The G20 New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration asserts that the ‘use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible’.
On 9 September 2023, the G-20 summit secretariat issued the ‘G20 New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration’. This is considered a big success for the Indian leadership and the Indian Presidency. This consensus document reflects the understanding of the participating parties regarding managing global challenges in the near future. The G-20 was created to accommodate rising powers in the global order so that the crises in the global financial order could be tackled effectively with involvement of multiple stakeholders. Recent developments in Ukraine, though, keep threatening the consensus-building approach of such an organisation.
The G-20 diplomacy has prevailed over confrontation and disruption. Efforts of Indian diplomacy have averted the G-20 plunging into a crisis. The declaration has underlined the principle of adaptation and adjustment. The right kind of language agreed upon among member states on some contentious issues has actually made it possible for the Declaration to be realised. Had there been no declaration, the exercise to resuscitate the global economic and financial order would have suffered a big setback.
The declaration contains a projection of not only global challenges but also their solutions. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has also promised to deliver an action-taken report soon. The declaration, which is a culmination of the exercise conducted by different tracks and engagement groups, is designed to address the priority areas of global challenges, essentially in the economic and financial areas.
A few nuclear issues relating to traditional military issues and non-traditional security issues matters like energy security are also discussed in the Leaders’ Declaration. The Declaration wants to address worldwide escalating costs associated with commodities such as food and energy along with other financial challenges. To construct a more promising tomorrow, the Declaration finds that implementing equitable energy transitions has the potential to enhance employment opportunities and people's well-being, as well as bolster economic resilience.
The declaration has a strong emphasis on energy transition plans. For nations choosing to utilise civil nuclear energy, there is a proposal for partnership based on voluntary and mutually accepted conditions. The partnership may have all the components of ‘research, innovation, development & deployment of civil nuclear technologies including advanced and Small Modular Reactors’.1 It is to be in alignment with their respective domestic laws. The nations are supposed to be
responsible nuclear decommissioning, radioactive waste and spent fuel management and mobilizing investments, and share knowledge and best practices, through strengthening international cooperation to promote nuclear safety globally.2
The Small and Modular Reactor, in contrast to the traditional method of building a reactor, is being promoted for its uniqueness. Such reactors could be useful in remote or isolated areas, on-grid deployment for replacing steam-coal power plants, generating dispatchable electricity, desalinated water, hydrogen for fuel, and ammonia for shipping. This is also considered useful for the countries that need energy but do not have diverse sources. The companies doing business in small modular reactors are offering services from fuel management to waste management. It is marketed for its minimal continuous human presence. However, the specialists are divided over the economic feasibility of the Small and Modular Reactor.
The Fukushima incident, environmental lobbies, regulatory issues, among others are complicating the matter for this reactor. Moreover, the supply of fuel, safeguards, safety and security challenges continue to dog the reactor. A modular reactor may have a high regulatory cost for small energy gains. No doubt, the ‘traditional guards, gates, and guns approach’ would ruin the economy of small modular reactors. New approaches are, therefore, essential.
Issues relating to transportation, nuclear security despite lower insider threat, commercial confidentiality, cyber threats, funding issues for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification, and so on are generally highlighted as the principal challenges for the Small Modular Reactors. However, forging of an early collaboration of designers, manufacturers, potential operators, governments, and IAEA may have the chance of making this type of reactors attractive for energy security.
The Declaration has strongly condemned any terrorist acts against critical infrastructure, including critical energy facilities. Although the declaration has not mentioned Zaporizhzhia, Chornobyl and any other Ukrainian nuclear complex, any nuclear energy complex is considered a critical energy facility. Both state and non-state actors may sabotage a nuclear energy complex. For years, the nuclear summit process and its follow-up activities have placed the limelight on nuclear terrorism. The international community is active in meeting the challenge not only in the nuclear summit process but also in other international forums. The G-20 has also become an important forum to address the challenge of nuclear terrorism.
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has emerged as an important global watchdog for combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism. It establishes global guidelines designed to thwart these unlawful actions and the detrimental consequences they inflict on society. The proliferation financing for Weapons of Mass Destruction, including nuclear weapons, has been one of the subjects of the FATF. It has been quite active on the issue. The G-20 has been recognising the role of FATF in many of its previous meetings.
The Delhi Leaders’ Declaration also lays down:
We reiterate the importance of countries developing and implementing effective regulatory and supervisory frameworks to mitigate risks associated with virtual assets in line with FATF Standards, especially for terrorism financing, money laundering, and proliferation financing risks. In this regard, we support the FATF's initiative to accelerate the global implementation of its standards, including the ‘travel rule’, and its work on risks of emerging technologies and innovations, including decentralised finance (DeFi) arrangements and peer-to-peer transactions.3
The G-20 underlines the significance of determining and evaluating the potential risks associated with potential violations, lack of enforcement, or avoidance of specific financial sanctions tied to proliferation financing, and implementation of suitable measures to address these risks in proportion to their severity. This approach will serve to inform both private sector entities and their regulatory authorities about the inherent risks within their industries and professions, preventing inadvertent support or involvement in proliferation financing networks or schemes, which would violate pertinent obligations. Additionally, it will guarantee that countries and private sector entities allocate resources appropriately, aligning with the level of risks associated with proliferation financing.
The Russia–Ukraine War seems to have shadowed the Delhi summit and the Declaration, too. After mentioning the discussions in Bali on the war in Ukraine, the Leaders’ Declaration mentions the national positions taken on the UN resolutions passed on the War in Ukraine. The same paragraph also cites the UN Charter, especially its principle ‘the use or threat of use of force for territorial acquisition against the territorial integrity and sovereignty or political independence of any state.’4
The last line of the paragraph has a statement on the nuclear threat. “The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible.”5 This is a consensus line upon which the entire summit has agreed upon. This is futuristic and universalistic in nature. Since it is part of the paragraph on the War in Ukraine, it clearly means that no side will resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. However, a Ukrainian official wanted the line to be read as: “On war against Ukraine, Russia’s use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible.”6
This begs the question: as Ukraine does not possess nuclear weapons, doesn’t the statement apply only to Russia if the war in Ukraine is taken as a context? At present, it may appear so. However, the future of war is unpredictable. The Russian threat of nuclear weapons use kept happening in the past. But fortunately, notwithstanding the regular sabre rattling, the taboo on nuclear use has remained intact. And the Russian utterances have basically been aimed at extracting concessions in the conflict. A careful reading of the Russian leadership of the use may indicate that it always has caveats that are downplayed or concealed by a section of the media.
However, those backing Ukraine occasionally have also used the Russian nuclear threat to mobilise global public opinion. As the situation is escalating and Ukraine is increasingly getting more sophisticated weapons, the G-20 has taken the right step in making the statement general in nature. It needs to be applied to all. Even if the immediate signalling is for Russia, in the future, the statement should remain a dominant global norm.
An overemphasis on the Ukrainian narrative may lead to the impression that Europe is still self-centred and Ukraine does not think beyond itself. This may lead to the weakening of the overwhelming global support it has for its territorial integrity and sovereignty. India and many other countries also face nuclear threats and blackmail from those nuclear countries that do not ascribe to the no-first-use policy.
Thus, the comprehensive and inclusive nature of the G-20 and its Leaders’ Declaration may be witnessed in different issue areas which have been covered during the Delhi meeting. The nuclear issue has all the dimensions—economic, energy transitions, security and the combination of all. A consensus document may have some words desired by an individual country missing but overall, it is a balanced document on the nuclear issues it has sought to touch upon or cover for various objectives.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The 18th East Asia Summit: Priorities of a Region in Flux
Temjenmeren Ao
September 14, 2023
The East Asia Summit remains critical to advancing closer regional cooperation, at a time of a rapid geo-political and geo-economic changes.
The 18th East Asia Summit (EAS) held in Jakarta on 7 September 2023 provided an opportunity for ASEAN member states and the eight non-ASEAN countries to exchange views on issues concerning the region and the world at large. Being a premier forum for strategic dialogue in the Indo-Pacific, the EAS remains critical to advancing closer regional cooperation, at a time of rapid geo-political and geo-economic changes.
EAS and Its Priorities
The origins of EAS dates back to the 1990 proposal for an East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) popularised by former Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad. This proposal, however, was met with stiff opposition from Japan and the United States. The project was later revived through the ASEAN Plus Three or APT (China, Japan, and South Korea) Summit of Heads of State and Government that first met in Kuala Lumpur in December 1997, and eventually found further expression through the creation of the EAS on 14 December 2005.1
Since its establishment, the membership of the EAS has increased from the original 16 to 18 countries comprising the ten ASEAN countries, along with Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the United States, and Russia. With Russia and the US being the last two countries to be admitted into the EAS in 2011, the forum has all the major powers including three of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. This expansion gave the EAS a more open, outward-looking and inclusive character.2
At the end of 2022, the participating countries in the EAS represented 52.8 per cent of the world population and accounted for 60.4 per cent of the global GDP.3 Being an ASEAN-led regional architecture, the EAS, unlike other regional forums, is inter-regional, consisting of countries from Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Australia. Further, the EAS is the first Asian grouping which includes all the great Asian powers, guided by an open and inclusive regionalism.4
The EAS being the only leader-led forum in the Indo-Pacific makes it a major platform to discuss the political, security, and economic priorities and challenges being confronted by the region. The EAS since its launch has enabled a platform wherein the participating countries have widened their perspectives beyond their traditional sub-regional focus. There are seven evolving priorities of regional cooperation within the framework of the EAS. These include environment and energy, education, finance, global health including pandemics, environment and disaster management, ASEAN connectivity, and maritime cooperation.5
With the emerging geo-political and the changing nature of threat being confronted in the Indo-Pacific region, the priorities of the EAS has evolved. During the 17th EAS held on 13 November 2022 in Phnom Penh, top priorities included food and energy security, climate change, the Russian–Ukraine crisis, concerns over escalating violence and the worsening humanitarian situation in Myanmar, and the situation in the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula.6
At the 18th EAS, the Leaders’ Declaration on ASEAN as an Epicentrum of Growth was adopted. Discussions were held on building resilience against emerging challenges and future shocks through cooperation on enhancing energy security and food security, maintaining financial stability, and strengthening regional health architecture. The meeting also reviewed the implementation of the EAS Plan of Action (POA) 2018–2022 and adopted the EAS POA (2024–2028).
The POA for the next five years outlines the priorities that include efforts on the mainstreaming and implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). The POA reinforces the centrality of ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms as the driving force within the EAS. It lays emphasis on strengthening partnerships, through cross-sectoral collaborations that includes efforts in furthering the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.7
A Region in Flux
Since the establishment of the EAS in 2005, the global economy has witnessed major shocks some of which include the global financial crisis, the socio-economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, and the impact of the ongoing war in Ukraine on global food and energy security. The priorities as outlined through the EAS Leaders’ Declaration indicates a consensus for a stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. Issues confronted by the region such as energy and environment, finance, education, cooperation in terms of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), health crisis including pandemics and its socio-economic implications, issues of connectivity, and traditional and non-traditional security threats from terrorism to piracy at sea underscores the significance of the EAS.
However, strengthening the EAS as a forum for dialogue and cooperation on a wide spectrum of strategic, political, and economic matters of common interest and concern, remains complex. This stems from the existing and ever-evolving multi-faceted threats and challenges which get compounded through the intense geo-political and geo-economic discourse being witnessed in the region. In his opening remarks at the 18th EAS, Indonesian President Jokowi urged the leaders to make the forum a place to strengthen collaboration and cooperation and not sharpen rivalries.8
While the EAS participating countries share a common perspective aimed at achieving peace and security in the Indo-Pacific, ongoing contestations limits cooperative and collaborative framework as envisaged originally. In the light of the emerging differences in the region, at the 14th EAS on 4 November 2019, Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated that the EAS is a
…logical platform to promote a free, open, inclusive, transparent, rules-based, peaceful, prosperous Indo-Pacific region, where sovereignty and territorial integrity and the application of international law especially UNCLOS are assured to all States equally….9
Being the only multilateral platform that brings together the leaders of ASEAN member states and the other major regional powers, it makes the EAS the most balanced amongst the other existing regional structures. However, the nature of the relations amongst the EAS participating countries, marked by confrontation and contestations, has had its impact on its efficacy and effectiveness.
The deepening geo-political divide being witnessed today raises concern on the relevance of the EAS in addressing issues of human security challenges as a consequent of the socio-economic fallout from the COVID-19 and the ongoing war in Ukraine. These challenges which requires a collaborative and consultative effort, get derailed as a consequence of ongoing contestations amongst countries over resources and territory to the ongoing strategic rivalry being witnessed in the Indo-Pacific region.
Conclusion
The 18th EAS was an attempt to strengthen the efficacy and effectiveness of the institution by emphasising on an international community, build on cooperation without division and confrontation. This year’s summit saw the adoption of the EAS Leaders’ Statement on Maintaining and Promoting the Region as an Epicenter of Growth with comprehensive discussions on regional and international issues. The reinforcement of ASEAN Centrality and Unity as well as the mainstreaming of the AOIP are positive outcomes as they aligned with the visons on the Indo-Pacific of the respective EAS participating countries.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. Joseph Chinyong Liow, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Southeast Asia, Routledge, Oxon, 2015, p. 150.
3.“East Asia Summit”, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government.
4. K. Kesavapany, “The East Asia Summit: An Overview”, in Dalijit Singh (ed.), Political and Security Dynamics of South and Southeast Asia, ISEAS Publishing, Singapore, 2007, p. 10.
5. Hoang Thi Ha and Malcolm Cook, “Is the East Asia Summit Suffering Erosion?”, ISEAS, 3 May 2021.
Prime Minister Modi and President Biden recommitted to expeditiously work towards supporting the fulfilment of the GE-HAL jet engine deal, at the meeting ahead of the New Delhi G20 Summit.
In June 2023, India and the US announced the agreement between the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and GE Aerospace to produce fighter jet engines for the Indian Air Force (IAF), during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s State visit to the US. This deal is being viewed as a major milestone and key element in strengthening defence cooperation between the two countries. The deal comes in the backdrop of the IAF’s efforts to enhance its capacities and capabilities.
The IAF is in the process of procuring 114 Multi-role fighter jets (MRFA), along with acquiring additional numbers of Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk1A, followed by LCA Mk2. The fifth generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) is also being developed, as is the Twin Engine Deck Based Fighter (TEDBF) by Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) for the Navy’s aircraft carriers.
The jet engine deal is important for India from strategic point of view as well as from point of view of indigenous capability development. Despite several efforts by DRDO’s Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE), desired level of development of an advanced combat jet engine has remained far from reality.
Despite self-reliance achieved in critical technologies such as cryogenic rocket engines, for instance, India has not been able to join the list of countries that can make jet aircraft engines. Very few countries like the US, Russia, the UK and France have the necessary technology and metallurgy needed to make combat jet engines. Prominent jet engine manufacturers include US-based majors like Pratt & Whitney, General Electric, Honeywell Aerospace, Safran SA (France), Rolls-Royce (UK), and Russian majors like Aviadvigatel and NPO Saturn.
The India–US jet engine agreement includes the potential joint production of GE Aerospace’s F414 engines in India, for which the US major is working with the US government to receive necessary export authorisation. For India, the F414 engine holds great significance, given that it will power the IAF’s LCA Mk2 jets. The ADA/DRDO had in 2010 selected F414-INS6 for the LCA Tejas Mk2.1
India’s first indigenous fighter jet LCA Tejas is powered by GE’s F404 engines. So far, 75 F404 engines have been delivered and another 99 are on order for LCA Mk1A by GE. Eight F414 engines have been delivered as part of an ongoing development programme for LCA Mk2.2 Furthermore, there are prospects of utilising F414 engines for the AMCA, India's ambitious fifth-generation fighter aircraft.
GE noted that the historic agreement has been made possible due to the longstanding partnership with HAL and that the F414 engines ‘will offer important economic and national security benefits for both countries’.3 The GE F414 engine has been known for its reliable performance and has been used by the US Navy for over 30 years. This engine is also used in F-18 Super Hornets. The F414G, the single-engine variant of the F414, powers Saab’s Gripen E/F aircraft. The F414 engine powers military aircraft in eight nations, making it a trusted choice for modern fighter jets.
Another aspect which makes this deal significant is the level of technology transfer, with 80 per cent technology transfer to HAL, including critical technologies, with sources noting this indicates the level of trust between India and the US. The 2012 ‘Engine Development Agreement’ in 2012 between GE and HAL for the F414 engine had 58 per cent technology transfer.4 The Joint Statement issued after talks between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Joe Biden notes that the ‘trailblazing initiative to manufacture F-414 engines in India will enable greater transfer of US jet engine technology than ever before’.5 The jet engine deal could be a game-changer for India’s indigenisation programme, opening the doors to access to new generation technologies which will percolate to other sectors.6
AMCA Engine
Major foreign OEMs like Rolls Royce and Safran have also offered their jet engines under Make in India programme, for India’s fifth generation AMCA.7 India’s High Commissioner to the UK, Vikram Doraiswami and DRDO Director General (Production Coordination and Services Interaction) Chandrika Koushik visited the UK-based Rolls Royce in October 2022. Rolls Royce reiterated that it was ‘committed to supporting India’s indigenisation journey and keen to partner the country's AMCA programme’.8 Rolls Royce produces the Eurojet EJ200 engine with a thrust of 110-120KN.
Rolls Royce’s European rival, Safran has also reportedly submitted a proposal to jointly design, develop, test, manufacture and certify a new state-of-the-art 110 KN thrust engine for AMCA and the twin-engine TEDBF for aircraft carriers, with complete technology transfer. Safran also offered to set up a centre of excellence in gas turbine technology in India with full design and metallurgical precision software tools, synchronised with Safran’s facility coming up in Hyderabad to maintain repair and overhaul LEAP engines for the A320 and Boeing 737 aircraft.9 In response to the Safran’s proposal, DRDO Chairman visited Safran engine factory and the R&D centre during Paris Air Show 2023.
GE is also reported to have offered to develop jet engine for India’s AMCA, three years after suspending joint development of aircraft engines under the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI) in October 2019. US Under Secretary for Defense Ellen Lord had indicated that issues with export controls stymied further cooperation.10
As for indigenous engine development, there are ongoing efforts to indigenously develop jet engine under Project Kaveri. It was reported in February 2023 that the high-altitude tests of the Kaveri derivative engine (a non-afterburning version) was conducted successfully in Russia, simulating an altitude of 13,000 m.11 Godrej and Boyce has been given a contract by DRDO to manufacture a few 48 KN dry Kaveri engine modules.12 GTRE is aiming to integrate Kaveri onto DRDO’s Ghatak by 2026, an Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV).
Conclusion
Given the status of indigenous engine development efforts capable of powering fighter aircraft, therefore, the India–US jet engine deal is being seen as a game-changer. It could help India leapfrog in aerospace technologies and create an enabling R&D ecosystem. The agreement though will need to have suitable technology transfer supporting India’s indigenisation programme. This can then open the doors to access to new generation technologies which can percolate to other sectors.
President Biden and Prime Minister Modi, in the Joint Statement issued after talks on 8 September 2023 ahead of the G20 Summit in New Delhi ‘welcomed the commencement of negotiations' between GE and HAL to manufacture the jet engines in India and ‘re-committed to work collaboratively and expeditiously to support the advancement of this unprecedented co-production and technology transfer agreement’.13
If the contract to co-produce jet engine with repair, maintenance and overhauling in India along with export clauses as per India’s expectations is finalised at the earliest with the due legislative and administrative approvals in US and with the desired technology transfers and a favourable cost negotiation, it will help India and the US to further strengthen their strategic partnership centred on trade, defence and technology as well as geopolitical alignment.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. “GE F414 Engines Selected to Power India Light Combat Aircraft Program”, GE, 1 October 2010.
2. “GE Aerospace Signs MOU with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited to Produce Fighter Jet Engines for Indian Air Force”, GE, 22 June 2023.
4. Dinakar Peri and Suhasini Haider, “Jet Engine Deal Ensures 80% Technology Transfer to HAL; First Engine in Three Years”, The Hindu, 23 June 2023.
5. “India-USA Joint Statement during the Official State visit of Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi to USA”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 23 June 2023.
6. “Why GE's Plan to Make Fighter Jet Engines in India is a Big Deal”, The Economic Times, 23 June 2023.
7. Sakshi Tiwari, “Rolls-Royce, Safran & GE Offer to Power India’s 5th-Gen AMCA Stealth Fighter Jet, But Export Restrictions Inevitable”, Eurasian Times, 11 October 2022.
The China–Africa Peace and Security Forum: Practical Outcomes or Same Old Rhetoric?
Abhishek Mishra
September 06, 2023
China’s security engagement in Africa has grown to encompass aspects relating to police and law enforcement cooperation, conflict mediation, and professional military education.
China’s oversized role in supporting Africa’s development primarily through massive amounts of loans and investments is well documented and tends to get a lot of media attention. However, equally important is China’s growing appetite for playing a role in Africa’s peace and security architecture and in the military domain. Issues relating to African peace and security are now considered to be a prominent feature of Chinese foreign policy rhetoric. Often, China asserts that it stands to benefit from a stable, secure, and peaceful Africa. This would in turn create a conducive environment that can ensure Beijing’s continuous access to the growing African market.
For the most part, the security dimension of China–Africa cooperation involved the deployment of troops for United Nations peacekeeping missions, training of African military and security personnel, and counter-piracy operations. This mandate in recent years has broadened to include aspects like conflict mediation, counter-terrorism, policing and law enforcement cooperation, and military training. This is the background in which the third edition of the China–Africa Peace and Security Forum was held from 28 August to 2 September 2023 under the theme ‘Implementing the Global Security Initiative, Strengthening China-Africa Solidarity and Cooperation’ in Beijing. Over 100 delegates, representatives, and defence officials from 50 African countries participated in the event.
The China–Africa Peace and Security Forum provides a common platform for military officials from both sides to convene and discuss issues of mutual interest. The forum serves two primary goals—consolidate networks of strategic communications between Chinese and African defence departments; and explore possible ways in which African militaries and security architecture can align with China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI). The GSI was espoused by President Xi Jinping during the Boao Forum in April 2022 but formally gained traction on 21 February 2023 with the release of the GSI’s Concept Paper.1 The GSI is China’s regional and global architecture and is an effort to shape a new world order with Chinese characteristics.
Outcomes of the Conference
Discussions at the forum echoed a similar rhetoric of the need to strengthen China–Africa security cooperation to jointly deal with global security challenges and uphold international justice. General Li Shangfu, State Councilor, and Chinese Defense Minister during his address at the plenary session called African partners to work with China to uphold a common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security mindset. This is to be achieved by focusing on dialogue rather than confrontation, partnership rather than alliance, ‘win-win’ rather than zero-sum to inject more certainty, peace, and positive energy into a global order riddled with security challenges.
China continues to insist that certain aspects of its outreach will not change. For example, the tradition of helping each other, or the principle of equality, the direction of practical cooperation, or the spirit of valuing righteousness, will not change. With a focus on practicability and effectiveness, China aims to offer African countries with an alternative model for growth and development that is different from the Western models. Such form of ‘Chinese model’ aims to coerce African countries into incorporating Chinese values, ethos, governance system, and develop a similar view of the global order. While these lofty claims and ambitions may serve to propagate Chinese interests, the conference in practice achieved very little apart from rhetorical commitments.
Drivers of Chinese security activism in Africa
There are both practical and political factors that drive China’s growing security engagement with African countries. Beijing’s security engagement is inextricably connected to its other goals such as expanding logistical footprint, increasing political influence in multilateral forums like the United Nations, professionalise its military, improve operational readiness, gain military access, and protect its commercial interests and investments. With over 1 million Chinese citizens, 10,000 Chinese firms, loans worth US$ 160 billion, and investments worth nearly US$ 300 billion in Africa, protecting its citizens and investments is a top priority for Beijing.2
An alarming trend in recent years is the increase in reports of attacks and kidnappings of Chinese workers in countries like Central African Republic, South Africa, Ethiopia, and Democratic Republic of Congo, raising question about China’s ability to protect its citizens overseas. The attacks have exposed the widening disconnect between China’s economic ambitions and its security apparatus abroad.3
Peacekeeping and the supply of small arms and light weapons have traditionally remained central to China’s security outreach to Africa. Around 80 per cent of Chinese peacekeeping forces that are currently deployed are in Africa in addition to the 44 anti-piracy task force groups deployed to protect trade since 2008.
However, there are some new areas of China’s security engagement in Africa, most notably professional military education (PME) and policing and law enforcement cooperation. China has been taking interest in African security governance and is working to promote Chinese policing norms within African police forces and governments.4 A paper released by China’s State Council Information Office in 2021 states that since 2018, China has trained over 2,000 African police and law enforcement personnel.5 In July 2023, the police chiefs of China and Ethiopia jointly decided to establish an ‘Ethio-China Law Enforcement Cooperation Center’ in Addis Ababa, reflecting a rapid increase in law enforcement engagement in response to crimes targeting Chinese citizens in Africa.6
Conflict mediation is an area which has attracted Chinese attention. Buoyed by the remarkable and unexpected success of brokering rapproachment between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023, Beijing is seeking to promote itself as a consequential mediator in African peace process. In June 2022, China sponsored a Horn of Africa Peace, Good Governance and Development Conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and appointed a ‘Special Envoy’ for the Horn of Africa region. Although this conference achieved little in practical terms, it did help Beijing signal to its African partners its willingness to host regional security dialogues to broker peace in the future.7 The African continent has emerged as sort of a ‘testing ground’ for Chinese security engagements abroad. Already, there are reports of the possibility of China brokering peace in conflict-ravaged countries like Sudan.8 It is only a matter of time before China looks to play a more consequential role in Francophone West Africa, a region that has witnessed eight coups in the last three years.
Another important trend is the growing Chinese affinity to use the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to accommodate its political and ideological goals through professional military education (PME). China provides education and training to African military personnel to promote its governance model and build a shared understanding of security.9 African military officers and students attend various PLA political schools to receive training on how a ruling political party could use available mechanisms to exercise control over the military. This is conducted at various levels like regional academies, command and staff colleges, or at the upper level at China’s National Defense Academy and National University of Defense Technology.
However, although the Chinese PMEs are considered less prestigious, cover limited subjects, and are less in scale and scope than Western PMEs, their applicability in an African context is much higher. Most of these Chinese PMEs train African officers in China, rather than training them within the continent. In essence, Chinese PMEs are working with African militaries to engender, foster, and reinforce a similar understanding of the concept of security through Chinese initiatives like the Global Security Initiative (GSI), the security aspects of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or the political architecture of defence building.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Sweden’s presidency contributed significantly to addressing the EU’s economic and security challenges.
The Council of the European Union (EU) negotiates and shapes legislation proposed by the European Commission. The Council comprises ministers from all EU Member States and its presidency rotates among the member states every six months. The Council President leads the Council's work and represents all member states in dealings with other EU institutions.
From 1 January 2023, Sweden assumed the presidency of the Council of the European Union for six months until 30 June 2023, taking over from The Czech Republic.1 This marked the third time that Sweden held the Council Presidency, with previous presidencies being in 2001 and 2009.
During the first tenure in 2001, the focus was on EU enlargement, employment and environment, while in 2009, the key issues included the financial crisis, economic recovery and climate change. Additionally, the Swedish Presidency played a significant role in implementing the Treaty of Lisbon, which brought about substantial changes across EU institutions. Sweden's then Prime Minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt was the last national representative to lead the European Council. Post that, the introduction of a permanent President aimed to ensure greater continuity in the Council's work.2
However, the world, including Europe, has faced paradigm shifts in recent years such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. These inevitably have expanded the function of the Council. This was evident in the more than 2,300 formal meetings as part of Sweden’s presidency.
Notably, Sweden, along with France and the Czech Republic, had jointly prepared a general programme called the Trio Programme. This endeavour spanned 18 months and set out the EU’s shared priorities and goals.3 Following Sweden, a new trio comprising Spain, Belgium and Hungary will take over and develop a new programme for the subsequent period.
Priorities of Sweden’s Presidency
The Swedish Presidency focused on four key areas:
Safeguarding citizens and freedoms;
Developing a sustainable foundation for the future of Europe;
Building a climate-neutral and socially just Europe; and
Promoting European interests and values globally.
In addition to the above, the Swedish presidency also focussed on security, competitiveness, green and energy transitions and rule of law.4 Unsurprisingly, it prioritised the continuation of economic and military support to Ukraine, including Kiev’s path towards EU integration. Notably, Ukraine’s membership would require a concerted effort at both the national and EU levels, including dealing with tricky issues such as reconstruction and reforms.
Amidst the EU’s hostile security environment, the Swedish presidency sought to build consensus and a plan of action to secure the Union’s interests. Measures were taken to implement the Strategic Compass5 and other related initiatives. The European Peace Facility (EPF) was effectively utilised to provide military assistance to Ukraine. .
Meanwhile, given the setback suffered by the continent on account of weaponisation of energy during the war,6 Sweden had to channelise its presidency towards tackling high energy prices and implementing long-term energy market reforms.
The Swedish presidency concluded with a focus on achieving a “greener, safer and freer Europe”.7
Progress towards a ‘Greener’, Safer’ and ‘Freer’ Europe
Under the Swedish presidency, attempts were made at fast-tracking Europe’s green energy transition. This involved the climate package called ‘Fit for 55’, first agreed upon in July 2021, with the aim to make Europe the world's first climate-neutral continent by 2050.8 This package targeted sectors such as climate, environment, energy and transportation.
As part of implementing the ‘Fit for 55’, attempts were made to enhance and expand the EU’s emission trading system (ETS), emission caps for each sector were introduced, strict conditions were set for members to reduce emissions under the Effort-Sharing Regulation (ESR), and targets to increase carbon sinks through forests and soils/land were given.9 The utilisation of renewable energy sources were sought to be expanded, while providing support for innovative green initiatives and robust energy policy was formulated. Together, these efforts were aimed at achieving sustainable and environmentally responsible transformation towards a greener future.
Unsurprisingly, amidst Europe’s energy boycott of Russia, the focus of the Swedish presidency was also on preparing for the upcoming winter in 2023 and addressing the high and fluctuating energy prices, as well as expediting investments in clean and renewable electricity generation. The Council, therefore, sought to prolong its own regulation on coordinated measures to reduce gas demand during the upcoming winter period. Additionally, it also chose to continue with the plan chartered for implementation of the Regulation on Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT),10 which is a crucial element of the proposed EU electricity market redesign.
Supporting Ukraine was a priority for the Swedish presidency. Efforts were made to coordinate actions of member states as part of the need to put up a united European front, including imposing far-reaching sanctions on the Russian government.11 Additionally, significant progress was made in agreeing on a new migration policy,12 which aims to reduce immigration into Europe and combat cross-border crime through enhanced cross-border cooperation among judicial and law enforcement authorities.13
Sweden emphasised the importance of promoting freedom in Europe and strengthening the EU's competitiveness.14 Efforts were made to lay the foundation for a more ambitious EU, focusing on long-term competitiveness, growth and productivity until 2030 and beyond.
Way Forward
The war in Ukraine has threatened the democratic values on which the EU was founded, highlighting the need for the organisation to adapt to new geopolitical realities. Additionally, it has resulted in several economic challenges, such as rising energy prices and inflation amidst an economic slowdown. Sweden’s presidency contributed significantly to addressing these issues.
With the next trio having set up their 18-month agenda, the Council has its task cut out.15 Delays in implementing judicial reforms and issues concerning transparency, values and justice remain a challenge, particularly vis-à-vis Poland and Hungary.16 As such, only time will tell how these challenges are handled by the Council. It would continue to require unity and concerted efforts to meet emerging challenges while continuing the pursuit of a stronger and more prosperous European Union.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The JCPOA revival, to some extent, will continue to depend on the US’s stand on the IRGC’s designation.
After the US unilaterally walked out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 to revive the Iran nuclear deal have not succeeded so far. Points of contention have included re-imposition of sanctions by the US, Iran making significant gains in its nuclear programme, as well as domestic political issues like the Iranian government’s brutal crackdown on protesters in 2022.1
The 2019 designation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) by the US State Department has been another key impediment that has prevented the revival of the deal. Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian in March 2022 held that sanctions imposed on the IRGC were a “red line” as the IRGC was “the most important security and defense” organisation in the country.2 While speaking at the Doha Forum in 2022, Kamal Kharazi, a former foreign minister and adviser to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei insisted that the IRGC “certainly must be removed” from the FTOs list for nuclear talks to succeed.3
IRGC’s role
The IRGC is an influential institution as the Guardian of the Islamic Revolution and has come to play a significant role economically as well as politically. The sanctions re-imposed on Iran after the Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA made it difficult for foreign firms to conduct business with Iran and further isolated Iran’s economy. As part of Khamenei’s vision of a ‘resistance economy’ against the US sanctions, the IRGC expanded its role as an economic actor, especially in mega projects.
The IRGC reportedly has a near monopoly in industries like construction, energy, mining, telecommunication, among others.4 Reports in 2020 noted that the IRGC controlled around one-third of the Iranian economy.5 The IRGC has been able to transform itself from an Islamist militia to one of the most powerful institutions in the country. The reformist Khatami and later moderate Rouhani administrations tried limiting the economic activities of the IRGC to expand the private sector.6
The Ahmadinejad and the current Raisi administrations, however, gave prominent roles to former IRGC generals, including Cabinet positions. For instance, Seyyed-Parviz Fatthah, Minister of Energy and Abdol-RezaMesri, Minister of Welfare and Security were among 12 out of 21 ministers appointed by Ahmadinejad who had served in the IRGC.7 President Raisi appointed former IRGC officials like Yaghubali Nazari as the Governor of Khorasan-Razavi province, Abedin Khorram as the Governor of Eastern Azerbaijan and Mohammad Sadatinejat as the Agriculture Minister.8 Supreme Leader Khamenei regards the IRGC as the sooton-e kheimeh enghlab (Main Pillar of the Islamic revolution).9
While the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) formulates Iranian nuclear policy within the broad policy framework set by the Supreme Leader, it is safe to say that the IRGC has an important say in the matter. Former President Hassan Rouhani, who was also the first Secretary of the SNSC, as well as his successors, have served in the IRGC. Most recently, on 22 May 2023, Ali Akbar Ahmadian, who was elevated to the post of SNSC Secretary, was also a veteran commander of the IRGC.10
The IRGC has maintained a hawkish stance vis-à-vis the nuclear issue and has been against giving nuclear concessions. The IRGC has long maintained that Iran should have the right to develop nuclear weapons in the face of the military threat from hostile actors as well as to safeguard the country from foreign intervention.11
US Position
The US Secretary of State designates an organisation as an FTO if it engages in terrorist activity and threatens the security of US nationals or the US national security. While the Biden administration is keen to revive the nuclear deal, there is unwillingness on delisting the IRGC from the FTOs list. On 16 August 2023, the US State Department insisted that the US was committed to ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon and that diplomacy was the best way to achieve it. The Spokesperson further stated that Iran needed to de-escalate first to create space for diplomacy.12
The IRGC is seen as perpetrator of terrorism in the region and is alleged to have had a role in the killing of US soldiers and officials in Iraq.13 In light of demands by Iran for the delisting of the IRGC, the US Senate passed a non-binding resolution in May 2022 against such a move by 62 votes to 33, with 16 Democrats also joining the Republicans in passing the measure.14 So far, there has been no change in the stand of the US that delisting the IRGC from FTO’s list is separate from JCPOA revival.15 The US State Department in May 2023 reiterated that the IRGC has been designated as an FTO and noted that the IRGC “are subject to more US sanctions than any other entity on the planet”.16
It is significant to note that after the IRGC listing as an FTO in 2019 and the killing of Hossein Soleimani in January 2020, attacks from Iran-backed groups went up by 400 per cent between 2019 and 2020.17 According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), the period saw heightened US–Iran tensions in which approximately 50 attacks took place on the US bases in Iraq.18 After the resumption of JCPOA talks in Vienna in April 2021, reports indicate that there has been a 25 per cent reduction in the attacks on the US bases in Iraq.19
Conclusion
The Trump administration listed the IRGC as an FTO under its maximum pressure campaign. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in May 2022 admitted that the FTO designation has had had minimal impact on curbing IRGC’s alleged destabilising activities.20 While the regional security situation has continued to deteriorate since the 2019 FTO designation, there has also not been much progress on the Iranian nuclear talks. A compromise on the IRGC issue between Iran and its interlocutors continues to be an essential part of the bargain to resume mutual compliance with the terms and obligations of the JCPOA.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The coup in Niger has deep regional and international implications and may lead to increase in major power contestations in the region.
On 26 July 2023, in a coup d’etat, General Abdourrahmane Tchiani, the head of Niger’s presidential guard, deposed the democratically elected President Mohammad Bazoum and declared himself as the leader of the military junta. This action led the 15-member regional economic grouping, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to impose economic sanctions and threaten military intervention if the democratic government is not restored in the country.
After a meeting with mediators from ECOWAS on 19 August 2023, the Niger coup leader promised to return the country to democratic rule in three years. The ECOWAS however has rejected the three-year time frame and are pushing for the earliest return of civilian rule in the country.
The regional efforts to reverse the coup are supported by the United States and France that have deep economic and military links with the country. Earlier, France, the European Union and the US declared economic sanctions and stopped development assistance. The unconstitutional change of government in Niger has deep implications for the region and for the country’s external partners.
Regional Implications
Niger is a land-locked country in West Africa that borders Mali to the West, Chad to the East, Algeria and Libya to the North and Burkina Faso, Benin and Nigeria to the South. The coup in the country has set alarm bells ringing across the region. West Africa has been rocked by multiple coups in the last three years. These include coups in Mali (August 2020, May 2021), Guinea (September 2021) and Burkina Faso (January and September 2022). In most cases, the democratically elected representatives were thrown out of power due to the growing dissatisfaction with the government in particular, due to corruption, economic malaise, and inability to stem the tide of violence from extremists and jihadists.
Regional leaders are worried since they recognise that the coup in Niger is an existential challenge not only for political and economic stability of Niger but for the entire West African region. They are aware that most countries in the region are facing political and economic problems and are quite vulnerable towards any form of internal instability. The regional leaders fear that failure to take a firm stand may trigger a contagion of unconstitutional changes in the region.
The failure to reverse the coup may also hamper regional counter-terrorism efforts. In recent years, the region bordering Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali has become the epicenter of violence by terror groups affiliated to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. As a result, lately, Niger had become the hub of counter-terrorism activities led by the West, particularly France and the US. The internal instability caused by the military coup may provide an opportunity to the terrorists to enhance their activities in the region.
More importantly, call for military intervention by ECOWAS has led to division amongst the member states with Burkina Faso and Mali supporting Niger’s military junta. Given that Niger borders seven countries, any conflict may increase regional instability. While Nigeria is leading the call for military intervention as the head of ECOWAS, it faces an additional challenge. Niger borders the northern states of Nigeria, with long-standing ethnic and cultural ties. Any conflict with Niger will open another front for the country that has been battling the Boko Haram militancy internally for years.
International Implications
Niger’s international partners are pushing for restoration of democracy in the country. Immediately after the coup, they imposed economic sanctions. France stopped its development assistance of US$ 130 million.1 Similarly, the EU and the US stopped development assistance of US$ 544 million and US$ 100 million, respectively.2 The immediate response from its international partners is driven by the impact of the coup on their energy security, their war against terrorism in the region and fear of increase in Russian influence in the country.
The importance of the Niger stems from the fact that it is the world’s seventh largest producer of uranium, a key mineral needed for the development of nuclear energy. Niger’s military junta’s ban on uranium exports to France has sent shock waves to the European country.3 Europe is dependent on Niger for the region’s nuclear energy production. Niger is the second largest supplier of uranium to the EU and contributes 25 per cent of uranium supplies to the country.4 France in particular, generates around 70 per cent of the country’s electricity through nuclear energy. Niger is the third largest supplier of Uranium to France and accounts for 19 per cent of its uranium imports.5 France, the country’s former colonial ruler, has deep economic ties with the country. The French nuclear firm Oreno owns and operates a uranium mine in the country.
The Niger coup also threatens the Trans Saharan Gas Pipeline Project connecting Nigeria’s natural gas fields through Niger and Algeria to Europe.6 In June 2023, Nigeria, Niger and Algeria agreed to accelerate work on the pipeline. The push for this pipeline came after Russia disrupted gas supplies to Europe. In 2022, during the Ukraine conflict, Russia cut off the gas supplies to Europe through the Nord stream pipeline. However, the Niger military junta does not seem to be keen towards continuing any connection with Europe, leaving the future implementation of this vital gas pipeline project in a limbo.
Apart from energy security, Niger is an important partner of the Western countries in countering extremism and terrorism in the region. Before the coup, both the US and France had close military cooperation with Niger. The move by the military junta to end military cooperation with France endangers decade-long counter-terrorism efforts in the region. Niger was the only remaining ally of France in the troubled Sahel region that includes Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Chad and Mali. France has around 1,500 troops in Niger stationed at the Naimey Air base in the country. The US has one of the largest drone bases in the region and has stationed around 1,000 troops in the country. In the last few years, the rise of military governments in neighbouring Mali and Burkina Faso led to the end of Operation Barkhane, a French counter-terrorism mission in the region and the exit of French troops from these countries.
Niger’s former international partners, France and the US also fear that the coup may increase Russian influence in the region. While Russia has not supported the Niger coup, it has warned that any military action by the ECOWAS in the region may lead to “protracted confrontation” in the region.7 The Niger junta has also approached the Russian private military company, Wagner group, for support. It is important to note that support for Russia is also visible amongst Nigerians. In several pro-military junta demonstrations in Niger, the demonstrators have raised Russian flag and chanted “down with France”. Niger’s military junta seems to be following the example of its neighbours. In 2021, after a coup, Mali asked French troops to leave and invited Wagner. Similarly, soon after the departure of French troops from Burkina Faso, the country’s military leader Ibrahim Tarore called Russia a “strategic ally”. 8
Conclusion
The coup in Niger has increased instability in the West Africa region. While the Niger military junta’s latest announcement of return to democratic rule in three years is a positive step, the possibility of a military intervention is still alive. The coup has deep regional and international implications and may lead to increase in major power contestation in the region. A diplomatic resolution may help in stemming the tide towards further authoritarianism and insecurity in the region.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
While defence public sector units have been making efforts to increase their marketing footprint, they will have to succeed in a highly competitive export market.
Defence exports by India in recent times have witnessed a significant surge. During the past decade, from 2013–23, India exported defence equipment worth about Rs 64,250 crore.1 Exports by the nine defence public sector units (DPSUs)2 accounted for 56 per cent of total defence exports in 2013–14 (and even stood as high as 97 per cent in 2014–15) but have since reduced to reach about 9 per cent in 2021–22.3 The volume of exports by the nine major DPSUs have no doubt increased during this period, from Rs 385 crore to Rs 1,126 crore, but given that the overall volume of defence exports from India has increased, the percentage share of the exports by DPSUs has reduced.
The share of the erstwhile Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) in the defence exports pie has reduced from nearly 3 per cent in 2013–14 to less than 1 per cent in 2021–22.4 In the period 2012–22, the cumulative value of OFB exports was about Rs 688 crore. The OFB’s biggest export order was for the supply of 40,000 155 mm shells to the United Arab Emirates in August 2019 worth over Rs 300 crore.
During the period 2013–22, defence exports by the nine major DPSUs were cumulatively worth around Rs 7,000 crores.5 BEL accounted for more than 33 per cent of the total, followed by HAL at 26 per cent and GSL at nearly 18 per cent. Some of the significant export items by DPSUs include offshore patrol vessel (OPV) and fast patrol vessels (FPVs) to countries like Sri Lanka and Mauritius, and helicopters to Nepal, Afghanistan, Mauritius, Seychelles, Namibia, Ecuador and Suriname.
DPSUs have also faced setbacks in their export efforts. GRSE, for instance, was shortlisted for delivery of two light frigates by the Philippines Navy. However, the Philippines gave the award to Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) in October 2016. While shipyards like GSL and GRSE have delivered ships to countries in India’s extended neighbourhood, the last export order for Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL) was a multi support vessel (MSV) to a Mexican company, more than a decade ago. Indian shipyards, though, have robust orders from the Indian Navy.
India’s aircraft exports primarily relate to various versions of the Dhruv helicopter to countries like Ecuador, Maldives, Mauritius and Nepal, maritime patrol aircraft to Sri Lanka, Seychelles, Namibia, light transport aircrafts to Mauritius, Cheetal helicopters to Afghanistan, among other countries. Apart from helicopters and patrol aircrafts, HAL’s exports have included engines, avionics, as well as structural work packages to major aerospace majors like Airbus, Boeing, Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), Rolls Royce, RUAG, Turbomeca, Safran engines, among others.6
HAL has carried out these exports successfully meeting the stringent reliability, quality and delivery specifications of these aerospace majors. Some of these exports have been carried out as part of the various offset contracts secured by the company. HAL has also carried out overhauls of aero engines for Namibian Air Force and Mauritius police Force.7
In order to expand its global export footprint, HAL has been actively responding to RFIs. The Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), Tejas was shortlisted by Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF). The RMAF however chose the Korean FA-50 aircraft in early 2023, in a deal valued at over US$ 900 mn for 18 aircraft.
HAL also received interest from the Philippines Coast Guard for procurement of seven Advanced Light Helicopters (ALH) and eight DO-228 aircraft through Government of India Line of Credit (LoC). The HAL was reportedly up against Airbus Panther AS565 for this particular contract.8
India’s defence exports under the category of ‘Sensors’ meanwhile primarily relate to exports by BEL of artillery locating radars to Armenia, air search radars to Myanmar and Sri Lanka, and maritime patrol aircraft radars to Seychelles.
India’s defence exports push is part of its effort to become a part of the global defence value chain and one of the leading countries in the defence sector. In a significant development, Philippines in January 2022 signed a US$ 375 million contract for the anti-ship variant of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, made by the Indo-Russian joint venture, BrahMos Aerospace.
India aims to achieve a defence exports target of Rs 35,000 crore by 2025. Research and Development (R&D) and focus on innovation are critical to help achieve these targets as well as to sustain the momentum. Among DPSUs, the R&D spend of DPSU behemoths like BEL and HAL at around 7–8 per cent of sales is on a relatively sound footing.
DPSUs have been making efforts to increase their marketing footprint, by opening marketing offices abroad. Most recently, Raksha Mantri Rajnath Singh inaugurated HAL’s office in Kuala Lumpur in July 2023. DPSUs have also proposed strategic alliances with foreign Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). Such strategic partnerships need to be leveraged effectively though to penetrate global markets.
Going forward, DPSUs will continue to face a highly competitive export market for defence products. It is a fact that the DPSUs are some of the biggest defence companies in the world in terms of sales, though mostly to the Indian armed forces. HAL was ranked at the 42nd position while BEL was ranked at the 63rd position among SIPRI Top 100 defence companies in the world in 2021.9
With the government’s emphasis on ‘Atmanirbharta’ and ambitious targets relating to defence production, defence indigenisation and defence exports, the ability of the DPSUs to contribute to the defence exports pie will continue to be in focus.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
2. Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL); Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL); Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML); Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE); Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL); Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL); Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL); Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL); and Mishra Dhatu Nigam (MIDHANI). Post corporatisation of the Ordnance Factory Board in mid-2021, 41 ordnance factories of the OFB were reconstituted as seven new corporate entities in mid-2021. There are therefore a total of 16 DPSUs currently.
5.“Performance and Audit Reports” (Various Years); Comptroller and Auditor General of India, “Reports of the Standing Committee on Defence” (Various Years), Lok Sabha; and DPSU Annual Reports (Various Years). DPSU exports include defence as well as civil exports. Some DPSUs export equipment relating to verticals like Rail and Metro, Mining and Construction (as in case of BEML) and Space and Energy (as in case of MIDHANI), apart from defence equipment. The figure mentioned does not include DPSU civil exports.
6.“Annual Reports”, Various Years, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited.
Strengthening Resilience: Atmanirbhar Bharat and Tackling Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
Rajneesh Singh
August 17, 2023
The complexity and interconnection of global supply chains has heightened the realisation of the need for supply chain resilience and self-reliance in production.
The concept of supply chain resilience has evolved as a response to various economic changes, technological advancements, vulnerabilities due to infrastructure disruptions, besides natural disasters and environmental concerns. Supply chains are susceptible to geopolitical tensions and war time disruptions. Globalisation and lean production practices have enhanced efficiency but have brought about greater interdependency and reduced buffer stocks, thereby increasing vulnerabilities. The complexity and interconnection of global supply chains has heightened the realisation of the need for supply chain resilience and self-reliance in production.
India's defence supply chain, like many others around the world, faces a range of vulnerabilities that has a direct impact on defence preparedness and operational efficiency of its armed forces. Indian armed forces have been further constrained due to traditional reliance on imports for a significant percentage of its weapons platforms, technology, and assemblies and sub-assemblies. Lengthy and complex procurement processes have resulted in delays in acquisition and limitations of domestic manufacturing and technological dependence have exposed vulnerable supply chain to extraneous influences.
The challenges to India's supply chain and defence manufacturing have got magnified because of the general shift in industrial supply chain towards East Asia, particularly to China. This shift in industrial manufacturing has placed India's supply chain under threat, especially during wars. China has a disproportionate influence over the global supply chain because of the large R&D budget, and civilian industrial base including high-tech manufacturing. There are also challenges of ownership of the firms, including those located in friendly countries, but with Chinese ownership. Taiwan and Israel have the world's leading electronics and semiconductor industries. Over-concentration of indispensable items for defence manufacturing increases vulnerabilities and calls for diversification.
The ‘Atmanirbhar Abhiyan’ was launched in May 2020 with an aim to make India self-reliant across various sectors, reducing its dependence on imports and enhancing domestic production capabilities. The programme focuses on five key pillars: economy, infrastructure, system, vibrant demography, and demand. By promoting indigenous manufacturing, innovation, and skill development, the programme seeks to build a robust and self-sufficient economy. The government's initiative aims to mitigate and adapt to shocks, disruptions, and uncertainties in supply chain by establishing domestic production capabilities of defence equipment and platforms. The ‘Atmanirbhar Abhiyan’ is an enabler for the three services to procure weapons and equipment as per the operational requirements without the impediments of external vetoes. The programme does not aim to isolate India's defence ecosystem from foreign participation, rather India will continue to pragmatically import foreign equipment involving niche technology, not available in the country. This is to obviate near-term defence vulnerabilities. Foreign participation in domestic manufacturing should be seen as a welcome contribution to the 'Make in India, Make for the World' agenda of the Prime Minister, articulated during his Independence Day speech of 2022. 'Atmanirbhar Bharat' is not about isolating India's manufacturing ecosystem from the world, rather it is about merging domestic production and consumption with global supply chains. The programme aims to be self-sustaining and self-generating.
Since 2020, a slew of measures has been announced by the government to improve defence indigenisation and domestic manufacturing. Prominent amongst these are emphasis on procuring from domestic manufacturers; the positive indigenisation lists; establishment of defence industrial corridors; and the corporatisation of Ordnance Factory Board. The government is also committed to encourage innovations through schemes of iDEX and has earmarked funds for research and development by private industry and startups.
In order to encourage domestic procurement, the government has earmarked more than 75 per cent of the capital acquisition budget for the year 2023–24 (more than Rs 100,000 crores) for domestic procurement, as against Rs 85,000 crores in 2022–23.1 As a result of these steps, not only has foreign procurement reduced in recent times (from 46 per cent in 2018–19 to 36 per cent in 2020–21),2 the value of domestic defence production has also risen (to more than Rs 100,000 crore in 2022–23),3 while there has been a significant rise in defence exports as well (Rs 16,000 crore in 2022–23).4
India has ambitious plans to become part of the global defence supply chains. The 2020 Draft Defence Production and Export Promotion Policy laid out a vision for the Indian defence industry to reach a turnover of Rs 175,000 crores by 2025, with exports amounting to Rs 35,000 crores. While the country is on course to achieve these ambitious targets, there is a need to take steps to reinforce defence supply chains and mitigate vulnerabilities.
A critical component of the defence supply chain are the MSMEs which require governmental support. The Ministry of Defence has taken significant steps for promoting the role of the MSMEs in the defence sector, including encouraging defence innovation by startups, earmarking orders up to Rs 100 crore exclusively to domestic MSMEs, modifying offset guidelines to ensure integration of MSMEs in the global defence supply chain, among others.
Given the key role of innovation in maintaining competitive edge, partnerships like INDUS-X between the US and Indian defence startups can be expected to add value and deliver critical edge to Indian defence manufacturing, as indeed efforts like the Strategic Partnership model that encourage foreign OEMs to set up domestic manufacturing units for critical platforms.
The path to supply chain resilience and self-reliance is not without challenges. Transitioning from a foreign dependent supply chain model to a more self-reliant one requires careful planning, policy reforms and huge investment. The government will have to walk the fine line to balance the advantages of international trade and collaboration with the need for domestic production capabilities. It requires a collaborative approach involving government agencies, industry stakeholders and academia.
Domestic manufacturing, especially by private industry, is driven by commercial considerations. Indian private defence industry and startups require governmental hand-holding to become players of some reckoning in the global supply chain. This will require industry-friendly policies which support Indian players and allow them to survive and flourish in extreme environment of cut-throat competition in the global supply chain.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Saudi offer to mediate in the Russia–Ukraine War is the latest instance of Riyadh’s dynamic and forward-looking foreign policy.
Saudi Arabia’s approach towards the Russia–Ukraine War is characterised by a commitment to neutrality, mediation efforts and providing humanitarian assistance to the Ukrainian refugees. While Riyadh’s primary political and security focus has traditionally remained within the Arab and Islamic world, it has displayed a profound concern for the ongoing developments in the Russia–Ukraine War. This Saudi stance towards the Russia–Ukraine War underscores the Kingdom’s dynamic and forward-looking foreign policy initiatives, as championed by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
On 5–6 August 2023, Saudi Arabia hosted a meeting of the National Security Advisers/representatives of over 40 countries along with the representatives of the United Nations, the European Commission and the European Council. The meeting, held in Jeddah, agreed to continue consultations and exchange opinions to find a way to restore peace between Russia and Ukraine. Ironically, Russia was not invited to the meeting. While Ukraine described the meeting as “fruitful consultations”,1 Russia stated that “without … taking into account its interests, no meetings on the Ukrainian crisis have the slightest added value”.2
Since the beginning of the Russia–Ukraine War, Saudi Arabia has adhered to a stance of neutrality while consistently advocating for a peaceful resolution through diplomatic negotiations. Over time, this neutrality has evolved into a more proactive diplomatic engagement, with Saudi Arabia striving to mediate between Russia and Ukraine.
Despite the deepening engagements with Russia, Saudi Arabia has voted in favour of the UN resolutions calling for the cessation of conflicts, the withdrawal of Russian forces and the Russian annexation of Ukrainian territory.3 The Kingdom has maintained a good relationship with both Russia and Ukraine which makes it believe that it is uniquely positioned as a neutral, and credible mediator in the crisis.
While appealing for a halt to the war, Saudi Arabia has provided humanitarian assistance for the Ukrainian refugees. In February 2023, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud visited Ukraine and met President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Both countries signed agreements worth US$ 400 million that included US$ 300 million in oil derivatives for Ukraine and providing humanitarian assistance of US$ 100 million through the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre (KSRelief).4
The Saudi foreign minister also expressed his country’s willingness to mediate in the conflict and help in resolving the situation. In less than two weeks, on 9 March 2023, Farhan Al Saud visited Moscow and met his counterpart, Sergey Lavrov. He also reiterated the Saudi willingness to mediate between Russia and Ukraine to end the war.5
Since the creation of OPEC+ in 2016, Saudi–Russian cooperation in the energy sector has significantly deepened. For the US, the Saudi–Russia bonhomie in the OPEC+ and its impact on the global oil market has been a major concern. At a time when the US and the European countries have imposed an import ban on Russian oil, the OPEC+ deal has helped the Russian economy during the war. It has also helped Saudi Arabia to maintain its dominance in the oil market and keep its economy in shape.
Thus, Saudi Arabia has ample reasons to uphold a neutral stance in the war, evading pressure from the US. Its relationship with Ukraine has also been warm with good political and economic ties. Saudi Arabia invited Zelenskyy to participate in the Jeddah summit of the Arab League in May 2023, where he sought the support of the organisation against Russian aggression.
Riyadh is seeking to strengthen its reputation as a credible mediator in its neighbourhood and beyond. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has been mediating in a number of regional conflicts and mediation has become an important feature of Saudi diplomacy. It has mediated in regional conflicts in the Arab/Islamic region such as in Lebanon, between Hamas and Fatah in Palestine, and most recently between the conflicting parties in Sudan. Riyadh often uses its religious soft power to establish its credibility as a mediator and also provides financial aid to support and pacify the conflicting parties.
In December 2022, Saudi Arabia and the UAE mediated between the US and Russia for the release of Brittney Griner, an American sportsperson jailed in Russia, and Victor Bout, a Russian citizen who was in a US prison.6 This has lent Riyadh a degree of confidence to engage in mediation between Russia and Ukraine.
Success in mediation in the 18-month long Russia–Ukraine War, however, would be a formidable task for Riyadh as the war is taking place in a region which is beyond its Arab/Islamic neighbourhood where its soft power is ineffective. Despite maintaining good relations with them, Riyadh’s political and diplomatic leverages to influence the decisions of Moscow and Kiev are limited. Convincing Russia to withdraw without an acceptable deal would be difficult to achieve. In the current situation, where Russia has captured Ukrainian territory, the US and NATO are actively supporting Ukraine in the War and a refugee crisis continues to exist, the efficacy of Riyadh's mediation would remain constrained.
In the Jeddah meeting, Riyadh has made a good start to bring the key stakeholders from across the world for consultation. Saudi mediation efforts have the potential to build an international consensus to bring the war to an end, but the intricate challenge lies in the successful translation of this consensus into tangible and effective actions on the ground.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The G20 New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration asserts that the ‘use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible’.
On 9 September 2023, the G-20 summit secretariat issued the ‘G20 New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration’. This is considered a big success for the Indian leadership and the Indian Presidency. This consensus document reflects the understanding of the participating parties regarding managing global challenges in the near future. The G-20 was created to accommodate rising powers in the global order so that the crises in the global financial order could be tackled effectively with involvement of multiple stakeholders. Recent developments in Ukraine, though, keep threatening the consensus-building approach of such an organisation.
The G-20 diplomacy has prevailed over confrontation and disruption. Efforts of Indian diplomacy have averted the G-20 plunging into a crisis. The declaration has underlined the principle of adaptation and adjustment. The right kind of language agreed upon among member states on some contentious issues has actually made it possible for the Declaration to be realised. Had there been no declaration, the exercise to resuscitate the global economic and financial order would have suffered a big setback.
The declaration contains a projection of not only global challenges but also their solutions. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has also promised to deliver an action-taken report soon. The declaration, which is a culmination of the exercise conducted by different tracks and engagement groups, is designed to address the priority areas of global challenges, essentially in the economic and financial areas.
A few nuclear issues relating to traditional military issues and non-traditional security issues matters like energy security are also discussed in the Leaders’ Declaration. The Declaration wants to address worldwide escalating costs associated with commodities such as food and energy along with other financial challenges. To construct a more promising tomorrow, the Declaration finds that implementing equitable energy transitions has the potential to enhance employment opportunities and people's well-being, as well as bolster economic resilience.
The declaration has a strong emphasis on energy transition plans. For nations choosing to utilise civil nuclear energy, there is a proposal for partnership based on voluntary and mutually accepted conditions. The partnership may have all the components of ‘research, innovation, development & deployment of civil nuclear technologies including advanced and Small Modular Reactors’.1 It is to be in alignment with their respective domestic laws. The nations are supposed to be
responsible nuclear decommissioning, radioactive waste and spent fuel management and mobilizing investments, and share knowledge and best practices, through strengthening international cooperation to promote nuclear safety globally.2
The Small and Modular Reactor, in contrast to the traditional method of building a reactor, is being promoted for its uniqueness. Such reactors could be useful in remote or isolated areas, on-grid deployment for replacing steam-coal power plants, generating dispatchable electricity, desalinated water, hydrogen for fuel, and ammonia for shipping. This is also considered useful for the countries that need energy but do not have diverse sources. The companies doing business in small modular reactors are offering services from fuel management to waste management. It is marketed for its minimal continuous human presence. However, the specialists are divided over the economic feasibility of the Small and Modular Reactor.
The Fukushima incident, environmental lobbies, regulatory issues, among others are complicating the matter for this reactor. Moreover, the supply of fuel, safeguards, safety and security challenges continue to dog the reactor. A modular reactor may have a high regulatory cost for small energy gains. No doubt, the ‘traditional guards, gates, and guns approach’ would ruin the economy of small modular reactors. New approaches are, therefore, essential.
Issues relating to transportation, nuclear security despite lower insider threat, commercial confidentiality, cyber threats, funding issues for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification, and so on are generally highlighted as the principal challenges for the Small Modular Reactors. However, forging of an early collaboration of designers, manufacturers, potential operators, governments, and IAEA may have the chance of making this type of reactors attractive for energy security.
The Declaration has strongly condemned any terrorist acts against critical infrastructure, including critical energy facilities. Although the declaration has not mentioned Zaporizhzhia, Chornobyl and any other Ukrainian nuclear complex, any nuclear energy complex is considered a critical energy facility. Both state and non-state actors may sabotage a nuclear energy complex. For years, the nuclear summit process and its follow-up activities have placed the limelight on nuclear terrorism. The international community is active in meeting the challenge not only in the nuclear summit process but also in other international forums. The G-20 has also become an important forum to address the challenge of nuclear terrorism.
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has emerged as an important global watchdog for combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism. It establishes global guidelines designed to thwart these unlawful actions and the detrimental consequences they inflict on society. The proliferation financing for Weapons of Mass Destruction, including nuclear weapons, has been one of the subjects of the FATF. It has been quite active on the issue. The G-20 has been recognising the role of FATF in many of its previous meetings.
The Delhi Leaders’ Declaration also lays down:
The G-20 underlines the significance of determining and evaluating the potential risks associated with potential violations, lack of enforcement, or avoidance of specific financial sanctions tied to proliferation financing, and implementation of suitable measures to address these risks in proportion to their severity. This approach will serve to inform both private sector entities and their regulatory authorities about the inherent risks within their industries and professions, preventing inadvertent support or involvement in proliferation financing networks or schemes, which would violate pertinent obligations. Additionally, it will guarantee that countries and private sector entities allocate resources appropriately, aligning with the level of risks associated with proliferation financing.
The Russia–Ukraine War seems to have shadowed the Delhi summit and the Declaration, too. After mentioning the discussions in Bali on the war in Ukraine, the Leaders’ Declaration mentions the national positions taken on the UN resolutions passed on the War in Ukraine. The same paragraph also cites the UN Charter, especially its principle ‘the use or threat of use of force for territorial acquisition against the territorial integrity and sovereignty or political independence of any state.’ 4
The last line of the paragraph has a statement on the nuclear threat. “The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible.”5 This is a consensus line upon which the entire summit has agreed upon. This is futuristic and universalistic in nature. Since it is part of the paragraph on the War in Ukraine, it clearly means that no side will resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. However, a Ukrainian official wanted the line to be read as: “On war against Ukraine, Russia’s use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible.”6
This begs the question: as Ukraine does not possess nuclear weapons, doesn’t the statement apply only to Russia if the war in Ukraine is taken as a context? At present, it may appear so. However, the future of war is unpredictable. The Russian threat of nuclear weapons use kept happening in the past. But fortunately, notwithstanding the regular sabre rattling, the taboo on nuclear use has remained intact. And the Russian utterances have basically been aimed at extracting concessions in the conflict. A careful reading of the Russian leadership of the use may indicate that it always has caveats that are downplayed or concealed by a section of the media.
However, those backing Ukraine occasionally have also used the Russian nuclear threat to mobilise global public opinion. As the situation is escalating and Ukraine is increasingly getting more sophisticated weapons, the G-20 has taken the right step in making the statement general in nature. It needs to be applied to all. Even if the immediate signalling is for Russia, in the future, the statement should remain a dominant global norm.
An overemphasis on the Ukrainian narrative may lead to the impression that Europe is still self-centred and Ukraine does not think beyond itself. This may lead to the weakening of the overwhelming global support it has for its territorial integrity and sovereignty. India and many other countries also face nuclear threats and blackmail from those nuclear countries that do not ascribe to the no-first-use policy.
Thus, the comprehensive and inclusive nature of the G-20 and its Leaders’ Declaration may be witnessed in different issue areas which have been covered during the Delhi meeting. The nuclear issue has all the dimensions—economic, energy transitions, security and the combination of all. A consensus document may have some words desired by an individual country missing but overall, it is a balanced document on the nuclear issues it has sought to touch upon or cover for various objectives.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The East Asia Summit remains critical to advancing closer regional cooperation, at a time of a rapid geo-political and geo-economic changes.
The 18th East Asia Summit (EAS) held in Jakarta on 7 September 2023 provided an opportunity for ASEAN member states and the eight non-ASEAN countries to exchange views on issues concerning the region and the world at large. Being a premier forum for strategic dialogue in the Indo-Pacific, the EAS remains critical to advancing closer regional cooperation, at a time of rapid geo-political and geo-economic changes.
EAS and Its Priorities
The origins of EAS dates back to the 1990 proposal for an East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) popularised by former Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad. This proposal, however, was met with stiff opposition from Japan and the United States. The project was later revived through the ASEAN Plus Three or APT (China, Japan, and South Korea) Summit of Heads of State and Government that first met in Kuala Lumpur in December 1997, and eventually found further expression through the creation of the EAS on 14 December 2005.1
Since its establishment, the membership of the EAS has increased from the original 16 to 18 countries comprising the ten ASEAN countries, along with Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the United States, and Russia. With Russia and the US being the last two countries to be admitted into the EAS in 2011, the forum has all the major powers including three of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. This expansion gave the EAS a more open, outward-looking and inclusive character.2
At the end of 2022, the participating countries in the EAS represented 52.8 per cent of the world population and accounted for 60.4 per cent of the global GDP.3 Being an ASEAN-led regional architecture, the EAS, unlike other regional forums, is inter-regional, consisting of countries from Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Australia. Further, the EAS is the first Asian grouping which includes all the great Asian powers, guided by an open and inclusive regionalism.4
The EAS being the only leader-led forum in the Indo-Pacific makes it a major platform to discuss the political, security, and economic priorities and challenges being confronted by the region. The EAS since its launch has enabled a platform wherein the participating countries have widened their perspectives beyond their traditional sub-regional focus. There are seven evolving priorities of regional cooperation within the framework of the EAS. These include environment and energy, education, finance, global health including pandemics, environment and disaster management, ASEAN connectivity, and maritime cooperation.5
With the emerging geo-political and the changing nature of threat being confronted in the Indo-Pacific region, the priorities of the EAS has evolved. During the 17th EAS held on 13 November 2022 in Phnom Penh, top priorities included food and energy security, climate change, the Russian–Ukraine crisis, concerns over escalating violence and the worsening humanitarian situation in Myanmar, and the situation in the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula.6
At the 18th EAS, the Leaders’ Declaration on ASEAN as an Epicentrum of Growth was adopted. Discussions were held on building resilience against emerging challenges and future shocks through cooperation on enhancing energy security and food security, maintaining financial stability, and strengthening regional health architecture. The meeting also reviewed the implementation of the EAS Plan of Action (POA) 2018–2022 and adopted the EAS POA (2024–2028).
The POA for the next five years outlines the priorities that include efforts on the mainstreaming and implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). The POA reinforces the centrality of ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms as the driving force within the EAS. It lays emphasis on strengthening partnerships, through cross-sectoral collaborations that includes efforts in furthering the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.7
A Region in Flux
Since the establishment of the EAS in 2005, the global economy has witnessed major shocks some of which include the global financial crisis, the socio-economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, and the impact of the ongoing war in Ukraine on global food and energy security. The priorities as outlined through the EAS Leaders’ Declaration indicates a consensus for a stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. Issues confronted by the region such as energy and environment, finance, education, cooperation in terms of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), health crisis including pandemics and its socio-economic implications, issues of connectivity, and traditional and non-traditional security threats from terrorism to piracy at sea underscores the significance of the EAS.
However, strengthening the EAS as a forum for dialogue and cooperation on a wide spectrum of strategic, political, and economic matters of common interest and concern, remains complex. This stems from the existing and ever-evolving multi-faceted threats and challenges which get compounded through the intense geo-political and geo-economic discourse being witnessed in the region. In his opening remarks at the 18th EAS, Indonesian President Jokowi urged the leaders to make the forum a place to strengthen collaboration and cooperation and not sharpen rivalries.8
While the EAS participating countries share a common perspective aimed at achieving peace and security in the Indo-Pacific, ongoing contestations limits cooperative and collaborative framework as envisaged originally. In the light of the emerging differences in the region, at the 14th EAS on 4 November 2019, Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated that the EAS is a
Being the only multilateral platform that brings together the leaders of ASEAN member states and the other major regional powers, it makes the EAS the most balanced amongst the other existing regional structures. However, the nature of the relations amongst the EAS participating countries, marked by confrontation and contestations, has had its impact on its efficacy and effectiveness.
The deepening geo-political divide being witnessed today raises concern on the relevance of the EAS in addressing issues of human security challenges as a consequent of the socio-economic fallout from the COVID-19 and the ongoing war in Ukraine. These challenges which requires a collaborative and consultative effort, get derailed as a consequence of ongoing contestations amongst countries over resources and territory to the ongoing strategic rivalry being witnessed in the Indo-Pacific region.
Conclusion
The 18th EAS was an attempt to strengthen the efficacy and effectiveness of the institution by emphasising on an international community, build on cooperation without division and confrontation. This year’s summit saw the adoption of the EAS Leaders’ Statement on Maintaining and Promoting the Region as an Epicenter of Growth with comprehensive discussions on regional and international issues. The reinforcement of ASEAN Centrality and Unity as well as the mainstreaming of the AOIP are positive outcomes as they aligned with the visons on the Indo-Pacific of the respective EAS participating countries.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Prime Minister Modi and President Biden recommitted to expeditiously work towards supporting the fulfilment of the GE-HAL jet engine deal, at the meeting ahead of the New Delhi G20 Summit.
In June 2023, India and the US announced the agreement between the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and GE Aerospace to produce fighter jet engines for the Indian Air Force (IAF), during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s State visit to the US. This deal is being viewed as a major milestone and key element in strengthening defence cooperation between the two countries. The deal comes in the backdrop of the IAF’s efforts to enhance its capacities and capabilities.
The IAF is in the process of procuring 114 Multi-role fighter jets (MRFA), along with acquiring additional numbers of Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk1A, followed by LCA Mk2. The fifth generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) is also being developed, as is the Twin Engine Deck Based Fighter (TEDBF) by Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) for the Navy’s aircraft carriers.
The jet engine deal is important for India from strategic point of view as well as from point of view of indigenous capability development. Despite several efforts by DRDO’s Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE), desired level of development of an advanced combat jet engine has remained far from reality.
Despite self-reliance achieved in critical technologies such as cryogenic rocket engines, for instance, India has not been able to join the list of countries that can make jet aircraft engines. Very few countries like the US, Russia, the UK and France have the necessary technology and metallurgy needed to make combat jet engines. Prominent jet engine manufacturers include US-based majors like Pratt & Whitney, General Electric, Honeywell Aerospace, Safran SA (France), Rolls-Royce (UK), and Russian majors like Aviadvigatel and NPO Saturn.
The India–US jet engine agreement includes the potential joint production of GE Aerospace’s F414 engines in India, for which the US major is working with the US government to receive necessary export authorisation. For India, the F414 engine holds great significance, given that it will power the IAF’s LCA Mk2 jets. The ADA/DRDO had in 2010 selected F414-INS6 for the LCA Tejas Mk2.1
India’s first indigenous fighter jet LCA Tejas is powered by GE’s F404 engines. So far, 75 F404 engines have been delivered and another 99 are on order for LCA Mk1A by GE. Eight F414 engines have been delivered as part of an ongoing development programme for LCA Mk2.2 Furthermore, there are prospects of utilising F414 engines for the AMCA, India's ambitious fifth-generation fighter aircraft.
GE noted that the historic agreement has been made possible due to the longstanding partnership with HAL and that the F414 engines ‘will offer important economic and national security benefits for both countries’.3 The GE F414 engine has been known for its reliable performance and has been used by the US Navy for over 30 years. This engine is also used in F-18 Super Hornets. The F414G, the single-engine variant of the F414, powers Saab’s Gripen E/F aircraft. The F414 engine powers military aircraft in eight nations, making it a trusted choice for modern fighter jets.
Another aspect which makes this deal significant is the level of technology transfer, with 80 per cent technology transfer to HAL, including critical technologies, with sources noting this indicates the level of trust between India and the US. The 2012 ‘Engine Development Agreement’ in 2012 between GE and HAL for the F414 engine had 58 per cent technology transfer.4 The Joint Statement issued after talks between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Joe Biden notes that the ‘trailblazing initiative to manufacture F-414 engines in India will enable greater transfer of US jet engine technology than ever before’.5 The jet engine deal could be a game-changer for India’s indigenisation programme, opening the doors to access to new generation technologies which will percolate to other sectors.6
AMCA Engine
Major foreign OEMs like Rolls Royce and Safran have also offered their jet engines under Make in India programme, for India’s fifth generation AMCA.7 India’s High Commissioner to the UK, Vikram Doraiswami and DRDO Director General (Production Coordination and Services Interaction) Chandrika Koushik visited the UK-based Rolls Royce in October 2022. Rolls Royce reiterated that it was ‘committed to supporting India’s indigenisation journey and keen to partner the country's AMCA programme’.8 Rolls Royce produces the Eurojet EJ200 engine with a thrust of 110-120KN.
Rolls Royce’s European rival, Safran has also reportedly submitted a proposal to jointly design, develop, test, manufacture and certify a new state-of-the-art 110 KN thrust engine for AMCA and the twin-engine TEDBF for aircraft carriers, with complete technology transfer. Safran also offered to set up a centre of excellence in gas turbine technology in India with full design and metallurgical precision software tools, synchronised with Safran’s facility coming up in Hyderabad to maintain repair and overhaul LEAP engines for the A320 and Boeing 737 aircraft.9 In response to the Safran’s proposal, DRDO Chairman visited Safran engine factory and the R&D centre during Paris Air Show 2023.
GE is also reported to have offered to develop jet engine for India’s AMCA, three years after suspending joint development of aircraft engines under the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI) in October 2019. US Under Secretary for Defense Ellen Lord had indicated that issues with export controls stymied further cooperation.10
As for indigenous engine development, there are ongoing efforts to indigenously develop jet engine under Project Kaveri. It was reported in February 2023 that the high-altitude tests of the Kaveri derivative engine (a non-afterburning version) was conducted successfully in Russia, simulating an altitude of 13,000 m.11 Godrej and Boyce has been given a contract by DRDO to manufacture a few 48 KN dry Kaveri engine modules.12 GTRE is aiming to integrate Kaveri onto DRDO’s Ghatak by 2026, an Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV).
Conclusion
Given the status of indigenous engine development efforts capable of powering fighter aircraft, therefore, the India–US jet engine deal is being seen as a game-changer. It could help India leapfrog in aerospace technologies and create an enabling R&D ecosystem. The agreement though will need to have suitable technology transfer supporting India’s indigenisation programme. This can then open the doors to access to new generation technologies which can percolate to other sectors.
President Biden and Prime Minister Modi, in the Joint Statement issued after talks on 8 September 2023 ahead of the G20 Summit in New Delhi ‘welcomed the commencement of negotiations' between GE and HAL to manufacture the jet engines in India and ‘re-committed to work collaboratively and expeditiously to support the advancement of this unprecedented co-production and technology transfer agreement’.13
If the contract to co-produce jet engine with repair, maintenance and overhauling in India along with export clauses as per India’s expectations is finalised at the earliest with the due legislative and administrative approvals in US and with the desired technology transfers and a favourable cost negotiation, it will help India and the US to further strengthen their strategic partnership centred on trade, defence and technology as well as geopolitical alignment.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
China’s security engagement in Africa has grown to encompass aspects relating to police and law enforcement cooperation, conflict mediation, and professional military education.
China’s oversized role in supporting Africa’s development primarily through massive amounts of loans and investments is well documented and tends to get a lot of media attention. However, equally important is China’s growing appetite for playing a role in Africa’s peace and security architecture and in the military domain. Issues relating to African peace and security are now considered to be a prominent feature of Chinese foreign policy rhetoric. Often, China asserts that it stands to benefit from a stable, secure, and peaceful Africa. This would in turn create a conducive environment that can ensure Beijing’s continuous access to the growing African market.
For the most part, the security dimension of China–Africa cooperation involved the deployment of troops for United Nations peacekeeping missions, training of African military and security personnel, and counter-piracy operations. This mandate in recent years has broadened to include aspects like conflict mediation, counter-terrorism, policing and law enforcement cooperation, and military training. This is the background in which the third edition of the China–Africa Peace and Security Forum was held from 28 August to 2 September 2023 under the theme ‘Implementing the Global Security Initiative, Strengthening China-Africa Solidarity and Cooperation’ in Beijing. Over 100 delegates, representatives, and defence officials from 50 African countries participated in the event.
The China–Africa Peace and Security Forum provides a common platform for military officials from both sides to convene and discuss issues of mutual interest. The forum serves two primary goals—consolidate networks of strategic communications between Chinese and African defence departments; and explore possible ways in which African militaries and security architecture can align with China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI). The GSI was espoused by President Xi Jinping during the Boao Forum in April 2022 but formally gained traction on 21 February 2023 with the release of the GSI’s Concept Paper.1 The GSI is China’s regional and global architecture and is an effort to shape a new world order with Chinese characteristics.
Outcomes of the Conference
Discussions at the forum echoed a similar rhetoric of the need to strengthen China–Africa security cooperation to jointly deal with global security challenges and uphold international justice. General Li Shangfu, State Councilor, and Chinese Defense Minister during his address at the plenary session called African partners to work with China to uphold a common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security mindset. This is to be achieved by focusing on dialogue rather than confrontation, partnership rather than alliance, ‘win-win’ rather than zero-sum to inject more certainty, peace, and positive energy into a global order riddled with security challenges.
China continues to insist that certain aspects of its outreach will not change. For example, the tradition of helping each other, or the principle of equality, the direction of practical cooperation, or the spirit of valuing righteousness, will not change. With a focus on practicability and effectiveness, China aims to offer African countries with an alternative model for growth and development that is different from the Western models. Such form of ‘Chinese model’ aims to coerce African countries into incorporating Chinese values, ethos, governance system, and develop a similar view of the global order. While these lofty claims and ambitions may serve to propagate Chinese interests, the conference in practice achieved very little apart from rhetorical commitments.
Drivers of Chinese security activism in Africa
There are both practical and political factors that drive China’s growing security engagement with African countries. Beijing’s security engagement is inextricably connected to its other goals such as expanding logistical footprint, increasing political influence in multilateral forums like the United Nations, professionalise its military, improve operational readiness, gain military access, and protect its commercial interests and investments. With over 1 million Chinese citizens, 10,000 Chinese firms, loans worth US$ 160 billion, and investments worth nearly US$ 300 billion in Africa, protecting its citizens and investments is a top priority for Beijing.2
An alarming trend in recent years is the increase in reports of attacks and kidnappings of Chinese workers in countries like Central African Republic, South Africa, Ethiopia, and Democratic Republic of Congo, raising question about China’s ability to protect its citizens overseas. The attacks have exposed the widening disconnect between China’s economic ambitions and its security apparatus abroad.3
Peacekeeping and the supply of small arms and light weapons have traditionally remained central to China’s security outreach to Africa. Around 80 per cent of Chinese peacekeeping forces that are currently deployed are in Africa in addition to the 44 anti-piracy task force groups deployed to protect trade since 2008.
However, there are some new areas of China’s security engagement in Africa, most notably professional military education (PME) and policing and law enforcement cooperation. China has been taking interest in African security governance and is working to promote Chinese policing norms within African police forces and governments.4 A paper released by China’s State Council Information Office in 2021 states that since 2018, China has trained over 2,000 African police and law enforcement personnel.5 In July 2023, the police chiefs of China and Ethiopia jointly decided to establish an ‘Ethio-China Law Enforcement Cooperation Center’ in Addis Ababa, reflecting a rapid increase in law enforcement engagement in response to crimes targeting Chinese citizens in Africa.6
Conflict mediation is an area which has attracted Chinese attention. Buoyed by the remarkable and unexpected success of brokering rapproachment between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023, Beijing is seeking to promote itself as a consequential mediator in African peace process. In June 2022, China sponsored a Horn of Africa Peace, Good Governance and Development Conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and appointed a ‘Special Envoy’ for the Horn of Africa region. Although this conference achieved little in practical terms, it did help Beijing signal to its African partners its willingness to host regional security dialogues to broker peace in the future.7 The African continent has emerged as sort of a ‘testing ground’ for Chinese security engagements abroad. Already, there are reports of the possibility of China brokering peace in conflict-ravaged countries like Sudan.8 It is only a matter of time before China looks to play a more consequential role in Francophone West Africa, a region that has witnessed eight coups in the last three years.
Another important trend is the growing Chinese affinity to use the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to accommodate its political and ideological goals through professional military education (PME). China provides education and training to African military personnel to promote its governance model and build a shared understanding of security.9 African military officers and students attend various PLA political schools to receive training on how a ruling political party could use available mechanisms to exercise control over the military. This is conducted at various levels like regional academies, command and staff colleges, or at the upper level at China’s National Defense Academy and National University of Defense Technology.
However, although the Chinese PMEs are considered less prestigious, cover limited subjects, and are less in scale and scope than Western PMEs, their applicability in an African context is much higher. Most of these Chinese PMEs train African officers in China, rather than training them within the continent. In essence, Chinese PMEs are working with African militaries to engender, foster, and reinforce a similar understanding of the concept of security through Chinese initiatives like the Global Security Initiative (GSI), the security aspects of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or the political architecture of defence building.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Sweden’s presidency contributed significantly to addressing the EU’s economic and security challenges.
The Council of the European Union (EU) negotiates and shapes legislation proposed by the European Commission. The Council comprises ministers from all EU Member States and its presidency rotates among the member states every six months. The Council President leads the Council's work and represents all member states in dealings with other EU institutions.
From 1 January 2023, Sweden assumed the presidency of the Council of the European Union for six months until 30 June 2023, taking over from The Czech Republic.1 This marked the third time that Sweden held the Council Presidency, with previous presidencies being in 2001 and 2009.
During the first tenure in 2001, the focus was on EU enlargement, employment and environment, while in 2009, the key issues included the financial crisis, economic recovery and climate change. Additionally, the Swedish Presidency played a significant role in implementing the Treaty of Lisbon, which brought about substantial changes across EU institutions. Sweden's then Prime Minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt was the last national representative to lead the European Council. Post that, the introduction of a permanent President aimed to ensure greater continuity in the Council's work.2
However, the world, including Europe, has faced paradigm shifts in recent years such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. These inevitably have expanded the function of the Council. This was evident in the more than 2,300 formal meetings as part of Sweden’s presidency.
Notably, Sweden, along with France and the Czech Republic, had jointly prepared a general programme called the Trio Programme. This endeavour spanned 18 months and set out the EU’s shared priorities and goals.3 Following Sweden, a new trio comprising Spain, Belgium and Hungary will take over and develop a new programme for the subsequent period.
Priorities of Sweden’s Presidency
The Swedish Presidency focused on four key areas:
In addition to the above, the Swedish presidency also focussed on security, competitiveness, green and energy transitions and rule of law.4 Unsurprisingly, it prioritised the continuation of economic and military support to Ukraine, including Kiev’s path towards EU integration. Notably, Ukraine’s membership would require a concerted effort at both the national and EU levels, including dealing with tricky issues such as reconstruction and reforms.
Amidst the EU’s hostile security environment, the Swedish presidency sought to build consensus and a plan of action to secure the Union’s interests. Measures were taken to implement the Strategic Compass5 and other related initiatives. The European Peace Facility (EPF) was effectively utilised to provide military assistance to Ukraine. .
Meanwhile, given the setback suffered by the continent on account of weaponisation of energy during the war,6 Sweden had to channelise its presidency towards tackling high energy prices and implementing long-term energy market reforms.
The Swedish presidency concluded with a focus on achieving a “greener, safer and freer Europe”.7
Progress towards a ‘Greener’, Safer’ and ‘Freer’ Europe
Under the Swedish presidency, attempts were made at fast-tracking Europe’s green energy transition. This involved the climate package called ‘Fit for 55’, first agreed upon in July 2021, with the aim to make Europe the world's first climate-neutral continent by 2050.8 This package targeted sectors such as climate, environment, energy and transportation.
As part of implementing the ‘Fit for 55’, attempts were made to enhance and expand the EU’s emission trading system (ETS), emission caps for each sector were introduced, strict conditions were set for members to reduce emissions under the Effort-Sharing Regulation (ESR), and targets to increase carbon sinks through forests and soils/land were given.9 The utilisation of renewable energy sources were sought to be expanded, while providing support for innovative green initiatives and robust energy policy was formulated. Together, these efforts were aimed at achieving sustainable and environmentally responsible transformation towards a greener future.
Unsurprisingly, amidst Europe’s energy boycott of Russia, the focus of the Swedish presidency was also on preparing for the upcoming winter in 2023 and addressing the high and fluctuating energy prices, as well as expediting investments in clean and renewable electricity generation. The Council, therefore, sought to prolong its own regulation on coordinated measures to reduce gas demand during the upcoming winter period. Additionally, it also chose to continue with the plan chartered for implementation of the Regulation on Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT),10 which is a crucial element of the proposed EU electricity market redesign.
Supporting Ukraine was a priority for the Swedish presidency. Efforts were made to coordinate actions of member states as part of the need to put up a united European front, including imposing far-reaching sanctions on the Russian government.11 Additionally, significant progress was made in agreeing on a new migration policy,12 which aims to reduce immigration into Europe and combat cross-border crime through enhanced cross-border cooperation among judicial and law enforcement authorities.13
Sweden emphasised the importance of promoting freedom in Europe and strengthening the EU's competitiveness.14 Efforts were made to lay the foundation for a more ambitious EU, focusing on long-term competitiveness, growth and productivity until 2030 and beyond.
Way Forward
The war in Ukraine has threatened the democratic values on which the EU was founded, highlighting the need for the organisation to adapt to new geopolitical realities. Additionally, it has resulted in several economic challenges, such as rising energy prices and inflation amidst an economic slowdown. Sweden’s presidency contributed significantly to addressing these issues.
With the next trio having set up their 18-month agenda, the Council has its task cut out.15 Delays in implementing judicial reforms and issues concerning transparency, values and justice remain a challenge, particularly vis-à-vis Poland and Hungary.16 As such, only time will tell how these challenges are handled by the Council. It would continue to require unity and concerted efforts to meet emerging challenges while continuing the pursuit of a stronger and more prosperous European Union.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The JCPOA revival, to some extent, will continue to depend on the US’s stand on the IRGC’s designation.
After the US unilaterally walked out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 to revive the Iran nuclear deal have not succeeded so far. Points of contention have included re-imposition of sanctions by the US, Iran making significant gains in its nuclear programme, as well as domestic political issues like the Iranian government’s brutal crackdown on protesters in 2022.1
The 2019 designation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) by the US State Department has been another key impediment that has prevented the revival of the deal. Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian in March 2022 held that sanctions imposed on the IRGC were a “red line” as the IRGC was “the most important security and defense” organisation in the country.2 While speaking at the Doha Forum in 2022, Kamal Kharazi, a former foreign minister and adviser to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei insisted that the IRGC “certainly must be removed” from the FTOs list for nuclear talks to succeed.3
IRGC’s role
The IRGC is an influential institution as the Guardian of the Islamic Revolution and has come to play a significant role economically as well as politically. The sanctions re-imposed on Iran after the Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA made it difficult for foreign firms to conduct business with Iran and further isolated Iran’s economy. As part of Khamenei’s vision of a ‘resistance economy’ against the US sanctions, the IRGC expanded its role as an economic actor, especially in mega projects.
The IRGC reportedly has a near monopoly in industries like construction, energy, mining, telecommunication, among others.4 Reports in 2020 noted that the IRGC controlled around one-third of the Iranian economy.5 The IRGC has been able to transform itself from an Islamist militia to one of the most powerful institutions in the country. The reformist Khatami and later moderate Rouhani administrations tried limiting the economic activities of the IRGC to expand the private sector.6
The Ahmadinejad and the current Raisi administrations, however, gave prominent roles to former IRGC generals, including Cabinet positions. For instance, Seyyed-Parviz Fatthah, Minister of Energy and Abdol-RezaMesri, Minister of Welfare and Security were among 12 out of 21 ministers appointed by Ahmadinejad who had served in the IRGC.7 President Raisi appointed former IRGC officials like Yaghubali Nazari as the Governor of Khorasan-Razavi province, Abedin Khorram as the Governor of Eastern Azerbaijan and Mohammad Sadatinejat as the Agriculture Minister.8 Supreme Leader Khamenei regards the IRGC as the sooton-e kheimeh enghlab (Main Pillar of the Islamic revolution).9
While the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) formulates Iranian nuclear policy within the broad policy framework set by the Supreme Leader, it is safe to say that the IRGC has an important say in the matter. Former President Hassan Rouhani, who was also the first Secretary of the SNSC, as well as his successors, have served in the IRGC. Most recently, on 22 May 2023, Ali Akbar Ahmadian, who was elevated to the post of SNSC Secretary, was also a veteran commander of the IRGC.10
The IRGC has maintained a hawkish stance vis-à-vis the nuclear issue and has been against giving nuclear concessions. The IRGC has long maintained that Iran should have the right to develop nuclear weapons in the face of the military threat from hostile actors as well as to safeguard the country from foreign intervention.11
US Position
The US Secretary of State designates an organisation as an FTO if it engages in terrorist activity and threatens the security of US nationals or the US national security. While the Biden administration is keen to revive the nuclear deal, there is unwillingness on delisting the IRGC from the FTOs list. On 16 August 2023, the US State Department insisted that the US was committed to ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon and that diplomacy was the best way to achieve it. The Spokesperson further stated that Iran needed to de-escalate first to create space for diplomacy.12
The IRGC is seen as perpetrator of terrorism in the region and is alleged to have had a role in the killing of US soldiers and officials in Iraq.13 In light of demands by Iran for the delisting of the IRGC, the US Senate passed a non-binding resolution in May 2022 against such a move by 62 votes to 33, with 16 Democrats also joining the Republicans in passing the measure.14 So far, there has been no change in the stand of the US that delisting the IRGC from FTO’s list is separate from JCPOA revival.15 The US State Department in May 2023 reiterated that the IRGC has been designated as an FTO and noted that the IRGC “are subject to more US sanctions than any other entity on the planet”.16
It is significant to note that after the IRGC listing as an FTO in 2019 and the killing of Hossein Soleimani in January 2020, attacks from Iran-backed groups went up by 400 per cent between 2019 and 2020.17 According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), the period saw heightened US–Iran tensions in which approximately 50 attacks took place on the US bases in Iraq.18 After the resumption of JCPOA talks in Vienna in April 2021, reports indicate that there has been a 25 per cent reduction in the attacks on the US bases in Iraq.19
Conclusion
The Trump administration listed the IRGC as an FTO under its maximum pressure campaign. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in May 2022 admitted that the FTO designation has had had minimal impact on curbing IRGC’s alleged destabilising activities.20 While the regional security situation has continued to deteriorate since the 2019 FTO designation, there has also not been much progress on the Iranian nuclear talks. A compromise on the IRGC issue between Iran and its interlocutors continues to be an essential part of the bargain to resume mutual compliance with the terms and obligations of the JCPOA.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The coup in Niger has deep regional and international implications and may lead to increase in major power contestations in the region.
On 26 July 2023, in a coup d’etat, General Abdourrahmane Tchiani, the head of Niger’s presidential guard, deposed the democratically elected President Mohammad Bazoum and declared himself as the leader of the military junta. This action led the 15-member regional economic grouping, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to impose economic sanctions and threaten military intervention if the democratic government is not restored in the country.
After a meeting with mediators from ECOWAS on 19 August 2023, the Niger coup leader promised to return the country to democratic rule in three years. The ECOWAS however has rejected the three-year time frame and are pushing for the earliest return of civilian rule in the country.
The regional efforts to reverse the coup are supported by the United States and France that have deep economic and military links with the country. Earlier, France, the European Union and the US declared economic sanctions and stopped development assistance. The unconstitutional change of government in Niger has deep implications for the region and for the country’s external partners.
Regional Implications
Niger is a land-locked country in West Africa that borders Mali to the West, Chad to the East, Algeria and Libya to the North and Burkina Faso, Benin and Nigeria to the South. The coup in the country has set alarm bells ringing across the region. West Africa has been rocked by multiple coups in the last three years. These include coups in Mali (August 2020, May 2021), Guinea (September 2021) and Burkina Faso (January and September 2022). In most cases, the democratically elected representatives were thrown out of power due to the growing dissatisfaction with the government in particular, due to corruption, economic malaise, and inability to stem the tide of violence from extremists and jihadists.
Regional leaders are worried since they recognise that the coup in Niger is an existential challenge not only for political and economic stability of Niger but for the entire West African region. They are aware that most countries in the region are facing political and economic problems and are quite vulnerable towards any form of internal instability. The regional leaders fear that failure to take a firm stand may trigger a contagion of unconstitutional changes in the region.
The failure to reverse the coup may also hamper regional counter-terrorism efforts. In recent years, the region bordering Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali has become the epicenter of violence by terror groups affiliated to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. As a result, lately, Niger had become the hub of counter-terrorism activities led by the West, particularly France and the US. The internal instability caused by the military coup may provide an opportunity to the terrorists to enhance their activities in the region.
More importantly, call for military intervention by ECOWAS has led to division amongst the member states with Burkina Faso and Mali supporting Niger’s military junta. Given that Niger borders seven countries, any conflict may increase regional instability. While Nigeria is leading the call for military intervention as the head of ECOWAS, it faces an additional challenge. Niger borders the northern states of Nigeria, with long-standing ethnic and cultural ties. Any conflict with Niger will open another front for the country that has been battling the Boko Haram militancy internally for years.
International Implications
Niger’s international partners are pushing for restoration of democracy in the country. Immediately after the coup, they imposed economic sanctions. France stopped its development assistance of US$ 130 million.1 Similarly, the EU and the US stopped development assistance of US$ 544 million and US$ 100 million, respectively.2 The immediate response from its international partners is driven by the impact of the coup on their energy security, their war against terrorism in the region and fear of increase in Russian influence in the country.
The importance of the Niger stems from the fact that it is the world’s seventh largest producer of uranium, a key mineral needed for the development of nuclear energy. Niger’s military junta’s ban on uranium exports to France has sent shock waves to the European country.3 Europe is dependent on Niger for the region’s nuclear energy production. Niger is the second largest supplier of uranium to the EU and contributes 25 per cent of uranium supplies to the country.4 France in particular, generates around 70 per cent of the country’s electricity through nuclear energy. Niger is the third largest supplier of Uranium to France and accounts for 19 per cent of its uranium imports.5 France, the country’s former colonial ruler, has deep economic ties with the country. The French nuclear firm Oreno owns and operates a uranium mine in the country.
The Niger coup also threatens the Trans Saharan Gas Pipeline Project connecting Nigeria’s natural gas fields through Niger and Algeria to Europe.6 In June 2023, Nigeria, Niger and Algeria agreed to accelerate work on the pipeline. The push for this pipeline came after Russia disrupted gas supplies to Europe. In 2022, during the Ukraine conflict, Russia cut off the gas supplies to Europe through the Nord stream pipeline. However, the Niger military junta does not seem to be keen towards continuing any connection with Europe, leaving the future implementation of this vital gas pipeline project in a limbo.
Apart from energy security, Niger is an important partner of the Western countries in countering extremism and terrorism in the region. Before the coup, both the US and France had close military cooperation with Niger. The move by the military junta to end military cooperation with France endangers decade-long counter-terrorism efforts in the region. Niger was the only remaining ally of France in the troubled Sahel region that includes Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Chad and Mali. France has around 1,500 troops in Niger stationed at the Naimey Air base in the country. The US has one of the largest drone bases in the region and has stationed around 1,000 troops in the country. In the last few years, the rise of military governments in neighbouring Mali and Burkina Faso led to the end of Operation Barkhane, a French counter-terrorism mission in the region and the exit of French troops from these countries.
Niger’s former international partners, France and the US also fear that the coup may increase Russian influence in the region. While Russia has not supported the Niger coup, it has warned that any military action by the ECOWAS in the region may lead to “protracted confrontation” in the region.7 The Niger junta has also approached the Russian private military company, Wagner group, for support. It is important to note that support for Russia is also visible amongst Nigerians. In several pro-military junta demonstrations in Niger, the demonstrators have raised Russian flag and chanted “down with France”. Niger’s military junta seems to be following the example of its neighbours. In 2021, after a coup, Mali asked French troops to leave and invited Wagner. Similarly, soon after the departure of French troops from Burkina Faso, the country’s military leader Ibrahim Tarore called Russia a “strategic ally”. 8
Conclusion
The coup in Niger has increased instability in the West Africa region. While the Niger military junta’s latest announcement of return to democratic rule in three years is a positive step, the possibility of a military intervention is still alive. The coup has deep regional and international implications and may lead to increase in major power contestation in the region. A diplomatic resolution may help in stemming the tide towards further authoritarianism and insecurity in the region.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
While defence public sector units have been making efforts to increase their marketing footprint, they will have to succeed in a highly competitive export market.
Defence exports by India in recent times have witnessed a significant surge. During the past decade, from 2013–23, India exported defence equipment worth about Rs 64,250 crore.1 Exports by the nine defence public sector units (DPSUs)2 accounted for 56 per cent of total defence exports in 2013–14 (and even stood as high as 97 per cent in 2014–15) but have since reduced to reach about 9 per cent in 2021–22.3 The volume of exports by the nine major DPSUs have no doubt increased during this period, from Rs 385 crore to Rs 1,126 crore, but given that the overall volume of defence exports from India has increased, the percentage share of the exports by DPSUs has reduced.
The share of the erstwhile Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) in the defence exports pie has reduced from nearly 3 per cent in 2013–14 to less than 1 per cent in 2021–22.4 In the period 2012–22, the cumulative value of OFB exports was about Rs 688 crore. The OFB’s biggest export order was for the supply of 40,000 155 mm shells to the United Arab Emirates in August 2019 worth over Rs 300 crore.
During the period 2013–22, defence exports by the nine major DPSUs were cumulatively worth around Rs 7,000 crores.5 BEL accounted for more than 33 per cent of the total, followed by HAL at 26 per cent and GSL at nearly 18 per cent. Some of the significant export items by DPSUs include offshore patrol vessel (OPV) and fast patrol vessels (FPVs) to countries like Sri Lanka and Mauritius, and helicopters to Nepal, Afghanistan, Mauritius, Seychelles, Namibia, Ecuador and Suriname.
DPSUs have also faced setbacks in their export efforts. GRSE, for instance, was shortlisted for delivery of two light frigates by the Philippines Navy. However, the Philippines gave the award to Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) in October 2016. While shipyards like GSL and GRSE have delivered ships to countries in India’s extended neighbourhood, the last export order for Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL) was a multi support vessel (MSV) to a Mexican company, more than a decade ago. Indian shipyards, though, have robust orders from the Indian Navy.
India’s aircraft exports primarily relate to various versions of the Dhruv helicopter to countries like Ecuador, Maldives, Mauritius and Nepal, maritime patrol aircraft to Sri Lanka, Seychelles, Namibia, light transport aircrafts to Mauritius, Cheetal helicopters to Afghanistan, among other countries. Apart from helicopters and patrol aircrafts, HAL’s exports have included engines, avionics, as well as structural work packages to major aerospace majors like Airbus, Boeing, Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), Rolls Royce, RUAG, Turbomeca, Safran engines, among others.6
HAL has carried out these exports successfully meeting the stringent reliability, quality and delivery specifications of these aerospace majors. Some of these exports have been carried out as part of the various offset contracts secured by the company. HAL has also carried out overhauls of aero engines for Namibian Air Force and Mauritius police Force.7
In order to expand its global export footprint, HAL has been actively responding to RFIs. The Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), Tejas was shortlisted by Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF). The RMAF however chose the Korean FA-50 aircraft in early 2023, in a deal valued at over US$ 900 mn for 18 aircraft.
HAL also received interest from the Philippines Coast Guard for procurement of seven Advanced Light Helicopters (ALH) and eight DO-228 aircraft through Government of India Line of Credit (LoC). The HAL was reportedly up against Airbus Panther AS565 for this particular contract.8
India’s defence exports under the category of ‘Sensors’ meanwhile primarily relate to exports by BEL of artillery locating radars to Armenia, air search radars to Myanmar and Sri Lanka, and maritime patrol aircraft radars to Seychelles.
India’s defence exports push is part of its effort to become a part of the global defence value chain and one of the leading countries in the defence sector. In a significant development, Philippines in January 2022 signed a US$ 375 million contract for the anti-ship variant of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, made by the Indo-Russian joint venture, BrahMos Aerospace.
India aims to achieve a defence exports target of Rs 35,000 crore by 2025. Research and Development (R&D) and focus on innovation are critical to help achieve these targets as well as to sustain the momentum. Among DPSUs, the R&D spend of DPSU behemoths like BEL and HAL at around 7–8 per cent of sales is on a relatively sound footing.
DPSUs have been making efforts to increase their marketing footprint, by opening marketing offices abroad. Most recently, Raksha Mantri Rajnath Singh inaugurated HAL’s office in Kuala Lumpur in July 2023. DPSUs have also proposed strategic alliances with foreign Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). Such strategic partnerships need to be leveraged effectively though to penetrate global markets.
Going forward, DPSUs will continue to face a highly competitive export market for defence products. It is a fact that the DPSUs are some of the biggest defence companies in the world in terms of sales, though mostly to the Indian armed forces. HAL was ranked at the 42nd position while BEL was ranked at the 63rd position among SIPRI Top 100 defence companies in the world in 2021.9
With the government’s emphasis on ‘Atmanirbharta’ and ambitious targets relating to defence production, defence indigenisation and defence exports, the ability of the DPSUs to contribute to the defence exports pie will continue to be in focus.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The complexity and interconnection of global supply chains has heightened the realisation of the need for supply chain resilience and self-reliance in production.
The concept of supply chain resilience has evolved as a response to various economic changes, technological advancements, vulnerabilities due to infrastructure disruptions, besides natural disasters and environmental concerns. Supply chains are susceptible to geopolitical tensions and war time disruptions. Globalisation and lean production practices have enhanced efficiency but have brought about greater interdependency and reduced buffer stocks, thereby increasing vulnerabilities. The complexity and interconnection of global supply chains has heightened the realisation of the need for supply chain resilience and self-reliance in production.
India's defence supply chain, like many others around the world, faces a range of vulnerabilities that has a direct impact on defence preparedness and operational efficiency of its armed forces. Indian armed forces have been further constrained due to traditional reliance on imports for a significant percentage of its weapons platforms, technology, and assemblies and sub-assemblies. Lengthy and complex procurement processes have resulted in delays in acquisition and limitations of domestic manufacturing and technological dependence have exposed vulnerable supply chain to extraneous influences.
The challenges to India's supply chain and defence manufacturing have got magnified because of the general shift in industrial supply chain towards East Asia, particularly to China. This shift in industrial manufacturing has placed India's supply chain under threat, especially during wars. China has a disproportionate influence over the global supply chain because of the large R&D budget, and civilian industrial base including high-tech manufacturing. There are also challenges of ownership of the firms, including those located in friendly countries, but with Chinese ownership. Taiwan and Israel have the world's leading electronics and semiconductor industries. Over-concentration of indispensable items for defence manufacturing increases vulnerabilities and calls for diversification.
The ‘Atmanirbhar Abhiyan’ was launched in May 2020 with an aim to make India self-reliant across various sectors, reducing its dependence on imports and enhancing domestic production capabilities. The programme focuses on five key pillars: economy, infrastructure, system, vibrant demography, and demand. By promoting indigenous manufacturing, innovation, and skill development, the programme seeks to build a robust and self-sufficient economy. The government's initiative aims to mitigate and adapt to shocks, disruptions, and uncertainties in supply chain by establishing domestic production capabilities of defence equipment and platforms. The ‘Atmanirbhar Abhiyan’ is an enabler for the three services to procure weapons and equipment as per the operational requirements without the impediments of external vetoes. The programme does not aim to isolate India's defence ecosystem from foreign participation, rather India will continue to pragmatically import foreign equipment involving niche technology, not available in the country. This is to obviate near-term defence vulnerabilities. Foreign participation in domestic manufacturing should be seen as a welcome contribution to the 'Make in India, Make for the World' agenda of the Prime Minister, articulated during his Independence Day speech of 2022. 'Atmanirbhar Bharat' is not about isolating India's manufacturing ecosystem from the world, rather it is about merging domestic production and consumption with global supply chains. The programme aims to be self-sustaining and self-generating.
Since 2020, a slew of measures has been announced by the government to improve defence indigenisation and domestic manufacturing. Prominent amongst these are emphasis on procuring from domestic manufacturers; the positive indigenisation lists; establishment of defence industrial corridors; and the corporatisation of Ordnance Factory Board. The government is also committed to encourage innovations through schemes of iDEX and has earmarked funds for research and development by private industry and startups.
In order to encourage domestic procurement, the government has earmarked more than 75 per cent of the capital acquisition budget for the year 2023–24 (more than Rs 100,000 crores) for domestic procurement, as against Rs 85,000 crores in 2022–23.1 As a result of these steps, not only has foreign procurement reduced in recent times (from 46 per cent in 2018–19 to 36 per cent in 2020–21),2 the value of domestic defence production has also risen (to more than Rs 100,000 crore in 2022–23),3 while there has been a significant rise in defence exports as well (Rs 16,000 crore in 2022–23).4
India has ambitious plans to become part of the global defence supply chains. The 2020 Draft Defence Production and Export Promotion Policy laid out a vision for the Indian defence industry to reach a turnover of Rs 175,000 crores by 2025, with exports amounting to Rs 35,000 crores. While the country is on course to achieve these ambitious targets, there is a need to take steps to reinforce defence supply chains and mitigate vulnerabilities.
A critical component of the defence supply chain are the MSMEs which require governmental support. The Ministry of Defence has taken significant steps for promoting the role of the MSMEs in the defence sector, including encouraging defence innovation by startups, earmarking orders up to Rs 100 crore exclusively to domestic MSMEs, modifying offset guidelines to ensure integration of MSMEs in the global defence supply chain, among others.
Given the key role of innovation in maintaining competitive edge, partnerships like INDUS-X between the US and Indian defence startups can be expected to add value and deliver critical edge to Indian defence manufacturing, as indeed efforts like the Strategic Partnership model that encourage foreign OEMs to set up domestic manufacturing units for critical platforms.
The path to supply chain resilience and self-reliance is not without challenges. Transitioning from a foreign dependent supply chain model to a more self-reliant one requires careful planning, policy reforms and huge investment. The government will have to walk the fine line to balance the advantages of international trade and collaboration with the need for domestic production capabilities. It requires a collaborative approach involving government agencies, industry stakeholders and academia.
Domestic manufacturing, especially by private industry, is driven by commercial considerations. Indian private defence industry and startups require governmental hand-holding to become players of some reckoning in the global supply chain. This will require industry-friendly policies which support Indian players and allow them to survive and flourish in extreme environment of cut-throat competition in the global supply chain.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Saudi offer to mediate in the Russia–Ukraine War is the latest instance of Riyadh’s dynamic and forward-looking foreign policy.
Saudi Arabia’s approach towards the Russia–Ukraine War is characterised by a commitment to neutrality, mediation efforts and providing humanitarian assistance to the Ukrainian refugees. While Riyadh’s primary political and security focus has traditionally remained within the Arab and Islamic world, it has displayed a profound concern for the ongoing developments in the Russia–Ukraine War. This Saudi stance towards the Russia–Ukraine War underscores the Kingdom’s dynamic and forward-looking foreign policy initiatives, as championed by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
On 5–6 August 2023, Saudi Arabia hosted a meeting of the National Security Advisers/representatives of over 40 countries along with the representatives of the United Nations, the European Commission and the European Council. The meeting, held in Jeddah, agreed to continue consultations and exchange opinions to find a way to restore peace between Russia and Ukraine. Ironically, Russia was not invited to the meeting. While Ukraine described the meeting as “fruitful consultations”,1 Russia stated that “without … taking into account its interests, no meetings on the Ukrainian crisis have the slightest added value”.2
Since the beginning of the Russia–Ukraine War, Saudi Arabia has adhered to a stance of neutrality while consistently advocating for a peaceful resolution through diplomatic negotiations. Over time, this neutrality has evolved into a more proactive diplomatic engagement, with Saudi Arabia striving to mediate between Russia and Ukraine.
Despite the deepening engagements with Russia, Saudi Arabia has voted in favour of the UN resolutions calling for the cessation of conflicts, the withdrawal of Russian forces and the Russian annexation of Ukrainian territory.3 The Kingdom has maintained a good relationship with both Russia and Ukraine which makes it believe that it is uniquely positioned as a neutral, and credible mediator in the crisis.
While appealing for a halt to the war, Saudi Arabia has provided humanitarian assistance for the Ukrainian refugees. In February 2023, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud visited Ukraine and met President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Both countries signed agreements worth US$ 400 million that included US$ 300 million in oil derivatives for Ukraine and providing humanitarian assistance of US$ 100 million through the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre (KSRelief).4
The Saudi foreign minister also expressed his country’s willingness to mediate in the conflict and help in resolving the situation. In less than two weeks, on 9 March 2023, Farhan Al Saud visited Moscow and met his counterpart, Sergey Lavrov. He also reiterated the Saudi willingness to mediate between Russia and Ukraine to end the war.5
Since the creation of OPEC+ in 2016, Saudi–Russian cooperation in the energy sector has significantly deepened. For the US, the Saudi–Russia bonhomie in the OPEC+ and its impact on the global oil market has been a major concern. At a time when the US and the European countries have imposed an import ban on Russian oil, the OPEC+ deal has helped the Russian economy during the war. It has also helped Saudi Arabia to maintain its dominance in the oil market and keep its economy in shape.
Thus, Saudi Arabia has ample reasons to uphold a neutral stance in the war, evading pressure from the US. Its relationship with Ukraine has also been warm with good political and economic ties. Saudi Arabia invited Zelenskyy to participate in the Jeddah summit of the Arab League in May 2023, where he sought the support of the organisation against Russian aggression.
Riyadh is seeking to strengthen its reputation as a credible mediator in its neighbourhood and beyond. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has been mediating in a number of regional conflicts and mediation has become an important feature of Saudi diplomacy. It has mediated in regional conflicts in the Arab/Islamic region such as in Lebanon, between Hamas and Fatah in Palestine, and most recently between the conflicting parties in Sudan. Riyadh often uses its religious soft power to establish its credibility as a mediator and also provides financial aid to support and pacify the conflicting parties.
In December 2022, Saudi Arabia and the UAE mediated between the US and Russia for the release of Brittney Griner, an American sportsperson jailed in Russia, and Victor Bout, a Russian citizen who was in a US prison.6 This has lent Riyadh a degree of confidence to engage in mediation between Russia and Ukraine.
Success in mediation in the 18-month long Russia–Ukraine War, however, would be a formidable task for Riyadh as the war is taking place in a region which is beyond its Arab/Islamic neighbourhood where its soft power is ineffective. Despite maintaining good relations with them, Riyadh’s political and diplomatic leverages to influence the decisions of Moscow and Kiev are limited. Convincing Russia to withdraw without an acceptable deal would be difficult to achieve. In the current situation, where Russia has captured Ukrainian territory, the US and NATO are actively supporting Ukraine in the War and a refugee crisis continues to exist, the efficacy of Riyadh's mediation would remain constrained.
In the Jeddah meeting, Riyadh has made a good start to bring the key stakeholders from across the world for consultation. Saudi mediation efforts have the potential to build an international consensus to bring the war to an end, but the intricate challenge lies in the successful translation of this consensus into tangible and effective actions on the ground.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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