Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh, Research Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) spoke on “Taiwan under Lai Ching-Te and China’s Response” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 25 November 2024. The session was moderated by Dr. Mayuri Banerjee, Research Analyst, MP-IDSA. Dr. Singh’s presentation was followed by a discussion on the evolving dynamics in the Taiwan Straits under President Lai Ching-Te. 

Executive Summary

Tensions in the Taiwan Straits have significantly heightened. Washington’s continued diplomatic and military support has greatly irked Beijing which has responded with increased diplomatic and military coercion vis-à-vis Taiwan. Simultaneously, Cross-Strait relations have been strained over the Democratic Progressive Party’s calls of upholding Taiwan’s sovereignty and China’s provocative military exercises around Taiwan.

Detailed Report

The session commenced with remarks by Dr. Mayuri Banerjee, on the contemporary state of cross-strait relations. Briefly touching upon issues of ‘One China Principle and the 1992 consensus, she observed that tensions continue over the legal and political status of Taiwan. While China considers Taiwan a renegade province and pledges reunification, Taiwan under DPP which has been in power since 2016 has vowed to resist any attempts at reunification. Furthermore, the current President has publicly committed to defend Taiwan’s sovereignty against Chinese incursion.

Following the initial remarks Dr. Singh proceeded with underlining Tsai Ing-wen’s legacy, which oversaw not just the sensitisation of international opinion on the cross-strait issue, thereby garnering support over its legitimacy of existence and sustenance, as well as diversification and growth of the Taiwanese economy amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, but also witnessed reduction of Taiwanese outbound investments to China. However, prominent developments were observed in the mainstreaming of DPP positions on the nature of cross-strait relations, subsequently weakening the so-called 1992 Consensus amidst Taiwanese society, as well as promoting Taiwan’s visibility in the international arena using COVID-19 sentiments.

Dr. Singh also, along the same lines, highlighted the lowering of the party’s popularity and presence within the governance system in the recent 2024 elections in comparison to the prior elections, with DPP securing 40% of the votes in comparison to 56% earlier, as well as the party losing majority in the Legislative Yuan with the seat count reducing to 51. In comparison, the Kuomintang (KMT) Party’s tally observed a subsequent increment from 14 to 51, and Taiwan’s People’s Party (TPP) secured 8 seats.

Further, discussion on the DPP candidate Lai Ching-Te, the present President of Taiwan, followed, with a brief address about his political background within the party: as Member of the Legislative Yuan from 1999-2010, Mayor of Tainan from 2010-17, Chairman of DPP since 2023, subsequently becoming the President since 20 May 2024. Lai Ching-Te, self-proclaimed as the “Pragmatic Worker of Taiwan Independence”, strongly believes in the DPP philosophy that the future of Taiwan would be decided by all its people. This party philosophy works in contrast to the KMT, which observes the reunification of China and Taiwan under the ROC framework. Dr. Singh further emphasised the same by quoting Article 1 of the DPP charter (1991), which aims to push forward its objective of establishing a sovereign and independent Republic of Taiwan, and the 2007 DPP resolution on ‘normalisation of the nation,’ which reaffirmed Taiwan’s separate identity. However, a lack of popular consensus and concerns about reprisal from China hindered the undertaking.

While Lai Ching-Te’s Presidential win was rather devoid of much Chinese reaction, Dr. Singh noted that the reaction came with his first inaugural speech on 20 May 2024, which in itself was categorised as “much less restrained” than Tsai’s inaugural speech. The speech emphasised political differences between Taiwan and the PRC, referencing ideas of democracy and sovereignty. In doing so, the speech pushed forward ideals of equal footing with China without being limited by political subordination. Furthermore, the speech observed Lai’s naming of Taiwan “Mother” (motherland), challenging PRC’s notion of Mainland China being the “ancestral motherland” of Chinese people.

Dr. Singh elaborated on the UNGA 2758 Resolution, which considered and henceforth, recognised the PRC to be the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations and subsequently, expelling forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the “unlawful occupation”. To this, Taiwan’s contestation can be observed: particularly on the fact that nowhere in the said Resolution is ROC or Taiwan explicitly mentioned. As such, the Resolution has no word for Taiwan and as such, Taiwanese sovereignty. China’s opposition to this contestation pushes forward the idea that the Resolution supports the “One China Principle” and henceforth, inherently accepts Taiwan as a part of China.

While such debate has existed for a while, Dr. Singh noted, it is from 2020 onwards, that the debate garnered international attention and support. US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell for instance, testified to the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs in September 2024 that China was using the Resolution to falsely portray Taiwan’s status as illegitimate. Similarly, the European Parliament adopted a resolution concerning the misinterpretation of the Resolution in October 2024. Again, the Australian Senate passed an urgent motion refuting Chinese interpretations. Subsequent lack of domestic consensus within the Taiwanese polity on the Resolution was also discussed by Dr. Singh, wherein the parties had moved their motions towards the said Resolution, which subsequently failed to get passed: as the parties had differing stances regarding cross-Strait relations with China.

Dr. Singh then gave insights on the measures and counter-measures in response to the contemporary heightened stresses in cross-strait relations post-inauguration, the focus of which was China’s 22-article long Guidelines, Imposing Criminal Punishments for Diehard Taiwanese Independence Separatists in June 2024. Further cancellation of preferential tariff treatment for 134 products on the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) Early Harvest List was observed from the Chinese side. Further reports on harassment of Taiwanese citizens in Hong Kong were observed. At the same time, countermeasures were observed from the Taiwanese side, with Taiwan issuing an “orange” advisory “against unnecessary travel” to Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau due to the significant expansion of national security regulations there. Taiwan has also fine-tuned its relevant laws to prohibit citizens from holding positions in the political and military organisations affiliated to Communist Party of China and the Government. It also prohibited citizens from having household registrations in China.

Finally, Dr. Singh discussed aspects of deterrence, which included signaling opposition:

1) By sailing through the Taiwan Strait. For instance, the US 7th Fleet destroyer USS Higgins and Canadian frigate HMCS Vancouver sailed through in October 2024 following the PLA drill that China conducted in response to Lai’s National Day Speech. Furthermore, Australian guided missile destroyer HMAS Sydney and New Zealand’s supply ship HMNZS Endeavour navigated in Taiwan Strait on 25 September, signaling collective deterrence.

2) Through speaking in unison for Taiwan’s support. This included statements within the Australia-Japan-US Trilateral Defence Ministers’ Meeting Joint Statement on November 2024, the Joint Statement of US-ROK Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) on October 2024, as well as the first UK-US Strategic Dialogue on September 2024; each pushing forward the need for security and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

3) Through international acceptance of Taiwan. This includes Taiwan’s signing of two MoUs on drone cooperation with Lithuania in November 2024, a MoU with Germany on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, and Taiwanese involvement in reconstructing the Ukrainian city of Bucha, among others.

4) Through US Legislative and arms support, which includes the US-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade First Agreement Implementation Act of 2023, Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020, Taiwan International Solidarity Act, etc., as well as the backlog of more than US$20 billion worth deliveries including 66 F-16 fighter jets, which has portrayed increased US support to Taiwan.

Concluding, Dr. Singh brought forth the aspects of rising anxiety on both sides and that the continuous rule of DPP poses a challenge to PRC’s One China Principle. On one hand, such situations could push the DPP to choose between preserving the status quo or acquiring a radical position over its international presence and putting Beijing’s patience to the test. Dr. Singh further recommended monitoring international campaigns around UNGA Resolution 2758. As such, it remains to be noted how China reacts, in light of the US and its allies creating a new geopolitical reality in the Taiwan Strait.

Q&A session

The presentation was followed by an interactive Q&A session, addressing several key dynamics, which included: the UN’s addressal of the UN Resolution 2758 issue, the preparedness of the Taiwanese military, as well as the support from the neighborhood, primarily from Japan under the new government.

The Speaker provided insightful responses to the comments and questions raised.

This report was prepared by Mr. Abhigyan Raktim Duarah, Intern, Europe and Eurasia Centre, MP-IDSA, New Delhi.