\n\n\n \n \n\n\n13.00-14.00\nLunch\n\n\n\n\n\n\nConference Booklet\nRapporteurs Report URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/16th-asian-security-conference-emerging-strategic-trends-in-asia-and-indias-response CATEGORIES:Asian Security Conference,Previous ASC,CONFERENCES ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140220T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140220T053000 DTSTAMP:20261109T063112 CREATED:20231223T124309Z LAST-MODIFIED:20240229T000612Z UID:62643-1392874200-1392874200@idsa.in SUMMARY:Keynote Address at the 16th Asian Security Conference on "Emerging Strategic Trends in Asia and India’s Response" DESCRIPTION:Watch Video\nI am grateful for the privilege afforded\, to deliver the Keynote Address at the 16th Asian Security Conference on Emerging Strategic Trends in Asia – India’s Response\, which is being organized by the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis. The IDSA is one of India’s leading think tanks\, and its Conferences attract many eminent experts and scholars. The opinions expressed\, and the outcomes\, have proved useful in shaping India’s policies in many areas. \nI. Introduction\n Today’s topic is of contemporary relevance given the fast changing developments taking place across Asia. There exist two Asias today – both competing for space and attention. Economically we have a dynamic\, and to an extent integrated Asia. The Asian Development Bank anticipates that by 2050 or even earlier\, Asia will nearly double its share of global GDP to 52%. 53% of Asia’s trade is now conducted within the region itself. The over USD 19 Trillion economy has today become an engine of global growth. While Asian economies are vital for each other\, economic ties with Asia have become critically important for the West following the global economic meltdown. \n There is\, however\, another Asia\, which in security terms appears dysfunctional\, buffeted by powerful nationalisms\, and prone to irredentism. This is an Asia where multiple strands of thought\, multiple perspectives\, and multiple courses of action\, intersect with fragile states already wracked by grave internal conflicts. Asia-Security\, thus\, appears anachronistic compared to Asia-Economic. Even regions that share commonalities of history\, geographies and cultures\, are often seen to be in conflict. \nII. Asian security dynamics: \nAsian security dynamics are an amalgam of issues such as: \n\noutstanding territorial disputes on land – the border dispute between India and China is perhaps the most longstanding\, but there are others which expose the fault lines in Asia\, and are potential flash points; \nmounting territorial tensions among India’s East Asian neighbours – which largely centre round contested claims regarding the sea\, spurred in part by China’s ever widening maritime claims in the South China and East China seas\, for which there are multiple claimants; \ntensions between China on the one hand\, and Vietnam\, the Philippines\, South Korea and Japan on the other;\nthe intense India-Pakistan rivalry\, that stems only in part from the unresolved issue of Jammu and Kashmir;\n\nNot to be ignored also\, are the differing perceptions among countries in the region of many of their neighbours\, and specially of the two largest countries of Asia\, all of which have tended to aggravate the divide across the continent. \nIII. Regional Stability Issues\nFor long\, South Asia had the unenviable reputation of being one of the most volatile regions in the world. Even today\, the situation in South Asia remains highly problematical\, but prevailing conditions in regions such as West\, South East and East Asia bring them also into similar reckoning. \nIn particular\, it needs to be recognized that fundamentalist\, extremist and radical ideas and beliefs\, are gaining ground faster in Asia than anywhere else; also that there is a resurgence of new radical outfits; and\, in turn\, religious extremism is aggravating existing turmoils. \nIn West Asia this is leading to an intensification of sectarian conflicts among disparate Islamist forces. Several West Asian nations like Egypt\, Syria\, Tunisia and the Gulf kingdoms\, are all wrestling with the problem of containing hard line Islamist groups. Opposing forces in the region are seeking asymmetrical support from the Hizbullah or Al-Quaeda\, depending on their predilections. Even Saudi Arabia feels highly vulnerable following the latest turn of events in Egypt\, Syria\, Iran and Iraq. \nSyria perhaps is an extreme case. An ‘alphabetic soup’ of elements – from the crumbling Free Syrian Army to the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Shams (ISIS) to Jabhat-Al-Musra and Ahrar-al-Sham to Zehran Allosush’s Army of Islam – are all battling for control. The spectre of Iran\, the rise of pro-Al Quaeda elements and the ‘terrorist narrative’\, as also the possibility of an enlarged Sunni-Shia conflict also hovers in the background. \nSouth Asia is not insulated from these winds sweeping across much of West Asia. Afghanistan\, Pakistan and Bangladesh\, for instance\, are facing intense pressure from radicals in their midst. The situation in both Afghanistan and Pakistan\, is additionally complicated by a combination of perceived State weakness and the presence of myriad terrorist groups\, which pose a threat of asymmetric warfare and terrorism to the countries themselves\, and to the region and beyond. \nMeantime\, extremist forces like the Taliban are gaining ground in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Afghanistan\, the possibility of the Taliban gaining ascendancy seems very real. In Pakistan\, the willingness of the present regime to hold talks with the Tehreek-e-Taliban posits a grave threat to neighbouring countries like India. Not to be ignored is Pakistan’s policy of continuing support to terrorist groups like the LeT\, and employ them as strategic instrumentalities against India. \nUnsettled conditions\, and a new cycle of conflict affect Myanmar\, Indonesia and Sri Lanka today. These involve religion\, ethnicity and politics; a special feature being the growing conflict between Buddhism and Islam. Thailand is embroiled in a fresh round of agitations\, though the colour of the present conflict is\, as yet\, unclear. The outlook in both Maldives and Nepal\, where Democratic governments have established a tenuous toehold for the present is uncertain. Sri Lanka confronts both a political as well as an ethnic crisis. \nChina-Japan differences are meantime getting further exacerbated. A more determined Japan under PM Shinzo Abe is unlikely\, and unwilling\, to accede or cede ground\, to China’s demands. China’s relations with Vietnam and some of the other ASEAN nations also lack warmth. Issues relating to North Korea and Taiwan add to existing complications. \nIV. Emerging Strategic Trends\nFrom the perspective of a Conference of this kind\, strategic experts would\, no doubt\, have us believe that it is the outcome of the two long standing conflicts in Asia viz.\, that of India and China\, and India and Pakistan\, and additionally China’s ‘rise’\, that will determine the end-situation in Asia. \nTalk of Indo-China rivalry in geopolitical and strategic matters is not new (though both countries discount such rivalry.) China and India clearly have different approaches to Asian security and regional stability and the situation calls for deft management having regard to the consequences. It does have the potential to test the established order in Asia and\, hence\, merits careful delineation. \nFor example\, China is accepted as a power economically\, but one which is also perceived by many Asian nations today as seeking to establish its strategic hegemony over the entire region and specially in its periphery. The assertion of China’s right to its ‘historic waters’ (confined within the nine dash lines of the Chinese claim line) and its announcement of an Air Identification Zone in the East China Sea\, are viewed as indices of its desire to achieve preeminence in the region. This is further buttressed by China’s growing interest in areas to its South\, and with which it shares a common border. China’s refrain of ‘continued competition’ in the military domain has only added to such concerns about China’s true intentions. \nIn comparison\, India’s priorities appear more limited\, largely restricted to maintaining its strategic autonomy even while trying to sustain higher economic growth. Its preference is for multilateral pluralist groupings and economic cooperation\, rather than for a policy based on power relations. This should be evident from its dealings with the Sunni-Arab world and Shia Iran\, as also Central Asian countries and Afghanistan. With countries of South East Asia\, India’s efforts have been mainly directed towards contributing to the creation of a mutually acceptable economic architecture. \nIn the case of the other longstanding conflict between India and Pakistan\, it must be acknowledged that it shows few signs of abating. In dealing with Pakistan\, however\, the challenge India faces is different from the one it faces in dealing with China. Part of the problem is Pakistan’s ‘propensity for perilous risk taking and a penchant for sub-state violence’ as a Western analyst puts it. \nThe growing influence and role of organizations like the Tehreek-e-Taliban\, Pakistan\, in determining key strategic decisions\, vis-à-vis India is exacerbating the problem. The Pakistan-Taliban is no longer confined to tribal areas straddling the Pak-Afghan border\, its influence is sizeable even in a city like Karachi. Its viewpoint\, at least as far as India is concerned\, could shape Pakistan’s policy in the coming period\, since there are influential elements today within the Pakistani Government who are anxious to co-opt\, rather than confront\, the Taliban. Consequently\, not every conciliatory gambit on India’s part is likely to produce a countervailing response. \nPakistan also possesses of one of the world’s biggest Armies – one that is equipped with a rapidly growing nuclear arsenal. The close support afforded by China to Pakistan in strategic matters – including that of assistance in nuclear matters – are all aspects that cannot be ignored. \nChina’s rise – peaceful or otherwise – is equally a vital factor in assessing emerging strategic trends in the region. Chinese nationalism is widely seen today as the main driver of China’s foreign and defence policies. Many strategic analysts believe that this is also one of those periods in Chinese history in which both Chinese nationalism and Chinese exceptionalism are on the ascendant. This will\, in turn\, have a direct impact on its external policies. The geo-political and geo-strategic fallout of this will require to be carefully considered. \nV. Strategic Threats\nThere are certain other aspects that will need to be taken into account. First and foremost\, is the expanding Terrorist dynamic in the Asian region. The reality is that global terrorism is expanding rapidly\, specially in Asia. The Syrian imbroglio is the most recent example. \nThe rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan-Pakistan\, and the situation in Syria and West Asia\, for instance\, are likely to exacerbate the tendency to pursue ‘high risk strategies.’ Viewed against the reality that terrorism has mutated into global franchise\, as also the existence of close coordination in operational matters among terrorist outfits such as the Al Quaeda in the Arabian Peninsula\, the Al Shabab\, the ISIS\, the LeT and the HuJI\, the terrorist threat has become very real. The advent of ‘leaderless jihad’ of the Abu Musab-al-Suri variety will aggravate an already difficult situation. Beset with other internal problems\, Asian nations would find themselves greatly stretched in dealing with such situations. \nNext\, is the Maritime Dimension. Sea lanes of communication have become critically important for Asian nations as the region contains several of the world’s most important choke points for global commerce. Many inter-state disputes are currently maritime in nature – including of late over Deep Seabed mining. Unsettled maritime boundaries and the tendency towards unrestricted exploitation of maritime resources with little regard for territorial jurisdiction – in the absence of a legal framework and multilateral agreements could become a flashpoint for conflict. \nAs Asian nations become conscious of the strategic potential of the Oceans many\, if not all\, of them are suitably positioning themselves by building their Blue Water capabilities. India and China – the two largest nations – are intent on expanding their Navies\, and both are in a race to enlarge the size of their surface and submarine fleets. The risk of unintended consequences has hence become considerable. \nA Third aspect is the Cyber Threat\, with strategic experts envisaging cyber space as the 21st Century battlefield\, and the Fifth Domain of Warfare. The cyber threat being intangible in nature\, with no borders\, and involving unseen armies targeting symbols of national security and data/information of security value\, poses a graver danger than many existing strategic threats. \nAmong the more vulnerable targets of cyber attacks\, are the military – including the nuclear and missile components – apart from national security targets and intelligence agencies. Across the world and not only in Asia\, attacks on military\, nuclear and financial systems have gone up almost two thousand percent over the past decade. Protecting a country’s critical infrastructure from crippling cyber attacks will\, hence\, prove increasingly difficult. As it is\, penetration modules like the STUXNET Worm (employed to attack closed systems such as Iran’s nuclear facility) are already passé. Highly sophisticated malicious malware to steal sensitive data are being evolved almost on a daily basis; even the Malware FLAME which only a few months ago was seen as the most sophisticated ever\, has been overtaken by later ones. \nThe grave nature of the cyber threat strengthens the case for erecting better firewalls and hardening of systems to withstand attacks. Advances in science are now being sought in this context\, and hopes have been raised that quantum mechanics could be the answer in the future. Meanwhile\, countries including India\, have\, of necessity\, be putting emphasis on evolving coordinated defence systems against cyber attacks – the National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre is India’s new hope in this respect. \nNuclear Asia represents yet another dimension of the strategic threat. In the contested geopolitics of Asia\, marked by enduring rivalries\, politically unstable regimes\, and concerns about conventional military inferiority\, the presence of many Nuclear States adds to prevailing security concerns. Some States do not have a well-defined nuclear doctrine or effective safety procedures; some like Pakistan are enlarging the scope of their nuclear weapons and experimenting with tactical nuclear missiles – Pakistan’s revelations of the existence of its Hatf-9 Nasr\, short range surface to surface missile with an operational range of 60 kms capable of carrying a nuclear warhead\, has raised the possibility of predelegation of nuclear weapons to battlefield commanders in case of a conflict. \nThe likelihood of Saudi Arabia intensifying its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons in response to a possible Iran-West deal on Nuclear Weapons is also real. It will further reinforce belief in nuclear superiority as a key determinant in resolving crises between nations that are otherwise perceived as unequal – militarily and economically. \nVI. India’s Response\nIndia’s response will be dictated by the perception of India – primarily in its immediate neighbourhood\, and to an extent in its extended neighbourhood and beyond. This perception would also be dependent on how China defines its national interests in the coming years. Will China opt for an aggressive or assertive policy in Asia? Or would it opt for a more cooperative and collaborative stance? As of now\, the former seems more likely. \nThe actions of the US in Asia – its withdrawal from Afghanistan; the blurring of lines (despite its rhetoric) as far as West Asia is concerned\, notably in the context of Syria and Iran; the policy shift from that of a pivot in Asia to ‘rebalancing of forces’ in the Indo-Pacific\, has greatly diminished its image. Most Asian nations will find US assurances as less than reliable\, and may be compelled to make other choices. Strategic thinkers in the West will\, as a result\, have to seriously rework and rethink their ideas on how to increase their geopolitical maneuverability in the Indo-Pacific; strengthening the natural capabilities of Beijing’s Asian neighbours and siding with them so as to balance China\, may no longer be a reliable option. \nHow nations would realign themselves would depend on whether they see the US as a recessed or receding major power\, China an aggressive one\, and India as a reluctant power. It is not without significance that Liu Yazhou\, Political Commissar at PLA’s National Defence University\, recently talked of the strategic opportunity that the PLA had to boost its military capability to defend China’s sovereignty where China is involved in territorial disputes (he had in mind the territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas\, but it could extend to other frontiers as well.) One must not also ignore the fact that aggressive nationalism often tends to spur a hawkish military. \nThe situation in Asia is such that it does open up opportunities as far as India is concerned. Equally\, if not more so\, it provides China with a strategic opening. Many Asian strategic analysts recommend that India should resist the temptation to be a part of US-led efforts to contain China; instead it should forge closer ties with Beijing and ensure proper management of its border tensions. This is also implicit in the advice proferred recently by State Counsellor PRC\, Yang Jiechi\, (while in India) when he observed that the growth of the China-India strategic and cooperative partnership serves the fundamental interests of the two countries…and the two countries must work to increase strategic mutual trust. \nAsia’s geopolitical future\, hence\, hangs in the balance. China’s real strength lies in its sustained economic growth. An issue that many Asian nations may\, hence\, have to ponder over in the near future is whether they should remain content being part of an economic partnership dominated by China in Asia\, or whether they should try and set up new fora where China’s economic dominance is less obvious. \nAgain\, military trends in Asia seem heavily slanted in China’s favour. Apart from India\, there is no country in Asia which can hope to match China’s military strength. While countries like Japan appear to be moving towards stronger defence mechanisms and forces\, there is little possibility that any of them could become a counterweight to China. Japan’s PM Shinjo Abe’s ‘democratic security diamond’ – a coalition among Japan\, India\, US and Australia – is a remake of the old Quadrilateral\, but dependence on the US tends to be highly problematic\, as allies such as Saudi Arabia are learning to their cost. \nThe two largest nations in Asia – China and India – also have their own Achilles Heel\, viz.\, the resource crunch they face. China has a clear headstart over India in tying up scarce resources with countries across the globe\, but the availability of resources is nevertheless a problem for both. The importance of ensuring that the Indo-Pacific remains peaceful cannot\, hence\, be denied. \nChina’s answer has been to draw up a viable Ocean strategy in its own image. At its 18th Party Congress\, China proclaimed the need to protect its overseas interests\, and underscored the centrality of maritime security in ensuring China’s economic progress and national well being. It also mentioned the need to set up ‘expeditionary forces’ to conduct military operations in distant lands and seas. This must serve as a wakeup call for China’s Asian neighbours – India in particular. \nVII. Conclusion\nRegional trajectories over the next 10 years are possibly not too difficult to predict. The outcome is\, however\, uncertain. China will almost certainly continue to make every effort to enlarge its influence across Asia\, and dominate its periphery. The absence of a Concert of Asia\, on the lines of the Concert of Europe of the 19th Century\, will\, hence\, have adverse consequences for many nations in Asia. Yet\, there does not appear to be any possibility of this happening\, in the absence of an Asian Metternich or a Bismarck. \nWatch Video URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/keynote-address-at-the-16th-asian-security-conference-on-emerging-strategic-trends-in-asia-and-indias-response CATEGORIES:KEY SPEECHES,Asian Security Conference,ASC Key Speeches ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140221T053000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20140221T053000 DTSTAMP:20261109T063112 CREATED:20231223T124305Z LAST-MODIFIED:20250311T075527Z UID:62642-1392960600-1392960600@idsa.in SUMMARY:Speaking Notes at the 16th Asian Security Conference on "Emerging Strategic Trends in Asia and India’s Response" DESCRIPTION:Watch Video\nDr. Arvind Gupta\, Director\, IDSA\,\nLadies and Gentlemen. \nThank you for asking me to speak to your conference. The IDSA Asian Security Con-ference has become an annual event that we look forward to as an occasion to review Asian issues and to learn from each other. As usual you have an impressive list of participants and a full and topical agenda. \nI thought I would briefly describe a few salient aspects of the present situation in the Asia-Pacific and what we might do about it. \nThe Present Situation in the Asia-Pacific\nFrom an Indian point of view\, located as we are at the intersection of West Asia and what is now called the Asia-Pacific\, until recently Asia appeared to be heading in dif-ferent directions\, depending on whether one looked East or West. But today\, in 2014\, whichever way one looks\, the factors of uncertainty have increased manifold\, as has a sense of insecurity. \nThe reasons why this is so to our west are well known. The turmoil in West Asia has been well analysed\, perhaps over-analysed; we know of the multiple transitions in Af-ghanistan this year\, of the situation in Syria\, Iraq\, Libya\, and so on and so forth. \nBut it is less obvious why there should be increased instability to our east in the Asia-Pacific\, why East Asia is much less harmonious than it was until a few years ago. \nOne reason could be that the Asia-Pacific is a crowded geopolitical space\, with the active involvement in its affairs of several established and of rising or re-emerging powers\, some external and some intrinsic to the region. But it has been so since the beginning of the nineteenth century. So what has changed to increase insecurity and uncertainty? I can think of four immediate reasons: \n\nFor one\, it is not just that the Asia-Pacific is getting even more crowded as China and several other powers re-emerge on the geopolitical stage. It is the simultane-ous emergence of several powers that has built pressure for a new equilibrium and balance. That new equilibrium has not emerged because the pace of change in the balance of power is so rapid.\nSecondly\, rapid economic growth in the last few decades has given several states in the region the means to militarily strengthen themselves. East Asia has seen the most rapid accumulation of economic power in world history. It is now seeing the same in terms of military power. The Asia-Pacific as a whole is witnessing the greatest peacetime arms buildup in its history\, possibly in world history.\nTechnology and politics have eliminated distance and separation between powers. We now speak of the Asia-Pacific as a geopolitical unit\, and not of East Asia\, South East Asia and South Asia separately. What happens in the South China Sea or the East China Sea concerns and affects the entire region\, if not the world. ICT and weapons technologies have eliminated the separations that existed between powers in the region.\nWe take for granted the removal of ideological restraints on the use of force or the threat of its use\, even though it is a recent phenomenon. The absence of ideology has resulted in renewed internal debates and political arguments in several major Asia-Pacific countries. (You see this in China and Japan. India is no exception.) At the risk of oversimplifying\, the debate is between liberal internationalists/reformers on the one hand\, and ultra-nationalists/conservatives on the other. The reformers seek more international cooperation and are committed to international values and solutions. The conservatives seek to recover lost territory and status\, (imagined or real)\, and seek a position of regional dominance\, or hegemony\, or in some cases as a superpower. The ultra-nationalists use a narrative of humiliation\, pride\, and re-sentment against limitations of capacity and reality to achieve their purposes. An essential part of this narrative is a threat inflation industry. And in many countries it is the conservatives with their emotional appeal who are the loudest in public dis-course\, not the cool reason and compromise of the reformers.\n\nEach of these phenomena individually might not have been a cause for worry. Even taken together they could have been manageable. But they come at a time of doubt about the security architecture in the Asia-Pacific and just when a new balance of power is emerging. For forty years\, since the US opening to China and the Vietnam War\, the Asia-Pacific has known relative stability under a security order in which the US provided security guarantees for the status quo. Today the US itself is rebalanc-ing back to the region and there is heightened uncertainty in the region. \nWhat should we do?\nContinued uncertainty or confrontation in the Asia-Pacific is clearly in no one’s inter-est as it will affect major powers’ attempts to restructure their economies and revive growth. Conflict would roll back the gains to each of our countries of forty years of stability and peace. \nWhat is the answer?\nClearly we need to act upon repeated statements by all the countries in the region and build an open\, inclusive security architecture in the region\, adding content to the concept and implementing it as soon as possible. We are only at the inception of this process with the ARF\, the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Plus dialogue\, and the East Asia Summit. \nIt will\, of course\, be a security architecture with Asian characteristics\, the political-military equivalent of the open interlinked economic order that has so benefitted the region\, taking into account the primarily maritime nature of many regional security issues and disputes amenable to collective solutions. \nIn building the order we should concentrate on the security essentials that made the region’s phenomenal economic growth possible. The commons\, on the high seas\, in air space\, and in cyber space should be safe and open to all lawful civilian users. That is why maritime security and freedom of navigation is so important and should be one of the first orders of business. \nOpenness about doctrines and defence\, and increased military contacts\, would also take some of the edge off uncertainty although confidence building can only hold the ring until the hard work of solving disputes and agreeing a rule based legal order is done. \nThank you for the patient hearing. I do hope that your deliberations will result in more clarity on strategic trends in Asia and on the security architecture and topics that we should work on to ensure the peace and security that is so essential to Asia’s com-mon future. \nWatch Video URL:https://idsa.in/idsa-event/speaking-notes-at-the-16th-asian-security-conference-on-emerging-strategic-trends-in-asia-and-indias-response CATEGORIES:KEY SPEECHES,Asian Security Conference,ASC Key Speeches ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/no_photo-200x150-2.jpg END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR