Introduction

Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) organised a covert meeting in November 2023 in Potsdam which featured the leader of the far-right Identitarian Movement,1 Martin Sellner. This meeting has sparked outrage over the AfD’s remigration agenda, referred to as a ‘masterplan’.2 This meeting was attended by three key figures within AfD—Ulrich Siegmund (Parliamentry Group Leader for Saxony-Anhalt), Tim Krause (Chair of the District Party in Potsdam and AfD Spokesperson) and Roland Hartwig (former aid to Alice Weidel, co-leader of AfD). They debated on ways to remigrate or forcefully deport those individuals to an unnamed country in Africa, who in their opinion failed to assimilate, had non-German lineage or demonstrated support for asylum seekers.

The attendees are adherents of a conspiracy theory commonly known as the Great Replacement, as per which there is a deliberate attempt to replace the White European population with migrants of colour, thereby altering the racial demography for good. While Remigration, a sociological term, refers to a voluntary migration of people back to their homelands, the far-right extremists, White supremacists, and conspiracy theorists have promoted a pejorative understanding of the subject. They have manipulated the term and endorsed it as a forced migration or deportation of non-members—migrants, asylum seekers, and their families.3 Remigration, a term considered anti-Islam and xenophobic by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, has been integral to AfD’s political agenda on social media platforms and in public speeches, where it has previously spoken about ‘a national and a supranational remigration agenda’.4

AfD’s Response

After the discussions at the meeting were exposed by a non-profit newsroom, they have been termed as a ‘smear campaign’ by the Left and reminiscent of the tactics adopted by the Stasi.5 Nevertheless, AfD’s extremist rhetoric and support for mass expulsion within parliamentary halls,6 while having polled second nationally in an opinion poll conducted by YouGov (a global public opinion and data company),7 indicates that should Germany take a hard tilt towards the far-right like Italy, Hungary, and Sweden, the party would use all means, including constitutional, to undermine the Basic Law enshrined in the constitution which prohibits discrimination against Germans regardless of their race, nationality or religion. It was instituted in May 1949 following the racially discriminative policies that defined Adolf Hitler’s reign throughout the Third Reich and culminated in the Second World War.

While deciding not to expel individuals like Tim Krause, an AfD spokesperson and an attendee at the Potsdam meeting, lawmakers such as Hans-Christopher Berndt (leader of AfD’s Parliamentary Group in the Brandenburg State Parliament) have gone as far as to argue that ‘Remigration is not a secret plan, but a promise.’8

Notably, those in attendance were required to donate a minimum of Euros 5,000 to advance the broader far-right cause across Europe. The organisers, the Düsseldorf Forum explained that funds were being solicited for a primary cause ‘We (Düsseldorf Forum) need patriots who are ready to act and individuals who will support their activities financially.’9

The Remigration Debate

This meeting and the ideas circulated among those present cannot be looked at in isolation. AfD has consistently advocated through its policies and actions to impose a ban on migrants and asylum seekers. Furthermore, its chapters in the states of Thuringia, Saxony, and Saxony-Anhalt10 and its youth wing—Junge Alternative or Young Alternatives11 —have been classified by the German Domestic Intelligence Services as extreme right-wing organisations and its leaders have been placed under surveillance over the past year.

In 2020, protestors decrying COVID-19 restrictions broke into the Bundestag (German Parliament) using badges procured by AfD lawmakers.12 In addition, a large group of alt-right extremists who are adherents of the Reichsbürger movement (which denies the legitimacy of the post-Third Reich Germany),13 including Birgit Malscak-Winklemann (she served as one of AfD’s parliamentary representatives between 2017 and 2021), were arrested in December 2022 for attempting to carry out a coup violently.

Malsack-Winklemann had access to confidential proceedings and documents during her tenure.14 As part of this group’s agenda, upon the coup’s realisation and overthrow of the democratic order in Germany, she was intended to be placed as the Justice Minister. This highlights that AfD’s support for an extremist agenda and undermining of German democracy has been in the works for years.

Germany, among all the European Union member states, has pledged to accommodate the largest number of refugees approved by the United Nations, totalling 13,000 in 2024 and 2025.15 At the moment, at least 23.8 million (10 million of whom have German passports)16 trace their lineage to migrants who settled down in Germany.17 Furthermore, there is growing frustration about Germany’s immigration and asylum policies among the public. As of September 2023, only 19 per cent of Germans have demonstrated support for the government’s handling of the refugee influx, marking a significant decrease from 43 per cent in 2018.18 Additionally, political leaders such as Markus Söder of the Christian Social Union in Bavaria or CSU have called for more restrictive immigration policies. As public opinion turns against immigrants and refugees, AfD will continue consolidating its strength and political influence. This has undoubtedly fuelled AfD’s ambition to oust as many individuals who fail to meet their litmus test of what it means to be a German.

Fallout of Correctiv’s Findings

Horrified by the revelations, at least a million people19 across Germany have taken to the streets chanting anti-AfD and anti-Nazi slogans, which have spilled over into neighbouring Austria, where at least three such rallies have also been held. Moreover, in a closely watched district administrative election in Saale-Orla (Thuringia) in January 2024, AfD narrowly lost to the Christian Democrats.20 This defeat has jolted AfD’s continued propulsion towards regional dominance in areas considered to be its strongholds.

Leaders from across party lines have called for Germans to rally against AfD’s attempts at eroding German democracy. Katharina Dröge (Parliamentary leader of the Greens Party) has asserted that

‘We’re all called on now, in our private lives, in the workplace, at sport, when shopping, to clearly state that voting for the AfD is to vote for right-wing extremists, who pose a threat to democracy.’21    

Interestingly, even some of the most well-known far-right political leaders, such as Marine Le Pen (National Front), have balked at AfD’s proposal, indicating that it does not bode well for their continued alliance—the Identity and Democracy (ID) group—in the European Parliament and it could not be, at least for those holding citizenship, be implemented in France.22

It has also renewed nationwide discussions on whether legal avenues must be adopted to thwart the German far-right extremists’ further consolidation of electoral power. Questions have been raised about taking the issue of banning AfD to Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court, which is the deciding authority regarding such matters.

A Potential Ban on AfD: Possibilities and Challenges

Per the requirements laid out by the Federal Constitutional Court, the imposition of a ban on a political party needs to meet two primary conditions:

‘The mere dissemination of anti-constitutional ideas is not sufficient. To be declared unconstitutional, a party must also take an actively belligerent, aggressive stance vis-à-vis the free democratic basic order and must seek to abolish it. In addition, specific indications are required which suggest that it is at least possible that the party will achieve its anti-constitutional aims.’23

There are precedents for banning a political party.  The Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and Socialist Reich Party (SPR) in the post-World World War II era in 1950 were banned for their ‘anti-democratic behaviour’.24 The ideological opposition to communism that had swept through Western Europe and among those fleeing East Germany facilitated and legitimised the crackdown on communist parties by declaring them as elements that posed a significant risk of undermining the post-Third Reich constitution. There was limited grassroots support for such parties and minimal appetite for a communist society.

Theoretically, individual AfD members’ involvement in various extremist activities, as mentioned above, on top of allying itself with militant groups25 and espousing anti-Semitic views frequently, and now the remigration plan, provides sufficient basis for it being proscribed. Simultaneously, its chapters’ classification as extreme right-wing, along with placing leaders under surveillance in 2021 for attempting to undermine German democracy (making it the first party to be subjected to this measure since 1945),26 provide robust evidence for the Court to prevent its further enlargement in terms of mobilisation, access to resources, and participation in the political sphere.

Nevertheless, banning AfD will prove to be a greater hurdle. This is because despite the massive outpouring of opposition to AfD’s proposed plan from various corners, it still ranks as the most potent political force and ranks the second-highest behind the Christian Democrats in national polls conducted in 2023. AfD controls 78 seats in the parliament, a little over 10 per cent of the total seats.27 Analysts expect it will receive at least 30 per cent of the total vote share in state elections scheduled to be held this year in Saxony, Thuringia and Brandenburg.28 These developments are crucial since state governments have significant representation in Germany’s upper house, i.e., the Bundesrat, which can veto 40 per cent of legislation introduced by the government.29

Moreover, if the courts do not agree to ban the AfD, its legal victory would cement its position as a legitimate player for the foreseeable future while weakening centrist parties. An anti-establishment narrative, having been effectively used as a political strategy by AfD since its inception, could be used by its leaders as a counter-response, mainly now as Germany heads into recession. Germany’s financial challenges can be attributed to rising energy costs and farmers’ strikes amid boiling resentment against Olaf Scholz’s administration, as evidenced by his coalition’s plummeting polling records and an increasingly polarised environment pitting the centrists against far-right extremists.

Conclusion

While AfD’s proposal appears to be far-fetched, mainly given the multi-level criticism it has received publicly and the recent electoral defeat denoting dissatisfaction with its policies, it does have a growing presence and influence among certain segments. To keep the AfD at bay, other moderate political parties might become inclined to support policies to deter further immigration or even expel some migrants. In the European political sphere, mainstream politicians are increasingly courting the extremist conservative electorate. There has been a surge of far-right populism across countries such as Italy, Hungary and Sweden. The worsening socio-economic situation in Germany could also allow the AfD to refurbish its image as the least bad option to address growing concerns among the electorate, undermining the liberal rules-based order.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Peter Hille, “How Dangerous is the Identitarian Movement?”, DW, 13 July 2019.
• 2. “Secret Plan Against Germany”, Correctiv, 15 January 2024.
• 3. Peter Hille, “German Remigration Debate Fuels Push to Ban Far-Right AfD”, DW, 12 January 2024.
• 4. Ingo Neumayer, “Remigration: Right-wing Fighting Term Becomes Bad Word of the Year”, WDR, 15 January 2024.
• 5. Jessica Parker, “AfD: Germans Float Ban on Elected Far-right Party After Scandal”, BBC News, 20 January 2024.
• 6. Jessica Weiner, “Brandenburg’s AfD Faction Supports the Content of the Right-Wing Secret Meeting”, rbb24, 17 January 2024.
• 7. Nick Alipour, “Germany: Far-right Overtakes Scholz’s SPD in New Poll”, Euractiv, 9 June 2023.
• 8. Jessica Weiner, “Brandenburg’s AfD Faction Supports the Content of the Right-wing Secret Meeting”, rbb24, 17 January 2024.
• 9. “Secret Plan Against Germany”, Correctiv, 15 January 2024.
• 10. “Germany Labels Branch of Far-right Party Extremist”, Barron’s, 8 December 2023.
• 11. Erika Solomon, “Germany Deems Youth Wing of Far-right Party an Extremist Group”, The New York Times, 26 April 2023.
• 12. Jens Thurau, “How Secure is the German Parliament?”, DW, 19 November 2020.
• 13. Rina Goldenburg, “What is Germany’s Reichsbürger Movement?”, DW, 17 May 2023.
• 14. Helen Whittle, “Germany’s Far-right AfD and the Reichsbürger Movement”, DW, 13 December 2022.
• 15. “Germany: Far-Right ‘Remigration’ Meeting Provokes Anger in the Streets, Interior Minister Attributes Decrease in Irregular Border Crossings to Stronger Controls Despite Concerns over Schengen Rules, Adoption of the “Repatriation Improvement Act” Raises Fears and Concerns among NGOs”, European Council of Refugees and Exiles, 19 January 2024.
• 16. Tanit Koch, “Germansplaining: The AfD’s Remigrations Plans are a Fantasy”, The New European, 24 January 2024.
• 17. Kate Connolly, “Germany Considers Entry Ban on Austrian Behind Mass Deportation Plan”, The Guardian, 24 January 2024.
• 18. Ellen Ehni, “Dissatisfaction with Migration Policy is Growing”, tagesschau, 28 September 2023.
• 19. Paul Hockenos, “Germany’s Far-right Party is Worse than the Rest of Europe’s”, Foreign Policy, 26 January 2024.
• 20. Kate Connolly, “AfD Narrowly Loses First Election Test Since Mass Deportation Plan Revelations”, The Guardian, 28 January 2024.
• 21. Kate Connolly, “AfD Plans to Turn Germany Into Authoritarian State, Vice-Chancellor Warns”, The Guardian, 17 January 2024.
• 22. Kjeld Neubert, Nick Alipour and Paul Messad, “Le Pen Questions EU-level Alliance with AfD, Spelling Trouble for ID Unity”, Euractiv, 1 February 2024.
• 23. “Proceedings for the Prohibition of Political Parties”, The Federal Constitutional Court.
• 24. Mika Hackner, “Germany Has Banned Political Parties in the Past. Can It Credibly Condemn Turkey for Doing the Same?”, The Washington Post, 8 April 2021.
• 25. Paul Hockenos, “Germany’s Far-right Party is Worse than the Rest of Europe’s”, no. 19.
• 26. Andreas Rinke, “German Far-right AfD First Party Put Under Surveillance Since Nazi Era”, Reuters, 3 March 2021.
• 27. “Distribution of Seats in the 20th German Bundestag”, Deutscher Bundestag.
• 28. Marcel Fürstenau, “Is Germany’s Far-right AfD a Threat to Democracy?”, DW, 1 February 2024. 
• 29. Ed Turner and Julian Hoerner, “Far-right AfD Makes Unprecedented Election Gains in West Germany, Worrying National Government”, The Conversation, 18 October 2023.

Introduction

Relations between India and Maldives hit a rocky patch when the new President Mohamed Muizzu was elected in September 2023. It was expected that bilateral relations under Muizzu would not be as warm and cordial as under the previous President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih. The foreign policy of Solih ever since he assumed power in 2018 was anchored in the theme of ‘India First’.

As against this, Muizzu fought the 2023 Presidential election on the slogan of ‘India Out’. According to a report by the European Election Observation Commission, parties supporting Muizzu ‘deployed anti-India sentiments and attempted to spread disinformation around this theme during the 2023 presidential elections’.

The rapid and precipitous decline in bilateral ties has come as a huge surprise to all observers and analysts of the evolving scenario. If there is one individual who can be held responsible for this unfortunate turn of events, it is none other than Muizzu himself. He has conducted Maldives’ relations with India with immaturity, lack of sophistication, short-sightedness and impetuosity.

Background

It is not unusual for India’s smaller neighbours to suffer from a small-country syndrome. There are several reasons for this. In the context of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), India is the only country in the grouping that shares land or maritime boundaries with each of the other member countries, while none of the other countries shares a border with any other member except India (other than Pakistan and Afghanistan which share a land border with each other).

According to Kautilya’s Mandala Theory, an immediate neighbour state is most likely to be an adversary (real or potential) and a state next to the immediate neighbour is likely to be a friend. This sentiment becomes even more pronounced when the differential between the neighbouring countries in territorial area, population, size of economy, etc., is widely different. India accounts for more than 70 per cent of the total area, population, GDP of the SAARC member states.  As such, India’s small neighbours have an apprehension that their independence and sovereignty could be under threat although India’s policies have always tried to reassure them that India has nothing but their security, well-being and prosperity at heart.

In the instant case of Maldives, this is unmistakably demonstrated by India’s prompt assistance during the 1988 coup attempt. The immediate withdrawal by India of its troops when they were no longer required, totally debunked any fears of Indian dominance or territorial aspirations. India was also the first to assist Maldives during the 2004 Tsunami and the water crisis in Malé in December 2014. India’s rapid and comprehensive assistance and support during the outbreak of measles and COVID-19 in 2020 established beyond doubt the advantages of India’s proximity and capacity to come to Maldives’ rescue in distress as compared to any other distant country. All these incidents further reinforce India’s credentials of being the ‘first responder’ in times of distress to Maldives and other neighbouring countries.

The anti-India small-country syndrome is used by certain segments in the neighbouring countries in their domestic politics for their narrow and short-sighted personal interests. This is what has been done by Muizzu and his party in the recent elections. It would be expected that parties in neighbouring countries that engage in shrill political rhetoric during the election process would steer themselves to a more centrist position once the responsibilities of governance devolve upon them. Exactly the opposite seems to have occurred in the case of Muizzu who appears to have become even more belligerent and hostile than he was during the elections.

India’s neighbours are also prone to using the China card to get more benefits and support in trade terms, investments, and infrastructure development from both India and China. This demands that they ensure warm and cordial relations with both the countries. This is what was pursued by Muizzu’s predecessor Solih who ruled from 2018 to 2023. Muizzu appears to have moved totally to the China camp by unnecessarily downgrading Maldives’ ties with India. This is nothing short of shooting itself in the foot as the track record of China in helping developing countries to achieve their developmental aspirations is highly suspect. Most countries who have been recipient of Chinese funding for investment projects have sunk into unsustainable debt from which they find themselves difficult to extricate. On the contrary, India’s support to developing countries is according to their needs and has not led any country into an unmanageable debt burden for them.

India–Maldives Relations

Relations between the two countries are deep-rooted and multi-faceted. The last few years, particularly during the Solih regime, have witnessed many new initiatives to strengthen and expand bilateral ties in diverse areas. In the security sphere, some of these pertained to capacity building and training requirements of the Maldivian National Defence Force (MNDF), meeting around 70 per cent of their defence training needs, joint exercises, Maritime Domain Awareness, gifting of hardware, and infrastructure development such as the building of the National College for Police and Law Enforcement.

Infrastructure development projects in the health sector have included the establishment of the Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital and a state-of-the-art Cancer Hospital. India has also helped restore the Hukuru Miskiiy (Friday Mosque) in Malé, has undertaken projects relating to the provision of water and sanitation in 34 Islands, the Addu Development Project (Roads and Land Reclamation), expansion of Maldives Industrial Fisheries Company Limited (MIFCO) facilities in Felivaru and Gemanafushi, the Gulhifalhu Port project, the Hulhumalé Cricket Stadium, airport redevelopment projects in Hanimaadhoo and Gan, the Greater Male Connectivity Project and many more. By embarking on his reckless and ill-conceived venture, Muizzu has heavily damaged the interests of Maldives and its citizens.

Recent Developments

Going against the past practice of coming to India as the first foreign country to visit after assuming charge, Muizzu chose Turkiye as his first foreign destination. This is indicative of the larger role that Turkiye can be expected to play in the defence and domestic affairs of Maldives. Over the years, Maldives has been transforming into an increasingly Islamic radicalised society. It had the dubious distinction of being the largest per capita supplier of foreign militants and terrorists to the cadres of the Islamic State fighting in Syria and other neighbouring countries. Turkiye in its bid to emerge as the leader of the Muslim Ummah has been dabbling in South Asian affairs particularly by strengthening its ties with Pakistan and reaching out to others like Bangladesh. Its increased presence in Maldives will be a matter of concern for India.

Prime Minster Narendra Modi during his visit to Lakshadweep on 2 January 2024 extolled the charm of the islands and encouraged more Indians to visit and enjoy their serene beauty. Totally unprovoked, three junior Maldivian ministers came out with vituperative, racist and abusive tirades against India, Indians and PM Modi himself. After a barrage of criticism on social media by Indian common people and celebrities against these remarks and threat to stop visiting Maldives as tourists (India contributed the largest viz. 12 per cent of total Maldivian incoming tourists in 2022), the Maldivian government ‘suspended’ (not dismissed) the three deputy ministers.

At the time when the mayhem about the Ministers’ remarks was in full sway, Muizzu was on a five-day long visit to China. He chose China to be his second port of call (after a short official trip to Dubai for the COP28 during which he also met PM Modi) during which he ‘elevated’ bilateral relations with China to ‘strategic cooperation’, signed 20 agreements, joined China’s Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Strategic Initiative (GSI), and Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI), revived the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Free Trade Agreement (FTA) from the Yameen era, both of which his successor Solih had put on the backburner.

On his return, he needlessly and haughtily declared that Maldives might be a small country but it did not give the right to any country to “bully” it. He added

“Though we have small islands in this ocean, we have a vast exclusive economic zone of 900,000 square kilometers. Maldives is one of the countries with the biggest share of this ocean. This ocean does not belong to a specific country. This ocean belongs to all countries situated in it”.

In addition, Maldives gave permission to the docking of the Chinese research/spy vessel Xiang Yang Hong 03 in Malé. Maldives’ explanation that the visit of the vessel was only to replenish stocks sounds hollow. Similarly, Muizzu’s decision to extend the Maldives’ public health insurance coverage to hospitals in Dubai and Thailand, beyond those in India and Sri Lanka, is calculated to significantly decrease its connect with India. Coming on the heels of the non-extension of the joint hydrographic agreement with India which expires in June 2024 and ultimatum to India to withdraw its “77 troops” (which are basically stationed in Maldives for humanitarian assistance and medical evacuation purposes) by 15 March 2024 signifies a pro-active push to replace India with China, Turkiye and other countries in meeting the strategic and daily requirements of the Maldivian government and people.

Muizzu’s anticipated yet fast-tracked replacement of India with China as the preferred partner, requesting China to send more tourists in a bid to supplant India’s significant presence in this sector, his simultaneous new partnership with distant Türkiye in civil and military trade as well as in importing essential staples like rice and flour from Türkiye, so as ‘not to rely on one country’ have created a new strategic conundrum and evoked considerable concern in India.

The Way Forward

Significant segments of the Maldivian population are in support of strong and close relations with India. Strong statements criticising comments by the three junior ministers against India and PM Modi were made by many common people as well as respected members of the political elite of Maldives like Ibrahim Solih and Mohamed Nasheed, both former Presidents of the country, Abdulla Shahid, former President of the UN General Assembly and Maldivian Foreign Minister, and several more. There have also been demands by several Maldivian leaders that Muizzu should tender an apology to India.

There are reports that the Opposition parties will bring a No-Confidence motion against Muizzu in the Maldivian Parliament. In the recent elections for the Mayor of Male, the position occupied by Muizzu before being elected President, the India-leaning party scored a decisive victory over the candidate put up by Muizzu’s party. The Parliament, elections to which are scheduled for 17 March 2024, is currently controlled by the party which advocates strong and warm relations with India.

India needs to reach out and proactively cultivate ties with the people of Maldives who are favourably disposed towards India. This would of course need to be done without in any way interfering in the internal affairs of the country.

India extends large quantities of developmental support and aid to Maldives. India will need to draw some clear red lines concerning its core strategic and security interests which must be respected by the Maldives if it wishes to continue to receive India’s support. There are other areas also where India can exercise its influence over Maldives. Comments from Maldives suggest that while it is keen to continue to receive largesse from India, it is not agreeable to respect India’s sensitivities.

Maldives would have to be told firmly that this would not be acceptable. All this would need to be communicated to Maldives behind closed doors and not through the media. The above carrot and stick approach would need to be conducted in a sophisticated and nuanced manner. Keeping in view the geo-strategic importance of Maldives, India should not respond in a knee-jerk fashion but adopt a measured, sober and well thought through approach. This is what India has done so far. It needs to continue the same policy with equal finesse.

Conclusion

The challenge posed by Muizzu’s government is stiff but not one that the experienced and mature diplomacy of India will not be able to handle. China continues to expand and deepen its ties with India’s neighbours in an effort to create a ‘string of pearls’ around it to contain it. India, through its Neighbourhood First, Act East and SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in The Region) policies, has been assiduously reaching out to its land and maritime neighbours. These initiatives have yielded positive and encouraging results.

PM Modi’s first visit to Nepal in August 2014 was the first visit by an Indian PM to Nepal in 17 years. Over the last nine years, PM Modi has travelled five times to Nepal, twice for multilateral engagements and thrice on bilateral visits. Similarly, the India–Nepal Joint Commission held in September 2014 was the first meeting of this body in 23 years. PM Modi’s visit to Sri Lanka in March 2015 was the first bilateral visit by an Indian PM to that country in 32 years. Over the last nine years, PM Modi has travelled thrice to Sri Lanka, all visits being bilateral in nature.

India continues to give increasing priority to all its neighbouring countries. It needs to further step up its game and use all the assets at its command of development cooperation, soft power, culture, language, cuisine, music, etc., to significantly deepen and upgrade its ties with its neighbouring countries.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s two-day visit to Iran on 14–15 January 2024 is a crucially timed diplomatic engagement. First, it came in the context of a deteriorating regional security environment owing to the ongoing Hamas–Israel war, the ISIS-claimed terrorist attacks in Iran and the maritime security crisis created by the Houthi targeting of commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden spilling into the Arabian Sea. Second, it brought into renewed focus India’s partnership with Iran on Chabahar port and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Another mega-connectivity project, India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor, was announced on the side-lines of the G20 summit held in New Delhi last year.

Rising Maritime Security Concerns 

Over the last four decades, Iran has successfully leveraged its ideology of revolutionary Islamism to mobilise the so-called ‘axis of resistance’, a region-wide network of state and non-state actors who share Iran’s ideological and geopolitical goal of countering the US regional presence and Israel. These include the Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis and Syria. In recent years, Tehran has used its influence over these actors to pushback against US threats and pressure, showing that insecurity for Iran is equivalent to insecurity for the region.

After Hamas attacks invited severe Israeli military response in Gaza, Iranian-backed forces have sought to engage Israel on multiple fronts underscoring that any hostile action against any of Iran’s allies risks snowballing into a wider regional war. Hezbollah, operating out of southern Lebanon, has fired thousands of rockets into northern Israel, and Israeli warplanes have been hitting Hezbollah military sites to push them away from the border. Houthis have launched more than 100 drone and missile strikes aimed at targeting Israeli-linked commercial shipping in the Red Sea and beyond.

On 24 December 2023, MV Chem Pluto, a Liberia-flagged, Japanese-owned and Netherlands-operated chemical tanker, with 21 Indian crew on board, was struck with a drone in the Indian Ocean 200 nautical miles (370 km) off the coast of Veraval in the Indian state of Gujarat. The vessel was heading from Saudi Arabia to India, and was allegedly affiliated to Israel.1   Indian Coast Guard offshore patrol vessel ICGC Vikram was the first to arrive at the scene and escorted the damaged vessel to Mumbai port.

Subsequently, the Indian Navy deployed Task Force Groups comprising destroyers and frigates, long-range maritime patrol aircraft and RPAs/drones, substantially enhancing maritime surveillance and domain awareness efforts in the central/north Arabian Sea. Together with the Indian Coast Guard, it also enhanced surveillance in the Indian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Notably, India has not joined Operation Prosperity Guardian, a multinational security mission under the aegis of Combined Maritime Forces’ Task Force 153, which was announced on 18 December 2023 by U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin during a visit to Bahrain. In November 2023, India had elevated to full-membership of the CMF, one year after it joined as ‘Associated Partner’.2 Still, India like several prominent members of the CMF, such as France, Italy, Spain, Saudi Arabia and Spain, has preferred to complement the US-led mission, avoiding a direct association in the context of Hamas–Israel war, and United States’ ‘unconditional backing’ of Israel.3

Jaishankar’s visit came two days after the US and Britain launched military strikes on 30 locations in Yemen. During a televised joint press conference with his Iranian counterpart Hossein Abdollahian, Jaishankar offered condolences over terrorist attacks in Kerman. At the same time, the minister stressed India’s “uncompromising position against terrorism in all forms and manifestations”, indirectly alluding to Hamas and possibly Houthis.4 Further, not only did Jaishankar deny Tehran the satisfaction of a public condemnation of Israel’s war in Gaza, he called for addressing the “humanitarian crisis” in Gaza and went on to urge “all parties to avoid escalatory and provocative actions and facilitate movement towards dialogue and diplomacy”.5 The visit underscored that India’s principled position of non-intervention in West Asia’s conflicts should not be confused with passivity, especially when Indian interests are at stake.

A Growing Connectivity Partnership

In the joint press statement, Jaishankar noted that regional connectivity remains a “critical pillar” of India–Iran relations and is expanding into new geographies. Emphasising on India’s commitment to Chabahar project, he called for establishing a “sustainable and long-term roadmap” for India’s continued involvement and the need to monitor its progress under the direct supervision of the political leadership.6

The Union Minister of Ports, Shipping and Waterways Sarbananda Sonowal visited Chabahar in August 2023 to review the progress and hand over six mobile harbour cranes (MHC) to the port operator Indian Ports Global Chabahar Free Trade Zone (IPGCFTZ). Tehran and New Delhi have made rapid progress in finalising a 10-year pact for India’s operations at the port.7 Earlier in 2021, India changed its plans to erect four new rail mounted quay cranes (RMQCs) or ship-to-shore cranes at Chabahar as no crane maker showed interest in India's tender due to US sanctions on Iran. However, India was able to deliver two tranches of MHCs of 100 tonnes capacity each manufactured by Italy’s Italgru S.r.l in January and March that year.8 Due to significant improvements in the cargo-handling capacity of the port, Indian operations at the port were declared commercially viable in 2023, paving the way for serious discussion reaching a long-term contract.9

Over the last two years, INSTC has gained momentum as a ‘sanctions-free’ route for Russia’s trade with India and Iran. Also, Iran’s full membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) at the end of the 23rd summit of the SCO Council of Heads of States virtually hosted by New Delhi has had a positive impact on India and Iran’s joint efforts to encourage Central Asian countries to use Chabahar for their trade with India. The first meeting of the India–Central Asia Joint Working Group (JWG) was held in Mumbai in April last year. Iranian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for Economic Diplomacy Mahdi Safari proposed to hold the next round in Tehran.10

In parallel to the INSTC, India and Iran have found convergence in developing transit and transportation potential of Armenia in the Caucasus. Following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Azerbaijan has been insistent on opening of the so-called Zangezur Corridor to link with its exclave in Nakhichevan via Armenia’s Syunik province bordering Iran. Armenia and Iran have opposed Baku’s irredentist claims over internationally recognised territory of Armenia, and have been courting Indian involvement in the Persian Gulf-Black Sea international transport corridor, as an additional route for India to reach Europe.

Analysts see the new corridor as a tool of ‘soft balancing’ the growing cooperation between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan in the Caucasus.11 The first India–Armenia–Iran trilateral consultations were held in Yerevan in April 2023, where senior officials from the three countries discussed the INSTC, trade, connectivity and culture, and agreed to “continue consultations” in the format.12

To sum up, Jaishankar’s visit is a timely reminder that India’s partnership stands on its own, and Indian interests demand more rather than less engagement with Tehran. As India deepens cooperation with the United States and allies in West Asia, it is determined to maintain its long-standing independent vision of the region.  

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Dharmesh Thakkar, “'Israel-Affiliated' Vessel With 21 Indians Comes Under Suspected Drone Attack Off Porbandar Coast; First Visuals Surface”, The Free Press Journal, 23 December 2023.
• 2. “Raksha Mantri & US Secretary of Defence Discuss Wide Range of Defence & Strategic Issues during Bilateral Talks in New Delhi”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India,10 November 2023.
• 3. “Blinken in Israel: We will always have your back”, Politico, 10 December 2023.
• 4. “Joint Press Statement by EAM, Dr. S. Jaishankar with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 15 January 2024.
• 5. Ibid.
• 6. Ibid.
• 7. “Shri Sarbananda Sonowal Visits Chabahar Port in Iran to Review Work Progress”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, Government of India, 20 August 2022.
• 8. P. Manoi, “Sanctions Affect Tender, Chabahar Port Crane Tender Finds No Takers Due to Sanctions”, The Hindu Businessline,20 June 2023.
• 9. Abhishek Law, “Our Operations in Chabahar are Now Commercially Viable: Sarbananda Sonowal”, The Hindu Businessline, 3 July 2023.
• 10. “Joint Statement of the First Meeting of the India-Central Asia Joint Working Group (JWG) on Chabahar”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 14 April 2023.
• 11. Vali Kaleji, “New Trilateral Cooperation for Iran, Armenia and India in the South Caucasus: From ‘Soft Balancing’ to Regional Transit Balance”, The Jamestown Foundation, 21 June 2023.
• 12. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India-Iran-Armenia Launch Trilateral to Create Corridor to Russia & Europe”, The Economic Times, 22 April 2023.

The Israel–Hamas conflict and its associated challenges have prompted the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to become a focal point of international attention once again. Since November 2023, Yemen’s Houthi rebels have been escalating their attacks on merchant ships and disturbing mercantile peace. This has subsequently prompted major shipping companies to suspend trade through this vital waterway.

The return of piracy and armed attacks in the Western Indian Ocean may come as a surprise to some observers. Despite piracy and armed attacks in the region witnessing a consistent decline since 2013 due to the dedicated efforts of the international community, a latent threat of its return always persisted. Over the past decade, piracy in the Western Indian Ocean was contained but not eradicated.

Maritime Security Architecture

Maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean has mostly been associated with piracy off the coast of Somalia, while new threats and challenges have simultaneously emerged. These include drug trafficking, illicit fishing, weapons smuggling, and grey-zone maritime attacks. This is what we are currently witnessing in the Red Sea as Houthi forces are attacking commercial vessels with aerial drones and rocket-propelled grenade strikes from fast moving boats. This entire situation points towards a new phase of naval warfare driven by cheap aerial drones and missile strikes.1

The Houthis have claimed they are carrying out attacks on shipping to show their solidarity with Palestinians against Israel. Despite the US and UK striking various Houthi-controlled sites in Yemen, they have vowed to retaliate and continue their attacks on shipping. The international community continues to remain over-reliant on a few regional navies including those of the European Union, the US, and India.

It can be argued that although a growing number of regional institutions are responsible for ensuring maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean, no central authority to coordinate the myriad responsibilities in this regard has evolved. While some institutions have a narrow focus on the east African coastline, others have a much broader ambit covering the entire Indian Ocean. In many instances, there is overlap between regional institutions. Many of these are donor-driven and they tend to focus primarily on maritime capacity building and technical coordination.

As Christian Bueger and Jan Stockbruegger have argued, there are only two informal institutions in the region that are responsible for political dialogue and deconfliction at the diplomatic and military level. These are the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) and the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) mechanism, both created in 2009.2 The CGPCS has now changed its mandate and is known as Contact Group on Illicit Maritime Activities (CGIMA) in the Western Indian Ocean.3

With the decline of piracy in the region, these groups have downscaled their activities and even closed some of their working groups. The two other institutions established by the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC)—the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre (RMIFC) in Madagascar and the Regional Centre for Operational Coordination (RCOC) in Seychelles—jointly constitute the executive arm of the maritime security architecture in the Western Indian Ocean. While the RMIFC and RCOC have conducted a few successful operations and work closely with EUNAVFOR-Atalanta and the British naval forces, their progress has certainly been slow.4

India’s Stakes

For India, unimpeded commerce through the Gulf of Aden is vital as annual imports and exports through this region are valued at US$ 50 billion and US$ 60 billion, respectively.  Naturally then, it is apt and appropriate for the Indian Navy to demonstrate its intent to keep the waters safe by displaying its presence and force as a deterrence. India has currently deployed 10 warships to the Red Sea to enhance maritime surveillance and deter piracy and drone strikes by Houthi rebels.5 Additionally, the Indian Navy deployed P-8I maritime patrol aircraft and MQ9B (Sea Guardian) drone to monitor operations.

The daring operation on 5 January 2024 when MV Lila Norfork—sailing under the Liberian flag and en-route from Brazil to Bahrain—was hijacked about 850 km off Africa’s Somalian coast, is instructive. Within minutes, the crew alerted the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations—a Royal Navy channel which acts as the focal point between merchant vessels and military ships—of the imminent threat it was facing. The Indian Navy immediately sprang into action and diverted INS Chennai, a guided missile destroyer, from its anti-piracy patrol to the site of the hijacking in the Gulf of Aden. The Indian Navy’s marine commandos successfully boarded the Lila Norfork and rescued all 21 crew members, including 15 Indians.6

The operation indeed served to demonstrate India’s capability and resolve to provide security in the face of acute threats to maritime security. Its success could be attributed to the Indian Navy’s mission-based deployment pattern that helps India to maintain a sustained presence in these waters. However, it is important to highlight that this incident is only one in a series of attacks in the region since November 2023.

The United States in December 2023 launched Operation Prosperity Guardian, a coalition of more than 20 nations to defend international shipping and deter Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Interestingly, India has not joined this US-led coalition and instead maintains a strategic distance and work independently in loose coordination with other maritime forces or under the United Nations flag.7

The fragile geopolitical situation in the Middle East and the unfurling Red Sea crisis presents India with several challenges. Due to the rerouting of shipping assets, Indian shipping companies are concerned with the transportation costs which has increased manifold. The alternative shipping route via the Cape of Good Hope off South Africa adds around 30 days in travel time. A report by the Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) assesses that Indian exports this financial year could drop by 6.7 per cent, resulting in a loss of US$ 30 billion.8 This is indeed a worrying situation for India which aims to reach US$ 2 trillion in total exports by 2030.

The developing situation however has also presented India with some opportunities. The Indian Navy is considered the most capable navy in this part of the world in terms of providing assurance, safety, surveillance, and monitoring. This behooves India to take a leading role in stabilising the current situation and ensure that mercantile peace prevails. The Indian Navy can be expected to continue to use its significant capabilities to protect the sea lanes of communications, acting as a deterrent force.

India recognises the Western Indian Ocean as an area of its primary interest and strives to be the ‘first responder’ to humanitarian disasters and a ‘preferred security partner’ for maritime capacity building for littorals in the region. Recently with Kenya, India launched a ‘Joint Vision Statement on Maritime Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region’. With Tanzania, India recently elevated its bilateral relations to the level of strategic partnership and held its maiden joint EEZ surveillance exercise in July 2023. India has also posted defence attaches in both Kenya and Tanzania. These initiatives attest to New Delhi’s seriousness in playing a proactive role in the evolving maritime security architecture in the Western Indian Ocean region.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Abhijit Singh, “Terrorism, Militancy and Pirates: Gulf of Aden Hijacking Underlines Naval Challenges”, The Indian Express, 10 January 2024.
• 2. Christian Bueger and Jan Stockbruegger, “Maritime Security and the Western Indian Ocean’s Militarisation Dilemma”, African Security Review, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2022.
• 3. “UN’s Contact Group on Somali Piracy Changes Its Mandate”, International Union of Marine Insurance, 21 February 2022.
• 4. Brian Gicheru, “Re-Imagining Africa’s Agency in Global Maritime Security”, The Maritime Executive, 10 December 2023.
• 5. Rajat Pandit, “Over 10 Warships Sent to Deter Pirates of the Arabian Sea”, The Times of India, 9 January 2024.
• 6. “Indian Navy’s Swift Response to the Hijacking Attempt of MV Lila Norfolk in the North Arabian Sea”, Indian Navy, 6 January 2024.
• 7. Teesta Prakash, “Red Sea Attacks: Why India is Strategically Silent on Iran Role”, The Times of India, 13 January 2024.
• 8. Shruti Srivastava, “India’s Exports May Take a $30 Billion Hit on Red Sea Threats”, The Economic Times, 8 January 2024.