Bhutan’s Graduation from LDC: Opportunities and Challenges
Sneha M
January 11, 2024
While Bhutan's transition from a least developed country (LDC) to a middle-income country is undeniably optimistic, its journey beyond LDC status lies in mindful governance and strategic planning.
Bhutan, known for its unique developmental model centered on collective happiness (gross national happiness), has achieved yet another milestone. By the end of 2023, Bhutan joined the group of developing middle-income economies by foregoing its title as a ‘Least Developed Country’ (LDC).1
Attaining non-LDC status signifies a notable achievement in the developmental journey of landlocked nations. However, the ongoing reduction of international support measures associated with this status presents potential challenges for Bhutan as the country continues to work towards sustaining its integration into the global economy.
UN Criteria and Evaluation Process
The United Nations (UN) classifies LDCs as nations characterised by low-income levels and substantial structural barriers hindering sustainable development. This category of LDCs was formally established in 1971 through General Assembly Resolution 2768 (XXVI). The decision to include or graduate a country from the LDC list is determined by the UN General Assembly, relying on recommendations from the Committee for Development Policy (CDP) and subsequently approved by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).
The CDP conducts triennial reviews of the LDC list, which involves assessing the eligibility of countries for inclusion or graduation from the LDC category. This process aims to provide targeted assistance to the most underdeveloped nations within the developing world. Currently, the UN recognises 45 nations as Least Developed Countries (LDCs).2 Among them, nine are situated in Asia, three in the Pacific, one in the Caribbean, and 33 in Africa.
The LDCs undergo evaluation based on three benchmarks—Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, Human Assets Index (HAI) measuring health and education outcomes, and Economic and Environmental Vulnerability Index (EVI).3 To be promoted from LDC, a nation must meet the graduation requirements for two of the aforementioned criteria in two consecutive triennial review periods of the CDP. No matter how well a nation does in the other two criteria, it may be recommended for graduation if its GNI per capita increases to twice the predetermined level.
In sum, achieving these goals may necessitate the implementation of a combination of strategies. These could encompass stimulating economic growth through infrastructure investments, improving governance, diversifying the economy, addressing environmental concerns, and making substantial investments in human development.
Charting Bhutan’s Economic Course
In 1971, Bhutan joined the initial cohort of LDCs.4 Over subsequent decades, the Himalayan Kingdom has undergone a remarkable transformation, experiencing substantial economic growth and witnessing an overall enhancement in the living standards of its populace.
Bhutan's economic growth since 1961 has been marked by a trajectory of development plans. Initiated with India's support during the first and second Five Year Plans (1961–1972), Bhutan laid the foundation for its economic journey in 1961. The subsequent decades witnessed steady growth, prominently influenced by development in the hydropower sector.
In the 1990s and 2000s, the opening of Chukha Hydropower Plant played a pivotal role. In the 2010s, the focus on sustainable development and diversification of sectors such as tourism contributed to continued economic resilience. Moreover, from 2010 to 2019, Bhutan's economy exhibited robust expansion, boasting an average annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth exceeding 5 per cent, resulting in significant reductions in poverty.
Bhutan has achieved remarkable advancements, including substantial progress in education, with an estimated overall literacy rate of approximately 66 per cent in 2018. The provision of electricity has become nearly universal, reaching 98 per cent coverage in 2017, and basic access to potable water services extended to about 97 per cent of the population in the same year. The country's growth has resulted in a remarkable decline in the national poverty rate, dropping from 23.2 per cent in 2007 to 8.2 per cent in 2017. In terms of the Human Development Index (HDI), Bhutan scored 0.654 in 2019, surpassing other Asian LDCs.5
However, the year 2020 brought unprecedented challenges as the government implemented early-stage lockdowns and border closures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite effective containment efforts, these stringent measures took a toll on the economy, contributing to an estimated 10 per cent decline in GDP.
Regardless, the February 2021 Monitoring Report by the UN CDP underscored Bhutan's exceptional performance, with GNI per capita growth estimated at USD 2,982, three times the graduation threshold of USD 1,222. Additionally, Bhutan's Human Assets Index (HAI) score exhibited substantial improvement, reaching 79.4 (compared to the required score of 66). Despite excelling in GNI per capita and HAI, Bhutan faces challenges in meeting the Economic & Environmental Vulnerability Index (EVI) criterion, with an EVI of 25.7, below the threshold of 32.6 Nonetheless, this positions Bhutan as one of the fastest-progressing non-oil exporting LDCs.
Despite these challenges, there has been a noteworthy rebound in economic growth, with projections indicating an approximate 4.2–4.7 per cent expansion since the financial year 202223.7 In FY 2022–23, the economy again grew by 4.6 per cent, driven by reopening of the borders for tourism in September 2022. The industry sector expanded by 5.1 per cent, with growth in construction and manufacturing, while the services sector grew by 5 per cent, creating more jobs, especially in transport and trade services.8
Prospects and Predicaments
Bhutan's exit from LDC carries significant promise across multifaceted dimensions of its development trajectory. Economically, this transition opens new doors for the nation, ushering in opportunities that have the potential to ignite robust growth and development. The improved economic conditions that accompany such a shift may act as magnets for foreign investments, encouraging diversification of industries and enhancing Bhutan's recognition on the global stage.
In addition, the anticipated focus in the 13th Five Year Plan (FYP) on infrastructure development holds the promise of increased efficiency and connectivity.9 This could manifest through the creation of advanced transportation networks, energy infrastructure, and improved communication systems, all of which play crucial roles in fostering economic vitality. As Bhutan asserts greater autonomy in decision-making post graduation, a noticeable decrease in reliance on foreign aid could be anticipated.
This transition empowers the nation with increased control over its policies and resources, fostering a trajectory towards a self-reliant and robust economy. Importantly, the positive effects extend beyond economic dimensions, encompassing notable improvements in human development, particularly in healthcare, education, and overall living standards.
However, amidst these promising prospects, it is crucial to underscore the importance of responsive governance and strategic planning. Navigating the challenges associated with such a transformative phase necessitates prudence and vigilance to prevent potential economic pitfalls in the years to come.
Grappling with various challenges and developmental constraints, Bhutan has significant economic vulnerabilities exacerbated by natural disasters. Its small and vulnerable economy, characterised by mountainous terrain, sparse population, limited industrial development, constrained global market access, and a narrow product range meeting international standards, faces predicaments upon graduating from its LDC status. The graduation will impact LDC-specific international support measures (ISM) in international trade, official development cooperation (ODA), and climate resilience support.
The Himalayan Kingdom currently benefits from LDC-specific preference schemes, such as the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) providing tariff exceptions, and duty-free and quota-free (DFQF) market access in the European Union (EU) and Japanese markets. Regional trading agreements, like the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), also offer preferential market access. However, exiting LDC status implies the erosion of these preferential trade agreements, resulting in increased tariffs and negative implications for export and economic diversification efforts.10
Bhutan's development success has historically relied on natural resources, particularly hydropower generation and tourism. Despite the swift rise in per capita income, reflected in the evolution of GNI per capita, there are concerns about structural impediments hindering economic diversification. Hydropower, as a capital-intensive sector, significantly contributes to the GDP, fostering the growth of energy-intensive industries.
In the realm of international trade, Bhutan currently stands outside the World Trade Organization (WTO) but is actively considering membership and may join shortly. As a non-WTO member, Bhutan is not bound by WTO provisions, lacking the protective cover of multilateral rules. The potential benefits of WTO accession, including facilitating export expansion, must be weighed against challenges, heightened scrutiny, and the necessity to undertake commitments, especially considering the capacity constraints of LDCs acknowledged by WTO members. Nonetheless, the predominant worry revolves around the potential consequences of climate change on Bhutan's economic advancement, presenting a risk to the achievements made through persistent efforts.
Conclusion
For Bhutan to sustain its growth and development trajectory post graduation, a comprehensive set of policies is imperative to tackle the multifaceted challenges inherent in its development path. As a small, vulnerable, landlocked nation heavily reliant on a limited range of export commodities, Bhutan remains exposed to economic vulnerabilities and natural disasters. The country's ability to continue its developmental journey after graduation hinges significantly on the graduation process itself, emphasising the necessity of a seamless transition.
A pivotal aspect of Bhutan's transition strategy should center on alleviating structural challenges, enabling the effective implementation of 13th FYP and cultivating the resilience required for navigating the post-LDC status environment. In sum, the transition should address vulnerabilities through economic diversification, developing productive capacities for structural transformation, and bolstering disaster management to enhance economic and natural disaster resilience.
Beyond Borders: The Urgent Case for Global Cooperation in Cyber Defence
Cherian Samuel
January 04, 2024
Like-minded countries need to cooperate more closely to shield critical infrastructure and prevent systemic disruptions.
Over the past year, the cyber conflict between Ukraine and Russia has captured much attention. Yet, a similarly critical situation has unfolded in the China–Taiwan theatre, where cyberattacks have significantly escalated. Reports from Google's threat analysis division and Microsoft security have confirmed this uptick, pinpointing that these incidents predominantly target critical sectors like energy systems, electrical grids, and communication networks. The semiconductor industry has not been spared either.
A report by the cybersecurity company Fortinet reveals a staggering figure of 412 billion attack events detected in Asia-Pacific in the first half of 2023, with Taiwan bearing the brunt at 22.48 billion, marking an 80 per cent increase from the year prior. Alongside espionage efforts, Taiwan has faced Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) and ransomware attacks. Further intensifying the situation are the misinformation campaigns aimed at undermining public trust in Taiwan's government and stoking societal confusion.
India has also been at the receiving end of misinformation aimed at Taiwan. A recent rumour claiming that the Taiwanese government was bringing in as many as 100,000 migrant workers from India went viral on social media in Taiwan. Though refuted by the Taiwan government, various social media pages operated by the Taiwan government were spammed with bot messages designed “to create social panic and spark tension between Taiwan and India”.1
In defence, Taiwan has fortified its cyber capabilities by establishing its Information Communication Electronic Force Command in 2017, consolidating various military units into one formidable force of over 6,000 personnel. The latest National Cybersecurity program, the sixth of its kind since 2001 and running until 2024, reflects Taiwan's commitment to strengthening its cyber defences—protecting crucial infrastructure, enhancing cyber skills, increasing information security, and supporting the private sector in safeguarding its operations. A key goal is to position Taiwan as a hub for cyber research and development.2
Taiwan's role in global cyber stability is underscored by its critical position in the electronics supply chain. Taiwan is the sixth-largest electronics exporter globally, with electronics exports valued at US$ 94.8 billion in 2021, representing a 3.9 per cent share of the global electronics market. Taiwan is known for its semiconductor manufacturing capabilities, with Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) alone having a 56 per cent global market share.
Taiwan has had a long-standing relationship with the United States, which has acted as a security guarantor for the island nation through the Taiwan Relations Act passed by the US Congress in 1979. Its security has acquired further salience as it became a technological powerhouse over the years, making it more vulnerable to cyber attacks from China that considers reunification of Taiwan with the mainland as a major goal and has used cyber, first as a means of espionage, and now increasingly, for destructive attacks on the networks of countries it is hostile to.
In its 2023 annual report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, the US Department of Defense noted that China could potentially use its cyber capabilities as part of a range of campaigns designed to coerce Taiwan. These campaigns may include cyberspace operations, blockade, and kinetic actions with the goal of compelling Taiwan to unify with China or to bring Taiwan's leadership to the negotiation table on terms favourable to the People's Republic of China (PRC). Cyber attacks had notably increased after Speaker Nancy Pelosi led a congressional delegation to Taiwan in August 2022 and are up 80 per cent from the same period in 2022.3
In April 2023, US lawmakers introduced the Taiwan Cybersecurity Resiliency Act, which would require the US Department of Defense to expand cybersecurity cooperation with Taiwan, calling for cybersecurity training exercises with Taiwan, joint efforts to defend Taiwan’s military networks, infrastructure, and systems, and leveraging US cybersecurity technologies to help defend Taiwan. The proposed legislation currently awaits further discussion in the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Taiwan has also sought to share expertise it has acquired from responding to these attacks but is constrained by the limits of its participation in international organisations. It is however a member of the Asia Pacific Computer Emergency Response Team (APCERT) where it has been a part of the Steering Committee and the convenor of Training Working Group. Taiwan and the US have also established a Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) platform to capitalise on Taiwan’s expertise and experience to address global issues of mutual concern and assist other countries in their capacity building efforts. The other countries partnering in the framework are Japan and Australia.
The GCTF has facilitated more than 63 workshops, engaging over 7,000 attendees from 126 countries, demonstrating Taiwan's commitment to sharing its cyber defence expertise and aiding in international capacity building. Most recently, the GCTF, with support from the US Embassy, held a workshop in New Delhi on 11 December 2023 with the aim of improving co-ordination and enhancing crisis response capabilities.4 The other aspects discussed, including AI, cyber crime prevention and critical information infrastructure protection, are also of utmost priority since the threats in these areas are moving faster than governments can respond individually.
The growing instability in the international system which is manifested most in cyberspace underscores the urgency for robust defence mechanisms and international cooperation in cybersecurity with all like-minded countries to shield critical infrastructure and prevent systemic disruptions.
MONUSCO's Early Withdrawal and the Future of UN Peacekeeping in Africa
Rajeesh Kumar
January 02, 2024
The UN should shift towards more traditional and narrowly focused peacekeeping missions and maintain a clearer and more distinct role as a neutral mediator in conflicts.
On 19 December 2023, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2717 to end its 24-year-old peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The resolution outlines a comprehensive disengagement plan for the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), comprising three phases to gradually transfer responsibilities from MONUSCO to the Government of the DRC by December 2024.1 The UNSC decision was prompted by the DRC’s earlier request for the Mission's withdrawal. As the UN's longest-standing peacekeeping mission with a robust mandate faces a turbulent exit, it is crucial to ask what its critical failings were and what the UN can learn from them.
MONUSCO in DRC
MONUSCO commenced its peacekeeping mandate in the DRC, aiming to stabilise the nation torn by internal conflicts and political instability. Established in July 2010 by UNSC Resolution 1925, MONUSCO succeeded an earlier mission known as MONUC (United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo), initiated in 1999.2 This peacekeeping operation in the DRC became one of the longest-standing and most extensive UN missions globally, involving multifaceted objectives encompassing security, political stability, protection of civilians, and promoting human rights and development.
In its initial years, MONUSCO deployed approximately 20,000 troops and played a crucial role in reducing the presence of foreign rebels in the DRC. Over its two-and-a-half-decade presence in the DRC, MONUSCO navigated complex challenges marked by internal strife, armed rebellions, regional tensions, and humanitarian crises. Within a few years after its establishment, MONUSCO achieved significant milestones, including disarming Congolese ex-combatants, repatriating foreign combatants, facilitating the return of Congolese refugees, and releasing children from armed groups.3
However, despite concerted efforts, MONUSCO faced persistent hurdles in achieving its mandates due to intricate and protracted nature of the conflicts, resource limitations, and political complexities. One of the contentious facets within the MONUSCO was establishing the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in 2013, an offensive military unit operating within the peacekeeping framework.4 The core objective of the FIB centred on curbing the expansion of armed groups, neutralising their impact and disarming them, thereby enhancing state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC to facilitate stabilisation efforts.
The induction of the FIB into MONUSCO initially sparked hope for change. With joint efforts between the FIB and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), there was an anticipation of fostering peace and stability in the volatile eastern region. However, despite the FIB's presence for over a decade, the DRC security situation has seen limited improvement, falling short of expectations.5
DRC has suffered immeasurable losses, with an estimated 6 million lives lost in the last two decades.6 It also faces the largest internal displacement crisis in Africa, with ongoing violence forcing 5.8 million people—over half of them women—to flee their homes. Since June 2022, over 600,000 people have been displaced due to escalating violence.7 In 2023, approximately 10 million people in the DRC required aid amid the turmoil.8 This dire situation fuelled widespread resentment against MONUSCO, prompting calls, including from the DRC president, for its withdrawal.9
Anti-MONUSCO Protests and Attacks against Peacekeepers
Since July 2022, DRC has seen a series of protests against MONUSCO. Attacks on UN peacekeepers surged, with over a dozen peacekeepers killed in one of the deadliest assaults against peacekeepers in recent history.10 More than 50 protesters died demanding the UN's withdrawal, blaming its inability to control rebel groups causing lethal attacks in the east.11 In November 2022, civilians targeted a UN peacekeeping convoy in eastern Congo, highlighting ongoing tensions. Also, a UN helicopter was attacked on 5 February, further underscoring the challenging situation faced by the mission in the region.12
Protests against MONUSCO in the DRC are not new. For instance, in 2019, following the ADF's atrocities in North Kivu, which MONUSCO could not prevent, large-scale protests against the UN mission erupted. However, this recent series of protests stands out due to its scale and the level of violence involved. Moreover, political elites also joined in criticising MONUSCO, intensifying pressure on the UN mission in the DRC. The International Peace Institute's 2022 report highlights increased disinformation about MONUSCO in the DRC, worsening negative sentiments towards the mission.13 Similarly, a recent survey revealed that nearly 45 per cent of Congolese want MONUSCO to leave the country immediately.14 This poses significant concerns regarding the future of peacekeeping missions in the continent.
Future of UN Peacekeeping in Africa
Africa has hosted the highest number of UN peacekeeping missions, accounting for nearly 47 per cent of all missions worldwide. The continent has been historically plagued by conflicts, civil wars, and humanitarian crises, making peacekeeping missions essential for regional and global stability. Despite many setbacks, UN missions helped end insurgencies, support elections and build peace in many African countries. However, growing resentments against UN missions raise serious concerns about the peacekeeping missions' effectiveness and long-term impact in the continent.
The protests and premature withdrawal of troops indicate the crisis confronting UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. Since 1948, more than 4,300 UN personnel have lost their lives in peacekeeping missions, with over 1,000 falling victim to targeted attacks, predominantly in Africa.15 Since 2013, the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, and the DRC have witnessed the highest number of attacks against peacekeepers.16
The UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is by far the most dangerous mission for peacekeepers, with 310 fatalities resulting from malicious acts from 2013 to 2023.17 The Security Council terminated the mission in June 2023, and peacekeepers exited the country without achieving their mandate. The African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) also encountered opposition from political elites and exited without fulfilling its mandate.18
This peacekeeping crisis revolves around two main issues: first, concern about the erosion of core UN peacekeeping principles, leading to peacekeepers becoming parties in the conflicts they aim to resolve. Second, the missions' limited operational effectiveness, especially combating non-traditional threats like terrorism. These issues were evident in CAR, DRC and Mali, where peacekeepers were tasked with peace enforcement mandates. Further, most peace operations lack the necessary resources and training for counter-terrorism tasks. Peacekeepers, typically underfunded and undertrained, lack the specialised equipment, skills, and intelligence essential for effective counter-terrorism efforts. Hence, it becomes crucial for peacekeeping to adapt and evolve to address the challenges of the present era effectively.
MONUSCO's closure marks the end of a significant era for large-scale UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. Its exit signifies a reduced UN presence on the continent compared to previous years. This situation might lead host governments to seek other security partners, including private military companies. For instance, Mali and the CAR extended invitations to the Wagner Group to operate within their countries.19 Likewise, in 2022, the DRC also opted for the involvement of private military contractors to intensify operations in the eastern regions.20
These instances collectively suggest a bleak outlook for the future of UN peacekeeping in Africa, highlighting the urgent need for a comprehensive restructuring of the UN's approach in the region. India recently proposed the establishment of clear, realistic mandates for peacekeeping and effective communication strategies involving local stakeholders. As the increased robustness of mandates has proven ineffective, there is a need to explore alternative solutions.21 As a significant Troop Contributing Country (TCC), India emphasises fostering trust and cooperation between mission leadership and host states to address acts against peacekeepers. India's proactive initiatives, mainly promoting accountability for crimes against peacekeepers, underscore essential areas requiring improvement.22
In light of the persisting challenges that extensive stabilisation missions face in achieving lasting peace in Africa, there is a growing rationale for the UN to consider shifting towards more traditional and narrowly focused peacekeeping missions. It would also enable the UN to maintain a clearer and more distinct role as a neutral mediator in conflicts, thereby rebuilding trust among the host governments and the local populations. This recalibration could lead to a more targeted and efficient use of resources and personnel.
Japan made great strides towards developing an independent foreign policy, even as it hewed closer to the Global North’s positions on the burning issues of 2023.
Japan has had a busy diplomatic year. It had to adapt its foreign policy on account of the structural challenge posed by China and was also called upon to display dexterity as a gamut of old and new territorial and ideological conflicts reignited in West Asia and Eastern Europe. Japan’s neighbourhood underwent milestone shifts that required deft tending by Tokyo. The infusion of defence-oriented language into its rhetoric had to take into account reactions across all of Asia and the world. Further, due to an internal political reshuffle, Japan has had two foreign ministers, giving rise to the unusual phenomenon (in Japan) of a prime minister explicitly staking a claim to make a personal impact on foreign policy. Given these trends, Japan’s diplomacy in 2023 marks a significant inflection point.
Rapprochement with the Global South
The first key trend noticeable in Japan’s foreign policy in 2023 has been its ardent embrace of the Global South concept. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida chose the occasion of his visit to New Delhi in March to announce his new plan for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.1 This plan gave importance to South and South-East Asia as well as Africa as key regions for Japan’s strategic engagement. Kishida’s invitation to India and Indonesia, two leading Global South nations, to the G-7 summit in Hiroshima, as well as his interactions with Global South leaders during the G-20 summit in New Delhi,2 spoke about Japan’s sincerity in putting its rhetoric into practice.
Kishida was ably assisted in this enterprise by Foreign Ministers Yoshimasa Hayashi and (post-September) Yoko Kamikawa. Both Hayashi and Kamikawa used their visits to Global South countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America to reinforce Japan’s commitment to convey their concerns to the industrialised Global North. Even the Imperial family was roped into the role of de facto ambassadors of Japan’s message. Emperor Naruhito and Empress Masako visited Indonesia in June, Crown Prince Fumihito (the Emperor’s brother) and Crown Princess Kiko visited Vietnam in September, while Princess Kako’s (daughter of the Crown Prince) successful visit to Peru in November compensated for the lack of visits by Kishida to the region.
Neighbourhood Diplomacy
Developments in the neighbourhood added new dimensions to Japan’s diplomatic calendar. The inauguration of a new President of the Republic of Korea, Yoon Suk-Yeol, in December 2022 augured a sea-change in that country’s blind-spot towards Japan. Yoon surprised many among his own countrymen by seeking out an engagement with Kishida in March. The engagement followed a long freeze in bilateral ties after the previous South Korean administration of Moon Jae-in allowed a Supreme Court judgement on Japan’s historical atrocities in the peninsula to affect bilateral security and political cooperation in 2018. Since that first meeting in March, Yoon and Kishida met each other seven times over the next nine months,3 a frequency rare in the annals of diplomacy.
During Kishida’s visit to Seoul in May, Yoon went further than any other South Korean leader in de-emphasising issues of history, wholeheartedly echoed by Kishida. The rapid improvement in ties resulted in some tangible benefits. The ROK did not oppose Japan’s release of seawater used in the clean-up of the crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor in August. Yoon and Kishida, in association with President Joseph Biden, agreed to resume joint military and security cooperation against the actions of North Korea and China.4
China itself proved to be the elephant in the room in 2023, particularly in the latter half of the year as Japan embarked on the wastewater discharge from the Fukushima Daiichi plant. It not only insisted on opposing the United Nations specialised agencies’ stance on the safety of the discharged water, but also embarked on an unprecedented campaign against Japanese citizens, mobilising crowds to vandalise the Japanese Embassy and a Japanese school, pre-emptively banning seafood and other exports from Japan, and encouraging a unique prank-call campaign against Japanese domestic entities.5
Japan also showed willingness to escalate matters by joining with the US and the Netherlands to restrict Chinese access to advanced semiconductor manufacturing technology in October.6 Japan widened its sanctions list in December to include Chinese government labs engaged in nuclear research as a protest against the latter’s expansion of its nuclear arsenal.7 Nevertheless, the two sides did resume informal military talks,8 and Kishida met President Xi Jinping on the side lines of the APEC Summit in November to discuss bilateral issues.9
Emphasising Defence Ties
Another discernible trend in Japan’s diplomacy in 2023 was the uptick in mentions of defence and security issues in its engagements with relevant countries. Kishida’s visit to New Delhi in March saw him engaging Prime Minister Narendra Modi on issues of defence technology cooperation. Kishida’s public commitment later in the summer to reconsider Japan’s strict curbs on export of lethal defence technology in the teeth of opposition from pacifist quarters of the Japanese political sphere saw him using his visit to Ukraine as an opportunity to shake up established norms. His subsequent visits to North Africa and South-East Asia, as well as those of his deputies to Europe, the US and West Asia have shown a consistent throughline under which Japan has committed to work cooperatively with partners and like-minded countries to ensure not only maritime security, but, as part of its comprehensive national power, economic, energy and technology security as well.
One of the most distinctive advances under this overarching theme has been the introduction of the Official Security Assistance (OSA) program10 as a complement to its Official Development Assistance. With an initial budget of 450 million Japanese yen, the OSA is intended to provide non-lethal security assistance to key countries. The first recipients, Fiji, Malaysia, the Philippines and Bangladesh, are indicative of Japan’s areas of interest, and Tokyo has shown its openness to considering an expansion of the program to a global scale in partnership with other net security providers in their respective regions. The fact that the Philippines is presently embroiled in a stand-off against China in the Second Thomas Shoal indicates Japan’s strategic choice in ensuring smaller countries are capable of pushing back against Chinese maritime aggression.
Enhancement of the Prime Minister’s Role
The year 2023 also marked the year when Japan’s diplomacy underwent an institutional reworking in terms of who ‘does’ foreign policy. In essence, this change turned the Japanese prime minister into the key effector of policies, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs being placed in a secretarial role.
Evidence of this could best be found in the announcement of the replacement of Yoshimasa Hayashi as the nation’s chief diplomat while Hayashi was on a trip to Ukraine, and the rapid substitution of Yoko Kamikawa—with no significant prior experience of foreign affairs, to the position. Kishida’s desire to take a greater role in foreign affairs came from a press conference he delivered in the wake of the reshuffle of his cabinet in September. He noted that while “[m]inisters have an important role to play…summit diplomacy is a big component as well. I myself intend to play a major role in such summit diplomacy.”11
As observers of Japan’s political arena know well, Japanese prime ministers tend not to be primarily aggressive salesmen of their country abroad, choosing to focus instead on leaving behind domestic legacies. Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda is the epitomical example. A former bureaucrat, he was central to the engineering of the ambitious industrial policies that caused what we now know as Japan’s high-speed economic growth era, from 1960 to 1973. Some prime ministers, to be sure, have been outward-looking in terms of their legacy-building: Shigeru Yoshida, father of the Yoshida Doctrine espousing close security ties with US in lieu of a focus on economic growth at home, and Shinzo Abe, come to mind. However, none so far have staked quite such an overt claim to diplomatic primacy as Kishida.
It is widely speculated, to some extent justly, that Kishida’s low domestic support ratings, due largely to internal policy failures such as the talk of new taxes to increase defence spending and the failure to completely repudiate the Liberal Democratic Party’s cosy ties with the controversial Unification Church, may have led him to seek diplomatic successes. However, this remains a double-edged sword. Should his key initiatives, such as the OSA or outreach to the Global South, sour, he will be doubly blamed for frittering away valuable policy space to pursue arcane objectives abroad. As such, Kishida’s ensuing moves in this sphere bear observation.
Conclusion
It is interesting to note that Japan, despite its long-standing image as a staid, reactive power, stands at a diplomatic crossroads of increasing significance at the end of 2023. Which road it takes in 2024 is not easy to predict, but there are certain significant mileposts which could signal the direction. One crucial milepost will be how Japan manages its ties with the Global South, especially with India. Another crucial marker will be the success (or failure) of its new policy of studied neutrality in West Asia, which will indicate whether it is prepared to deviate from the Western world’s script should its interests be seriously affected. Third, and finally, it would be interesting to see whether Prime Minister Kishida continues to expand his role in diplomacy, and to what extent he can claim the space to do so before encountering significant bureaucratic pushback.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Maldives’ foreign policy has witnessed a shift from ‘India First’ under former President Ibrahim Solih to ‘India Out’ that was central to Mohammed Muizzu’s presidential campaign.
President Mohammed Muizzu of Maldives confirmed on 4 December 2023 that an agreement was reached with India for the withdrawal of over 70 troops deployed in the archipelago nation for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) and training purposes. This statement was made after his return from the UAE and Turkey.
Two Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopters and a Dornier aircraft are expected to continue to be deployed in the Maldives.1 Muizzu had requested India to withdraw its military personnel formally when he met the Minister of Earth Sciences Kiren Rijiju in Male on 18 November 2023. This was also a key election campaign promise of the incumbent, who took over power in September 2023.
The shift in Maldives foreign policy is not sudden. It is a result of a simmering anti-India sentiment dating back to at least a decade, which played up fears of India gradually attempting to impinge on Male’s sovereignty. These sentiments got briefly stabilised under the Solih government since 2018, but peaked during the 2023 presidential campaign.
Moreover, this is not an organically generated sentiment. It has been actively fanned, and is reflective of undertones of a well-crafted war of narratives that facilitated the changing domestic realities in the country. The foreign policy shift has witnessed a leap from a call for ‘India First’ under former President Ibrahim Solih to ‘India Out’ that was central to Muizzu’s presidential campaign.
Tracing the Trajectory
The genesis of the India Out campaign in the Maldives can be traced back to the political landscape of 2013, when the government of Abdulla Yameen assumed power. Yameen's administration, marked by an unequivocal pro-China stance, entered into a series of opaque infrastructure agreements with Chinese state-owned enterprises. During the five years of his rule, as the country slid into various Chinese ‘debt trap’ investments, his governments’ conscious efforts at framing the cognitive environment by raising an India-phobic campaign began.
A popular discourse emerged surrounding the agreement for receiving two Indian Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopters and an accompanying contingent of Indian armed personnel, integral to the training of the Maldives National Defense Forces for helicopter operations. Raging disinformation campaigns generated social panic suggesting Indian designs to impinge on the nation’s sovereignty. By 2015, Yameen terminated the agreement with India. Yameen’s tenure was marred with dubious infrastructure project deals with Chinese-owned companies and human rights abuses. He lost in 2018 elections, and Ibrahim Solih became the president.2
Solih reaffirmed the traditional ‘India First’ policy and his tenure was marked by the re-signing of the agreement relating to the Dhruv helicopters. Furthermore, in 2021, India and the Maldives entered into the Uthura Thila Falu (UTF) development deal concerning port construction.3 While Solih's ascendancy provided some respite for New Delhi, the anti-India sentiment among the population kept simmering. The controversial discourse surrounding Indian military presence re-emerged in the form of the ‘India Out’ campaign in print as well as social media and on the Maldivian streets. Notably, the Indian High Commission became a focal point for expressions of this anti-India sentiment, with Indian diplomats being targeted on various social media platforms.4
The Case of Dhiyares News
The role of a local news outlet called Dhiyares News assumed significance, with even the ruling Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) charging that the “continuous barrage of anti-India vitriol” by the outfit appeared to be a “well-funded, well-orchestrated and pre-meditated political campaign with the express purpose of whipping up hatred against the Maldives’ closest ally, India.”5 Former President Yameen, who was released from jail by then, assumed a leadership role in the ‘India Out’ campaign. His involvement added a layer of complexity, considering his previous alignment with pro-China policies. The presidential campaign of Muizzu, a PNC candidate who was a coalition partner of Yameen’s former party PPM, was centered on fanning the social panic generated through the campaign, which eventually ended up in the fall of the Solih government.
It is pertinent to highlight the orchestrated war of narratives over the issue. A report by the Colombo Information Agency serves as an eye-opener in this context. As the activity on Twitter (where the ‘India Out’ campaign spread most as the hashtag #IndiaOut) was tracked, it was notable that the 59.3k tweets using the hashtag were tweeted by a mere 2,252 handles—almost half of which were created between 2019 and 2021. Moreover, approximately half of these newly created handles in turn were identified as fake. According to the report, around 210 handles were responsible for 80 per cent of the content engagement where a mere eight handles contributed to over 12,171 tweets.6
The report further examined the role of Dhiyares News and its sister journal TheMaldives Journal in driving this campaign. The journal, professing an anti-India sentiment, was sympathetic to former President Yameen’s cause, and had an openly pro-China stance. The journal published articles titled “Yameen tortured on Modi’s Orders: Opposition”8 and targeted Indian presence and alleged “interference” in Male’s internal affairs.
The role of the co-founder Azad Azaan was highlighted in the report. Of the 2,252 handles which engaged in the sharing of the hashtag, the report noted that half of them were followers of Azaan, where his account managed to single-handedly attract 12 per cent of the total traction.9 Azaan’s pro-China alignment is also well known. Regardless, the fact that this orchestrated disinformation campaign could be transformed into an organic public discourse that defined the presidential elections of a country speaks volumes of the cognitive vulnerabilities existing in contemporary times.
Going Forward
India has been the first responder to each of Maldives’ political, economic, and natural disasters. Despite this, the generation and seeming acceptance of an anti-India sentiment due to dis-information campaigns is significant. Popular perceptions got manipulated which in turn changed the domestic political mood and political dynamics, and subsequently the fate and direction of the country’s diplomatic engagements.
While discussing ways to defeat an adversary through covert means, Kautilya’s sutra in the second chapter of his twelfth book of Arthashastra states “एवं जानपदान्समाहर्तुर्भेदयेयुः”. This roughly translates as “...in the same manner, they should divide the country people from the Administrator” (12.2.29). As democracies function in the contemporary scenario, any state’s sovereignty lies in its population, making favourable popular perceptions central to any diplomatic pursuits. Bilateral ties are only as strong as the support that a partner government can generate in favour of a policy.
Regardless of the changing domestic realities in Male, India’s regional and geopolitical relevance will continue to keep relations with New Delhi among Male’s high-priority affairs.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Japan and the Philippines: Towards a Stronger Strategic Partnership
Sriram Vellore
December 06, 2023
The Philippines became the first Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member state to sign a defence pact with Japan.
The National Security Strategy (NSS) 2022 highlighted Japan’s aim to establish a new cooperation framework that would provide equipment and assistance for infrastructure development to like-minded countries. As part of this aim, the ‘Official Security Assistance’ (OSA) framework was introduced.
The OSA is a new cooperation framework to reinforce the armed forces of like-minded countries in order to deepen security cooperation with Japan’s defence forces. While the Official Development Assistance (ODA) focuses on enhancing the social and economic development of developing countries, the OSA intends to expand bilateral defence cooperation to tackle common security challenges.1
On 3 November, the Philippines became the first recipients of the OSA and also became the first Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member to sign a defence pact with Japan. The National Security Policy (NSP) 2023–28 of the Philippines highlights that the West Philippine Sea (WPS)/South China Sea (SCS) issue remains a key priority for Manila. It also elaborates on acquiring state-of-the-art military assets to become a self-reliant military power.2
The institutionalisation of Japan’s security ties with Manila is a testament to the fact that Japan has gained the Philippines’ trust to act as a security partner despite its tainted past during the Second World War.3 Due to the significant convergence of security interests, particularly in the South China Sea (SCS) region, Japan and the Philippines are now closer than ever in security terms.
On 22 October 2023, a Chinese coastguard vessel bumped into a Philippine coastguard vessel during a resupply mission near the Second Thomas Shoal in the SCS. This incident was the most consequential of all the maritime confrontations between the Philippines and China that began in the 1990s. Following the severe maritime confrontation in October, the Philippine Transportation Secretary declared the revocation of Chinese infrastructure projects valued at US$ 4.9 billion and Manila signed the OSA pact with Tokyo.4
The new defence agreement marked a shift in Japan’s previous policy which restricted the use of development aid to disaster relief. Tokyo is to offer a grant valued at Y600 million (US$ 4 million) under the scheme, along with defence equipment such as warning and control radars.5 Shortly after inking the pact with Japan, the Philippines declared its exit from the Belt and Road Initiative. This is another major step taken by Manila to alleviate its economic dependence on Beijing and lean more towards its security allies, namely Tokyo and Washington.
Japan–Philippine Relations: Brief Overview
During the Second World War, the Philippines was one of the countries that Japan targeted in its military occupation of the Southeast Asian region. It was a vital part of Japanese territorial ambitions, particularly since it was a US colony. After the war ended, Manila aimed to establish good relations with Tokyo, contrary to the approach of other neighbouring countries that bore the brunt of Japan’s military occupation.
In the early years of their relationship, the Philippines approached Japan with caution fearing military expansion. However, Washington’s push to improve relations and Tokyo’s willingness to pay war reparations led the two countries to conclude the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation in 1960. Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo’s introduction of “heart-to-heart diplomacy” in 1977 brought Japan closer to Southeast Asian countries.6
The two countries have explored maritime safety and security since the 1990s. On 4 June 2015, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Benigno Aquino III jointly declared that the relationship has entered the stage of a “Strengthened Strategic Partnership”. The declaration focused on enhancing security dialogues and concluding negotiations on the transfer of defence equipment, along with other pertinent security issues.7
The Philippines also benefitted substantially from the ODA provided by Japan. The ODA loan to Manila rose from US$ 2304.77 million in the period 1985–1990 to US$ 2593.61 million in the period 2010–2017.8 In 2022, Japan offered an ODA loan of 30,000 million yen to the Philippines for the COVID-19 Crisis Response Emergency Support Loan.9
Growth of Security Relations
Philippine–China relations have regressed gradually over China’s maritime confrontations with the Philippines in the South China Sea since the mid-1990s. In 1995, Manila’s perception of its relations with China changed considerably when it discovered the Chinese construction on the Mischief Reef. Prior to the development in 1995, relations were marked by detente and economic cooperation, devoid of any confrontation. The detention of a Filipino fishing vessel by Chinese troops on Mischief Reef aggravated President Fidel Ramos, who condemned Chinese activities in the South China Sea. A series of maritime confrontations followed throughout the 1990s.10
The Second Thomas Shoal, also known as Ayungin Shoal, which lies about 195 km (121 miles) northwest of the Philippine province of Palawan, has been a hotspot of maritime confrontations, particularly in 2023. After the October incident near the Second Thomas Shoal, Manila recognised the severity of the security threat posed by China, leading to its exit from the Belt and Road Initiative. The deterioration of China–Philippine relations induced the Philippines to shift towards Japan to alleviate the security threat in the SCS.11
The change of leadership in Manila assisted this reorientation in Japan–Philippine relations. The former Philippine president, Rodrigo Duterte, had announced in 2016 that it was “time to say goodbye to Washington”.12 Duterte welcomed the BRI initiative and viewed China as an ally. His pro-China policy jeopardised US security relations, almost putting an end to the Visiting Forces Agreement with the US.
Maritime tensions with China did not dislodge Duterte’s friendly posture towards China. His priority was to deepen economic ties with China and benefit from a raft of trade and infrastructure deals, a significantly different approach from the one taken by his predecessor Benigno Aquino III. Under Aquino’s leadership, the Philippines had emerged victorious when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague rejected China’s claims in the South China Sea.
In hopes of obtaining economic concessions from China, Duterte devalued the ICJ ruling and stated that Manila was in no position to counter China.13 However, Manila’s stance on China changed drastically when Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos Jr. took the helm. Marcos’s position is “not to look for trouble but to defend against Chinese aggression”. His tenure is increasingly being marked by cooperation with Japan and the United States. Marcos’s entry into power has paved the way for Japan to further bilateral defence cooperation.14
The outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war triggered a series of security policy responses from Japan as well. Tokyo’s perception of the severity of the security threat in the Indo-Pacific heightened after the war commenced. Japan has stated the aim of doubling its defence expenditure to about 2 per cent of its GDP, which is about 43 trillion yen (US$ 320 billion), by 2027. The NSS 2022 also highlighted Japan’s intent to take proactive measures to build security cooperation with “like-minded” countries, through the OSA initiative.15
The NSP 2023–28 of Manila and the NSS 2022 of Japan also reflect similar security objectives such as augmenting of armed forces, reinforcing security arrangements with the US, and developing a potent cyber-security system. The similarity of these security objectives and interests are bringing Tokyo and Manilla closer in security terms, especially given their common concerns based on China’s maritime assertion in the SCS.16
Through the OSA framework, Japan is to provide the Philippines with equipment and supplies as well as assistance for developing infrastructure. The OSA also includes activities related to monitoring and surveillance in territorial waters and airspace, humanitarian activities such as disaster response and international peace cooperation operations such as capacity building to participate in peacekeeping operations.
Japan offered a ¥600 million (US$ 4 million) grant to the Philippines to aid its defence ministry’s endeavour to obtain coastal radars for maritime security. The two countries are also expected to commence negotiations associated with the conclusion of the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), which will set the foundation for the Self-Defence Forces and the Philippine military to conduct joint exercises. Manila also received its first military equipment from Tokyo, an air surveillance radar system, as part of a 2020 contract. The Philippines is now the third country to have such an agreement with Japan, following Australia and Britain.17
Conclusion
Converging security interests have brought Japan and the Philippines closer than ever before. Japan’s revised security policy has allowed it to play the role of a vital security partner. Though the Philippines has a long way to go in terms of developing a robust military that can counter the Chinese threat in the Indo-Pacific, accepting the OSA provided by Japan is certainly a strong step towards realising its vision of a self-reliant military power. The OSA will help Tokyo and Manila enhance bilateral defence cooperation and reinforce the prospect of better security relations in the future.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Social media platform usage during course of counter-terror operations can lead to adverse fallouts.
A counter-terror operation lasting for more than 24 hours in Rajouri's Kalakote in Jammu and Kashmir on 22–23 November saw five soldiers including two young Indian army officers and Lashkar-e-Taiba's (LeT) highly-trained 'commander' and his associate killed. Although the intent here is not to carry out a military analysis of the incident, it would be pertinent to mention that officers’ casualty once again reinforces the fact that the Indian army leaders continue to lead the troops by example. The military lessons from this operation will certainly be drawn by the Army to modify its tactics and planning, as applicable. The opinion endeavours to flag the sensitive issue of usage of social media (SM) platforms, especially WhatsApp, during the course of such counter-terror operations.
Adverse Fallouts
Social media, as we all know, is very thoroughly abused by the terror outfits towards spread of dis-information as well as for recruitment purposes, among other objectives. The usage of social media platforms by the common people during the course of counter-terror operations, though, does not always portend well. In crisis situations such as natural disasters, messages on social media by the affected sections of people as also by relief providers do prove to be a force multiplier.
In most cases, SM platforms have been the only way of responding to natural disasters for disseminating real-time information, warnings, coordinating aid and relief and asking for funds, etc. However, given past experience, irresponsible spread of half-baked information on SM platforms could be counter-productive in several ways, especially when a counter-terror operation is in progress.
Vis-à-vis the recent Kalakote incident, a case in point were messages floating around on WhatsApp that gave finer and specific details concerning the ongoing gun fight between the troops and terrorists. These details, without any veracity, included name of the units involved in operations, location of operations, casualty to own troops to include their identity, etc. Shockingly, these details were in real- time, unofficial and against the norms of stealth and secrecy concerning tactical military operations. The origin of this particular message, amongst others, remained hazy and preceded any kinds of statement from an official source.
Such messages during an ongoing encounter with terrorists inevitably lead to adverse fallouts. It compromises the operational security by revealing tactics by giving out specific details of mobilisation of units, locations, and the quantum of troops involved. In the said context, the handlers of proxies are able to connect dots and deduce the operational plan of own forces. Such real-time information to the terrorists enables them to adapt their strategies.
Although not evident in the recent and similar terror incidents, SM updates could create panic among the public and hinder the authorities’ ability to manage the situation effectively, through exaggerated account of losses by a terror strike that may inflame passions. It may also impact the morale of security forces and provide fuel to our adversary to carry out propaganda.
The reaction of common people, who are oblivious to the facts and cannot possibly appreciate the peculiarity of an unfolding operational situation, could get out of hand in extreme contingencies. This may manifest in display of anger through various means by the locals, instigated by sympathisers of terrorists.
Last but not the least, this variety of irresponsible message proliferation, adversely affects the families of soldiers that are involved in the operations. As per the norm, the next of kin of a soldier who is killed in action is informed about the loss through proper channel and according to a laid-down military protocol. A passage of information to the concerned family is processed after due verification for sake of authenticity. Information about demise through social media, prior to the same being conveyed officially by the army authorities, is the last thing that any suffering family would prefer. This is about dignity and military ethos.
Precedence and Counter Measures
Overall, the risks of compromising security and jeopardising the operations that irresponsible messaging could lead to, during such events, is highly problematic. We had seen this trend at its zenith during 26/11 Mumbai attacks, when the holed in terrorists continuously modified their actions, partially on their own initiative and partially due to the directions of their handlers from across the border, after getting status updates from the real-time media coverage. The major difference in context between 26/11 and the present time period is the proliferation of messages on social media platforms like WhatsApp and X (formerly twitter), which is more challenging to control.
Given the popularity of SM, the army too has not been left untouched by its widespread usage and messaging on SM platforms is rampantly resorted to by its personnel, towards routine functioning. Being a mirror image of the civil society, one cannot blame the army for this. As mentioned, at times, reliance on SM becomes inescapable for everyday functioning of military units in terms of sharing updates and progress of routine activities.
In view of the above, it is needed that information leaks through social media be taken as the new normal by military planners and adequate measures are taken to mitigate the adverse fallouts, by factoring in such messaging. In addition to sensitising its personnel to obviate pilferage of information, proactive steps require to be planned so as not to let an information void shape up, for the same to be filled up by dis-information. Perhaps there is a requirement to decentralise the information management structure to make the same more responsive to dilute the ill-effects of half-baked messages that swarm the social media platforms during critical times when lives are at stake.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
S&T Initiatives and the Strategic Advance of India–US Relations
Cherian Samuel
November 30, 2023
There is now a forward-looking embrace of science and technology cooperation in India–US relations.
The successful completion of another 2+2 dialogue marks one more step in the saga of Indo-US cooperation. Structured India–US dialogues have had a long and checkered history. Economic cooperation was the initial focus, with an agreement being signed in 2000 to institute a commercial dialogue through a financial and economic forum and a working group on trade.1 The first Strategic dialogue was held from 1 June to 4 June 2010 in Washington. In US terminology, this was ostensibly to serve as a capstone dialogue to assess progress, provide policy guidance and propose new areas of cooperation. 2
Other dialogues operating at that time were the Counter Terrorism Cooperation Initiative and the Homeland Security dialogue. This was subsequently expanded to Strategic and Commercial Dialogue in 2015 and consultations were further deepened with then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken also holding High Level Consultations with then India’s Foreign Secretary, S. Jaishankar in December of that year. Thus, in the initial years, these mechanisms were focussed on building confidence and trust in each other, and forming habits of co-operation.
The mechanism attained its present 2+2 format in 2018 to “better elevate strategic communication on cross-cutting defence and security issues”.3 The change in the tone and tenor of each subsequent dialogue is evident through the Joint Statements released at the end of each dialogue. In the most recent dialogue held on 14 November 2023, as per the joint statement issued, the principals declared their satisfaction with the substantial progress in transforming India–US relations. They reaffirmed the importance of the India–US Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership, including the Quad. They discussed developments in the Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Ukraine, and terrorism. They also pledged to deepen the defence partnership and strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation.
As regards defence co-operation, the two sides finalised the Security of Supply Arrangement (SOSA) to enhance both countries' supply chain independence and agreed on the 2023 Roadmap for US–India Defence Industrial Cooperation. Signing of agreements has been a staple of the dialogue process with the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement, the Industrial Security Annex, and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation over the last few years. In a bilateral following the 2+2 dialogue, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin discussed the progress of the General Electric F-414 deal as well as the possibilities of co-production of the Stryker infantry combat vehicles.
If defence and security relations are finally on an even keel after many decades of differing perspectives and priorities on the two sides, it could be said that it is the multi-faceted co-operation in science and technology that is providing the ballast for a new phase of the relationship. During the Dialogue, there was considerable attention paid to the progress of the science and technology partnerships. The ministers highlighted the progress made under the India–US Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) to foster collaborations in science, technology, and critical technology value chains. They commended US private sector investments in India's semiconductor ecosystem and urged continued strategic partnerships between the academic, research, and corporate sectors in emerging technologies like quantum, telecom, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and semiconductors to drive global innovation.
The ministers also acknowledged advancements in space collaborations, including the establishment of a sub-working group on Space Commerce and India's participation in international space organisations. They discussed mineral security, energy cooperation, and the strengthening of India–US Science and Technology cooperation under their bilateral agreement. Specific collaborative frameworks such as the iCET, India–US Civil Space Joint Working Group, Joint Committee Meeting on Science and Technology, and the Strategic Trade Dialogue Monitoring Mechanism, point to the deepening and maturing of these mechanisms. 4
The ecosystem for partnerships between the academic, research and corporate sectors in emerging technologies across the two countries would be further strengthened through programmes such as the India–United States Defence Acceleration Ecosystem (INDUS X) initiative which serves to build an innovation bridge to connect defence start-ups. On the anvil are joint challenges, establishment of a Joint Innovation Fund, academia engagement programmes, industry-star-startup connects, and facilitation of mentoring by experts.5 The inaugural event also had a discussion on export control regulations which has stymied many a joint venture.6
Indus-X recalls the TiE (The Indus Entrepreneurs) Network created by India-American entrepreneurs in 1994 to foster entrepreneurship and networking for the large number of Indians who came to the United States as students and then went on to set up tech start-ups in Silicon Valley. That trend still continues with Indian students studying in the United States having recently reached an all-time high of 268,923, according to the latest Open Doors report.7 Of these, over 73,000, or more than a quarter, have enrolled for engineering degrees.8 They present a possible pool of candidates to participate in the burgeoning S&T ties, if channelled successfully by creating awareness and creating programmes in those universities in which they are present in large numbers.
Thus, it may be said that the evolution of India–US relations, particularly through the framework of the 2+2 dialogues, has consistently moved towards deeper strategic collaboration. Moving beyond the initial focus on economic cooperation and strategic and defence alignment, there is now a forward-looking embrace of science and technology cooperation. The pioneering spirit inherent to science and technology can be seen in initiatives like the iCET and Indus-X. With thousands of Indian students continuing to contribute to the US innovation landscape, there is scope for increasing their participation in these programmes for the benefit of both nations.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
ChatGPT and Potential for Deleterious Exploitation
Saman Ayesha Kidwai
November 22, 2023
ChatGPT’s potentially exploitative use by violent non-state actors can undermine human and state security.
Despite various advantages, Artificial Intelligence (AI)-enabled programmes like ChatGPT can also be used for criminal purposes. There are concerns that individuals, whether lone wolves or members of violent extremist or terrorist organisations, can easily tap into the resourceful information generated on this AI platform for preparing and carrying out subversive acts. At a Five Eyes Intelligence Summit in California in October 2023, these concerns were flagged by MI5’ Director General Ken McCallum and FBI’s Director Christopher Wray.1
As pointed out by EUROPOL, ChatGPT safety mechanisms can be circumvented in some cases with the ‘correct prompt engineering’, which is the ‘practice of users refining the precise way a question is asked in order to influence the output that is generated by an AI system’. The report notes that this ‘can be abused in order to bypass content moderation limitations to produce potentially harmful content’.2
It is true that the coding fed into it by its developers can indeed detect and refuse to obey sensitive commands and searches, for example, those related to crafting storylines about murder, citing ethical considerations.3 However, by using seemingly ordinary phrases and commands, actors can find ways to undermine human and national security. Some of the key concerns are enumerated below.
Disinformation and Propaganda
Disinformation and misinformation are not just the prerogatives of state actors. Experts have even underscored that this AI platform can assist terrorists in creating ‘malicious web pages and social engineering reliant scams’.4 Non-State actors, including terrorists, can exploit these tactics to spread their propaganda, rally support, and discredit legitimate state representatives and institutions. Some experts have also highlighted issues relating to ‘astroturfing, which is propaganda designed to look like a grassroots campaign—giving the sense that lots of people believe a sentiment when that’s not actually true or real’.5
What aids violent non-State actors is that access to basic services provided by ChatGPT requires no monetary costs, only a stable internet connection and a device on which carefully crafted instructions can be issued to the AI platform. This aspect underscores how decentralisation, affordability, and access to technology, while empowering billions globally, has also facilitated its exploitation by many.
Furthermore, despite increased surveillance to detect and clamp down on terrorists or violent extremists sharing propaganda and participating in radicalised and extremist discussions, use of carefully articulated prompts has ensured that ChatGPT provides avenues to deceive the system. The AI platform, for instance, recommends the use of Tor Browser, Signal, ProtonMail, DuckDuckGo, SecureDrop, and Zeronet—forums prioritising security and complete anonymity, when asked, ‘What are the forums that can be used to freely exchange views amid increased surveillance?’
In December 2022, one of the servers operated by ISIS on Rocket.Chat, an open-source communications platform, announced that the outfit had begun relying on ChatGPT to strengthen and protect a renewed Caliphate. According to the server’s operatives, the AI platform, superior to those present in the public domain, provided ‘precise guidelines for identifying and enlisting a core group of supporters, formulating a political and ideological strategy, garnering backing from the Muslim community, capturing territory, [and] establishing institutions and governmental structures.’6
ChatGPT can churn out information that, if put to use, can strengthen a non-State actor’s strategy to radicalise and recruit extremist individuals. Similar knowledge, disseminated into public space, can inspire lone wolves to commit violence or attempt to do so. In the past, at the peak of COVID-19, it has generated information legitimising conspiracy theories, including the QAnon Movement.7 This political conspiracy theory has been responsible for socio-political fragmentation and polarisation in Western countries like the United States and radicalising those who became disillusioned with the liberal democratic order’s promises.
Furthermore, ChatGPT is accused of replicating, ‘the ideologically consistent, interactive…online extremist environments … amplifying extremist movements that seek to radicalize and recruit individuals’.8 Analysts note that AI chatbots ‘may be trained – or worse, decide – to disseminate violent extremist ideas’.9
Violent Video Games and Radicalisation
ChatGPT’s exploitative use can be expanded to include compilation of ideas to create gripping video games. They are a particularly attractive recreational avenue for the youth and one of the key mediums of radicalising the habitual gamers. Law enforcement, analysts, and security agencies have pointed out the steep rise in this trend recently.10
ChatGPT can create storylines likely to gain traction along themes used by far-right groups in the West or once used by ISIS previously. Notably, video games, filled with violent imagery and audio-visual effects, were one of the many strategies applied by ISIS to expand its recruitment until its physical caliphate’s defeat in March 2019. Today, it is mainly far-right and neo-Nazi extremist groups adopting this strategy to mobilise support.
The fact that ChatGPT can be a resourceful platform to generate a beginner’s manual to build video games from scratch can be a worrying factor for security and law enforcement officials. This is because these build-your-own games can also be launched on various self-publishing platforms like Epic Games Store, with minimal effort and regulation involved. ChatGPT listed this gaming platform as one of the many avenues when prompted with the question of ‘What is the best self-publishing platform for video games?’
ChatGPT also lists some popular video editing platforms in response to question of ‘What is the most popular and accessible audio and video editing software with gripping effects on the audience?’ These platforms can be used to create doctored videos at minimal or no cost. This dilemma can exacerbate deepening concerns regarding deep fakes and the spread of disinformation in the public domain.
3D Weapons
A detailed breakdown of instructions to construct 3D weapons and instruments, the production and sale of which are not necessarily regulated (unlike conventional firearms), and more so within confines of private properties, can be easily found on this AI platform. It provided a 13-step blueprint, from conceptualisation to appropriate software modelling techniques, ways to create required textures, animation, and documentation, when prompted with this instruction—‘Please provide a detailed breakdown on making 3D instruments or weapons.’
Such information can later be released on chat forums like 4kun, 8 Chan, and Gab, which are not subjected to content moderation. The problem is exacerbated by the ease of access to low and high-cost 3D printers, which can be used for violent acts. ChatGPT lists some of the more commonly found 3D printers, such as Creality 3D Ender 3 Series, Prusa i3 MK3/MK4, and Anycubic i3 Mega, with their descriptions when prompted with ‘What is the most easily available 3D printer?’ While the use of such weapon types is in its nascent stages, it can become more popular as future, technologically-equipped generations become gradually exposed to it, and the technology gains more traction commercially.
3D weapons have been used in the past to carry out acts of violence. For example, a synagogue in Halle (Germany) was targeted in October 2019 using a firearm comprised of some of the 3D components made at home by the perpetrator, Stephen Baillet. At least two people died in that attack. The UK witnessed the first-ever conviction of a far-right lone-wolf terrorist in July 2021 for possessing a 3D firearm.11
Data Privacy
ChatGPT even gives insights into some of the most secure platforms like High Fidelity and Decentraland to engage with other individuals in the metaverse, emphasising data security and user privacy. Metaverse can be exploited by terrorists and violent extremists to congregate and formulate plans for their activities.
Moreover, given the right prompts, ChatGPT can outline a detailed list of encrypted chat forums and secure cryptocurrency platforms, providing pathways to evade detection or stringent surveillance in a controlled ecosystem. It recommended using Matrix/Riot, Mastodon, Diaspora, Monero, and Zcash when asked, ‘What are the encrypted chat forms and cryptocurrency platforms that unfailingly uphold freedom of speech and expression?’
Notably, encrypted chat forums have been one of the more commonly used means for those looking to bypass surveillance by law enforcement and intelligence authorities, disseminate propaganda, recruit and radicalise new members and engage in terror financing. User privacy and data protection facilitated by platforms providing crypto trading and funding make such avenues attractive to hostile actors.
Conclusion
Apart from the November 2015 Paris Attacks, casualties have not exceeded double digits in recent extremist or terrorist attacks. Even these events have been restricted to the US due to lax gun regulations. Nevertheless, amid this shift in terrorist trends, as technological dependence increases and expertise to put together weapons inspired by such developments becomes easily available on platforms like ChatGPT, concerns regarding global security architecture’s future have proliferated. While ChatGPT has no doubt contributed to decentralising access to technology, it also allows far-reaching expertise to be gained from the comfort of one’s home, which can equally be put to deleterious use.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Hamas and its affiliates, along with other hacktivist groups, have conducted numerous cyber operations against Israeli targets.
The ongoing Israel–Hamas conflict has spilled over into cyberspace as well. Threat actors, including Hamas and its affiliates, along with other hacktivist groups, have conducted numerous operations against Israel. Despite Israel's strength in cybersecurity and its global reputation, adversaries have succeeded in breaching Israeli systems. Furthermore, threat actors have effectively leveraged social media platforms and other digital spaces to conduct influence operations, aiming to shape global opinions on the ongoing conflict.
Digital Battleground
Israel came under an unprecedented, surprise attack from Hamas, a terror group in control of the Gaza Strip, on 7 October 2023. The nature of the attack caught Israeli intelligence off-guard. As per assessments, the Israeli public alarm system, Tzeva Adom, designed to notify citizens of missile attacks, was reportedly disabled within an hour of the terrorist attack.1 The attack was purportedly claimed by Anonymous Sudan, a group known for religiously motivated attacks and believed to be affiliated with Russia. Prominent online news platforms, such as The Jerusalem Post, endured continuous Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks for two days. In fact, during the initial days of the conflict, newspaper and media websites were the main target of DDoS attacks, accounting for nearly 56 per cent of all intrusions against Israeli websites.
Government entities, including the Bank of Israel and the Israeli Knesset (parliament), also experienced disruptions in the initial days of the conflict. Billboards in Israel were briefly hacked to display pro-Palestinian messages. Furthermore, hack and leak operations, such as the Ono Academic College breach, resulted in the publication of approximately 2,50,000 records containing information about employees, students, former students, and more on Telegram.2 Reportedly, personally identifiable information (PII) from the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and Israeli security agencies was advertised on certain dark web platforms.3 While the source and timing of the breach are not available, advertising these details during the conflict strongly suggests a clear link to the ongoing hostilities. Several aid organisations, pooling resources to assist people in distress, were also targeted by DDoS attacks.4
The cyber-attacks moved beyond the actors directly involved in the conflict. Countries like the US, France, India and Italy have experienced a significant increase in cyber activities against them.5 Several hacktivist groups were involved in cyber operations against these states due to their open support for Israel. However, it's important to note that these states did not confirm the information related to such operations and was shared on Telegram channels associated with these hacktivist groups. Some Arab and Islamic nations were also subjected to cyber attacks by these groups as a consequence of perceived ambiguous support for Palestine.6
The nature of cyberspace poses challenges in attributing or linking cyber incidents to a specific actor unless those actors claim responsibility for the attacks. However, reports indicate that numerous Iranian-linked entities have been implicated in orchestrating cyber attacks against Israel.7 Nevertheless, some reports suggest that the operations of Iranian groups have predominantly been opportunistic in nature, with their impact often exaggerated.8 The reports also indicate that Iranian actors initially lacked knowledge about Hamas's coordinated attack on Israel but later pivoted their cyber activities to the Israel–Hamas conflict following the escalation.
As with the previous Israel–Hamas conflict, the recent escalation is also turning out to be a battle of narratives or, as often the case, a 'fight over the image'. In the asymmetric nature of the Israel–Hamas conflict, where a state is fighting a non-state actor, the weaker side also employ images as a weapon to sway public opinion. This integration of images with warfare is referred to as ‘Imagefare’, where visuals serve as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve political objectives.9
The use of imagery has been amplified with social media platforms. Hamas has used these platforms to conduct influence operations, aiming to mobilise public support for its actions against a formidable adversary. Simultaneously, it instills fear and uncertainty among Israelis regarding their perceived invincibility. On the day of the attack, Hamas used its Telegram channels and other social media accounts to disseminate information about its attacks on both Israeli military assets and civilians.
Hamas also employed GoPro First-Person View (FPV) footage to capture unsettling videos of its attacks on civilians, including the act of taking hostages in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli state subsequently used the brutality in the videos to garner international support for its airstrikes and ground operations in the Gaza Strip. The terrorists also hijacked the social media accounts of their victims, livestreaming the harrowing experiences of the captives from these compromised accounts.10
Due to the widespread reach and accessibility of social media, these platforms also abound with misinformation and disinformation. The wider accessibility of artificial intelligence (AI) tools is being exploited to produce and disseminate fabricated images and videos. Deepfake videos, which gained prominence in the early stages of the Russia–Ukraine war, are also being used to sow confusion and propagate false narratives in the ongoing struggle for public opinion in the Israel–Hamas conflict. These technology-enabled false narratives have posed a significant challenge for fact-checkers and the Israeli public diplomacy front.
According to observers, the AI tools are already thickening the ‘fog of war’, and the Israel–Hamas war is unprecedented in terms of the dissemination of deep fake content.11 For instance, an image of a baby in the rubble of destroyed buildings in Gaza, which was widely used by anti-Israel protestors across the globe and even figured in a national daily, turned out to be a fake image.12 The massive number of images that can be created by simple commands using AI tools has posed a significant challenge to content moderators and other organisations seeking to deliver breaking news while maintaining credibility.
Amidst the chaos, the big tech companies have faced mounting scrutiny due to a surge in harmful content and disinformation in the wake of the attack on Israel. The Vice-President of the European Commission, Vera Jourova, has asked the executives from TikTok and social media platform X to step up their efforts to counter illegal hate speech.13 The issue of disinformation was also brought to attention in a strongly worded letter from the European Union (EU) to Elon Musk. The letter warned him about potential actions that could be taken against the platform if it failed to comply with regulatory laws and adequately address the escalating issue of fake news on X.14
Israeli Response
Given the hybrid nature of contemporary conflicts, the spillover of the conflict into cyberspace was expected, and it is reasonable to assume that Israel must have anticipated such a scenario. The crucial question to pose is whether Israel was adequately prepared to respond to such threats. The issue of Israeli cybersecurity preparedness was raised in the May 2023 Report of the State Comptroller on Cyber and Information Systems, which highlighted potential vulnerabilities in institutions such as the National Insurance Institute.15 The report also pointed out that “given the complex geopolitical climate from a security perspective, Israel is a significant target for potential cyber-attackers”.16
Israel has refrained from launching kinetic attacks specifically targeting Hamas cyber operations in the current conflict, in contrast to previous engagements. Nevertheless, Israel has sought to capitalise on its technological prowess through various measures.According to reports, Israel has reportedly sought assistance from spyware companies in tracking hostages in Gaza.17
In response to growing cyber threats, emergency regulations were introduced to provide flexibility to IDF and Shin Bet, enabling them to operationalise counter-offensive measures in the cyber realm. For instance, emergency regulations were approved authorising the IDF and the Shin Bet to penetrate the computers used to operate stationary cameras. The INCD issued a warning to owners of home cameras about the potential threat of hacking by terrorists.18 Measures like GPS jamming were also employed by INCD, leading to significant disruptions in Israel's location applications. Israel also took action against the cryptocurrency fundraising efforts of Hamas and its supporters by freezing accounts suspected of financing Hamas operations.
The ongoing conflict clearly reiterates the complexities that mire contemporary battlefields. Israel, which built a global reputation for its counter-terror measures, has failed to deter Hamas from pulling out such large-scale operations. However, it is too early to appraise its cybersecurity posture, given the cyberattacks on Israel have not moved beyond minor disruptions and nuisance. Unlike what the world witnessed on the physical front, Israel has not faced any sophisticated breach in the ongoing conflict. However, this should not mean that Israel underestimates the concerted efforts by various groups in deploying influence operations that have largely been successful. Such operations have been amplified by leveraging widely available generative AI tools.
Israel must also factor in the emerging realities of responding to cyber threats while simultaneously undertaking kinetic operations in the physical realm. Such broader response needs better cooperation and synergy between the IDF and other security agencies alongwith the INCD. Policy makers must also prioritise ensuring that the appeal for extensive mobilisation of reservists does not disrupt the functioning of cybersecurity companies. Even though such mobilisation occurs in rare circumstances, the potential for this conflict to rapidly escalate necessitates careful consideration of all possibilities.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
While Bhutan's transition from a least developed country (LDC) to a middle-income country is undeniably optimistic, its journey beyond LDC status lies in mindful governance and strategic planning.
Bhutan, known for its unique developmental model centered on collective happiness (gross national happiness), has achieved yet another milestone. By the end of 2023, Bhutan joined the group of developing middle-income economies by foregoing its title as a ‘Least Developed Country’ (LDC).1
Attaining non-LDC status signifies a notable achievement in the developmental journey of landlocked nations. However, the ongoing reduction of international support measures associated with this status presents potential challenges for Bhutan as the country continues to work towards sustaining its integration into the global economy.
UN Criteria and Evaluation Process
The United Nations (UN) classifies LDCs as nations characterised by low-income levels and substantial structural barriers hindering sustainable development. This category of LDCs was formally established in 1971 through General Assembly Resolution 2768 (XXVI). The decision to include or graduate a country from the LDC list is determined by the UN General Assembly, relying on recommendations from the Committee for Development Policy (CDP) and subsequently approved by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).
The CDP conducts triennial reviews of the LDC list, which involves assessing the eligibility of countries for inclusion or graduation from the LDC category. This process aims to provide targeted assistance to the most underdeveloped nations within the developing world. Currently, the UN recognises 45 nations as Least Developed Countries (LDCs).2 Among them, nine are situated in Asia, three in the Pacific, one in the Caribbean, and 33 in Africa.
The LDCs undergo evaluation based on three benchmarks—Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, Human Assets Index (HAI) measuring health and education outcomes, and Economic and Environmental Vulnerability Index (EVI).3 To be promoted from LDC, a nation must meet the graduation requirements for two of the aforementioned criteria in two consecutive triennial review periods of the CDP. No matter how well a nation does in the other two criteria, it may be recommended for graduation if its GNI per capita increases to twice the predetermined level.
In sum, achieving these goals may necessitate the implementation of a combination of strategies. These could encompass stimulating economic growth through infrastructure investments, improving governance, diversifying the economy, addressing environmental concerns, and making substantial investments in human development.
Charting Bhutan’s Economic Course
In 1971, Bhutan joined the initial cohort of LDCs.4 Over subsequent decades, the Himalayan Kingdom has undergone a remarkable transformation, experiencing substantial economic growth and witnessing an overall enhancement in the living standards of its populace.
Bhutan's economic growth since 1961 has been marked by a trajectory of development plans. Initiated with India's support during the first and second Five Year Plans (1961–1972), Bhutan laid the foundation for its economic journey in 1961. The subsequent decades witnessed steady growth, prominently influenced by development in the hydropower sector.
In the 1990s and 2000s, the opening of Chukha Hydropower Plant played a pivotal role. In the 2010s, the focus on sustainable development and diversification of sectors such as tourism contributed to continued economic resilience. Moreover, from 2010 to 2019, Bhutan's economy exhibited robust expansion, boasting an average annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth exceeding 5 per cent, resulting in significant reductions in poverty.
Bhutan has achieved remarkable advancements, including substantial progress in education, with an estimated overall literacy rate of approximately 66 per cent in 2018. The provision of electricity has become nearly universal, reaching 98 per cent coverage in 2017, and basic access to potable water services extended to about 97 per cent of the population in the same year. The country's growth has resulted in a remarkable decline in the national poverty rate, dropping from 23.2 per cent in 2007 to 8.2 per cent in 2017. In terms of the Human Development Index (HDI), Bhutan scored 0.654 in 2019, surpassing other Asian LDCs.5
However, the year 2020 brought unprecedented challenges as the government implemented early-stage lockdowns and border closures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite effective containment efforts, these stringent measures took a toll on the economy, contributing to an estimated 10 per cent decline in GDP.
Regardless, the February 2021 Monitoring Report by the UN CDP underscored Bhutan's exceptional performance, with GNI per capita growth estimated at USD 2,982, three times the graduation threshold of USD 1,222. Additionally, Bhutan's Human Assets Index (HAI) score exhibited substantial improvement, reaching 79.4 (compared to the required score of 66). Despite excelling in GNI per capita and HAI, Bhutan faces challenges in meeting the Economic & Environmental Vulnerability Index (EVI) criterion, with an EVI of 25.7, below the threshold of 32.6 Nonetheless, this positions Bhutan as one of the fastest-progressing non-oil exporting LDCs.
Despite these challenges, there has been a noteworthy rebound in economic growth, with projections indicating an approximate 4.2–4.7 per cent expansion since the financial year 202223.7 In FY 2022–23, the economy again grew by 4.6 per cent, driven by reopening of the borders for tourism in September 2022. The industry sector expanded by 5.1 per cent, with growth in construction and manufacturing, while the services sector grew by 5 per cent, creating more jobs, especially in transport and trade services.8
Prospects and Predicaments
Bhutan's exit from LDC carries significant promise across multifaceted dimensions of its development trajectory. Economically, this transition opens new doors for the nation, ushering in opportunities that have the potential to ignite robust growth and development. The improved economic conditions that accompany such a shift may act as magnets for foreign investments, encouraging diversification of industries and enhancing Bhutan's recognition on the global stage.
In addition, the anticipated focus in the 13th Five Year Plan (FYP) on infrastructure development holds the promise of increased efficiency and connectivity.9 This could manifest through the creation of advanced transportation networks, energy infrastructure, and improved communication systems, all of which play crucial roles in fostering economic vitality. As Bhutan asserts greater autonomy in decision-making post graduation, a noticeable decrease in reliance on foreign aid could be anticipated.
This transition empowers the nation with increased control over its policies and resources, fostering a trajectory towards a self-reliant and robust economy. Importantly, the positive effects extend beyond economic dimensions, encompassing notable improvements in human development, particularly in healthcare, education, and overall living standards.
However, amidst these promising prospects, it is crucial to underscore the importance of responsive governance and strategic planning. Navigating the challenges associated with such a transformative phase necessitates prudence and vigilance to prevent potential economic pitfalls in the years to come.
Grappling with various challenges and developmental constraints, Bhutan has significant economic vulnerabilities exacerbated by natural disasters. Its small and vulnerable economy, characterised by mountainous terrain, sparse population, limited industrial development, constrained global market access, and a narrow product range meeting international standards, faces predicaments upon graduating from its LDC status. The graduation will impact LDC-specific international support measures (ISM) in international trade, official development cooperation (ODA), and climate resilience support.
The Himalayan Kingdom currently benefits from LDC-specific preference schemes, such as the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) providing tariff exceptions, and duty-free and quota-free (DFQF) market access in the European Union (EU) and Japanese markets. Regional trading agreements, like the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), also offer preferential market access. However, exiting LDC status implies the erosion of these preferential trade agreements, resulting in increased tariffs and negative implications for export and economic diversification efforts.10
Bhutan's development success has historically relied on natural resources, particularly hydropower generation and tourism. Despite the swift rise in per capita income, reflected in the evolution of GNI per capita, there are concerns about structural impediments hindering economic diversification. Hydropower, as a capital-intensive sector, significantly contributes to the GDP, fostering the growth of energy-intensive industries.
In the realm of international trade, Bhutan currently stands outside the World Trade Organization (WTO) but is actively considering membership and may join shortly. As a non-WTO member, Bhutan is not bound by WTO provisions, lacking the protective cover of multilateral rules. The potential benefits of WTO accession, including facilitating export expansion, must be weighed against challenges, heightened scrutiny, and the necessity to undertake commitments, especially considering the capacity constraints of LDCs acknowledged by WTO members. Nonetheless, the predominant worry revolves around the potential consequences of climate change on Bhutan's economic advancement, presenting a risk to the achievements made through persistent efforts.
Conclusion
For Bhutan to sustain its growth and development trajectory post graduation, a comprehensive set of policies is imperative to tackle the multifaceted challenges inherent in its development path. As a small, vulnerable, landlocked nation heavily reliant on a limited range of export commodities, Bhutan remains exposed to economic vulnerabilities and natural disasters. The country's ability to continue its developmental journey after graduation hinges significantly on the graduation process itself, emphasising the necessity of a seamless transition.
A pivotal aspect of Bhutan's transition strategy should center on alleviating structural challenges, enabling the effective implementation of 13th FYP and cultivating the resilience required for navigating the post-LDC status environment. In sum, the transition should address vulnerabilities through economic diversification, developing productive capacities for structural transformation, and bolstering disaster management to enhance economic and natural disaster resilience.
Like-minded countries need to cooperate more closely to shield critical infrastructure and prevent systemic disruptions.
Over the past year, the cyber conflict between Ukraine and Russia has captured much attention. Yet, a similarly critical situation has unfolded in the China–Taiwan theatre, where cyberattacks have significantly escalated. Reports from Google's threat analysis division and Microsoft security have confirmed this uptick, pinpointing that these incidents predominantly target critical sectors like energy systems, electrical grids, and communication networks. The semiconductor industry has not been spared either.
A report by the cybersecurity company Fortinet reveals a staggering figure of 412 billion attack events detected in Asia-Pacific in the first half of 2023, with Taiwan bearing the brunt at 22.48 billion, marking an 80 per cent increase from the year prior. Alongside espionage efforts, Taiwan has faced Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) and ransomware attacks. Further intensifying the situation are the misinformation campaigns aimed at undermining public trust in Taiwan's government and stoking societal confusion.
India has also been at the receiving end of misinformation aimed at Taiwan. A recent rumour claiming that the Taiwanese government was bringing in as many as 100,000 migrant workers from India went viral on social media in Taiwan. Though refuted by the Taiwan government, various social media pages operated by the Taiwan government were spammed with bot messages designed “to create social panic and spark tension between Taiwan and India”.1
In defence, Taiwan has fortified its cyber capabilities by establishing its Information Communication Electronic Force Command in 2017, consolidating various military units into one formidable force of over 6,000 personnel. The latest National Cybersecurity program, the sixth of its kind since 2001 and running until 2024, reflects Taiwan's commitment to strengthening its cyber defences—protecting crucial infrastructure, enhancing cyber skills, increasing information security, and supporting the private sector in safeguarding its operations. A key goal is to position Taiwan as a hub for cyber research and development.2
Taiwan's role in global cyber stability is underscored by its critical position in the electronics supply chain. Taiwan is the sixth-largest electronics exporter globally, with electronics exports valued at US$ 94.8 billion in 2021, representing a 3.9 per cent share of the global electronics market. Taiwan is known for its semiconductor manufacturing capabilities, with Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) alone having a 56 per cent global market share.
Taiwan has had a long-standing relationship with the United States, which has acted as a security guarantor for the island nation through the Taiwan Relations Act passed by the US Congress in 1979. Its security has acquired further salience as it became a technological powerhouse over the years, making it more vulnerable to cyber attacks from China that considers reunification of Taiwan with the mainland as a major goal and has used cyber, first as a means of espionage, and now increasingly, for destructive attacks on the networks of countries it is hostile to.
In its 2023 annual report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, the US Department of Defense noted that China could potentially use its cyber capabilities as part of a range of campaigns designed to coerce Taiwan. These campaigns may include cyberspace operations, blockade, and kinetic actions with the goal of compelling Taiwan to unify with China or to bring Taiwan's leadership to the negotiation table on terms favourable to the People's Republic of China (PRC). Cyber attacks had notably increased after Speaker Nancy Pelosi led a congressional delegation to Taiwan in August 2022 and are up 80 per cent from the same period in 2022.3
In April 2023, US lawmakers introduced the Taiwan Cybersecurity Resiliency Act, which would require the US Department of Defense to expand cybersecurity cooperation with Taiwan, calling for cybersecurity training exercises with Taiwan, joint efforts to defend Taiwan’s military networks, infrastructure, and systems, and leveraging US cybersecurity technologies to help defend Taiwan. The proposed legislation currently awaits further discussion in the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Taiwan has also sought to share expertise it has acquired from responding to these attacks but is constrained by the limits of its participation in international organisations. It is however a member of the Asia Pacific Computer Emergency Response Team (APCERT) where it has been a part of the Steering Committee and the convenor of Training Working Group. Taiwan and the US have also established a Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) platform to capitalise on Taiwan’s expertise and experience to address global issues of mutual concern and assist other countries in their capacity building efforts. The other countries partnering in the framework are Japan and Australia.
The GCTF has facilitated more than 63 workshops, engaging over 7,000 attendees from 126 countries, demonstrating Taiwan's commitment to sharing its cyber defence expertise and aiding in international capacity building. Most recently, the GCTF, with support from the US Embassy, held a workshop in New Delhi on 11 December 2023 with the aim of improving co-ordination and enhancing crisis response capabilities.4 The other aspects discussed, including AI, cyber crime prevention and critical information infrastructure protection, are also of utmost priority since the threats in these areas are moving faster than governments can respond individually.
The growing instability in the international system which is manifested most in cyberspace underscores the urgency for robust defence mechanisms and international cooperation in cybersecurity with all like-minded countries to shield critical infrastructure and prevent systemic disruptions.
The UN should shift towards more traditional and narrowly focused peacekeeping missions and maintain a clearer and more distinct role as a neutral mediator in conflicts.
On 19 December 2023, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2717 to end its 24-year-old peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The resolution outlines a comprehensive disengagement plan for the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), comprising three phases to gradually transfer responsibilities from MONUSCO to the Government of the DRC by December 2024.1 The UNSC decision was prompted by the DRC’s earlier request for the Mission's withdrawal. As the UN's longest-standing peacekeeping mission with a robust mandate faces a turbulent exit, it is crucial to ask what its critical failings were and what the UN can learn from them.
MONUSCO in DRC
MONUSCO commenced its peacekeeping mandate in the DRC, aiming to stabilise the nation torn by internal conflicts and political instability. Established in July 2010 by UNSC Resolution 1925, MONUSCO succeeded an earlier mission known as MONUC (United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo), initiated in 1999.2 This peacekeeping operation in the DRC became one of the longest-standing and most extensive UN missions globally, involving multifaceted objectives encompassing security, political stability, protection of civilians, and promoting human rights and development.
In its initial years, MONUSCO deployed approximately 20,000 troops and played a crucial role in reducing the presence of foreign rebels in the DRC. Over its two-and-a-half-decade presence in the DRC, MONUSCO navigated complex challenges marked by internal strife, armed rebellions, regional tensions, and humanitarian crises. Within a few years after its establishment, MONUSCO achieved significant milestones, including disarming Congolese ex-combatants, repatriating foreign combatants, facilitating the return of Congolese refugees, and releasing children from armed groups.3
However, despite concerted efforts, MONUSCO faced persistent hurdles in achieving its mandates due to intricate and protracted nature of the conflicts, resource limitations, and political complexities. One of the contentious facets within the MONUSCO was establishing the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in 2013, an offensive military unit operating within the peacekeeping framework.4 The core objective of the FIB centred on curbing the expansion of armed groups, neutralising their impact and disarming them, thereby enhancing state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC to facilitate stabilisation efforts.
The induction of the FIB into MONUSCO initially sparked hope for change. With joint efforts between the FIB and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), there was an anticipation of fostering peace and stability in the volatile eastern region. However, despite the FIB's presence for over a decade, the DRC security situation has seen limited improvement, falling short of expectations.5
DRC has suffered immeasurable losses, with an estimated 6 million lives lost in the last two decades.6 It also faces the largest internal displacement crisis in Africa, with ongoing violence forcing 5.8 million people—over half of them women—to flee their homes. Since June 2022, over 600,000 people have been displaced due to escalating violence.7 In 2023, approximately 10 million people in the DRC required aid amid the turmoil.8 This dire situation fuelled widespread resentment against MONUSCO, prompting calls, including from the DRC president, for its withdrawal.9
Anti-MONUSCO Protests and Attacks against Peacekeepers
Since July 2022, DRC has seen a series of protests against MONUSCO. Attacks on UN peacekeepers surged, with over a dozen peacekeepers killed in one of the deadliest assaults against peacekeepers in recent history.10 More than 50 protesters died demanding the UN's withdrawal, blaming its inability to control rebel groups causing lethal attacks in the east.11 In November 2022, civilians targeted a UN peacekeeping convoy in eastern Congo, highlighting ongoing tensions. Also, a UN helicopter was attacked on 5 February, further underscoring the challenging situation faced by the mission in the region.12
Protests against MONUSCO in the DRC are not new. For instance, in 2019, following the ADF's atrocities in North Kivu, which MONUSCO could not prevent, large-scale protests against the UN mission erupted. However, this recent series of protests stands out due to its scale and the level of violence involved. Moreover, political elites also joined in criticising MONUSCO, intensifying pressure on the UN mission in the DRC. The International Peace Institute's 2022 report highlights increased disinformation about MONUSCO in the DRC, worsening negative sentiments towards the mission.13 Similarly, a recent survey revealed that nearly 45 per cent of Congolese want MONUSCO to leave the country immediately.14 This poses significant concerns regarding the future of peacekeeping missions in the continent.
Future of UN Peacekeeping in Africa
Africa has hosted the highest number of UN peacekeeping missions, accounting for nearly 47 per cent of all missions worldwide. The continent has been historically plagued by conflicts, civil wars, and humanitarian crises, making peacekeeping missions essential for regional and global stability. Despite many setbacks, UN missions helped end insurgencies, support elections and build peace in many African countries. However, growing resentments against UN missions raise serious concerns about the peacekeeping missions' effectiveness and long-term impact in the continent.
The protests and premature withdrawal of troops indicate the crisis confronting UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. Since 1948, more than 4,300 UN personnel have lost their lives in peacekeeping missions, with over 1,000 falling victim to targeted attacks, predominantly in Africa.15 Since 2013, the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, and the DRC have witnessed the highest number of attacks against peacekeepers.16
The UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is by far the most dangerous mission for peacekeepers, with 310 fatalities resulting from malicious acts from 2013 to 2023.17 The Security Council terminated the mission in June 2023, and peacekeepers exited the country without achieving their mandate. The African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) also encountered opposition from political elites and exited without fulfilling its mandate.18
This peacekeeping crisis revolves around two main issues: first, concern about the erosion of core UN peacekeeping principles, leading to peacekeepers becoming parties in the conflicts they aim to resolve. Second, the missions' limited operational effectiveness, especially combating non-traditional threats like terrorism. These issues were evident in CAR, DRC and Mali, where peacekeepers were tasked with peace enforcement mandates. Further, most peace operations lack the necessary resources and training for counter-terrorism tasks. Peacekeepers, typically underfunded and undertrained, lack the specialised equipment, skills, and intelligence essential for effective counter-terrorism efforts. Hence, it becomes crucial for peacekeeping to adapt and evolve to address the challenges of the present era effectively.
MONUSCO's closure marks the end of a significant era for large-scale UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. Its exit signifies a reduced UN presence on the continent compared to previous years. This situation might lead host governments to seek other security partners, including private military companies. For instance, Mali and the CAR extended invitations to the Wagner Group to operate within their countries.19 Likewise, in 2022, the DRC also opted for the involvement of private military contractors to intensify operations in the eastern regions.20
These instances collectively suggest a bleak outlook for the future of UN peacekeeping in Africa, highlighting the urgent need for a comprehensive restructuring of the UN's approach in the region. India recently proposed the establishment of clear, realistic mandates for peacekeeping and effective communication strategies involving local stakeholders. As the increased robustness of mandates has proven ineffective, there is a need to explore alternative solutions.21 As a significant Troop Contributing Country (TCC), India emphasises fostering trust and cooperation between mission leadership and host states to address acts against peacekeepers. India's proactive initiatives, mainly promoting accountability for crimes against peacekeepers, underscore essential areas requiring improvement.22
In light of the persisting challenges that extensive stabilisation missions face in achieving lasting peace in Africa, there is a growing rationale for the UN to consider shifting towards more traditional and narrowly focused peacekeeping missions. It would also enable the UN to maintain a clearer and more distinct role as a neutral mediator in conflicts, thereby rebuilding trust among the host governments and the local populations. This recalibration could lead to a more targeted and efficient use of resources and personnel.
Japan made great strides towards developing an independent foreign policy, even as it hewed closer to the Global North’s positions on the burning issues of 2023.
Japan has had a busy diplomatic year. It had to adapt its foreign policy on account of the structural challenge posed by China and was also called upon to display dexterity as a gamut of old and new territorial and ideological conflicts reignited in West Asia and Eastern Europe. Japan’s neighbourhood underwent milestone shifts that required deft tending by Tokyo. The infusion of defence-oriented language into its rhetoric had to take into account reactions across all of Asia and the world. Further, due to an internal political reshuffle, Japan has had two foreign ministers, giving rise to the unusual phenomenon (in Japan) of a prime minister explicitly staking a claim to make a personal impact on foreign policy. Given these trends, Japan’s diplomacy in 2023 marks a significant inflection point.
Rapprochement with the Global South
The first key trend noticeable in Japan’s foreign policy in 2023 has been its ardent embrace of the Global South concept. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida chose the occasion of his visit to New Delhi in March to announce his new plan for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.1 This plan gave importance to South and South-East Asia as well as Africa as key regions for Japan’s strategic engagement. Kishida’s invitation to India and Indonesia, two leading Global South nations, to the G-7 summit in Hiroshima, as well as his interactions with Global South leaders during the G-20 summit in New Delhi,2 spoke about Japan’s sincerity in putting its rhetoric into practice.
Kishida was ably assisted in this enterprise by Foreign Ministers Yoshimasa Hayashi and (post-September) Yoko Kamikawa. Both Hayashi and Kamikawa used their visits to Global South countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America to reinforce Japan’s commitment to convey their concerns to the industrialised Global North. Even the Imperial family was roped into the role of de facto ambassadors of Japan’s message. Emperor Naruhito and Empress Masako visited Indonesia in June, Crown Prince Fumihito (the Emperor’s brother) and Crown Princess Kiko visited Vietnam in September, while Princess Kako’s (daughter of the Crown Prince) successful visit to Peru in November compensated for the lack of visits by Kishida to the region.
Neighbourhood Diplomacy
Developments in the neighbourhood added new dimensions to Japan’s diplomatic calendar. The inauguration of a new President of the Republic of Korea, Yoon Suk-Yeol, in December 2022 augured a sea-change in that country’s blind-spot towards Japan. Yoon surprised many among his own countrymen by seeking out an engagement with Kishida in March. The engagement followed a long freeze in bilateral ties after the previous South Korean administration of Moon Jae-in allowed a Supreme Court judgement on Japan’s historical atrocities in the peninsula to affect bilateral security and political cooperation in 2018. Since that first meeting in March, Yoon and Kishida met each other seven times over the next nine months,3 a frequency rare in the annals of diplomacy.
During Kishida’s visit to Seoul in May, Yoon went further than any other South Korean leader in de-emphasising issues of history, wholeheartedly echoed by Kishida. The rapid improvement in ties resulted in some tangible benefits. The ROK did not oppose Japan’s release of seawater used in the clean-up of the crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor in August. Yoon and Kishida, in association with President Joseph Biden, agreed to resume joint military and security cooperation against the actions of North Korea and China.4
China itself proved to be the elephant in the room in 2023, particularly in the latter half of the year as Japan embarked on the wastewater discharge from the Fukushima Daiichi plant. It not only insisted on opposing the United Nations specialised agencies’ stance on the safety of the discharged water, but also embarked on an unprecedented campaign against Japanese citizens, mobilising crowds to vandalise the Japanese Embassy and a Japanese school, pre-emptively banning seafood and other exports from Japan, and encouraging a unique prank-call campaign against Japanese domestic entities.5
Japan also showed willingness to escalate matters by joining with the US and the Netherlands to restrict Chinese access to advanced semiconductor manufacturing technology in October.6 Japan widened its sanctions list in December to include Chinese government labs engaged in nuclear research as a protest against the latter’s expansion of its nuclear arsenal.7 Nevertheless, the two sides did resume informal military talks,8 and Kishida met President Xi Jinping on the side lines of the APEC Summit in November to discuss bilateral issues.9
Emphasising Defence Ties
Another discernible trend in Japan’s diplomacy in 2023 was the uptick in mentions of defence and security issues in its engagements with relevant countries. Kishida’s visit to New Delhi in March saw him engaging Prime Minister Narendra Modi on issues of defence technology cooperation. Kishida’s public commitment later in the summer to reconsider Japan’s strict curbs on export of lethal defence technology in the teeth of opposition from pacifist quarters of the Japanese political sphere saw him using his visit to Ukraine as an opportunity to shake up established norms. His subsequent visits to North Africa and South-East Asia, as well as those of his deputies to Europe, the US and West Asia have shown a consistent throughline under which Japan has committed to work cooperatively with partners and like-minded countries to ensure not only maritime security, but, as part of its comprehensive national power, economic, energy and technology security as well.
One of the most distinctive advances under this overarching theme has been the introduction of the Official Security Assistance (OSA) program10 as a complement to its Official Development Assistance. With an initial budget of 450 million Japanese yen, the OSA is intended to provide non-lethal security assistance to key countries. The first recipients, Fiji, Malaysia, the Philippines and Bangladesh, are indicative of Japan’s areas of interest, and Tokyo has shown its openness to considering an expansion of the program to a global scale in partnership with other net security providers in their respective regions. The fact that the Philippines is presently embroiled in a stand-off against China in the Second Thomas Shoal indicates Japan’s strategic choice in ensuring smaller countries are capable of pushing back against Chinese maritime aggression.
Enhancement of the Prime Minister’s Role
The year 2023 also marked the year when Japan’s diplomacy underwent an institutional reworking in terms of who ‘does’ foreign policy. In essence, this change turned the Japanese prime minister into the key effector of policies, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs being placed in a secretarial role.
Evidence of this could best be found in the announcement of the replacement of Yoshimasa Hayashi as the nation’s chief diplomat while Hayashi was on a trip to Ukraine, and the rapid substitution of Yoko Kamikawa—with no significant prior experience of foreign affairs, to the position. Kishida’s desire to take a greater role in foreign affairs came from a press conference he delivered in the wake of the reshuffle of his cabinet in September. He noted that while “[m]inisters have an important role to play…summit diplomacy is a big component as well. I myself intend to play a major role in such summit diplomacy.”11
As observers of Japan’s political arena know well, Japanese prime ministers tend not to be primarily aggressive salesmen of their country abroad, choosing to focus instead on leaving behind domestic legacies. Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda is the epitomical example. A former bureaucrat, he was central to the engineering of the ambitious industrial policies that caused what we now know as Japan’s high-speed economic growth era, from 1960 to 1973. Some prime ministers, to be sure, have been outward-looking in terms of their legacy-building: Shigeru Yoshida, father of the Yoshida Doctrine espousing close security ties with US in lieu of a focus on economic growth at home, and Shinzo Abe, come to mind. However, none so far have staked quite such an overt claim to diplomatic primacy as Kishida.
It is widely speculated, to some extent justly, that Kishida’s low domestic support ratings, due largely to internal policy failures such as the talk of new taxes to increase defence spending and the failure to completely repudiate the Liberal Democratic Party’s cosy ties with the controversial Unification Church, may have led him to seek diplomatic successes. However, this remains a double-edged sword. Should his key initiatives, such as the OSA or outreach to the Global South, sour, he will be doubly blamed for frittering away valuable policy space to pursue arcane objectives abroad. As such, Kishida’s ensuing moves in this sphere bear observation.
Conclusion
It is interesting to note that Japan, despite its long-standing image as a staid, reactive power, stands at a diplomatic crossroads of increasing significance at the end of 2023. Which road it takes in 2024 is not easy to predict, but there are certain significant mileposts which could signal the direction. One crucial milepost will be how Japan manages its ties with the Global South, especially with India. Another crucial marker will be the success (or failure) of its new policy of studied neutrality in West Asia, which will indicate whether it is prepared to deviate from the Western world’s script should its interests be seriously affected. Third, and finally, it would be interesting to see whether Prime Minister Kishida continues to expand his role in diplomacy, and to what extent he can claim the space to do so before encountering significant bureaucratic pushback.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Maldives’ foreign policy has witnessed a shift from ‘India First’ under former President Ibrahim Solih to ‘India Out’ that was central to Mohammed Muizzu’s presidential campaign.
President Mohammed Muizzu of Maldives confirmed on 4 December 2023 that an agreement was reached with India for the withdrawal of over 70 troops deployed in the archipelago nation for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) and training purposes. This statement was made after his return from the UAE and Turkey.
Two Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopters and a Dornier aircraft are expected to continue to be deployed in the Maldives.1 Muizzu had requested India to withdraw its military personnel formally when he met the Minister of Earth Sciences Kiren Rijiju in Male on 18 November 2023. This was also a key election campaign promise of the incumbent, who took over power in September 2023.
The shift in Maldives foreign policy is not sudden. It is a result of a simmering anti-India sentiment dating back to at least a decade, which played up fears of India gradually attempting to impinge on Male’s sovereignty. These sentiments got briefly stabilised under the Solih government since 2018, but peaked during the 2023 presidential campaign.
Moreover, this is not an organically generated sentiment. It has been actively fanned, and is reflective of undertones of a well-crafted war of narratives that facilitated the changing domestic realities in the country. The foreign policy shift has witnessed a leap from a call for ‘India First’ under former President Ibrahim Solih to ‘India Out’ that was central to Muizzu’s presidential campaign.
Tracing the Trajectory
The genesis of the India Out campaign in the Maldives can be traced back to the political landscape of 2013, when the government of Abdulla Yameen assumed power. Yameen's administration, marked by an unequivocal pro-China stance, entered into a series of opaque infrastructure agreements with Chinese state-owned enterprises. During the five years of his rule, as the country slid into various Chinese ‘debt trap’ investments, his governments’ conscious efforts at framing the cognitive environment by raising an India-phobic campaign began.
A popular discourse emerged surrounding the agreement for receiving two Indian Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopters and an accompanying contingent of Indian armed personnel, integral to the training of the Maldives National Defense Forces for helicopter operations. Raging disinformation campaigns generated social panic suggesting Indian designs to impinge on the nation’s sovereignty. By 2015, Yameen terminated the agreement with India. Yameen’s tenure was marred with dubious infrastructure project deals with Chinese-owned companies and human rights abuses. He lost in 2018 elections, and Ibrahim Solih became the president.2
Solih reaffirmed the traditional ‘India First’ policy and his tenure was marked by the re-signing of the agreement relating to the Dhruv helicopters. Furthermore, in 2021, India and the Maldives entered into the Uthura Thila Falu (UTF) development deal concerning port construction.3 While Solih's ascendancy provided some respite for New Delhi, the anti-India sentiment among the population kept simmering. The controversial discourse surrounding Indian military presence re-emerged in the form of the ‘India Out’ campaign in print as well as social media and on the Maldivian streets. Notably, the Indian High Commission became a focal point for expressions of this anti-India sentiment, with Indian diplomats being targeted on various social media platforms.4
The Case of Dhiyares News
The role of a local news outlet called Dhiyares News assumed significance, with even the ruling Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) charging that the “continuous barrage of anti-India vitriol” by the outfit appeared to be a “well-funded, well-orchestrated and pre-meditated political campaign with the express purpose of whipping up hatred against the Maldives’ closest ally, India.”5 Former President Yameen, who was released from jail by then, assumed a leadership role in the ‘India Out’ campaign. His involvement added a layer of complexity, considering his previous alignment with pro-China policies. The presidential campaign of Muizzu, a PNC candidate who was a coalition partner of Yameen’s former party PPM, was centered on fanning the social panic generated through the campaign, which eventually ended up in the fall of the Solih government.
It is pertinent to highlight the orchestrated war of narratives over the issue. A report by the Colombo Information Agency serves as an eye-opener in this context. As the activity on Twitter (where the ‘India Out’ campaign spread most as the hashtag #IndiaOut) was tracked, it was notable that the 59.3k tweets using the hashtag were tweeted by a mere 2,252 handles—almost half of which were created between 2019 and 2021. Moreover, approximately half of these newly created handles in turn were identified as fake. According to the report, around 210 handles were responsible for 80 per cent of the content engagement where a mere eight handles contributed to over 12,171 tweets.6
Figure 1: Report by Colombo Information Agency7
The report further examined the role of Dhiyares News and its sister journal The Maldives Journal in driving this campaign. The journal, professing an anti-India sentiment, was sympathetic to former President Yameen’s cause, and had an openly pro-China stance. The journal published articles titled “Yameen tortured on Modi’s Orders: Opposition”8 and targeted Indian presence and alleged “interference” in Male’s internal affairs.
The role of the co-founder Azad Azaan was highlighted in the report. Of the 2,252 handles which engaged in the sharing of the hashtag, the report noted that half of them were followers of Azaan, where his account managed to single-handedly attract 12 per cent of the total traction.9 Azaan’s pro-China alignment is also well known. Regardless, the fact that this orchestrated disinformation campaign could be transformed into an organic public discourse that defined the presidential elections of a country speaks volumes of the cognitive vulnerabilities existing in contemporary times.
Going Forward
India has been the first responder to each of Maldives’ political, economic, and natural disasters. Despite this, the generation and seeming acceptance of an anti-India sentiment due to dis-information campaigns is significant. Popular perceptions got manipulated which in turn changed the domestic political mood and political dynamics, and subsequently the fate and direction of the country’s diplomatic engagements.
While discussing ways to defeat an adversary through covert means, Kautilya’s sutra in the second chapter of his twelfth book of Arthashastra states “एवं जानपदान्समाहर्तुर्भेदयेयुः”. This roughly translates as “...in the same manner, they should divide the country people from the Administrator” (12.2.29). As democracies function in the contemporary scenario, any state’s sovereignty lies in its population, making favourable popular perceptions central to any diplomatic pursuits. Bilateral ties are only as strong as the support that a partner government can generate in favour of a policy.
Regardless of the changing domestic realities in Male, India’s regional and geopolitical relevance will continue to keep relations with New Delhi among Male’s high-priority affairs.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Philippines became the first Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member state to sign a defence pact with Japan.
The National Security Strategy (NSS) 2022 highlighted Japan’s aim to establish a new cooperation framework that would provide equipment and assistance for infrastructure development to like-minded countries. As part of this aim, the ‘Official Security Assistance’ (OSA) framework was introduced.
The OSA is a new cooperation framework to reinforce the armed forces of like-minded countries in order to deepen security cooperation with Japan’s defence forces. While the Official Development Assistance (ODA) focuses on enhancing the social and economic development of developing countries, the OSA intends to expand bilateral defence cooperation to tackle common security challenges.1
On 3 November, the Philippines became the first recipients of the OSA and also became the first Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member to sign a defence pact with Japan. The National Security Policy (NSP) 2023–28 of the Philippines highlights that the West Philippine Sea (WPS)/South China Sea (SCS) issue remains a key priority for Manila. It also elaborates on acquiring state-of-the-art military assets to become a self-reliant military power.2
The institutionalisation of Japan’s security ties with Manila is a testament to the fact that Japan has gained the Philippines’ trust to act as a security partner despite its tainted past during the Second World War.3 Due to the significant convergence of security interests, particularly in the South China Sea (SCS) region, Japan and the Philippines are now closer than ever in security terms.
On 22 October 2023, a Chinese coastguard vessel bumped into a Philippine coastguard vessel during a resupply mission near the Second Thomas Shoal in the SCS. This incident was the most consequential of all the maritime confrontations between the Philippines and China that began in the 1990s. Following the severe maritime confrontation in October, the Philippine Transportation Secretary declared the revocation of Chinese infrastructure projects valued at US$ 4.9 billion and Manila signed the OSA pact with Tokyo.4
The new defence agreement marked a shift in Japan’s previous policy which restricted the use of development aid to disaster relief. Tokyo is to offer a grant valued at Y600 million (US$ 4 million) under the scheme, along with defence equipment such as warning and control radars.5 Shortly after inking the pact with Japan, the Philippines declared its exit from the Belt and Road Initiative. This is another major step taken by Manila to alleviate its economic dependence on Beijing and lean more towards its security allies, namely Tokyo and Washington.
Japan–Philippine Relations: Brief Overview
During the Second World War, the Philippines was one of the countries that Japan targeted in its military occupation of the Southeast Asian region. It was a vital part of Japanese territorial ambitions, particularly since it was a US colony. After the war ended, Manila aimed to establish good relations with Tokyo, contrary to the approach of other neighbouring countries that bore the brunt of Japan’s military occupation.
In the early years of their relationship, the Philippines approached Japan with caution fearing military expansion. However, Washington’s push to improve relations and Tokyo’s willingness to pay war reparations led the two countries to conclude the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation in 1960. Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo’s introduction of “heart-to-heart diplomacy” in 1977 brought Japan closer to Southeast Asian countries.6
The two countries have explored maritime safety and security since the 1990s. On 4 June 2015, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Benigno Aquino III jointly declared that the relationship has entered the stage of a “Strengthened Strategic Partnership”. The declaration focused on enhancing security dialogues and concluding negotiations on the transfer of defence equipment, along with other pertinent security issues.7
The Philippines also benefitted substantially from the ODA provided by Japan. The ODA loan to Manila rose from US$ 2304.77 million in the period 1985–1990 to US$ 2593.61 million in the period 2010–2017.8 In 2022, Japan offered an ODA loan of 30,000 million yen to the Philippines for the COVID-19 Crisis Response Emergency Support Loan.9
Growth of Security Relations
Philippine–China relations have regressed gradually over China’s maritime confrontations with the Philippines in the South China Sea since the mid-1990s. In 1995, Manila’s perception of its relations with China changed considerably when it discovered the Chinese construction on the Mischief Reef. Prior to the development in 1995, relations were marked by detente and economic cooperation, devoid of any confrontation. The detention of a Filipino fishing vessel by Chinese troops on Mischief Reef aggravated President Fidel Ramos, who condemned Chinese activities in the South China Sea. A series of maritime confrontations followed throughout the 1990s.10
The Second Thomas Shoal, also known as Ayungin Shoal, which lies about 195 km (121 miles) northwest of the Philippine province of Palawan, has been a hotspot of maritime confrontations, particularly in 2023. After the October incident near the Second Thomas Shoal, Manila recognised the severity of the security threat posed by China, leading to its exit from the Belt and Road Initiative. The deterioration of China–Philippine relations induced the Philippines to shift towards Japan to alleviate the security threat in the SCS.11
The change of leadership in Manila assisted this reorientation in Japan–Philippine relations. The former Philippine president, Rodrigo Duterte, had announced in 2016 that it was “time to say goodbye to Washington”.12 Duterte welcomed the BRI initiative and viewed China as an ally. His pro-China policy jeopardised US security relations, almost putting an end to the Visiting Forces Agreement with the US.
Maritime tensions with China did not dislodge Duterte’s friendly posture towards China. His priority was to deepen economic ties with China and benefit from a raft of trade and infrastructure deals, a significantly different approach from the one taken by his predecessor Benigno Aquino III. Under Aquino’s leadership, the Philippines had emerged victorious when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague rejected China’s claims in the South China Sea.
In hopes of obtaining economic concessions from China, Duterte devalued the ICJ ruling and stated that Manila was in no position to counter China.13 However, Manila’s stance on China changed drastically when Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos Jr. took the helm. Marcos’s position is “not to look for trouble but to defend against Chinese aggression”. His tenure is increasingly being marked by cooperation with Japan and the United States. Marcos’s entry into power has paved the way for Japan to further bilateral defence cooperation.14
The outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war triggered a series of security policy responses from Japan as well. Tokyo’s perception of the severity of the security threat in the Indo-Pacific heightened after the war commenced. Japan has stated the aim of doubling its defence expenditure to about 2 per cent of its GDP, which is about 43 trillion yen (US$ 320 billion), by 2027. The NSS 2022 also highlighted Japan’s intent to take proactive measures to build security cooperation with “like-minded” countries, through the OSA initiative.15
The NSP 2023–28 of Manila and the NSS 2022 of Japan also reflect similar security objectives such as augmenting of armed forces, reinforcing security arrangements with the US, and developing a potent cyber-security system. The similarity of these security objectives and interests are bringing Tokyo and Manilla closer in security terms, especially given their common concerns based on China’s maritime assertion in the SCS.16
Through the OSA framework, Japan is to provide the Philippines with equipment and supplies as well as assistance for developing infrastructure. The OSA also includes activities related to monitoring and surveillance in territorial waters and airspace, humanitarian activities such as disaster response and international peace cooperation operations such as capacity building to participate in peacekeeping operations.
Japan offered a ¥600 million (US$ 4 million) grant to the Philippines to aid its defence ministry’s endeavour to obtain coastal radars for maritime security. The two countries are also expected to commence negotiations associated with the conclusion of the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), which will set the foundation for the Self-Defence Forces and the Philippine military to conduct joint exercises. Manila also received its first military equipment from Tokyo, an air surveillance radar system, as part of a 2020 contract. The Philippines is now the third country to have such an agreement with Japan, following Australia and Britain.17
Conclusion
Converging security interests have brought Japan and the Philippines closer than ever before. Japan’s revised security policy has allowed it to play the role of a vital security partner. Though the Philippines has a long way to go in terms of developing a robust military that can counter the Chinese threat in the Indo-Pacific, accepting the OSA provided by Japan is certainly a strong step towards realising its vision of a self-reliant military power. The OSA will help Tokyo and Manila enhance bilateral defence cooperation and reinforce the prospect of better security relations in the future.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Social media platform usage during course of counter-terror operations can lead to adverse fallouts.
A counter-terror operation lasting for more than 24 hours in Rajouri's Kalakote in Jammu and Kashmir on 22–23 November saw five soldiers including two young Indian army officers and Lashkar-e-Taiba's (LeT) highly-trained 'commander' and his associate killed. Although the intent here is not to carry out a military analysis of the incident, it would be pertinent to mention that officers’ casualty once again reinforces the fact that the Indian army leaders continue to lead the troops by example. The military lessons from this operation will certainly be drawn by the Army to modify its tactics and planning, as applicable. The opinion endeavours to flag the sensitive issue of usage of social media (SM) platforms, especially WhatsApp, during the course of such counter-terror operations.
Adverse Fallouts
Social media, as we all know, is very thoroughly abused by the terror outfits towards spread of dis-information as well as for recruitment purposes, among other objectives. The usage of social media platforms by the common people during the course of counter-terror operations, though, does not always portend well. In crisis situations such as natural disasters, messages on social media by the affected sections of people as also by relief providers do prove to be a force multiplier.
In most cases, SM platforms have been the only way of responding to natural disasters for disseminating real-time information, warnings, coordinating aid and relief and asking for funds, etc. However, given past experience, irresponsible spread of half-baked information on SM platforms could be counter-productive in several ways, especially when a counter-terror operation is in progress.
Vis-à-vis the recent Kalakote incident, a case in point were messages floating around on WhatsApp that gave finer and specific details concerning the ongoing gun fight between the troops and terrorists. These details, without any veracity, included name of the units involved in operations, location of operations, casualty to own troops to include their identity, etc. Shockingly, these details were in real- time, unofficial and against the norms of stealth and secrecy concerning tactical military operations. The origin of this particular message, amongst others, remained hazy and preceded any kinds of statement from an official source.
Such messages during an ongoing encounter with terrorists inevitably lead to adverse fallouts. It compromises the operational security by revealing tactics by giving out specific details of mobilisation of units, locations, and the quantum of troops involved. In the said context, the handlers of proxies are able to connect dots and deduce the operational plan of own forces. Such real-time information to the terrorists enables them to adapt their strategies.
Although not evident in the recent and similar terror incidents, SM updates could create panic among the public and hinder the authorities’ ability to manage the situation effectively, through exaggerated account of losses by a terror strike that may inflame passions. It may also impact the morale of security forces and provide fuel to our adversary to carry out propaganda.
The reaction of common people, who are oblivious to the facts and cannot possibly appreciate the peculiarity of an unfolding operational situation, could get out of hand in extreme contingencies. This may manifest in display of anger through various means by the locals, instigated by sympathisers of terrorists.
Last but not the least, this variety of irresponsible message proliferation, adversely affects the families of soldiers that are involved in the operations. As per the norm, the next of kin of a soldier who is killed in action is informed about the loss through proper channel and according to a laid-down military protocol. A passage of information to the concerned family is processed after due verification for sake of authenticity. Information about demise through social media, prior to the same being conveyed officially by the army authorities, is the last thing that any suffering family would prefer. This is about dignity and military ethos.
Precedence and Counter Measures
Overall, the risks of compromising security and jeopardising the operations that irresponsible messaging could lead to, during such events, is highly problematic. We had seen this trend at its zenith during 26/11 Mumbai attacks, when the holed in terrorists continuously modified their actions, partially on their own initiative and partially due to the directions of their handlers from across the border, after getting status updates from the real-time media coverage. The major difference in context between 26/11 and the present time period is the proliferation of messages on social media platforms like WhatsApp and X (formerly twitter), which is more challenging to control.
Given the popularity of SM, the army too has not been left untouched by its widespread usage and messaging on SM platforms is rampantly resorted to by its personnel, towards routine functioning. Being a mirror image of the civil society, one cannot blame the army for this. As mentioned, at times, reliance on SM becomes inescapable for everyday functioning of military units in terms of sharing updates and progress of routine activities.
In view of the above, it is needed that information leaks through social media be taken as the new normal by military planners and adequate measures are taken to mitigate the adverse fallouts, by factoring in such messaging. In addition to sensitising its personnel to obviate pilferage of information, proactive steps require to be planned so as not to let an information void shape up, for the same to be filled up by dis-information. Perhaps there is a requirement to decentralise the information management structure to make the same more responsive to dilute the ill-effects of half-baked messages that swarm the social media platforms during critical times when lives are at stake.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
There is now a forward-looking embrace of science and technology cooperation in India–US relations.
The successful completion of another 2+2 dialogue marks one more step in the saga of Indo-US cooperation. Structured India–US dialogues have had a long and checkered history. Economic cooperation was the initial focus, with an agreement being signed in 2000 to institute a commercial dialogue through a financial and economic forum and a working group on trade.1 The first Strategic dialogue was held from 1 June to 4 June 2010 in Washington. In US terminology, this was ostensibly to serve as a capstone dialogue to assess progress, provide policy guidance and propose new areas of cooperation. 2
Other dialogues operating at that time were the Counter Terrorism Cooperation Initiative and the Homeland Security dialogue. This was subsequently expanded to Strategic and Commercial Dialogue in 2015 and consultations were further deepened with then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken also holding High Level Consultations with then India’s Foreign Secretary, S. Jaishankar in December of that year. Thus, in the initial years, these mechanisms were focussed on building confidence and trust in each other, and forming habits of co-operation.
The mechanism attained its present 2+2 format in 2018 to “better elevate strategic communication on cross-cutting defence and security issues”.3 The change in the tone and tenor of each subsequent dialogue is evident through the Joint Statements released at the end of each dialogue. In the most recent dialogue held on 14 November 2023, as per the joint statement issued, the principals declared their satisfaction with the substantial progress in transforming India–US relations. They reaffirmed the importance of the India–US Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership, including the Quad. They discussed developments in the Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Ukraine, and terrorism. They also pledged to deepen the defence partnership and strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation.
As regards defence co-operation, the two sides finalised the Security of Supply Arrangement (SOSA) to enhance both countries' supply chain independence and agreed on the 2023 Roadmap for US–India Defence Industrial Cooperation. Signing of agreements has been a staple of the dialogue process with the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement, the Industrial Security Annex, and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation over the last few years. In a bilateral following the 2+2 dialogue, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin discussed the progress of the General Electric F-414 deal as well as the possibilities of co-production of the Stryker infantry combat vehicles.
If defence and security relations are finally on an even keel after many decades of differing perspectives and priorities on the two sides, it could be said that it is the multi-faceted co-operation in science and technology that is providing the ballast for a new phase of the relationship. During the Dialogue, there was considerable attention paid to the progress of the science and technology partnerships. The ministers highlighted the progress made under the India–US Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) to foster collaborations in science, technology, and critical technology value chains. They commended US private sector investments in India's semiconductor ecosystem and urged continued strategic partnerships between the academic, research, and corporate sectors in emerging technologies like quantum, telecom, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and semiconductors to drive global innovation.
The ministers also acknowledged advancements in space collaborations, including the establishment of a sub-working group on Space Commerce and India's participation in international space organisations. They discussed mineral security, energy cooperation, and the strengthening of India–US Science and Technology cooperation under their bilateral agreement. Specific collaborative frameworks such as the iCET, India–US Civil Space Joint Working Group, Joint Committee Meeting on Science and Technology, and the Strategic Trade Dialogue Monitoring Mechanism, point to the deepening and maturing of these mechanisms. 4
The ecosystem for partnerships between the academic, research and corporate sectors in emerging technologies across the two countries would be further strengthened through programmes such as the India–United States Defence Acceleration Ecosystem (INDUS X) initiative which serves to build an innovation bridge to connect defence start-ups. On the anvil are joint challenges, establishment of a Joint Innovation Fund, academia engagement programmes, industry-star-startup connects, and facilitation of mentoring by experts.5 The inaugural event also had a discussion on export control regulations which has stymied many a joint venture.6
Indus-X recalls the TiE (The Indus Entrepreneurs) Network created by India-American entrepreneurs in 1994 to foster entrepreneurship and networking for the large number of Indians who came to the United States as students and then went on to set up tech start-ups in Silicon Valley. That trend still continues with Indian students studying in the United States having recently reached an all-time high of 268,923, according to the latest Open Doors report.7 Of these, over 73,000, or more than a quarter, have enrolled for engineering degrees.8 They present a possible pool of candidates to participate in the burgeoning S&T ties, if channelled successfully by creating awareness and creating programmes in those universities in which they are present in large numbers.
Thus, it may be said that the evolution of India–US relations, particularly through the framework of the 2+2 dialogues, has consistently moved towards deeper strategic collaboration. Moving beyond the initial focus on economic cooperation and strategic and defence alignment, there is now a forward-looking embrace of science and technology cooperation. The pioneering spirit inherent to science and technology can be seen in initiatives like the iCET and Indus-X. With thousands of Indian students continuing to contribute to the US innovation landscape, there is scope for increasing their participation in these programmes for the benefit of both nations.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
ChatGPT’s potentially exploitative use by violent non-state actors can undermine human and state security.
Despite various advantages, Artificial Intelligence (AI)-enabled programmes like ChatGPT can also be used for criminal purposes. There are concerns that individuals, whether lone wolves or members of violent extremist or terrorist organisations, can easily tap into the resourceful information generated on this AI platform for preparing and carrying out subversive acts. At a Five Eyes Intelligence Summit in California in October 2023, these concerns were flagged by MI5’ Director General Ken McCallum and FBI’s Director Christopher Wray.1
As pointed out by EUROPOL, ChatGPT safety mechanisms can be circumvented in some cases with the ‘correct prompt engineering’, which is the ‘practice of users refining the precise way a question is asked in order to influence the output that is generated by an AI system’. The report notes that this ‘can be abused in order to bypass content moderation limitations to produce potentially harmful content’.2
It is true that the coding fed into it by its developers can indeed detect and refuse to obey sensitive commands and searches, for example, those related to crafting storylines about murder, citing ethical considerations.3 However, by using seemingly ordinary phrases and commands, actors can find ways to undermine human and national security. Some of the key concerns are enumerated below.
Disinformation and Propaganda
Disinformation and misinformation are not just the prerogatives of state actors. Experts have even underscored that this AI platform can assist terrorists in creating ‘malicious web pages and social engineering reliant scams’.4 Non-State actors, including terrorists, can exploit these tactics to spread their propaganda, rally support, and discredit legitimate state representatives and institutions. Some experts have also highlighted issues relating to ‘astroturfing, which is propaganda designed to look like a grassroots campaign—giving the sense that lots of people believe a sentiment when that’s not actually true or real’.5
What aids violent non-State actors is that access to basic services provided by ChatGPT requires no monetary costs, only a stable internet connection and a device on which carefully crafted instructions can be issued to the AI platform. This aspect underscores how decentralisation, affordability, and access to technology, while empowering billions globally, has also facilitated its exploitation by many.
Furthermore, despite increased surveillance to detect and clamp down on terrorists or violent extremists sharing propaganda and participating in radicalised and extremist discussions, use of carefully articulated prompts has ensured that ChatGPT provides avenues to deceive the system. The AI platform, for instance, recommends the use of Tor Browser, Signal, ProtonMail, DuckDuckGo, SecureDrop, and Zeronet—forums prioritising security and complete anonymity, when asked, ‘What are the forums that can be used to freely exchange views amid increased surveillance?’
In December 2022, one of the servers operated by ISIS on Rocket.Chat, an open-source communications platform, announced that the outfit had begun relying on ChatGPT to strengthen and protect a renewed Caliphate. According to the server’s operatives, the AI platform, superior to those present in the public domain, provided ‘precise guidelines for identifying and enlisting a core group of supporters, formulating a political and ideological strategy, garnering backing from the Muslim community, capturing territory, [and] establishing institutions and governmental structures.’6
ChatGPT can churn out information that, if put to use, can strengthen a non-State actor’s strategy to radicalise and recruit extremist individuals. Similar knowledge, disseminated into public space, can inspire lone wolves to commit violence or attempt to do so. In the past, at the peak of COVID-19, it has generated information legitimising conspiracy theories, including the QAnon Movement.7 This political conspiracy theory has been responsible for socio-political fragmentation and polarisation in Western countries like the United States and radicalising those who became disillusioned with the liberal democratic order’s promises.
Furthermore, ChatGPT is accused of replicating, ‘the ideologically consistent, interactive…online extremist environments … amplifying extremist movements that seek to radicalize and recruit individuals’.8 Analysts note that AI chatbots ‘may be trained – or worse, decide – to disseminate violent extremist ideas’.9
Violent Video Games and Radicalisation
ChatGPT’s exploitative use can be expanded to include compilation of ideas to create gripping video games. They are a particularly attractive recreational avenue for the youth and one of the key mediums of radicalising the habitual gamers. Law enforcement, analysts, and security agencies have pointed out the steep rise in this trend recently.10
ChatGPT can create storylines likely to gain traction along themes used by far-right groups in the West or once used by ISIS previously. Notably, video games, filled with violent imagery and audio-visual effects, were one of the many strategies applied by ISIS to expand its recruitment until its physical caliphate’s defeat in March 2019. Today, it is mainly far-right and neo-Nazi extremist groups adopting this strategy to mobilise support.
The fact that ChatGPT can be a resourceful platform to generate a beginner’s manual to build video games from scratch can be a worrying factor for security and law enforcement officials. This is because these build-your-own games can also be launched on various self-publishing platforms like Epic Games Store, with minimal effort and regulation involved. ChatGPT listed this gaming platform as one of the many avenues when prompted with the question of ‘What is the best self-publishing platform for video games?’
ChatGPT also lists some popular video editing platforms in response to question of ‘What is the most popular and accessible audio and video editing software with gripping effects on the audience?’ These platforms can be used to create doctored videos at minimal or no cost. This dilemma can exacerbate deepening concerns regarding deep fakes and the spread of disinformation in the public domain.
3D Weapons
A detailed breakdown of instructions to construct 3D weapons and instruments, the production and sale of which are not necessarily regulated (unlike conventional firearms), and more so within confines of private properties, can be easily found on this AI platform. It provided a 13-step blueprint, from conceptualisation to appropriate software modelling techniques, ways to create required textures, animation, and documentation, when prompted with this instruction—‘Please provide a detailed breakdown on making 3D instruments or weapons.’
Such information can later be released on chat forums like 4kun, 8 Chan, and Gab, which are not subjected to content moderation. The problem is exacerbated by the ease of access to low and high-cost 3D printers, which can be used for violent acts. ChatGPT lists some of the more commonly found 3D printers, such as Creality 3D Ender 3 Series, Prusa i3 MK3/MK4, and Anycubic i3 Mega, with their descriptions when prompted with ‘What is the most easily available 3D printer?’ While the use of such weapon types is in its nascent stages, it can become more popular as future, technologically-equipped generations become gradually exposed to it, and the technology gains more traction commercially.
3D weapons have been used in the past to carry out acts of violence. For example, a synagogue in Halle (Germany) was targeted in October 2019 using a firearm comprised of some of the 3D components made at home by the perpetrator, Stephen Baillet. At least two people died in that attack. The UK witnessed the first-ever conviction of a far-right lone-wolf terrorist in July 2021 for possessing a 3D firearm.11
Data Privacy
ChatGPT even gives insights into some of the most secure platforms like High Fidelity and Decentraland to engage with other individuals in the metaverse, emphasising data security and user privacy. Metaverse can be exploited by terrorists and violent extremists to congregate and formulate plans for their activities.
Moreover, given the right prompts, ChatGPT can outline a detailed list of encrypted chat forums and secure cryptocurrency platforms, providing pathways to evade detection or stringent surveillance in a controlled ecosystem. It recommended using Matrix/Riot, Mastodon, Diaspora, Monero, and Zcash when asked, ‘What are the encrypted chat forms and cryptocurrency platforms that unfailingly uphold freedom of speech and expression?’
Notably, encrypted chat forums have been one of the more commonly used means for those looking to bypass surveillance by law enforcement and intelligence authorities, disseminate propaganda, recruit and radicalise new members and engage in terror financing. User privacy and data protection facilitated by platforms providing crypto trading and funding make such avenues attractive to hostile actors.
Conclusion
Apart from the November 2015 Paris Attacks, casualties have not exceeded double digits in recent extremist or terrorist attacks. Even these events have been restricted to the US due to lax gun regulations. Nevertheless, amid this shift in terrorist trends, as technological dependence increases and expertise to put together weapons inspired by such developments becomes easily available on platforms like ChatGPT, concerns regarding global security architecture’s future have proliferated. While ChatGPT has no doubt contributed to decentralising access to technology, it also allows far-reaching expertise to be gained from the comfort of one’s home, which can equally be put to deleterious use.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Hamas and its affiliates, along with other hacktivist groups, have conducted numerous cyber operations against Israeli targets.
The ongoing Israel–Hamas conflict has spilled over into cyberspace as well. Threat actors, including Hamas and its affiliates, along with other hacktivist groups, have conducted numerous operations against Israel. Despite Israel's strength in cybersecurity and its global reputation, adversaries have succeeded in breaching Israeli systems. Furthermore, threat actors have effectively leveraged social media platforms and other digital spaces to conduct influence operations, aiming to shape global opinions on the ongoing conflict.
Digital Battleground
Israel came under an unprecedented, surprise attack from Hamas, a terror group in control of the Gaza Strip, on 7 October 2023. The nature of the attack caught Israeli intelligence off-guard. As per assessments, the Israeli public alarm system, Tzeva Adom, designed to notify citizens of missile attacks, was reportedly disabled within an hour of the terrorist attack.1 The attack was purportedly claimed by Anonymous Sudan, a group known for religiously motivated attacks and believed to be affiliated with Russia. Prominent online news platforms, such as The Jerusalem Post, endured continuous Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks for two days. In fact, during the initial days of the conflict, newspaper and media websites were the main target of DDoS attacks, accounting for nearly 56 per cent of all intrusions against Israeli websites.
Government entities, including the Bank of Israel and the Israeli Knesset (parliament), also experienced disruptions in the initial days of the conflict. Billboards in Israel were briefly hacked to display pro-Palestinian messages. Furthermore, hack and leak operations, such as the Ono Academic College breach, resulted in the publication of approximately 2,50,000 records containing information about employees, students, former students, and more on Telegram.2 Reportedly, personally identifiable information (PII) from the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and Israeli security agencies was advertised on certain dark web platforms.3 While the source and timing of the breach are not available, advertising these details during the conflict strongly suggests a clear link to the ongoing hostilities. Several aid organisations, pooling resources to assist people in distress, were also targeted by DDoS attacks.4
The cyber-attacks moved beyond the actors directly involved in the conflict. Countries like the US, France, India and Italy have experienced a significant increase in cyber activities against them.5 Several hacktivist groups were involved in cyber operations against these states due to their open support for Israel. However, it's important to note that these states did not confirm the information related to such operations and was shared on Telegram channels associated with these hacktivist groups. Some Arab and Islamic nations were also subjected to cyber attacks by these groups as a consequence of perceived ambiguous support for Palestine.6
The nature of cyberspace poses challenges in attributing or linking cyber incidents to a specific actor unless those actors claim responsibility for the attacks. However, reports indicate that numerous Iranian-linked entities have been implicated in orchestrating cyber attacks against Israel.7 Nevertheless, some reports suggest that the operations of Iranian groups have predominantly been opportunistic in nature, with their impact often exaggerated.8 The reports also indicate that Iranian actors initially lacked knowledge about Hamas's coordinated attack on Israel but later pivoted their cyber activities to the Israel–Hamas conflict following the escalation.
As with the previous Israel–Hamas conflict, the recent escalation is also turning out to be a battle of narratives or, as often the case, a 'fight over the image'. In the asymmetric nature of the Israel–Hamas conflict, where a state is fighting a non-state actor, the weaker side also employ images as a weapon to sway public opinion. This integration of images with warfare is referred to as ‘Imagefare’, where visuals serve as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve political objectives.9
The use of imagery has been amplified with social media platforms. Hamas has used these platforms to conduct influence operations, aiming to mobilise public support for its actions against a formidable adversary. Simultaneously, it instills fear and uncertainty among Israelis regarding their perceived invincibility. On the day of the attack, Hamas used its Telegram channels and other social media accounts to disseminate information about its attacks on both Israeli military assets and civilians.
Hamas also employed GoPro First-Person View (FPV) footage to capture unsettling videos of its attacks on civilians, including the act of taking hostages in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli state subsequently used the brutality in the videos to garner international support for its airstrikes and ground operations in the Gaza Strip. The terrorists also hijacked the social media accounts of their victims, livestreaming the harrowing experiences of the captives from these compromised accounts.10
Due to the widespread reach and accessibility of social media, these platforms also abound with misinformation and disinformation. The wider accessibility of artificial intelligence (AI) tools is being exploited to produce and disseminate fabricated images and videos. Deepfake videos, which gained prominence in the early stages of the Russia–Ukraine war, are also being used to sow confusion and propagate false narratives in the ongoing struggle for public opinion in the Israel–Hamas conflict. These technology-enabled false narratives have posed a significant challenge for fact-checkers and the Israeli public diplomacy front.
According to observers, the AI tools are already thickening the ‘fog of war’, and the Israel–Hamas war is unprecedented in terms of the dissemination of deep fake content.11 For instance, an image of a baby in the rubble of destroyed buildings in Gaza, which was widely used by anti-Israel protestors across the globe and even figured in a national daily, turned out to be a fake image.12 The massive number of images that can be created by simple commands using AI tools has posed a significant challenge to content moderators and other organisations seeking to deliver breaking news while maintaining credibility.
Amidst the chaos, the big tech companies have faced mounting scrutiny due to a surge in harmful content and disinformation in the wake of the attack on Israel. The Vice-President of the European Commission, Vera Jourova, has asked the executives from TikTok and social media platform X to step up their efforts to counter illegal hate speech.13 The issue of disinformation was also brought to attention in a strongly worded letter from the European Union (EU) to Elon Musk. The letter warned him about potential actions that could be taken against the platform if it failed to comply with regulatory laws and adequately address the escalating issue of fake news on X.14
Israeli Response
Given the hybrid nature of contemporary conflicts, the spillover of the conflict into cyberspace was expected, and it is reasonable to assume that Israel must have anticipated such a scenario. The crucial question to pose is whether Israel was adequately prepared to respond to such threats. The issue of Israeli cybersecurity preparedness was raised in the May 2023 Report of the State Comptroller on Cyber and Information Systems, which highlighted potential vulnerabilities in institutions such as the National Insurance Institute.15 The report also pointed out that “given the complex geopolitical climate from a security perspective, Israel is a significant target for potential cyber-attackers”.16
Israel has refrained from launching kinetic attacks specifically targeting Hamas cyber operations in the current conflict, in contrast to previous engagements. Nevertheless, Israel has sought to capitalise on its technological prowess through various measures.According to reports, Israel has reportedly sought assistance from spyware companies in tracking hostages in Gaza.17
In response to growing cyber threats, emergency regulations were introduced to provide flexibility to IDF and Shin Bet, enabling them to operationalise counter-offensive measures in the cyber realm. For instance, emergency regulations were approved authorising the IDF and the Shin Bet to penetrate the computers used to operate stationary cameras. The INCD issued a warning to owners of home cameras about the potential threat of hacking by terrorists.18 Measures like GPS jamming were also employed by INCD, leading to significant disruptions in Israel's location applications. Israel also took action against the cryptocurrency fundraising efforts of Hamas and its supporters by freezing accounts suspected of financing Hamas operations.
The ongoing conflict clearly reiterates the complexities that mire contemporary battlefields. Israel, which built a global reputation for its counter-terror measures, has failed to deter Hamas from pulling out such large-scale operations. However, it is too early to appraise its cybersecurity posture, given the cyberattacks on Israel have not moved beyond minor disruptions and nuisance. Unlike what the world witnessed on the physical front, Israel has not faced any sophisticated breach in the ongoing conflict. However, this should not mean that Israel underestimates the concerted efforts by various groups in deploying influence operations that have largely been successful. Such operations have been amplified by leveraging widely available generative AI tools.
Israel must also factor in the emerging realities of responding to cyber threats while simultaneously undertaking kinetic operations in the physical realm. Such broader response needs better cooperation and synergy between the IDF and other security agencies alongwith the INCD. Policy makers must also prioritise ensuring that the appeal for extensive mobilisation of reservists does not disrupt the functioning of cybersecurity companies. Even though such mobilisation occurs in rare circumstances, the potential for this conflict to rapidly escalate necessitates careful consideration of all possibilities.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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