Geo-political, geo-economic as well as ecological factors will increasingly impact the implementation of new BRI projects in ASEAN region.
Recent high-level diplomatic visits between China and three ASEAN countries—Indonesia, Vietnam and Cambodia—and discussions on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects at these meetings indicate that the BRI will continue to play an important role towards regional infrastructure development. The ASEAN region remains a source of minerals critical to China’s sustained economic growth. Geo-political and geo-economic factors are propelling Beijing to renew its investment commitments in the ASEAN region and ensure the long-term viability of the BRI.
On 1 April 2024, Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted Indonesian President-elect Prabowo Subianto. On 8 April, he welcomed Vietnamese National Assembly Chairman Vuong Dinh Hue in Beijing. During these two meetings, discussions were held on the possibility of integration of the BRI into existing initiatives of the respective countries.1 President Xi praised the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway project as one of the most successful projects under the BRI. On 23 April, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Cambodia for the seventh meeting of the China–Cambodia Intergovernmental Coordination Committee.2 Both sides agreed to accelerate the alignment of the BRI with the ‘Pentagon Strategy' and the ‘Fish and Rice Corridor’.
Indonesia, Vietnam and Cambodia have seen the most high-level engagement and discussion on the BRI compared to the other ASEAN countries. These countries have been responding positively to the BRI for a decade and have a strong demand for infrastructure development, especially after the pandemic. These countries have been largely positive about the impact of BRI projects. Officials in these countries had previously welcomed and praised the BRI for its great potential to deliver public goods and increase local revenues, and expressed their desire to engage with the Belt and Road Forum.3 Concerns though remain about the debt trap, implementation delays, cost overruns, worker safety issues, unsustainable lending and environmental degradation for both the BRI and new development initiatives such as the Global Development Initiative (GDI).4
Post COVID-19 BRI Revival
In 2020, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that 20 per cent of BRI projects were ‘severely affected’ by COVID-19.5 In 2021, the figures showed an 18 per cent decrease in the disbursements for projects compared to 2020. While the pandemic was one reason for the decrease in investment, factors such as political instability, local communication gaps, the energy transition and delays were also the reasons for a slowdown in the project implementation. Despite that, the implementation rate of BRI projects in ASEAN was 35 per cent in 2023, which is higher than that of Japan (19 per cent) and Korea's (18 per cent) development projects in the region.6 In 2020, ASEAN countries received US$ 16.06327 billion from China which accounted for 71.27 per cent of the total BRI investments. About 85 per cent of these investments were for ongoing BRI projects signed between 2015 and 2023.7
In 2023, Indonesia emerged as the largest recipient of BRI investment, receiving around US$ 7.3 billion, a 14 per cent increase for its infrastructure projects.8 Two Indonesian projects—the Java 7 Power Station and the Bangko Tengah Sumsel-8 coal-fired power station—said to have been delayed due to COVID-19 restrictions, have now been successfully completed. The Jakarta–Bandung high-speed railway, hailed as one of the BRI's most successful projects, also faced several challenges. These included poor implementation, construction delays, rising material prices and high land acquisition costs. The cost overrun for this project was around US$ 1.2 billion and it only started commercial operation in October 2023.9
Several projects, including Phnom Pehn Airport in Cambodia and the Indonesian park under ‘Two Countries, Twin Parks’, the BRI's flagship project to establish industrial parks and facilitate development in Indonesia and China,10 are expected to be operational by 2024.11 The three-airport high-speed railway project in Thailand, the Mandalay-Kyaukphyu railway project in Myanmar and the Vinh Tan 3 coal-fired power plant in Vietnam are likely to be completed soon. Some projects such as the Nam Ou Hydropower Project Phase II in Laos and the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone Deep-Sea Port Project in Myanmar have been relabelled as BRI key projects, although the original agreement was signed before the BRI.12 The relabelling, restructuring and integration of projects has become part of Beijing’s new strategy as regards regional infrastructure development assistance.
There are also projects which have become a cause of concern for some ASEAN countries while some have been suspended. The announcement of a US$ 1.7 billion waterway project, the Funan Techo Canal in Cambodia in 2023, has raised serious ecological, economic and security concerns in Vietnam. The Philippines government has cancelled the construction of US$ 5 billion worth of BRI projects, including the Panay-Guimaras-Negros Inter-Island Bridge, the Mindanao Railway and the South Long-Haul Railway (Bicol Line), without giving clear reasons.
Negotiations on these began in January 2024 but were unsuccessful as the government stated that China had not disbursed the requested funds. Analysts have cited the change of government in the Philippines and tensions in the South China Sea as the main reasons for this move. The evolving geo-political, geo-economic as well as ecological factors will increasingly impact the implementation of new BRI projects. Loan conditions, concerns over sovereignty, debt repayment, downsizing of projects, deforestation, displacement of communities, potential destruction of historical sites and overdependence serve as critical discussion points for the new BRI projects.13
At the 2021 G7 summit, US President Joe Biden announced the Build Back Better (B3W) initiative as a competitor to the BRI, which, unlike China, offers unconditional aid.14 The Global Gateway (GG) project announced by the European Union in the same year promised investments of 300 billion euros between 2021 and 2027 in the areas of digitalisation, climate and energy, transport, health, education and research in the partner countries, similar to the BRI.15
With initiatives such as Global Gateway and Build Back Better, ASEAN countries are in a unique position to reap the benefits of these initiatives and offset risks. Beijing therefore is making renewed efforts to demonstrate the benefits of its new BRI strategy. Therefore, high-level diplomatic visits are an attempt to reaffirm its infrastructure and development commitment to the region by integrating ongoing and new projects under the BRI. On 18 October 2023, the Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation published a list of 32 practical deliverables out of which 12 were for ASEAN countries.16 Beijing also intends to engage ASEAN in high-level thematic forums, and international conferences to be held this year.17
It is evident that the Belt and Road Forum will be used to institutionalise and promote the BRI on a larger scale. Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang, head of the Belt and Road Leadership Group and member of the Politburo Standing Committee, said that Beijing is working to fully implement the Science, Technology and Innovation Cooperation Action Plan to accelerate the innovative Silk Road. He also emphasised the deepening of scientific and technological innovation with BRI countries.18 On 25 April 2024, he spoke at the opening ceremony of the Zhongguancun Forum in Beijing, mentioning the acceleration of the construction of world-class science and technology parks with BRI countries.19 Beijing is learning from its mistakes and shifting the focus from mega projects to smaller projects. However, the transition to the Global Development Initiative (GDI) could slow down efforts to revitalise the BRI in the region.
GDI vs BRI
The Global Development Initiative was proposed at the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 2021. The announcement of the GDI at the UNGA emphasises Beijing’s attempt to make it a multilateral initiative, in contrast to its BRI. Of the 130 countries, seven ASEAN countries, including Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, have joined the Group of Friends of the GDI.20
Despite the focus on newer forms of cooperation, knowledge transfer, capacity building, development assistance and sustainable development, ASEAN countries, especially Indonesia, fear that the GDI could end up favouring China's interests and push the countries into the debt trap. Beijing's GDI offers no guarantee that the social and environmental problems associated with the Belt and Road projects will not recur under the GDI.21 With the changing geo-political situation in the region, Beijing’s GDI came at a time when there was a major power competition with the US in the Indo-Pacific region and when the US was introducing counter-initiatives such as Build Back Better and Global Gateway with other countries.
While the motive, nature, scope and incentives are different for both initiatives and the GDI cannot replace the BRI in the near future, analysts note that it has definitely slowed down the implementation of the BRI projects.22 The China International Development Cooperation Agency, which was established with the aim of promoting the BRI, is now working on GDI-related projects with a focus on poverty reduction, climate action and the digital economy. These issues are of growing importance to the ASEAN region, and countries have been working to address the problems caused by climate change and focus on the transition to a digital economy.
The areas of cooperation under the GDI and the BRI are different, with the BRI focusing on infrastructure financing and development, while the GDI is focused on achieving sustainable development goals through support and assistance to various countries. While the GDI is gaining momentum, Beijing is ensuring that the BRI is driven forward through high-level diplomatic engagement and is actively rebranding the initiative to incentivise ASEAN countries.
Assessment
An assessment of the BRI investment pattern in ASEAN countries between 2014 and 2023 shows a significant change in energy-related engagements. In the first half of 2023, the energy-related engagements were the greenest since the BRI’s inception in 2014.23 China currently has 24 megaproject commitments in ASEAN countries with a completion rate of 33 per cent.24 Projects worth US$ 35 billion are on track, and are expected to be completed soon. Despite China's pledge to invest more than US$ 50 billion in infrastructure, it has struggled to fully deliver on its commitments. While Japan is also an important player, it still lags behind China in terms of infrastructure investment. Even with downsizing and partially completed projects, China remains the top investor in ASEAN countries, providing more than any other international partners involved in the region.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Indo-US Defence Industrial Cooperation: Reaching for the Next Level or a Bridge Too Far?
Cherian Samuel
May 17, 2024
Successful implementation of the Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement (RDPA) will require a deep understanding of the nuances and requirements of both the US and Indian defence procurement systems.
With sundry agreements signed between India and the United States (US) in the recent past, to facilitate defence cooperation, the next ones on the anvil are the Security of Supply Arrangement (SOSA) agreement and the Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement (RDPA). Described by a Korean analyst as a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in defence, getting RDPA through might be a challenge for the two countries.
Defence agreements serve a number of purposes, going beyond the specifics, and in the case of India and US, they have served as milestones, reflecting a deepening strategic partnership aimed at addressing common security challenges and advancing mutual interests. In fact, the very first of the agreements signed over the years, the Indo-US Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Technology Transfer, came about when negotiations with the Northrop company for the purchase of the F-5 G Tigershark fighter jet failed in 1981, following the refusal of the company to part with sensitive information on the operational effectiveness of the engine.1 This agreement paved the way for the supply of the General Electric F404 engine for the Light Combat Aircraft. Though the next agreement, the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), facilitating the sharing of military information and classified technologies, was signed in 2002, it was after much opposition from India, since it argued that the Indo-US MoU on Technology Transfer already covered most of the provisions of the GSOMIA.
A Defence Framework was signed in 2005 but US pressure to sign the so-called foundational agreements that would provide the “legal sinews for operational defence co-operation”, was resisted for various reasons. Getting the agreements through has often proved to be a long and laborious exercise, often due to misgivings about their actual utility and apprehensions of unintended consequences. In terms of utility, it was felt that the US would benefit more from these agreements, given the size of its military and its global footprint. To allay these misgivings, many of the recent boilerplate agreements have India-specific clauses and exemptions.2 These were finally signed, though, not all at once, after the renewal of the Defence Framework Agreement in 2015, with the US declaring India a Major Defence Partner in 2016. The first of these was the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) for mutual logistics support signed in 2016,3 followed by the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) for secure communications interoperability in 2018,4 the Industrial Security Annex (ISA) to the GSOMIA in 2019, and the Basic Exchange Cooperation Agreement (BECA) facilitating the sharing of geospatial information between the two countries in October 2020. Initial analyses following these agreements have extolled their benefits, particularly in the areas of “interoperability, making arms transfers easier and paving the way for improved cooperation on innovation and production”.5 However, in general, it is difficult to make a tangible assessment of their benefits.
Next on the anvil are the Security of Supply Arrangement (SOSA) agreement and the Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement (RDPA). Whilst the earlier agreements primarily facilitated interoperability, these agreements streamline defence commerce between the two countries, making it easier for private companies in the two countries to bid for each other’s defence contracts.
The signing of SOSA and RDPA was initially proposed in June 2023 by the United States Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin, during his visit to India. This proposal was part of a new roadmap aimed at strengthening defence industrial cooperation between the United States and India.6 This was subsequently reiterated in the Joint Statement following Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Washington in the same month. 7 Subsequently, the US government issued notice in the Federal Register in October 2023 and sought feedback from the defence industry community about their experience in participation in “public defence procurement conducted by or on behalf of the Indian Ministry of Defence”.8 The Indian Ministry of Defence is also soliciting similar feedback.9
For the foreign companies to be able to sell to the United States, their respective governments should have concluded an RDPA, as required under Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Pt. 225.10 The US has signed these agreements with 28 countries, many of them, close allies and partners, though with “varying scope, enforce ability, and reciprocity”.11 The US is currently going through a similar process with South Korea, with the Department of Defense (DoD) issuing notice on 23 February 2024.12 According to one account, discussions on the RDPA have been going on with South Korea since the mid-1980s, however, the Koreans are reluctant to sign as they fear that their defence industrial base would be adversely impacted by the onslaught of American equipment given that the RDPA calls for full reciprocal access to the defence procurement market.13 However, of late, there is a perception that the RDPA would be beneficial for joint development and production of advanced defence technologies and platforms. The example given is of Japan which, subsequent to the signing of an RDPA, has seen an uptick in collaboration between US and Japanese companies. Another benefit is that the RDPA provides an exemption to the Buy American Act which has made it mandatory for goods bought with federal funds to contain 75 per cent domestic content by 2029.14 Offers of evaluation of qualifying country end products are also carried out without applying the price differentials otherwise required by the Buy American statute and the Balance of Payments Program.15
Setting the positives aside, negotiating an RDPA will be a long and arduous process, a fact highlighted even by American officials.16 Its description as an “FTA for defence” only serves to underscore this point. Differences in procurement procedures in the respective countries would make the stated goals of ensuring transparency, fairness and reciprocity in defence procurements difficult to achieve in practice. Among the many issues that would come within the scope of the negotiations are the scope and coverage of the RDPA with regard to R&D and seeking exemptions from certain US procurement rules.
Even after the RDPA is signed, Indian contractors and sub-contractors will have to deal with the complex rules and regulations within the US defence procurement system. For instance, these regulations include several sections that outline the obligations of DoD contractors regarding the storage, transmission and processing of "controlled information", which refers to sensitive information with military applications. A significant portion of the DFARS rules on cybersecurity deals with the disclosure of data breaches, requiring contractors to report the type of incident and the malicious programs or tactics used. This is because defence contractors are prime targets for cyber criminals.17
These requirements cover a wide range of areas, such as limiting access to data, implementing audit controls, maintaining baseline configurations and configuration management of software and hardware, enforcing robust identity and access management (IAM), ensuring physical security of the workplace, and maintaining the integrity of personnel.
Meeting the DFARS requirements necessitates expertise in technical and security administration areas. Non-compliance can result in financial penalties and permanent disbarment. Additionally, contractors must now be CMMC (Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification) certified, with renewals required every three years. The CMMC is the standard the DoD uses to verify that companies meet cybersecurity requirements before being awarded contracts. The DFARS requirements pose significant challenges for companies, especially small and medium-sized contractors.18 Even American Industry associations have highlighted the lack of clarity around DFARS and CMMC, as well as the additional expenses that contractors must incur to bring their organisations up to the required specifications.19
While the potential benefits of the RDPA are substantial, including improved interoperability, technological advancements and economic growth, the path to its realisation is not without obstacles. Differences in procurement procedures, compliance with complex US regulations such as DFARS and CMMC, and concerns over potential impact on domestic defence industries will all need to be carefully addressed during the negotiation process. Successful implementation of the RDPA will require a deep understanding of the nuances and requirements of both the US and Indian defence procurement systems. Effective collaboration between the defence industries of the two nations will depend on their ability to navigate the regulatory landscape. This, in turn, would be critical to realising the full potential of these agreements.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
3. LEMOA facilitates refuelling and replenishment of military vessels of both sides along with a payment mechanism. This is especially useful during joint exercises and naval outreach and foreign port visits.
4. The COMCASA has facilitated purchase of standalone US military communications equipment as well as equipment that use encrypted communications and avionics such as drones. India-specific alterations included a validity of 10 years as well as a clause that any data obtained from Indian platforms cannot be shared with third parties without India’s consent.
Deterrence, Escalation Management and the Iran–Israel Conflict
Deepika Saraswat
May 20, 2024
Iran and Israel have shown preference for a carefully controlled escalation while avoiding a conflict spiral.
On 13 April 2024, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launched an aerial attack on Israel involving over 300 drones, cruise and ballistic missiles. Israel and its Western allies including the United States, the United Kingdom, France and neighbouring Jordan were able to organise a coordinated defence using fighter jets, warships, anti-missile and air defence systems intercepting most of the projectiles at the cost of more than US$ 1 billion. At least nine ballistic missiles evaded Israeli defences causing minor damages to Nevatim Air Base in Southern Israel, where Israel’s F-35 fighter jets are based.1
Iran’s Supreme National Security Council issued a statement which noted that Iran had carried out ‘minimum necessary punitive action’ within the framework of the ‘legitimate right of self-defence’ as outlined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. On 1 April 2024, Israeli air strikes had destroyed Iran’s consulate in Damascus killing seven IRGC officers including Quds Force senior-most commander for Syria and Lebanon, Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi. Since 7 October 2023 Hamas attacks, Israel has intensified its grey-zone attacks targeting the IRGC commanders in Syria and Lebanon with the objective of raising costs for the IRGC for its alleged involvement in targeting Israel. As Maj Gen Yaacov Amidror (Retd) observed, by targeting Iran’s consulate, Israel sent a strong signal to Iran that its continued actions are bringing Israel closer to launching a direct attack on it.2
Iran’s Retaliatory Strikes
The 13 April Iranian strikes against Israel were the first state-on-state attack and therefore entailed a new level of escalation and a significant change in Iran’s deterrence posture. Major General Hossein Salami, the Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC, noted that Iran’s retaliatory strikes have established a new equation with Israel and that if Israel attacked Iranian interests and citizens anywhere, the IRGC will retaliate from Iran. Salami, who served as deputy commander of IRGC until 2019 when he was appointed the Commander-in-Chief, is credited with revision of Iran's defensive doctrine along the lines of the “strategy of threat against threat” at a time when Iran faced renewed hostility from the United States and Israel under the former US President Donald Trump, who unilaterally withdrew from the Iran nuclear agreement.
The IRGC made first operational use of mid-range missiles in a counter-attack in June 2017 two weeks after ISIS claimed terrorist attacks in Tehran. It launched five to six Zolfaghars, solid-fuelled missiles with a range of some 700 kms from Kermanshah base at ISIS targets in the Deir el-Zour region of eastern Syria. In January 2020, Iran launched short-range missiles at Ayn al Asad and Erbil Air Bases housing US troops in Iraq following the assassination of Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani in a US drone attack in Baghdad. In February 2022, after an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) raid on a drone manufacturing facility in western Iran, the IRGC launched missiles on what it described as an Israeli ‘spy centre’ near the US consulate in Erbil.
On 16 January 2024, the IRGC carried out coordinated missile strikes by launching 24 Kheibar Shekan precision-guided ballistic missile with a range of 1,450 kms from different locations inside Iran to hit targets in Syria and Iraq. According to Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the commander of the IRGC Aerospace Forces,
four Khyber rockets were launched from southern Khuzestan at ISIS’s headquarters in Idlib, and an additional four from Kermanshah, along with seven rockets from East Azerbaijan, targeting the Zionist headquarters in Erbil.34
The missiles were launched from the south of the country to test if they could reach the intended range of 1,300 kms. Israeli media noted that by demonstrating the precision-strike capabilities and range of its new ballistic missiles, Iran was sending a message to Israel.5 On 13 April, in the multi-layered Iranian strike on Israel, Kheibar Shekan were the newest and the most advanced missile used together with Shahed-136 Kamikaze drones and Paveh cruise missile which have a range of 1,650 kms.
Iran’s aim was to demonstrate its credible capabilities as well as resolve or risk acceptance in engaging in escalation against a conventionally superior and a nuclear-armed adversary. On the occasion of Iran Army Day on 21 April, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei stressed that the number of missiles launched or hitting their targets, which has been a focus of the enemy, is secondary.6 The primary issue was demonstrating the emergence of the willpower of the Iranian people and the Armed Forces on the global stage, and this is what has upset the other side.
IRGC Aerospace Forces Commander Hajizadeh noted in an interview that while Israel had mobilised all its military resources to counter Iran's attacks, Iran had used only minimal capability that is only 20 per cent of what it had prepared to take action against Israel.7 The fact that Iran did not use its more advanced weapons such as Sajjil 2 missile or Fattah hypersonic missiles also underscore Iran’s deterrence strategy designed for different levels of conflict. At the current stage, Iranian attacks were not designed to cause damage, but intended to be a demonstrative measure.
As part of escalation management and to assuage Iran’s neighbouring countries’ concerns about its impending retaliation, Foreign Minister Hossein Abdollahian embarked on a regional tour starting with Oman, which often plays the role of a crucial diplomatic intermediary between Tehran and Washington in times of crisis. At Muscat, Abdollahian stated that in any counter-attacks Iran’s “sole goal in legitimate defence is to punish the Israeli regime” and it was not seeking to expand the conflict in the region. Muscat reportedly relayed Iran’s message to the US that Iranian attacks will be non-lethal and calibrated to target an Israeli military facility.8 Iran also notified its Arab neighbours of its retaliatory strikes on Israel 72 hours in advance, which gave ample time for Israel and its Western allies and regional partners to activate air defences for thwarting impending Iranian strikes.
Israeli Preference for Grey-Zone Attacks
Israeli military claimed that their multi-layered air defence system had successfully intercepted 99 per cent of Iranian drones and missiles. Israel’s European and American allies hailed their ‘defensive victory’, as they pressed Israel for de-escalation. Despite calls for restraint from close allies, Israel’s war cabinet led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu favoured retaliation. Subsequently, amid the uncertainty about how Israel will retaliate, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in his address at Iran’s annual army parade, warned that the “tiniest attack” by Israel would bring a “massive and harsh” response from Iran.9 Israeli counterstrike was therefore aimed at demonstrating Israeli resolve and restore deterrence in the face of Iranian threats.
Israeli media ratcheted up the threat of a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, leading Iran to temporarily close its nuclear facilities and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Rafael Grossi urging ‘extreme restraint’ from Israel. On 19 April, Iranian officials insisted that there had been “no air attack from outside borders”, and that three quadcopters were shot down by air defence in Isfahan.10 US officials claimed that Israeli Air Force fired three missiles from outside Iran that hit an air base in Isfahan housing Iran’s fleet of American-made F-14 Tomcats, and an air defence radar site defending Iran’s largest nuclear facility in Natanz.11
While Israel did not publicly take responsibility, the strikes exposed Iran’s vulnerabilities in order to influence Iranian cost-benefit calculus in any further escalation. By continuing with grey-zone tactic of ambiguity about the scale of attacks in Isfahan and plausible deniability about the source of attack, Israel handed Iran an off-ramp for de-escalation. Israel’s decision to not attack Iran’s nuclear facilities may have been shaped by pressure from its Western allies and Arab partners and also the messaging from Iran.
Israel attacking Iranian nuclear facilities would have led to spiral of escalation drawing a massive Iranian response against US interests in the region. On 18 April, a senior IRGC commander in charge of security of nuclear facilities, stated that if
Israel uses the threat of attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities as a tool to put pressure on Iran, it is possible and conceivable to revise Iran’s nuclear doctrine and policies and deviate from the previous declared considerations.12
Maj Gen Amidror (Retd), former National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Netanyahu, describes Iran's latent capacity to produce nuclear weapons as a key component of Iran's 'smart' strategy for war with Israel. He argues that Iran’s military nuclear capability will serve as an umbrella to ensure that hostile actions against Iran will not be possible, and that Tehran will be able to continue and even expand its aggressive activities throughout the region, mainly against Israel, but also against the United States.13
What the recent exchange of fire has demonstrated is that neither Iran nor Israel can claim escalation dominance that is having decidedly superior capabilities over the other to deter it from engaging in further escalation. However, the controlled or limited escalation by both countries suggest that they are determined to maintain a ‘balance of resolves’, where none is willing to accept the other’s deterrent red lines. Both sides have shown preference for a carefully controlled escalation while avoiding a conflict spiral.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Armenia–France ties are now shaping regional geopolitics in the Caucasus, and their bilateral relationship has become more meaningful after the Nagorno-Karabakh war.
Introduction
The Russia–Ukraine and the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict have impacted the Eurasian regional security framework. These conflicts have shaped and bolstered the contours of various relationships, including the Armenia–France relationship. France is Armenia's most critical European partner. Armenia’s complementarist approach, which is correlated to the recent foreign policy initiatives adopted regarding France, has further enhanced their relationship.
Paris and Yerevan’s high-level diplomatic dialogue has its roots in their centuries-long relationship based on shared values and cultural appreciation.1 Furthermore, after Russia, since 2016, France has ranked as the country with the second-largest investments in Armenia, totalling €229 million. Its investments are primarily in agri-food, water and banking.2 At the same time, as a member of Le Francophonie, Armenia contributes to promoting the French language and political, economic, educational and cultural cooperation with its European partner.3 More importantly, while being the first European nation to recognise the Armenian Genocide,4 on 14 October 2016, France took the additional step of criminalising the denial of the Armenian genocide.5
With the evolving geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus, Armenians could look towards the French as part of their continuous quest to diversify foreign relations and reduce Russia's influence. On the other hand, the French look towards Armenia as a viable partner, with which they already share old ties that would help further stamp their regional influence.
Current Dynamics
There has been an increased focus on strengthening cooperation between the two actors, reiterating the inviolability of Armenian sovereignty. French Prime Minister Gabriel Attal recently demanded the withdrawal of Azerbaijani troops from the occupied areas in Armenia, highlighting French support for Armenia.6 Apart from being active in its efforts to support Armenia in the conflict with Azerbaijan, the French remain focused on building its relationship with the Armenian defence sector.
Defence (including arms sales to Armenia) has long served as the primary sector of cooperation between Yerevan and Paris. The Nagorno-Karabakh war deepened their ties as France began selling air defence systems to bolster Armenia’s response. The two countries have also signed a contract on 23 October 2023 for three Ground Masters radars, including binoculars and sensors.7 Moreover, regular meetings between Ministers of Defence and an agreement to deploy a French defence consultant to train Armenian soldiers8 are now in place as part of the contract signed in October 2023. Armenia’s growing cooperation with France in this sector can be perceived as part of its undertaking to diversify and deepen its defence partnerships globally, mainly in the light of expanding Azerbaijani aggression.
France has adopted a proactive role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, with its involvement ranging from peace-making via the Minsk Group in the first War in Nagorno Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the 1990s to the recognition of the Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh in the Armenian) republic’s independence in 2020 after the start of the Second War.9 Additionally, it provided €15 million in emergency aid to Armenia to look after the refugees of Nagorno-Karabakh10 while condemning the Azerbaijani blockade in Lachin, which restricted the supply of goods and movement of people.11
Russia’s dismissive attitude towards Armenia has festered disappointment and resentment during the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. Resultantly, the latter has courted European countries like France with growing enthusiasm. The European Union peace initiatives have been received favourably by Armenians, who have sought greater international support and cooperation regarding Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
France is also home to the largest Armenian diaspora in the European Union and the third largest globally,12 with around 500,000. French governments therefore do recognise the significance of this diaspora electorally. Armenian causes find support across ideological fault lines in France. In 2017, four French Armenians—Daniele Cazarian, Nadia Essayan, Guillaume Kasbarian, and Jacques Marilossian—won election to the French parliament, highlighting their growing influence in the national political arena.
Recently, the entry ban on Mourad Papazian, the leader of the Dashnaktsutyun party (pan-Armenian party) based in France, was revoked. The ban was initially imposed on Papazian for protesting against the Armenian leadership's visit to France in June 2021.13 This tactical change in the Armenian leadership towards its external critics highlights the importance of the French-Armenian diaspora in promoting Armenian leadership ideas in France.
Besides this, the diaspora plays a prominent role in non-governmental organisations (NGOs), including the Armenian General Benevolent Union, based in France in five cities (Lyon, Marseille, Paris, Valence and Vienne). The organisation aims to build a bridge between Armenians and the diaspora and promote the prosperity and well-being of all Armenians.14
Russia’s and Azerbaijan's Reactions
Russia, one of the regional powers in the Caucasus, has reacted to rising Armenian-French relations. It has stated that it would reconsider its relationship with Armenia if it continues to tilt towards the West.15 Russia's reactions to Armenia’s relationship with France have not been as critical as its focus remains on France's involvement in Ukraine. But in the long term, there could be a more sharper response from Russia.
Azerbaijan has viewed the expanding French-Armenian ties negatively, criticising the recent developments in defence cooperation between the two countries. Accusing France of stoking a new war in the region by arming Armenia, the Azerbaijani government has forewarned that France would be culpable should another conflict arise.16 The Azerbaijanis have also denounced what they perceive as the absence of credible French involvement in the peace process despite its co-chairmanship of the Minsk Group.17
Azerbaijani officials have publicly expressed these criticisms despite Azerbaijan’s close economic cooperation with European countries such as France and membership of the European Union’s Eastern Partnership initiative. The Azerbaijanis’ hostile attitude must be understood through its ever-present resistance to France establishing a regional presence. This is mainly due to the French statements in support of the Armenian stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. France’s stance became more visible after the French statements on the Lachin blockade and the recognition of Artsakh as an independent Republic.
Conclusion
France and Russia’s opposing positions on Ukraine, primarily after President Emanuel Macron announced deploying troops in Ukrainian territory, have worsened ties between the two countries. Therefore, French involvement in Armenia would be viewed with even more suspicion and disdain. Armenia, like Ukraine, could become a stage for a new ‘Great Game’ in the long term between the two powers.
Due to Russian preoccupation in Ukraine, the Azerbaijanis have gained the advantage and held the upper hand over Armenia in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. France's increasing participation in the region could hinder that moving forward, creating a level playing field between the two conflicting nations.
Russia considered Armenia as a more significant ally in the post-Soviet space and would not want to entertain any involvement from Europe, particularly France. Armenia already has a complex relationship with the Russian-dominated security organisation, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, leading to a conflict of interest with Russia. Any attempts to move towards the European sphere or further develop any relationship could cause further friction between the two nations.
Despite the lack of probability of a possible Armenian defection from the Russian sphere of influence, Armenia would continue attempting to diversify its strategic partners and uphold its territorial sovereignty against adversarial powers.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Israel’s successful interception of Iranian missiles and drones has restored its image as a superior military power regionally, an image which was dented by the October 2023 Hamas attacks.
The situation in West Asia continues to deteriorate with the Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus that killed seven Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officials on 1 April 2024 and the subsequent retaliatory Iranian attack on Israel on 13 April with more than 300 drones and missiles fired towards Israel. This is the first direct Iranian attack on Israel and the biggest escalation in the region since the beginning of the Israel–Hamas War in October 2023. Iran has also seized an Israel-linked ship in the Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz on 13 April.
Israel has been successful in intercepting most of the drones and missiles before they entered its airspace. Israeli interceptions shows its military defensive capability and preparedness in the face of Iranian attack. While the 7 October Hamas attack exposed Israeli complacency and raised doubts about its claims of technological superiority and its application in national security, the successful interception of Iranian missiles and drones has effectively restored Israel's image as a superior military power. The US, UK and Jordan also intercepted several drones and missiles.
The Iranian Argument
In a statement before the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on 13 April, Iran stated that it has evoked Article 51 of the UN Charter for self-defence against the defiance of Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter by Israel on account of its military aggression against its diplomatic premises in Syria.1 Named as ‘Operation Truthful Promise’, the Iranian attack on Israel has also sent a larger message to the US, UK and other countries supporting Israel. The attack is seen as Iranian defiance of the Israeli military operations in Gaza and the Western support for Israel.
Iran has stated that the 13 April attack was a retaliation against the Israeli attack on its consulate in Syria and there will be no more attacks on Israel as it “deemed the matter concluded.”2 It has also forewarned that if Israel or the US attacks Iran, then they will face a strong response from Iran.3 Iran has also stated that US military bases in the region will be in danger if it joined any Israeli attack against Iran.4
The Iranian strategy of launching a retaliatory attack on Israel and then unilaterally declaring that it has “deemed the matter concluded” reflects growing Iranian confidence in dealing with Israel. Such an Iranian exhibition of military prowess and diplomatic assertiveness would further soar up tension between the two. Iran’s retaliatory attack and this statement would make Israel seriously think and ponder over its next course of action.
Israel Weighs its Options
Israeli response after the first direct Iranian attack would, to a large extent, shape the course of the conflict. The Israeli war cabinet met on 15 April and decided to take action on Iran as the attack of this scale and nature cannot “pass without a reaction”.5 As a result of the pressure from its allies, there are indications that Israel will not engage in a large scale military response against Iran to avoid escalation in the region. However, an explosion was reported in Isfahan in central Iran in the early hours of 19 April. Three UAVs were intercepted by the Iranian Air Force. Though it is believed to be a ‘limited attack’ by Israel, it has not officially claimed the attack and the Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian has downplayed the attack by stating that “It has not been proved to us that there is a connection between these and Israel.”6 Israeli ‘limited attack’ is a message to Iran though that it has the capability and intent to penetrate deep inside Iran’s sensitive areas.
Whether the Benjamin Netanyahu government adopts a restrained or an aggressive approach towards Iran , the Israel–Iran rivalry has already taken a new and decisive turn. The chances of scaling down of the actions and approaches of Israel and Iran look slim. The possibility of an Israel–Iran direct face-off has been brewing since the beginning of the Israel–Hamas War in October 2023. Iran has backed Hamas and hosted its leaders in Tehran and, thus, Israel has alleged Iran of being indirectly fighting a war against it. Since the beginning of the War, Israel has faced attacks from Hezbollah from across the Lebanese border as well. Iran’s presence in Israel’s neighbourhood is a major national security challenge for Israel.
Regional Impact
Hamas has described the Iranian attack on Israel as “legitimate and deserved”.7 However, the recent escalation further limits the potential for negotiations and severely undermines any progress made in the talks between Israel and Hamas over the release of Israeli hostages and cessation of the war. Regional powers such as Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE have expressed concerns and called for restraint from both Israel and Iran.
However, if there is an escalation between Israel and Iran, their support for peace efforts may be adversely affected. Additionally, the situation in various regional flashpoints may deteriorate, leading to significant collateral damage in the event of a military escalation between Israel and Iran. Israeli airstrikes in Syria could escalate, and Hezbollah's involvement in the Israel–Hamas conflict, which has been limited thus far, may increase. The already tense situation in the Red Sea, with Houthi attacks on ships and the presence of foreign navies, would worsen in the event of an escalation.
The situation remains tense amid the calls for restraint and de-escalation from regional and global leaders. As Israel weighs its options against Iran, a heightened fear pervades the entire region. Regional powers are urging de-escalation between Israel and Iran, recognising that a direct confrontation between these two major military forces would have devastating consequences for the region's security and stability.
Israel finds itself in a dilemma, torn between demonstrating its deterrence and maintaining strategic patience. With Iran's expanding influence in the region and its political assertiveness posing significant challenges, any further significant Israeli strike on Iran in the near future will have severe repercussions for the region.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Russia–Ukraine war has not only exacerbated already broken relations between the US and Russia but has emerged as a major hindrance to the conduct of the arms control talks.
On 18 March 2024, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) convened a meeting on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation. Speaking at the meeting, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the United States (US) Representative to the UN expressed her country’s willingness to engage with Russia and China on the issue of bilateral arms control discussion without any preconditions.1
However, Moscow reiterated its position that it will debate arms control with the US as part of a broader debate rather than divorced from the overall security situation in the region.2 In January 2024, during a press conference, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused the US of using the Kyiv regime to create direct security threats to Russia.3 Nevertheless, he kept an opening for resumption of the talks in the future by saying that “we do not reject this idea altogether…”4
Recently, Russian President Vladimir Putin, in his annual address to the Federal Assembly, asserted that if the US wanted to have strategic stability dialogue, “it must be done as a package”, taking care of all the aspects that impinge on Russian security.5 He implied that the arms control talks should discuss Western support for Ukraine.
From the statements of the Russian side, it is clear that the Ukraine war has a role to play in the stalled arms control efforts. It has become one of the stumbling blocks in strategic stability dialogue, especially in light of the expiration of the last remaining arms control treaty—the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), in 2026.
Decoding Arms Control Talks Breakdown
The Ukraine war has cast a shadow over the arms control talks in more than one way. First, Russia's direct involvement in the Ukraine war, as opposed to the indirect support of the US from afar by way of military assistance, is impeding the arms control efforts. The Ukraine war is being played out on the territory of Ukraine and Russia. During the Cold War, it was observed that superpowers hammered out arms control deals when they sensed that a nuclear attack was imminent on their territories. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962, when the superpowers threatened each other’s territories with a nuclear strike from close proximity, prodded the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to negotiate arms control measures.
Today, the situation is different as the US is physically insulated from the consequences of war as opposed to Russia. Thus, there is an asymmetry in terms of stakes involved in the arms control talks. While the US would like to continue with the arms control talks independent of the overall geopolitical situation on the ground, Moscow has sought to link the negotiations with the Ukraine war as it wants to keep all options open to have the upper hand and meet war objectives at the end of the war. Lavrov clearly stated that since Washington waged a hybrid war against Moscow, Russia does not see any reason “for engaging in strategic stability talks with the United States in general.”6
Second, the collateral fallout of the Ukraine war in the form of Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO has made Russia more insecure. President Putin, in his speeches on 21 and 24 February 2022 addressed to Russian citizens, clearly emphasised the threat perception coming out of the eastward expansion of NATO. Putin assessed that the expansion of NATO into Ukraine was just a matter of time, and the country would serve as a “bridgehead”7 in the eventuality of an attack by NATO on Russia. He calculated that with the advanced strategic and non-strategic weapons on Russia’s borders, it would be a “knife to throat” situation for the country.8
Although the aim of the so-called “special military operation” was to “demilitarise and denazify Ukraine”, Putin’s speeches clearly suggest that the real objective was to deter NATO from being present at the borders of Russia. However, things turned out exactly the opposite, and the neutral Nordic countries on the north-western border of Russia also became parties to NATO. Thus, Russia’s three core demands—prevention of NATO expansion, no assault weapons on the Russian borders and rolling back NATO’s military capacity and infrastructure in Europe to where they were in 19979—have gone for a toss.
Putin thinks that the “US administration’s professed interest in discussing strategic stability is merely demagoguery”.10 Flagging reckless expansion of NATO and waging a hybrid war against Moscow by the US, Lavrov accused Washington of wanting to resume inspection and visit Russian nuclear facilities in the garb of strategic stability talks.11 Thus, it seems Russia feels it is futile to engage Washington in the arms control talks. With the Ukraine war turning into a virtual fight between NATO and Russia, Moscow is trying to convey its disapproval of the current ground reality through non-participation in the arms control talks.
Third, the Ukraine war has led to the crumbling of the European as well as global arms control architecture. The expansion of NATO and Russian reaction to the same has sabotaged any chance of revival of the cornerstone of the European arms control architecture—the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. In the middle of the Ukraine war, the Russian Foreign Ministry said that “while the deal initially helped to stabilise the security framework in Europe, the US-led military bloc later started to overtly bypass the restrictions, including by admitting new members.”12
As a result, the CFE was dismantled on 7 December 2023, with the formal withdrawal of Russia from the same.13 The US, along with the NATO allies, have also suspended the operation of the CFE treaty.14 The Treaty signed in 1990, aimed to limit the number of conventional arms and equipment. It was revised in 1999 as the ‘Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe’ to suit the geopolitical conditions of the time post-Cold War.
However, it was never ratified by the US and its allies. In turn, Russia decided to suspend its participation in the Treaty in 2007 and ceased to participate actively in 2015. Although the Treaty was ineffectual for all practical purposes, countries had not formally exited the same until the Ukraine war began. By formally withdrawing from the Treaty, the countries signalled their intentions vis-à-vis the arms control architecture.
However, this is just a continuation of the global trend in the arena of arms control. Putin cast aspersions on the US’ withdrawal from the Anti-Ballestic Missile (ABM) treaty in 2002 and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in 2019 in his address in February 2022, raising suspicion about the Pentagon’s intentions to attack mainland Russia.15 According to him, the US intends “to discuss strategic security issues with us while simultaneously trying to inflict strategic defeat on Russia on the battlefield.”16 Thus, the current environment of mistrust is impacting arms control efforts negatively.
Fourth, the protracted Ukraine war has dented Russia’s image as a great power due to its failure to win the war decisively. During the Cold War, the US and the West relied on nuclear weapons to offset their conventional inferiority vis-à-vis the USSR. After the end of the Cold War, the Russian economy stagnated, resulting in the stagnation of its technological base and impacting its ability to strengthen conventional munitions. Therefore, it looks like Russia wants to compensate for its conventional weakness by relying on nuclear weapons.
Russia is still a significant military power, especially in terms of the number of nuclear weapons it possesses. Putin wants the world to remember that an enduring international order is impossible in the absence of a strong and sovereign Russia.17 The Kremlin’s nuclear position may give it a semblance of power parity with the US. By engaging in the arms control dialogue, Russia does not want to lose its leverage.
Conclusion
It is clear that the Ukraine war has emerged as a major hindrance to the conduct of the arms control talks. It has exacerbated already broken relations between the US and Russia. The statements from Moscow suggest that Russia is feeling insecure about its place in the emerging world order. The country is also feeling threatened due to the geographic expansion of NATO. The demise of European security architecture and the dismantling of the CFE have added to the environment of mistrust.
Therefore, Russia is treating arms control talks as a strategic leverage against the West, which it is unlikely to give up. Moscow’s direct involvement in the war and diminished status in the emerging world, the collapse of European security architecture and Russian insecurities vis-à-vis NATO’s eastward expansion have made strategic stability dialogue even more difficult. Thus, arms control talks have become hostage to the Ukraine war, even if it is not the only factor that is stalling the dialogue.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Critical Minerals for Energy Transition: Linchpin or Risk?
Nandakumar Janardhanan, Kentaro Tamura
April 15, 2024
The race to climate neutrality must be guided by responsible practices and environmental stewardship is paramount.
Overview
As the world races towards a net-zero future, the critical mineral value chain emerges as both a linchpin and a potential obstacle to achieving climate neutrality goals. While countries have been adopting a range of initiatives to secure supply of critical minerals required for transition, the environmental, social and economic implications of an unsustainable value chain are often ignored in the policy debates. Ensuring the sustainability of this value chain is crucial, given its pivotal role in supplying the minerals essential for clean energy technologies. However, without adequate policies and governance mechanisms, the critical mineral sector could pose significant risks to environment sustainability, social equity, and economic stability and can eventually lead to risks to energy transition goals.
Risks of Critical Mineral Value Chain
The global push towards decarbonisation will lead to significant demand for critical minerals to support its transition. The demand for certain critical minerals is projected to grow up to 500 per cent by 2050,1 with sectors such as transportation, energy, and semiconductor manufacturing driving this growth. Importing countries face economic risks due to potential supply shortages and geopolitical tensions. In view of this surging demand, many importing countries have been shaping strategies to ensure the uninterrupted supplies of minerals critical to fuel their climate mitigation initiatives. About 30 to 50 minerals have been listed as critical to energy transition or strategic to national security, by many major economies.
While Canada, Australia and many European countries are major producers of some minerals, a significant share of critical minerals pivotal for energy clean technologies are sourced from many developing and least developed economies, which are rich in biodiversity and have fragile systems. The overlap of mining locations and areas rich in biodiversity threatens serval species of flora and fauna.2 For example, studies note that one-third of Africa’s great ape population faces mining-related risks,3 while several migratory fish species and river-dwelling birds are affected by mining related water pollution in Brazil.4
Critical mineral mining related adverse impacts are not limited to the biodiversity in one or two regions, but happens on a global scale mostly due to the increasing land usage and the corresponding impact on water resources, land and air.5 Weak governance mechanisms and not so stringent environmental regulations in these developing economies help the mining and processing industry to flourish. The fact that the industry contributes to economic and social benefits in terms of resource rent and employment opportunities, also justifies less stringent regulations by the government.6 However, the larger adverse impact on the environment, people and society – mostly related to the mining, processing, and waste management activities, are often not paid adequate attention in policy making.
Critical Minerals for Sustainable and Just Transition Key challenges and crosscutting issues in the value chain demand efficient policy, governance, technology and financial measures to enable just and equitable transition to climate neutrality
Source: Authors
The environmental impacts include biodiversity loss, land degradation, water resource depletion and pollution stemming from the extraction and processing. Social implications range from disruptions to local communities and livelihoods to altering employment scenarios in mining regions. Economic challenges are particularly acute for producing countries, where the ripple effects of environmental and social impacts can have far-reaching consequences on national economy. Technical challenges within the value chain include inefficient processing, usage, and limited recycling of critical minerals, exacerbating resource inefficiencies and environmental degradation. In addition to these core challenges, cross-cutting issues such as equity, gender and justice concerns, impact on agrifood systems, and transition risks for businesses further complicate the landscape.
While part of the world is accelerating towards clean energy future, many poor economies will eventually end up damaging their environment This raises the question how well is the world prepared to steer towards a just and equitable transition to net-zero future.
To address these challenges, robust policies and governance mechanisms are essential. Stakeholders across the globe must collaborate to establish transparent regulatory frameworks, promote responsible mining practices, and enforce environmental and social standards throughout the value chain. Additionally, financial support and technological innovations are crucial for enhancing the sustainability and efficiency of critical mineral production and utilisation.
What Can the World do for Risk Alleviation?
To alleviate these risks and ensure a smooth transition, three specific efforts must be made, in addition to the conventional approaches. First, while supply challenges and geopolitical tensions are significant concerns in the critical mineral value chain, focusing solely on these aspects overlooks the broader spectrum of risks. Stakeholders will need to expand the scope of planning beyond traditional supply-centric perspectives, to develop strategies that address the multifaceted risks of the value chain. A starting point could be to shape and implement stringent regulations to ensure responsible mining practices, improving transparency in the value chain, and investing in technologies that enhances efficient processing of minerals. Stakeholders will also need to ensure equitable distribution of benefits to the local and indigenous population whose livelihood may be affected due to the mining impacts.
Secondly, many of the mining activities lead to innumerable impact on biodiversity and natural resources. While sustainable practices are essential, aiming for regenerative approaches can yield even greater benefits. Regenerative strategies that seek to restore ecosystems, protect biodiversity, and ensure well-being of the local communities are essential. Regenerative outcome is also closely linked to how efficiently stakeholders are adopting circular economic principles. Designing processes with end-of-life recycling stakeholders can manage waste and maximise resource efficiency in key operations in mining and processing.
Lastly, responsible transition is utmost important. The race to climate neutrality must be guided by responsible practices and environmental stewardship is paramount. The businesses will also need to embrace responsible transition initiatives and engage in meaningful dialogue with local communities. However, it is important to make these interventions transformational unlike the current landscape where environmental, social and governance (ESG) norms are often criticised for being limited to mere target meeting exercise.7
Conclusion
Addressing the challenges of the critical mineral value chain requires a concerted effort from governments, industry players, civil society and local communities. By implementing robust policies, fostering transparency and accountability, investing in technological innovation, and prioritising social equity, countries can navigate the complexities of the energy transition while minimising environmental impacts and promoting inclusive development. By looking beyond supply challenges and geopolitics, embracing sustainable and regenerative practices, and transitioning responsibly, the world can foster a resilient and equitable transition to a sustainable energy future.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Harnessing the Potential for Defence Cooperation through Defence Attachés
D. Padma Kumar Pillay
April 12, 2024
India's evolving defence diplomacy reflects its growing strategic ambitions.
As India’s profile as a security partner has improved in concert with its economic and scientific growth and its military stands out as a stabilising factor in the region, the need to engage with the rest of the world on defence issues has become more relevant. Providing a strategic context to defence cooperation efforts in the changing security environment is important.
Historically, India has used instruments of military power not only to protect its national interests, but also to safeguard, when requested, the interests of friendly countries against internal disturbances and disorders, including in Korea, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. As per the terms of the Indo-Bhutan treaty, India has discharged its obligation to defend the security of Bhutan. It has maintained a key Indian military training establishment in Bhutan since 1969.
India has extended military expertise and assistance to Mauritius and Seychelles and other countries in restoring order in lesser known operations. In Central Asia, India has an air force facility and a military hospital. India has provided training and infrastructure development assistance to a large number of countries in Africa, Asia, and Central Asia. India has also been a significant contributor to UN Peacekeeping efforts since independence. On a number of occasions, India has successfully used diplomatic and defence instruments in responding to humanitarian and natural disasters worldwide.
In the emerging geopolitical environment, defence cooperation is increasingly becoming a dynamic tool for achieving India’s overall diplomatic objectives. India’s diplomatic interactions with other countries have increased significantly over the last two decades. The joint statements issued at the highest levels invariably include defence and military cooperation.
India has defence cooperation agreements of one kind or the other with over 50 countries. The emphasis is on security dialogues, joint military exercises, and cooperation amongst Special Forces, intelligence sharing, maritime domain awareness, co-production and co-development of high technology equipment and defence research and development. With some countries, training and capacity building is given high priority.
Overall, India's evolving defence diplomacy reflects its growing strategic ambitions. By continuing to effectively address the challenges and capitalising on the opportunities, India can significantly enhance its security and position as a major global player. India can not only safeguard its own interests, but also contribute to global and regional peace and stability, with focused attention to defence diplomacy in the coming years.
In this context, the decision of the government as reported on 10 April 2024 to increase defence representation in several countries is indeed noteworthy. International defence representation by way of positioning a military officer as a Defence Attaché in missions abroad is an internationally accepted norm for enhancing defence cooperation with other countries. It is an ideal tool to advance a nation’s foreign policy objectives by building bridges of friendship that can be operationalised in times of crises and conflicts.
It is equally true that many countries have enhanced their international defence representation in India manifold, recognising the utility of the office of Defence Attachés. There are over 120 Defence Attachés from over 70 countries stationed in India, with frequent requests for further enhancements. This shows the importance attached by other countries to enhance defence cooperation with India.
In contrast, India, for several years had around 50 defence wings abroad. Thus, the announcement of new billets of 16 defence attaches from the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force to be posted to various locations is a significant development that reflects India's growing strategic ambitions and its focus on expanding its military partnerships around the world. Not doing so would have opportunity costs which India can ill afford and is a very positive sign of a pro-active policy in responding to the challenges of a fast evolving geopolitical scenario.
Evidently, the established international order is under stress and becoming less effective in dealing with the emerging challenges. This move is likely a response to growing geopolitical competition and India's desire to strengthen its strategic ties and military diplomacy with these countries. There are several first-time deployments including several African nations. The focus seems to be on strategically important regions like Africa, Asia (including the Philippines and Armenia), and Europe (Poland).
Recommendations
A major drawback is that the Defence Attachés are on a one-time assignment with little previous experience in international diplomacy. It is a one-time posting for high performing officers who usually only report to the Service Intelligence Directorates. There is a need to professionalise the training of Defence Attachés to include language skills and attachment with the territorial division of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).
Defence Attachés are often under conflicting pressure of functioning between their controlling agency (Director General, Defence Intelligence Agency) and the parent service (respective service Intelligence Directorates). The MoD may in consultation with the MEA consider creating a cadre of specialists from the Defence Forces. They will benefit by spending some time in the concerned divisions of the MEA. MoD and MEA could create a dedicated cadre of area experts including language experts from Armed Forces who can be rotated between missions, service headquarters and the MEA.
Defence Attaches need to be considered as an extension of the diplomatic missions and there has to be clear objective settings and goals for them other than that which is accorded by the Service Headquarters. Defence Attachés could be called by the MoD to India for an Annual Review where their goals could be evaluated and stipulated pro-actively.
The officers with experience and the talent could be seconded to regional organisations that are considered essential in furthering India’s national security and foreign policy objectives. There are several regional organisations like the Indian Ocean Association for Regional Cooperation (IORA), ASEAN, African Union (AU), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). India engages significantly with some of these organisations on defence and security matters. The government could identify specific organisations which could have representation for furthering defence cooperation. The Armed Forces may also create a pool of Liaison Officers (LO) based in the service HQ to coordinate and also to undertake visits, if necessary, to the these organisations. Such LOs' can function from the IDS or Service HQs.
The Armed Forces could also consider sending on deputation serving and retired armed forces experts for overseeing projectsand infrastructure being constructed overseas. Indian missions and Defence Attachés need to be specifically tasked to explore the potential of beneficial defence collaborations, for marketing and co-development and export of defence products. This would not just be to co-develop defence items but to give a fillip to their own defence R&D.
Transfer of Technology guidelines may be game changers in time to come if the right policies and opportunities are provided and markets are exploited. Indian Missions abroad should be tasked to identify companies that can be acquired, technology that can be sourced as well as facilitate the entry of Indian private companies into foreign supply chains.
The Ministry of Defence also conducts two major international defence exhibitions viz., the biennial Air Show and DEFEXPO. In both these events, leading indigenous and foreign defence industries participate showcasing their latest systems and inventories. A large number of delegations, often headed by the Defence Ministers or Chiefs of Armed Forces, participate in these two prestigious events. These events can continue to be utilised as opportunities to further defence collaborations. India should also continue to actively participate in global expositions and air shows to establish markets for Indian defence exports.
DRDO, DPSU, new corporatised Ordnance factories should develop capabilities to customise their products for export requirement in concert with the Indian private industry and fully exploiting opportunities available. There is also a need to formalise an export policy.
Conclusion
Defence cooperation has been an important component of India’s overall defence diplomacy. India has been using its Armed Forces to further the country’s national interests by contributing proactively to achieve international peace and security as well as creating conducive conditions for accelerating India’s ongoing transformation from an importer of defence equipment to an exporter. The decision to increase Defence Attache representation will no doubt help build capacities in furtherance of national interests.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The GCC’s ‘Vision for Regional Security’ is a conscious move on the part of the GCC to reaffirm its cohesion at the time of fast-evolving regional crises.
For the first time since its inception, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) announced its ‘Vision for Regional Security’ at a ceremony held in its headquarters in Riyadh on 28 March 2024. While announcing the launch of the document, GCC Secretary General Jasem Mohamed Al Budaiwi stated that the “Vision for Regional Security is not just a political commitment, but an ethical dedication that unites us all.”1 He also stated that “our common security is the foundation upon which we build our hopes and dreams for a better future.”2 Similar sentiments have been previously expressed by the leaders of the GCC on multiple occasions. However, the national interests of the individual countries, the fluid nature of regional security and the complex geopolitics have hindered unity against the common security challenges.
Principles, Objectives and Commitments
The ‘Vision for Regional Security’ emphasises that it is based on the principles of shared destiny and indivisible security of the member states, and any threat to one is a threat to all the member States.3 This was also earlier mentioned in the Joint Defence Agreement of the GCC signed in 2000.4 The vision document is based on the principles of respecting sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of the States. Based on these principles, the GCC aims to preserve regional security and stability, tackle the challenges facing them and settle the disputes through peaceful means. It also intends to build regional and international partnerships to deal with the regional threats.5
To achieve these objectives, the vision document emphasises joint efforts on the part of all the member states to avoid the use of force and prioritise dialogue and negotiation to resolve their differences. The Vision for Regional Security enlists a number of old and some new issues affecting regional security of the GCC. The document reiterates the traditional concern of the GCC countries on terrorism and extremism. It urges the member states to combat terrorism and extremism, stopping the flow of money to the hands of the terrorists and combat money laundering.6
The concern of the GCC countries over maritime security has also been reflected in the document. It calls for regional and international coordination to ensure maritime security and ensure trade and energy supply routes. As all the GCC countries are key suppliers of energy, any disruption in the sea lines of communication will directly affect their national economies.
As the threat of a nuclear arms race in the region looms large with Iran and Israel having nuclear programmes, the GCC has urged to make the region a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ). It calls for a nuclear non-proliferation regime in West Asia, and at the same time, supports the right of the States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.7
With growing digitisation and the use of the internet, the number of cyber-attacks has also increased. They are also apprehensive that in case of any conflict, they would be highly vulnerable to cyber-attacks from their adversaries. Therefore, the vision document urges the member states to take effective steps to combat cyber security challenges.
Apart from the traditional security issues, climate change, water and food security, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), energy security, defending economic resources and creating investment opportunities have also been prioritised and included in their conception of regional security.8 Historically, the GCC has consistently emphasised the imperative of collaboration among the member states in addressing these shared challenges. These non-traditional security issues have increasingly occupied the attention of the GCC rulers in recent years and have been articulated in the vision document.
This is a clear reflection of the widening ambit of the GCC’s conception of regional security. The GCC has moved beyond the traditional interpretation of regional security and its analysis of regional security has become more comprehensive in nature and scope. Previously, the regional security issues were primarily articulated through official communiqués issued after the high-level summit meetings of the GCC. The unveiling of the vision document constitutes a formal and unambiguous articulation of their regional security vision and a reiteration of their commitment to work together in this regard.
Geopolitical Context
The document has come at a time when the West Asian region is engulfed in a turmoil since the beginning of the Israel–Hamas War in October 2023. The vision document makes explicit reference to the Israel–Palestine issue and calls for activating the Arab Peace Initiative.9 Among others, it calls for a two-State solution, the withdrawal of Israeli forces to the pre-June 1967 borders and the establishment of an independent Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as its capital. It seems like the devastating consequences of the ongoing Israel–Hamas War and its regional implications have had an impact on the formulation of the vision document. The GCC often expresses its concerns over other regional issues such as the crisis in Yemen, Syria, Libya, Lebanon etc., but the Israel–Palestine issue is the only regional issue which finds a mention in the vision document.
The Israel–Hamas War has impacted the wider region as well, spilling over into the neighbouring Red Sea. The Houthis, whom the GCC member countries except Oman have fought against, have again become active. They have been targeting the ships in the Red Sea and as a result, a new tension has been created in the high seas. A coalition of more than 20 countries led by the US has started ‘Operation Prosperity Guardian’ to ensure the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. The tensions in the Red Sea affects all the GCC countries, more specifically Saudi Arabia, as it shares a long border with the Red Sea. While Riyadh’s engagement with the Houthis was moving in a positive direction following the Saudi–Iran rapprochement, the Houthis involvement in the Israel–Hamas War has brought the Houthi trouble back for the Kingdom.
The Israel–Hamas War has once again brought the US–Iran tension in the region to the fore. Recent months have witnessed an increasing number of attacks on the US forces by different militia groups in GCC’s neighbourhood in Iraq, Syria and Jordan. The US has alleged that these groups are backed by Iran. The GCC countries are worried about any further military escalation between the US and Iran in their neighbourhood.
The announcement of the document at this point is a conscious move on the part of the GCC to reaffirm its cohesion at the time of fast-evolving regional crises. It proposes a comprehensive framework of regional security which promotes negotiation and dialogue to overcome disagreements, violence and conflict. Furthermore, it reinforces the role of the organisation in mediating as well as resolving regional conflicts. While the vision document is an effort in the right direction, executing this framework in a volatile geopolitical and security environment will test the commitment of the individual member states and the unity of the GCC as a collective.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Empowering Indigenous Defence Innovation: The ADITI Scheme and DefConnect 2024
Shayesta Nishat Ahmed
April 03, 2024
The launch of the ADITI Scheme reflects the government’s commitment to promote innovations in defence technologies by Indian start-ups for the armed forces.
The Innovations for Defence Excellence-Defence Innovation Organisation (iDEX-DIO), under the aegis of Department of Defence Production (DDP), Ministry of Defence, organised the DefConnect 2024 on 4 March 2024 in New Delhi. Raksha Mantri (RM) Rajnath Singh inaugurated the key event, which witnessed the involvement of notable stakeholders including the military, defence sector, emerging businesses, educational institutions and decision-makers, aiming to foster cooperation among them. The aim of the event was to
facilitate meaningful engagements, showcase cutting-edge technologies [… developed by IDEX winners …] and […] to be a transformative platform for fostering collaboration, innovation, and entrepreneurship in the defence sector.1
The RM, while delivering the inaugural address, stressed on the importance of achieving Aatmanirbharta in defence production. He launched the ‘Acing Development of Innovative Technologies’ with iDEX (ADITI) Scheme with the objective to “promote innovations in critical and strategic defence technologies”.2 The RM noted that iDEX has been expanded to iDEX Prime with the innovation grants being raised from Rs 1.5 Cr to Rs 10 Cr and stated that the intent behind these schemes was to enable India to transform in to a knowledge society. He expressed confidence that the initiatives like iDEX and ADITI Schemes will bolster the defence sector and reduce the reliance on imports.
In the course of DefConnect 2024, Raksha Mantri Singh reiterated the significance of attaining self-reliance by reducing the dependence on import of weapon systems and stressed that “getting a hold on state-of-the-art defence technology [is] the most crucial aspect to achieve self-reliance due to the increasing role of cutting-edge technology in warfare in today’s time”.3 He outlined two approaches to achieving technological self-reliance—adopting the latest innovations from other countries or fostering indigenous capabilities through research and development (R&D).4 Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan noted that the event was a great initiative to connect the vision of MoD, services and innovators in the defence manufacturing sector.5
Key Features of the ADITI Scheme
iDEX was established in 2018 under the Defence Innovation Organisation (DIO) as a ‘not for profit’ company as per Section 8 of the Companies Act 2013, to create an ecosystem with necessary infrastructure support and incubation in Defence by engaging industries, start-ups, MSMEs, even academia, for R&D and technology development. The ADITI Scheme, which is a sub-scheme within iDEX, encompasses a corpus of Rs 750 crore covering the period 2023–2024 to 2025–2026, and is to be administered by the DIO to encourage “innovations in critical and strategic defence technologies”.6
Technologies deemed ‘Critical and Strategic’ encompass
Satellite communication applications, advanced cyber technology, autonomous weapons, cyber weapons, nuclear technologies, advancement in semiconductor technology, Artificial Intelligence (AI), Quantum Technologies (QT), advanced underwater surveillance systems and others.7
Critical and strategic technologies will increasingly drive innovation and modernisation efforts of the Indian Armed Forces to bolster combat potential and capacity building. The ADITI Scheme aims to foster the development of critical and advanced technologies essential for national security, filling gaps where existing capabilities are lacking. Stakeholder interactions, including with the Armed Forces, start-ups, MSMEs, and academic incubators, underscored the need for increased funding for projects concerning critical and strategic technologies, as highlighted during the Ministry of Defence’s Chintan Shivir in July 2023.8
The scheme offers grants of up to 50 per cent of the Product Development Budget (PDB) with a maximum limit of Rs 25 crore, potentially leading to a PDB of Rs 50 crore or more. The scheme is intended to be monitored by the team with the DIO Board chaired by Secretary (DP) ‘through partner incubators to ensure regular guidance and adequate resources for oversight’.9 The project consists of 6 milestones, with a payment limit of Rs 9 lakh per case, amounting to Rs 1,50,000 for each milestone, allocated for Partner Incubator (PIs) upon completion of each milestone by the respective challenge winner.
In total, the estimated expenditure for PIs is approximately Rs 3 crore. These grants will facilitate research and development intended towards innovations in defence technology. Its objective is to accelerate the development of approximately 30 deep-tech critical and strategic technologies by 2026.10 These 30 technologies will primarily serve defence applications with export potential.
Secondly, it aims to foster collaboration between start-ups, MSMEs and established industry players to bring these technologies to fruition, and reduce dependence on foreign Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). The ADITI Scheme leverages the existing iDEX Scheme to streamline the development process. The Scheme endeavours to create a ‘Technology Watch Tool’, as a mechanism to close the capability gap in the armed forces, and to strengthen the country’s defence innovation ecosystem.
The purpose of the ‘Technology Watch Tool’ is to bridge the gap between modern armed forces’ needs and defence innovation ecosystem capabilities, facilitating strategic policy formation and milestone monitoring. The technology watch tool will also ensure no overlap in technologies through technology foresight workshops. Within the technology watch tool, an estimated 3 per cent of the grant in aid amount is estimated for challenge winners and Partner Incubators (PIs) is expected to accommodate the specialised services required from external agencies and subject matter experts for the curation and evaluation of critical high-cost technologies.11
The problem statements initiated under the ADITI Scheme will be termed as ADITI challenges. In the first edition of launch of the scheme, 17 challenges have been launched out of which three were from the Indian Army, five each from the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force and four from the Defence Space Agency.12 Furthermore, ADITI seeks to enhance these critical technologies through continuous development and integrate them with products and technologies from the existing iDEX scheme.
Enhanced funding and collaborative efforts are essential for advancing defence technology, and national security interests. The embedded framework will also enable the integration of cutting-edge defence systems and technologies into the defence establishment. There are several important components with regard to implementation of the ADITI Scheme.
Firstly, it provides support for up to two winners per challenge in the ADITI programme, with each applicant eligible for only one challenge at a time, ensuring a fair process.13 The Scheme primarily benefits start-ups, MSMEs and Partner Incubators (PI). A network of approximately 10 Partner Incubators is proposed to be established to offer specialised support to bolster India’s self-defence capabilities and defence exports by fostering the creation of innovative technologies and products.
Moreover, there will be direct engagement with military and government agencies to align technology-driven requirements of the armed forces of the country. Stringent oversight mechanisms will ensure proper utilisation of government funds, including a comprehensive grant management system and close monitoring through an IT platform and dashboard. Lastly, any supplementary activities deemed necessary to advance the scheme's core objectives will be undertaken.
In addition to launch of the ADITI Scheme, the 11th edition of the Defence India Start-up Challenge (DISC) was launched at DefConnect 2024 where 22 problem statements were introduced. Among these, four were from the Indian Army, five from the Indian Navy, five from the Indian Air Force, seven from the Armoured Vehicles Nigam Limited, and one from the Hindustan Shipyard Limited.14 As part of the DefConnect event, a technology showcase was also organised by the iDEX-DIO. It featured a variety of technology start-ups leading innovation in the defence sector, specialising in areas such as
Artificial Intelligence and Robotics, Undersea Detection and Communication, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Wearable Technology, Blast & Ballistics Proof Structures and Equipment, smart textiles and cyber security.15
These start-ups represented cutting-edge technologies and innovations, offering solutions to bolster defence capabilities and strengthen national security.
Observations
The launch of the ADITI Scheme, after the expansion of iDEX to iDEX Prime on 22 April 2022, reflects the government’s commitment to promote innovations in defence technologies by Indian start-ups for the armed forces. Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman in the Interim Budget 2024–25 had also announced a corpus of Rs 1 lakh crore to promote Innovation and Startups coupled with a new scheme for Deep Tech Startups in Defence.16
The creation of the corpus of Rs 750 crore and the allotment of Rs 25 crore is well appreciated as the development of prototypes and hardware requires more capital. The significant rise in funding is widely acknowledged, recognising the greater financial resources needed for the development of new prototypes and hardware. The 30 identified critical and strategic technologies will largely benefit from this increase in funding.
Defence innovation funding is being pursued using a dual approach, employing both the iDEX framework and the Technology Development Fund (TDF).17 The TDF aims to capitalise on the existing domestic capabilities within Indian industries, particularly MSMEs and start-ups.18 With these two strategies in place, the introduction of additional schemes with a larger fund pool however could lead to redundant efforts, a scenario that can be mitigated by integrating such schemes within these existing frameworks. Doing so not only prevents duplication but also facilitates more effective oversight of these initiatives.
In conclusion, the ADITI Scheme represents a pivotal initiative towards achieving self-reliance in defence technology, aligning with the broader goal of promoting indigenous innovation and bolstering India’s defence capabilities. The coordinated efforts of various stakeholders, coupled with effective oversight mechanisms, are essential for the successful implementation of such schemes, ultimately contributing to national security and economic growth.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
18.“Innovations for Defence Excellence”, Ministry of Defence, Digital India Corporation (DIC), Ministry of Electronics & IT (MeitY), Government of India.
Geo-political, geo-economic as well as ecological factors will increasingly impact the implementation of new BRI projects in ASEAN region.
Recent high-level diplomatic visits between China and three ASEAN countries—Indonesia, Vietnam and Cambodia—and discussions on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects at these meetings indicate that the BRI will continue to play an important role towards regional infrastructure development. The ASEAN region remains a source of minerals critical to China’s sustained economic growth. Geo-political and geo-economic factors are propelling Beijing to renew its investment commitments in the ASEAN region and ensure the long-term viability of the BRI.
On 1 April 2024, Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted Indonesian President-elect Prabowo Subianto. On 8 April, he welcomed Vietnamese National Assembly Chairman Vuong Dinh Hue in Beijing. During these two meetings, discussions were held on the possibility of integration of the BRI into existing initiatives of the respective countries.1 President Xi praised the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway project as one of the most successful projects under the BRI. On 23 April, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Cambodia for the seventh meeting of the China–Cambodia Intergovernmental Coordination Committee.2 Both sides agreed to accelerate the alignment of the BRI with the ‘Pentagon Strategy' and the ‘Fish and Rice Corridor’.
Indonesia, Vietnam and Cambodia have seen the most high-level engagement and discussion on the BRI compared to the other ASEAN countries. These countries have been responding positively to the BRI for a decade and have a strong demand for infrastructure development, especially after the pandemic. These countries have been largely positive about the impact of BRI projects. Officials in these countries had previously welcomed and praised the BRI for its great potential to deliver public goods and increase local revenues, and expressed their desire to engage with the Belt and Road Forum.3 Concerns though remain about the debt trap, implementation delays, cost overruns, worker safety issues, unsustainable lending and environmental degradation for both the BRI and new development initiatives such as the Global Development Initiative (GDI).4
Post COVID-19 BRI Revival
In 2020, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that 20 per cent of BRI projects were ‘severely affected’ by COVID-19.5 In 2021, the figures showed an 18 per cent decrease in the disbursements for projects compared to 2020. While the pandemic was one reason for the decrease in investment, factors such as political instability, local communication gaps, the energy transition and delays were also the reasons for a slowdown in the project implementation. Despite that, the implementation rate of BRI projects in ASEAN was 35 per cent in 2023, which is higher than that of Japan (19 per cent) and Korea's (18 per cent) development projects in the region.6 In 2020, ASEAN countries received US$ 16.06327 billion from China which accounted for 71.27 per cent of the total BRI investments. About 85 per cent of these investments were for ongoing BRI projects signed between 2015 and 2023.7
In 2023, Indonesia emerged as the largest recipient of BRI investment, receiving around US$ 7.3 billion, a 14 per cent increase for its infrastructure projects.8 Two Indonesian projects—the Java 7 Power Station and the Bangko Tengah Sumsel-8 coal-fired power station—said to have been delayed due to COVID-19 restrictions, have now been successfully completed. The Jakarta–Bandung high-speed railway, hailed as one of the BRI's most successful projects, also faced several challenges. These included poor implementation, construction delays, rising material prices and high land acquisition costs. The cost overrun for this project was around US$ 1.2 billion and it only started commercial operation in October 2023.9
Several projects, including Phnom Pehn Airport in Cambodia and the Indonesian park under ‘Two Countries, Twin Parks’, the BRI's flagship project to establish industrial parks and facilitate development in Indonesia and China,10 are expected to be operational by 2024.11 The three-airport high-speed railway project in Thailand, the Mandalay-Kyaukphyu railway project in Myanmar and the Vinh Tan 3 coal-fired power plant in Vietnam are likely to be completed soon. Some projects such as the Nam Ou Hydropower Project Phase II in Laos and the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone Deep-Sea Port Project in Myanmar have been relabelled as BRI key projects, although the original agreement was signed before the BRI.12 The relabelling, restructuring and integration of projects has become part of Beijing’s new strategy as regards regional infrastructure development assistance.
There are also projects which have become a cause of concern for some ASEAN countries while some have been suspended. The announcement of a US$ 1.7 billion waterway project, the Funan Techo Canal in Cambodia in 2023, has raised serious ecological, economic and security concerns in Vietnam. The Philippines government has cancelled the construction of US$ 5 billion worth of BRI projects, including the Panay-Guimaras-Negros Inter-Island Bridge, the Mindanao Railway and the South Long-Haul Railway (Bicol Line), without giving clear reasons.
Negotiations on these began in January 2024 but were unsuccessful as the government stated that China had not disbursed the requested funds. Analysts have cited the change of government in the Philippines and tensions in the South China Sea as the main reasons for this move. The evolving geo-political, geo-economic as well as ecological factors will increasingly impact the implementation of new BRI projects. Loan conditions, concerns over sovereignty, debt repayment, downsizing of projects, deforestation, displacement of communities, potential destruction of historical sites and overdependence serve as critical discussion points for the new BRI projects.13
At the 2021 G7 summit, US President Joe Biden announced the Build Back Better (B3W) initiative as a competitor to the BRI, which, unlike China, offers unconditional aid.14 The Global Gateway (GG) project announced by the European Union in the same year promised investments of 300 billion euros between 2021 and 2027 in the areas of digitalisation, climate and energy, transport, health, education and research in the partner countries, similar to the BRI.15
With initiatives such as Global Gateway and Build Back Better, ASEAN countries are in a unique position to reap the benefits of these initiatives and offset risks. Beijing therefore is making renewed efforts to demonstrate the benefits of its new BRI strategy. Therefore, high-level diplomatic visits are an attempt to reaffirm its infrastructure and development commitment to the region by integrating ongoing and new projects under the BRI. On 18 October 2023, the Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation published a list of 32 practical deliverables out of which 12 were for ASEAN countries.16 Beijing also intends to engage ASEAN in high-level thematic forums, and international conferences to be held this year.17
It is evident that the Belt and Road Forum will be used to institutionalise and promote the BRI on a larger scale. Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang, head of the Belt and Road Leadership Group and member of the Politburo Standing Committee, said that Beijing is working to fully implement the Science, Technology and Innovation Cooperation Action Plan to accelerate the innovative Silk Road. He also emphasised the deepening of scientific and technological innovation with BRI countries.18 On 25 April 2024, he spoke at the opening ceremony of the Zhongguancun Forum in Beijing, mentioning the acceleration of the construction of world-class science and technology parks with BRI countries.19 Beijing is learning from its mistakes and shifting the focus from mega projects to smaller projects. However, the transition to the Global Development Initiative (GDI) could slow down efforts to revitalise the BRI in the region.
GDI vs BRI
The Global Development Initiative was proposed at the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 2021. The announcement of the GDI at the UNGA emphasises Beijing’s attempt to make it a multilateral initiative, in contrast to its BRI. Of the 130 countries, seven ASEAN countries, including Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, have joined the Group of Friends of the GDI.20
Despite the focus on newer forms of cooperation, knowledge transfer, capacity building, development assistance and sustainable development, ASEAN countries, especially Indonesia, fear that the GDI could end up favouring China's interests and push the countries into the debt trap. Beijing's GDI offers no guarantee that the social and environmental problems associated with the Belt and Road projects will not recur under the GDI.21 With the changing geo-political situation in the region, Beijing’s GDI came at a time when there was a major power competition with the US in the Indo-Pacific region and when the US was introducing counter-initiatives such as Build Back Better and Global Gateway with other countries.
While the motive, nature, scope and incentives are different for both initiatives and the GDI cannot replace the BRI in the near future, analysts note that it has definitely slowed down the implementation of the BRI projects.22 The China International Development Cooperation Agency, which was established with the aim of promoting the BRI, is now working on GDI-related projects with a focus on poverty reduction, climate action and the digital economy. These issues are of growing importance to the ASEAN region, and countries have been working to address the problems caused by climate change and focus on the transition to a digital economy.
The areas of cooperation under the GDI and the BRI are different, with the BRI focusing on infrastructure financing and development, while the GDI is focused on achieving sustainable development goals through support and assistance to various countries. While the GDI is gaining momentum, Beijing is ensuring that the BRI is driven forward through high-level diplomatic engagement and is actively rebranding the initiative to incentivise ASEAN countries.
Assessment
An assessment of the BRI investment pattern in ASEAN countries between 2014 and 2023 shows a significant change in energy-related engagements. In the first half of 2023, the energy-related engagements were the greenest since the BRI’s inception in 2014.23 China currently has 24 megaproject commitments in ASEAN countries with a completion rate of 33 per cent.24 Projects worth US$ 35 billion are on track, and are expected to be completed soon. Despite China's pledge to invest more than US$ 50 billion in infrastructure, it has struggled to fully deliver on its commitments. While Japan is also an important player, it still lags behind China in terms of infrastructure investment. Even with downsizing and partially completed projects, China remains the top investor in ASEAN countries, providing more than any other international partners involved in the region.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Successful implementation of the Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement (RDPA) will require a deep understanding of the nuances and requirements of both the US and Indian defence procurement systems.
With sundry agreements signed between India and the United States (US) in the recent past, to facilitate defence cooperation, the next ones on the anvil are the Security of Supply Arrangement (SOSA) agreement and the Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement (RDPA). Described by a Korean analyst as a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in defence, getting RDPA through might be a challenge for the two countries.
Defence agreements serve a number of purposes, going beyond the specifics, and in the case of India and US, they have served as milestones, reflecting a deepening strategic partnership aimed at addressing common security challenges and advancing mutual interests. In fact, the very first of the agreements signed over the years, the Indo-US Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Technology Transfer, came about when negotiations with the Northrop company for the purchase of the F-5 G Tigershark fighter jet failed in 1981, following the refusal of the company to part with sensitive information on the operational effectiveness of the engine.1 This agreement paved the way for the supply of the General Electric F404 engine for the Light Combat Aircraft. Though the next agreement, the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), facilitating the sharing of military information and classified technologies, was signed in 2002, it was after much opposition from India, since it argued that the Indo-US MoU on Technology Transfer already covered most of the provisions of the GSOMIA.
A Defence Framework was signed in 2005 but US pressure to sign the so-called foundational agreements that would provide the “legal sinews for operational defence co-operation”, was resisted for various reasons. Getting the agreements through has often proved to be a long and laborious exercise, often due to misgivings about their actual utility and apprehensions of unintended consequences. In terms of utility, it was felt that the US would benefit more from these agreements, given the size of its military and its global footprint. To allay these misgivings, many of the recent boilerplate agreements have India-specific clauses and exemptions.2 These were finally signed, though, not all at once, after the renewal of the Defence Framework Agreement in 2015, with the US declaring India a Major Defence Partner in 2016. The first of these was the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) for mutual logistics support signed in 2016,3 followed by the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) for secure communications interoperability in 2018,4 the Industrial Security Annex (ISA) to the GSOMIA in 2019, and the Basic Exchange Cooperation Agreement (BECA) facilitating the sharing of geospatial information between the two countries in October 2020. Initial analyses following these agreements have extolled their benefits, particularly in the areas of “interoperability, making arms transfers easier and paving the way for improved cooperation on innovation and production”.5 However, in general, it is difficult to make a tangible assessment of their benefits.
Next on the anvil are the Security of Supply Arrangement (SOSA) agreement and the Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement (RDPA). Whilst the earlier agreements primarily facilitated interoperability, these agreements streamline defence commerce between the two countries, making it easier for private companies in the two countries to bid for each other’s defence contracts.
The signing of SOSA and RDPA was initially proposed in June 2023 by the United States Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin, during his visit to India. This proposal was part of a new roadmap aimed at strengthening defence industrial cooperation between the United States and India.6 This was subsequently reiterated in the Joint Statement following Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Washington in the same month. 7 Subsequently, the US government issued notice in the Federal Register in October 2023 and sought feedback from the defence industry community about their experience in participation in “public defence procurement conducted by or on behalf of the Indian Ministry of Defence”.8 The Indian Ministry of Defence is also soliciting similar feedback.9
For the foreign companies to be able to sell to the United States, their respective governments should have concluded an RDPA, as required under Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Pt. 225.10 The US has signed these agreements with 28 countries, many of them, close allies and partners, though with “varying scope, enforce ability, and reciprocity”.11 The US is currently going through a similar process with South Korea, with the Department of Defense (DoD) issuing notice on 23 February 2024.12 According to one account, discussions on the RDPA have been going on with South Korea since the mid-1980s, however, the Koreans are reluctant to sign as they fear that their defence industrial base would be adversely impacted by the onslaught of American equipment given that the RDPA calls for full reciprocal access to the defence procurement market.13 However, of late, there is a perception that the RDPA would be beneficial for joint development and production of advanced defence technologies and platforms. The example given is of Japan which, subsequent to the signing of an RDPA, has seen an uptick in collaboration between US and Japanese companies. Another benefit is that the RDPA provides an exemption to the Buy American Act which has made it mandatory for goods bought with federal funds to contain 75 per cent domestic content by 2029.14 Offers of evaluation of qualifying country end products are also carried out without applying the price differentials otherwise required by the Buy American statute and the Balance of Payments Program.15
Setting the positives aside, negotiating an RDPA will be a long and arduous process, a fact highlighted even by American officials.16 Its description as an “FTA for defence” only serves to underscore this point. Differences in procurement procedures in the respective countries would make the stated goals of ensuring transparency, fairness and reciprocity in defence procurements difficult to achieve in practice. Among the many issues that would come within the scope of the negotiations are the scope and coverage of the RDPA with regard to R&D and seeking exemptions from certain US procurement rules.
Even after the RDPA is signed, Indian contractors and sub-contractors will have to deal with the complex rules and regulations within the US defence procurement system. For instance, these regulations include several sections that outline the obligations of DoD contractors regarding the storage, transmission and processing of "controlled information", which refers to sensitive information with military applications. A significant portion of the DFARS rules on cybersecurity deals with the disclosure of data breaches, requiring contractors to report the type of incident and the malicious programs or tactics used. This is because defence contractors are prime targets for cyber criminals.17
These requirements cover a wide range of areas, such as limiting access to data, implementing audit controls, maintaining baseline configurations and configuration management of software and hardware, enforcing robust identity and access management (IAM), ensuring physical security of the workplace, and maintaining the integrity of personnel.
Meeting the DFARS requirements necessitates expertise in technical and security administration areas. Non-compliance can result in financial penalties and permanent disbarment. Additionally, contractors must now be CMMC (Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification) certified, with renewals required every three years. The CMMC is the standard the DoD uses to verify that companies meet cybersecurity requirements before being awarded contracts. The DFARS requirements pose significant challenges for companies, especially small and medium-sized contractors.18 Even American Industry associations have highlighted the lack of clarity around DFARS and CMMC, as well as the additional expenses that contractors must incur to bring their organisations up to the required specifications.19
While the potential benefits of the RDPA are substantial, including improved interoperability, technological advancements and economic growth, the path to its realisation is not without obstacles. Differences in procurement procedures, compliance with complex US regulations such as DFARS and CMMC, and concerns over potential impact on domestic defence industries will all need to be carefully addressed during the negotiation process. Successful implementation of the RDPA will require a deep understanding of the nuances and requirements of both the US and Indian defence procurement systems. Effective collaboration between the defence industries of the two nations will depend on their ability to navigate the regulatory landscape. This, in turn, would be critical to realising the full potential of these agreements.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Iran and Israel have shown preference for a carefully controlled escalation while avoiding a conflict spiral.
On 13 April 2024, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launched an aerial attack on Israel involving over 300 drones, cruise and ballistic missiles. Israel and its Western allies including the United States, the United Kingdom, France and neighbouring Jordan were able to organise a coordinated defence using fighter jets, warships, anti-missile and air defence systems intercepting most of the projectiles at the cost of more than US$ 1 billion. At least nine ballistic missiles evaded Israeli defences causing minor damages to Nevatim Air Base in Southern Israel, where Israel’s F-35 fighter jets are based.1
Iran’s Supreme National Security Council issued a statement which noted that Iran had carried out ‘minimum necessary punitive action’ within the framework of the ‘legitimate right of self-defence’ as outlined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. On 1 April 2024, Israeli air strikes had destroyed Iran’s consulate in Damascus killing seven IRGC officers including Quds Force senior-most commander for Syria and Lebanon, Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi. Since 7 October 2023 Hamas attacks, Israel has intensified its grey-zone attacks targeting the IRGC commanders in Syria and Lebanon with the objective of raising costs for the IRGC for its alleged involvement in targeting Israel. As Maj Gen Yaacov Amidror (Retd) observed, by targeting Iran’s consulate, Israel sent a strong signal to Iran that its continued actions are bringing Israel closer to launching a direct attack on it.2
Iran’s Retaliatory Strikes
The 13 April Iranian strikes against Israel were the first state-on-state attack and therefore entailed a new level of escalation and a significant change in Iran’s deterrence posture. Major General Hossein Salami, the Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC, noted that Iran’s retaliatory strikes have established a new equation with Israel and that if Israel attacked Iranian interests and citizens anywhere, the IRGC will retaliate from Iran. Salami, who served as deputy commander of IRGC until 2019 when he was appointed the Commander-in-Chief, is credited with revision of Iran's defensive doctrine along the lines of the “strategy of threat against threat” at a time when Iran faced renewed hostility from the United States and Israel under the former US President Donald Trump, who unilaterally withdrew from the Iran nuclear agreement.
The IRGC made first operational use of mid-range missiles in a counter-attack in June 2017 two weeks after ISIS claimed terrorist attacks in Tehran. It launched five to six Zolfaghars, solid-fuelled missiles with a range of some 700 kms from Kermanshah base at ISIS targets in the Deir el-Zour region of eastern Syria. In January 2020, Iran launched short-range missiles at Ayn al Asad and Erbil Air Bases housing US troops in Iraq following the assassination of Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani in a US drone attack in Baghdad. In February 2022, after an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) raid on a drone manufacturing facility in western Iran, the IRGC launched missiles on what it described as an Israeli ‘spy centre’ near the US consulate in Erbil.
On 16 January 2024, the IRGC carried out coordinated missile strikes by launching 24 Kheibar Shekan precision-guided ballistic missile with a range of 1,450 kms from different locations inside Iran to hit targets in Syria and Iraq. According to Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the commander of the IRGC Aerospace Forces,
four Khyber rockets were launched from southern Khuzestan at ISIS’s headquarters in Idlib, and an additional four from Kermanshah, along with seven rockets from East Azerbaijan, targeting the Zionist headquarters in Erbil.3 4
The missiles were launched from the south of the country to test if they could reach the intended range of 1,300 kms. Israeli media noted that by demonstrating the precision-strike capabilities and range of its new ballistic missiles, Iran was sending a message to Israel.5 On 13 April, in the multi-layered Iranian strike on Israel, Kheibar Shekan were the newest and the most advanced missile used together with Shahed-136 Kamikaze drones and Paveh cruise missile which have a range of 1,650 kms.
Iran’s aim was to demonstrate its credible capabilities as well as resolve or risk acceptance in engaging in escalation against a conventionally superior and a nuclear-armed adversary. On the occasion of Iran Army Day on 21 April, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei stressed that the number of missiles launched or hitting their targets, which has been a focus of the enemy, is secondary.6 The primary issue was demonstrating the emergence of the willpower of the Iranian people and the Armed Forces on the global stage, and this is what has upset the other side.
IRGC Aerospace Forces Commander Hajizadeh noted in an interview that while Israel had mobilised all its military resources to counter Iran's attacks, Iran had used only minimal capability that is only 20 per cent of what it had prepared to take action against Israel.7 The fact that Iran did not use its more advanced weapons such as Sajjil 2 missile or Fattah hypersonic missiles also underscore Iran’s deterrence strategy designed for different levels of conflict. At the current stage, Iranian attacks were not designed to cause damage, but intended to be a demonstrative measure.
As part of escalation management and to assuage Iran’s neighbouring countries’ concerns about its impending retaliation, Foreign Minister Hossein Abdollahian embarked on a regional tour starting with Oman, which often plays the role of a crucial diplomatic intermediary between Tehran and Washington in times of crisis. At Muscat, Abdollahian stated that in any counter-attacks Iran’s “sole goal in legitimate defence is to punish the Israeli regime” and it was not seeking to expand the conflict in the region. Muscat reportedly relayed Iran’s message to the US that Iranian attacks will be non-lethal and calibrated to target an Israeli military facility.8 Iran also notified its Arab neighbours of its retaliatory strikes on Israel 72 hours in advance, which gave ample time for Israel and its Western allies and regional partners to activate air defences for thwarting impending Iranian strikes.
Israeli Preference for Grey-Zone Attacks
Israeli military claimed that their multi-layered air defence system had successfully intercepted 99 per cent of Iranian drones and missiles. Israel’s European and American allies hailed their ‘defensive victory’, as they pressed Israel for de-escalation. Despite calls for restraint from close allies, Israel’s war cabinet led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu favoured retaliation. Subsequently, amid the uncertainty about how Israel will retaliate, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in his address at Iran’s annual army parade, warned that the “tiniest attack” by Israel would bring a “massive and harsh” response from Iran.9 Israeli counterstrike was therefore aimed at demonstrating Israeli resolve and restore deterrence in the face of Iranian threats.
Israeli media ratcheted up the threat of a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, leading Iran to temporarily close its nuclear facilities and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Rafael Grossi urging ‘extreme restraint’ from Israel. On 19 April, Iranian officials insisted that there had been “no air attack from outside borders”, and that three quadcopters were shot down by air defence in Isfahan.10 US officials claimed that Israeli Air Force fired three missiles from outside Iran that hit an air base in Isfahan housing Iran’s fleet of American-made F-14 Tomcats, and an air defence radar site defending Iran’s largest nuclear facility in Natanz.11
While Israel did not publicly take responsibility, the strikes exposed Iran’s vulnerabilities in order to influence Iranian cost-benefit calculus in any further escalation. By continuing with grey-zone tactic of ambiguity about the scale of attacks in Isfahan and plausible deniability about the source of attack, Israel handed Iran an off-ramp for de-escalation. Israel’s decision to not attack Iran’s nuclear facilities may have been shaped by pressure from its Western allies and Arab partners and also the messaging from Iran.
Israel attacking Iranian nuclear facilities would have led to spiral of escalation drawing a massive Iranian response against US interests in the region. On 18 April, a senior IRGC commander in charge of security of nuclear facilities, stated that if
Israel uses the threat of attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities as a tool to put pressure on Iran, it is possible and conceivable to revise Iran’s nuclear doctrine and policies and deviate from the previous declared considerations.12
Maj Gen Amidror (Retd), former National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Netanyahu, describes Iran's latent capacity to produce nuclear weapons as a key component of Iran's 'smart' strategy for war with Israel. He argues that Iran’s military nuclear capability will serve as an umbrella to ensure that hostile actions against Iran will not be possible, and that Tehran will be able to continue and even expand its aggressive activities throughout the region, mainly against Israel, but also against the United States.13
What the recent exchange of fire has demonstrated is that neither Iran nor Israel can claim escalation dominance that is having decidedly superior capabilities over the other to deter it from engaging in further escalation. However, the controlled or limited escalation by both countries suggest that they are determined to maintain a ‘balance of resolves’, where none is willing to accept the other’s deterrent red lines. Both sides have shown preference for a carefully controlled escalation while avoiding a conflict spiral.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Armenia–France ties are now shaping regional geopolitics in the Caucasus, and their bilateral relationship has become more meaningful after the Nagorno-Karabakh war.
Introduction
The Russia–Ukraine and the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict have impacted the Eurasian regional security framework. These conflicts have shaped and bolstered the contours of various relationships, including the Armenia–France relationship. France is Armenia's most critical European partner. Armenia’s complementarist approach, which is correlated to the recent foreign policy initiatives adopted regarding France, has further enhanced their relationship.
Paris and Yerevan’s high-level diplomatic dialogue has its roots in their centuries-long relationship based on shared values and cultural appreciation.1 Furthermore, after Russia, since 2016, France has ranked as the country with the second-largest investments in Armenia, totalling €229 million. Its investments are primarily in agri-food, water and banking.2 At the same time, as a member of Le Francophonie, Armenia contributes to promoting the French language and political, economic, educational and cultural cooperation with its European partner.3 More importantly, while being the first European nation to recognise the Armenian Genocide,4 on 14 October 2016, France took the additional step of criminalising the denial of the Armenian genocide.5
With the evolving geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus, Armenians could look towards the French as part of their continuous quest to diversify foreign relations and reduce Russia's influence. On the other hand, the French look towards Armenia as a viable partner, with which they already share old ties that would help further stamp their regional influence.
Current Dynamics
There has been an increased focus on strengthening cooperation between the two actors, reiterating the inviolability of Armenian sovereignty. French Prime Minister Gabriel Attal recently demanded the withdrawal of Azerbaijani troops from the occupied areas in Armenia, highlighting French support for Armenia.6 Apart from being active in its efforts to support Armenia in the conflict with Azerbaijan, the French remain focused on building its relationship with the Armenian defence sector.
Defence (including arms sales to Armenia) has long served as the primary sector of cooperation between Yerevan and Paris. The Nagorno-Karabakh war deepened their ties as France began selling air defence systems to bolster Armenia’s response. The two countries have also signed a contract on 23 October 2023 for three Ground Masters radars, including binoculars and sensors.7 Moreover, regular meetings between Ministers of Defence and an agreement to deploy a French defence consultant to train Armenian soldiers8 are now in place as part of the contract signed in October 2023. Armenia’s growing cooperation with France in this sector can be perceived as part of its undertaking to diversify and deepen its defence partnerships globally, mainly in the light of expanding Azerbaijani aggression.
France has adopted a proactive role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, with its involvement ranging from peace-making via the Minsk Group in the first War in Nagorno Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the 1990s to the recognition of the Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh in the Armenian) republic’s independence in 2020 after the start of the Second War.9 Additionally, it provided €15 million in emergency aid to Armenia to look after the refugees of Nagorno-Karabakh10 while condemning the Azerbaijani blockade in Lachin, which restricted the supply of goods and movement of people.11
Russia’s dismissive attitude towards Armenia has festered disappointment and resentment during the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. Resultantly, the latter has courted European countries like France with growing enthusiasm. The European Union peace initiatives have been received favourably by Armenians, who have sought greater international support and cooperation regarding Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
France is also home to the largest Armenian diaspora in the European Union and the third largest globally,12 with around 500,000. French governments therefore do recognise the significance of this diaspora electorally. Armenian causes find support across ideological fault lines in France. In 2017, four French Armenians—Daniele Cazarian, Nadia Essayan, Guillaume Kasbarian, and Jacques Marilossian—won election to the French parliament, highlighting their growing influence in the national political arena.
Recently, the entry ban on Mourad Papazian, the leader of the Dashnaktsutyun party (pan-Armenian party) based in France, was revoked. The ban was initially imposed on Papazian for protesting against the Armenian leadership's visit to France in June 2021.13 This tactical change in the Armenian leadership towards its external critics highlights the importance of the French-Armenian diaspora in promoting Armenian leadership ideas in France.
Besides this, the diaspora plays a prominent role in non-governmental organisations (NGOs), including the Armenian General Benevolent Union, based in France in five cities (Lyon, Marseille, Paris, Valence and Vienne). The organisation aims to build a bridge between Armenians and the diaspora and promote the prosperity and well-being of all Armenians.14
Russia’s and Azerbaijan's Reactions
Russia, one of the regional powers in the Caucasus, has reacted to rising Armenian-French relations. It has stated that it would reconsider its relationship with Armenia if it continues to tilt towards the West.15 Russia's reactions to Armenia’s relationship with France have not been as critical as its focus remains on France's involvement in Ukraine. But in the long term, there could be a more sharper response from Russia.
Azerbaijan has viewed the expanding French-Armenian ties negatively, criticising the recent developments in defence cooperation between the two countries. Accusing France of stoking a new war in the region by arming Armenia, the Azerbaijani government has forewarned that France would be culpable should another conflict arise.16 The Azerbaijanis have also denounced what they perceive as the absence of credible French involvement in the peace process despite its co-chairmanship of the Minsk Group.17
Azerbaijani officials have publicly expressed these criticisms despite Azerbaijan’s close economic cooperation with European countries such as France and membership of the European Union’s Eastern Partnership initiative. The Azerbaijanis’ hostile attitude must be understood through its ever-present resistance to France establishing a regional presence. This is mainly due to the French statements in support of the Armenian stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. France’s stance became more visible after the French statements on the Lachin blockade and the recognition of Artsakh as an independent Republic.
Conclusion
France and Russia’s opposing positions on Ukraine, primarily after President Emanuel Macron announced deploying troops in Ukrainian territory, have worsened ties between the two countries. Therefore, French involvement in Armenia would be viewed with even more suspicion and disdain. Armenia, like Ukraine, could become a stage for a new ‘Great Game’ in the long term between the two powers.
Due to Russian preoccupation in Ukraine, the Azerbaijanis have gained the advantage and held the upper hand over Armenia in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. France's increasing participation in the region could hinder that moving forward, creating a level playing field between the two conflicting nations.
Russia considered Armenia as a more significant ally in the post-Soviet space and would not want to entertain any involvement from Europe, particularly France. Armenia already has a complex relationship with the Russian-dominated security organisation, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, leading to a conflict of interest with Russia. Any attempts to move towards the European sphere or further develop any relationship could cause further friction between the two nations.
Despite the lack of probability of a possible Armenian defection from the Russian sphere of influence, Armenia would continue attempting to diversify its strategic partners and uphold its territorial sovereignty against adversarial powers.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Israel’s successful interception of Iranian missiles and drones has restored its image as a superior military power regionally, an image which was dented by the October 2023 Hamas attacks.
The situation in West Asia continues to deteriorate with the Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus that killed seven Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officials on 1 April 2024 and the subsequent retaliatory Iranian attack on Israel on 13 April with more than 300 drones and missiles fired towards Israel. This is the first direct Iranian attack on Israel and the biggest escalation in the region since the beginning of the Israel–Hamas War in October 2023. Iran has also seized an Israel-linked ship in the Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz on 13 April.
Israel has been successful in intercepting most of the drones and missiles before they entered its airspace. Israeli interceptions shows its military defensive capability and preparedness in the face of Iranian attack. While the 7 October Hamas attack exposed Israeli complacency and raised doubts about its claims of technological superiority and its application in national security, the successful interception of Iranian missiles and drones has effectively restored Israel's image as a superior military power. The US, UK and Jordan also intercepted several drones and missiles.
The Iranian Argument
In a statement before the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on 13 April, Iran stated that it has evoked Article 51 of the UN Charter for self-defence against the defiance of Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter by Israel on account of its military aggression against its diplomatic premises in Syria.1 Named as ‘Operation Truthful Promise’, the Iranian attack on Israel has also sent a larger message to the US, UK and other countries supporting Israel. The attack is seen as Iranian defiance of the Israeli military operations in Gaza and the Western support for Israel.
Iran has stated that the 13 April attack was a retaliation against the Israeli attack on its consulate in Syria and there will be no more attacks on Israel as it “deemed the matter concluded.”2 It has also forewarned that if Israel or the US attacks Iran, then they will face a strong response from Iran.3 Iran has also stated that US military bases in the region will be in danger if it joined any Israeli attack against Iran.4
The Iranian strategy of launching a retaliatory attack on Israel and then unilaterally declaring that it has “deemed the matter concluded” reflects growing Iranian confidence in dealing with Israel. Such an Iranian exhibition of military prowess and diplomatic assertiveness would further soar up tension between the two. Iran’s retaliatory attack and this statement would make Israel seriously think and ponder over its next course of action.
Israel Weighs its Options
Israeli response after the first direct Iranian attack would, to a large extent, shape the course of the conflict. The Israeli war cabinet met on 15 April and decided to take action on Iran as the attack of this scale and nature cannot “pass without a reaction”.5 As a result of the pressure from its allies, there are indications that Israel will not engage in a large scale military response against Iran to avoid escalation in the region. However, an explosion was reported in Isfahan in central Iran in the early hours of 19 April. Three UAVs were intercepted by the Iranian Air Force. Though it is believed to be a ‘limited attack’ by Israel, it has not officially claimed the attack and the Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian has downplayed the attack by stating that “It has not been proved to us that there is a connection between these and Israel.”6 Israeli ‘limited attack’ is a message to Iran though that it has the capability and intent to penetrate deep inside Iran’s sensitive areas.
Whether the Benjamin Netanyahu government adopts a restrained or an aggressive approach towards Iran , the Israel–Iran rivalry has already taken a new and decisive turn. The chances of scaling down of the actions and approaches of Israel and Iran look slim. The possibility of an Israel–Iran direct face-off has been brewing since the beginning of the Israel–Hamas War in October 2023. Iran has backed Hamas and hosted its leaders in Tehran and, thus, Israel has alleged Iran of being indirectly fighting a war against it. Since the beginning of the War, Israel has faced attacks from Hezbollah from across the Lebanese border as well. Iran’s presence in Israel’s neighbourhood is a major national security challenge for Israel.
Regional Impact
Hamas has described the Iranian attack on Israel as “legitimate and deserved”.7 However, the recent escalation further limits the potential for negotiations and severely undermines any progress made in the talks between Israel and Hamas over the release of Israeli hostages and cessation of the war. Regional powers such as Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE have expressed concerns and called for restraint from both Israel and Iran.
However, if there is an escalation between Israel and Iran, their support for peace efforts may be adversely affected. Additionally, the situation in various regional flashpoints may deteriorate, leading to significant collateral damage in the event of a military escalation between Israel and Iran. Israeli airstrikes in Syria could escalate, and Hezbollah's involvement in the Israel–Hamas conflict, which has been limited thus far, may increase. The already tense situation in the Red Sea, with Houthi attacks on ships and the presence of foreign navies, would worsen in the event of an escalation.
The situation remains tense amid the calls for restraint and de-escalation from regional and global leaders. As Israel weighs its options against Iran, a heightened fear pervades the entire region. Regional powers are urging de-escalation between Israel and Iran, recognising that a direct confrontation between these two major military forces would have devastating consequences for the region's security and stability.
Israel finds itself in a dilemma, torn between demonstrating its deterrence and maintaining strategic patience. With Iran's expanding influence in the region and its political assertiveness posing significant challenges, any further significant Israeli strike on Iran in the near future will have severe repercussions for the region.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Russia–Ukraine war has not only exacerbated already broken relations between the US and Russia but has emerged as a major hindrance to the conduct of the arms control talks.
On 18 March 2024, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) convened a meeting on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation. Speaking at the meeting, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the United States (US) Representative to the UN expressed her country’s willingness to engage with Russia and China on the issue of bilateral arms control discussion without any preconditions.1
However, Moscow reiterated its position that it will debate arms control with the US as part of a broader debate rather than divorced from the overall security situation in the region.2 In January 2024, during a press conference, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused the US of using the Kyiv regime to create direct security threats to Russia.3 Nevertheless, he kept an opening for resumption of the talks in the future by saying that “we do not reject this idea altogether…”4
Recently, Russian President Vladimir Putin, in his annual address to the Federal Assembly, asserted that if the US wanted to have strategic stability dialogue, “it must be done as a package”, taking care of all the aspects that impinge on Russian security.5 He implied that the arms control talks should discuss Western support for Ukraine.
From the statements of the Russian side, it is clear that the Ukraine war has a role to play in the stalled arms control efforts. It has become one of the stumbling blocks in strategic stability dialogue, especially in light of the expiration of the last remaining arms control treaty—the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), in 2026.
Decoding Arms Control Talks Breakdown
The Ukraine war has cast a shadow over the arms control talks in more than one way. First, Russia's direct involvement in the Ukraine war, as opposed to the indirect support of the US from afar by way of military assistance, is impeding the arms control efforts. The Ukraine war is being played out on the territory of Ukraine and Russia. During the Cold War, it was observed that superpowers hammered out arms control deals when they sensed that a nuclear attack was imminent on their territories. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962, when the superpowers threatened each other’s territories with a nuclear strike from close proximity, prodded the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to negotiate arms control measures.
Today, the situation is different as the US is physically insulated from the consequences of war as opposed to Russia. Thus, there is an asymmetry in terms of stakes involved in the arms control talks. While the US would like to continue with the arms control talks independent of the overall geopolitical situation on the ground, Moscow has sought to link the negotiations with the Ukraine war as it wants to keep all options open to have the upper hand and meet war objectives at the end of the war. Lavrov clearly stated that since Washington waged a hybrid war against Moscow, Russia does not see any reason “for engaging in strategic stability talks with the United States in general.”6
Second, the collateral fallout of the Ukraine war in the form of Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO has made Russia more insecure. President Putin, in his speeches on 21 and 24 February 2022 addressed to Russian citizens, clearly emphasised the threat perception coming out of the eastward expansion of NATO. Putin assessed that the expansion of NATO into Ukraine was just a matter of time, and the country would serve as a “bridgehead”7 in the eventuality of an attack by NATO on Russia. He calculated that with the advanced strategic and non-strategic weapons on Russia’s borders, it would be a “knife to throat” situation for the country.8
Although the aim of the so-called “special military operation” was to “demilitarise and denazify Ukraine”, Putin’s speeches clearly suggest that the real objective was to deter NATO from being present at the borders of Russia. However, things turned out exactly the opposite, and the neutral Nordic countries on the north-western border of Russia also became parties to NATO. Thus, Russia’s three core demands—prevention of NATO expansion, no assault weapons on the Russian borders and rolling back NATO’s military capacity and infrastructure in Europe to where they were in 19979 —have gone for a toss.
Putin thinks that the “US administration’s professed interest in discussing strategic stability is merely demagoguery”.10 Flagging reckless expansion of NATO and waging a hybrid war against Moscow by the US, Lavrov accused Washington of wanting to resume inspection and visit Russian nuclear facilities in the garb of strategic stability talks.11 Thus, it seems Russia feels it is futile to engage Washington in the arms control talks. With the Ukraine war turning into a virtual fight between NATO and Russia, Moscow is trying to convey its disapproval of the current ground reality through non-participation in the arms control talks.
Third, the Ukraine war has led to the crumbling of the European as well as global arms control architecture. The expansion of NATO and Russian reaction to the same has sabotaged any chance of revival of the cornerstone of the European arms control architecture—the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. In the middle of the Ukraine war, the Russian Foreign Ministry said that “while the deal initially helped to stabilise the security framework in Europe, the US-led military bloc later started to overtly bypass the restrictions, including by admitting new members.”12
As a result, the CFE was dismantled on 7 December 2023, with the formal withdrawal of Russia from the same.13 The US, along with the NATO allies, have also suspended the operation of the CFE treaty.14 The Treaty signed in 1990, aimed to limit the number of conventional arms and equipment. It was revised in 1999 as the ‘Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe’ to suit the geopolitical conditions of the time post-Cold War.
However, it was never ratified by the US and its allies. In turn, Russia decided to suspend its participation in the Treaty in 2007 and ceased to participate actively in 2015. Although the Treaty was ineffectual for all practical purposes, countries had not formally exited the same until the Ukraine war began. By formally withdrawing from the Treaty, the countries signalled their intentions vis-à-vis the arms control architecture.
However, this is just a continuation of the global trend in the arena of arms control. Putin cast aspersions on the US’ withdrawal from the Anti-Ballestic Missile (ABM) treaty in 2002 and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in 2019 in his address in February 2022, raising suspicion about the Pentagon’s intentions to attack mainland Russia.15 According to him, the US intends “to discuss strategic security issues with us while simultaneously trying to inflict strategic defeat on Russia on the battlefield.”16 Thus, the current environment of mistrust is impacting arms control efforts negatively.
Fourth, the protracted Ukraine war has dented Russia’s image as a great power due to its failure to win the war decisively. During the Cold War, the US and the West relied on nuclear weapons to offset their conventional inferiority vis-à-vis the USSR. After the end of the Cold War, the Russian economy stagnated, resulting in the stagnation of its technological base and impacting its ability to strengthen conventional munitions. Therefore, it looks like Russia wants to compensate for its conventional weakness by relying on nuclear weapons.
Russia is still a significant military power, especially in terms of the number of nuclear weapons it possesses. Putin wants the world to remember that an enduring international order is impossible in the absence of a strong and sovereign Russia.17 The Kremlin’s nuclear position may give it a semblance of power parity with the US. By engaging in the arms control dialogue, Russia does not want to lose its leverage.
Conclusion
It is clear that the Ukraine war has emerged as a major hindrance to the conduct of the arms control talks. It has exacerbated already broken relations between the US and Russia. The statements from Moscow suggest that Russia is feeling insecure about its place in the emerging world order. The country is also feeling threatened due to the geographic expansion of NATO. The demise of European security architecture and the dismantling of the CFE have added to the environment of mistrust.
Therefore, Russia is treating arms control talks as a strategic leverage against the West, which it is unlikely to give up. Moscow’s direct involvement in the war and diminished status in the emerging world, the collapse of European security architecture and Russian insecurities vis-à-vis NATO’s eastward expansion have made strategic stability dialogue even more difficult. Thus, arms control talks have become hostage to the Ukraine war, even if it is not the only factor that is stalling the dialogue.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The race to climate neutrality must be guided by responsible practices and environmental stewardship is paramount.
Overview
As the world races towards a net-zero future, the critical mineral value chain emerges as both a linchpin and a potential obstacle to achieving climate neutrality goals. While countries have been adopting a range of initiatives to secure supply of critical minerals required for transition, the environmental, social and economic implications of an unsustainable value chain are often ignored in the policy debates. Ensuring the sustainability of this value chain is crucial, given its pivotal role in supplying the minerals essential for clean energy technologies. However, without adequate policies and governance mechanisms, the critical mineral sector could pose significant risks to environment sustainability, social equity, and economic stability and can eventually lead to risks to energy transition goals.
Risks of Critical Mineral Value Chain
The global push towards decarbonisation will lead to significant demand for critical minerals to support its transition. The demand for certain critical minerals is projected to grow up to 500 per cent by 2050,1 with sectors such as transportation, energy, and semiconductor manufacturing driving this growth. Importing countries face economic risks due to potential supply shortages and geopolitical tensions. In view of this surging demand, many importing countries have been shaping strategies to ensure the uninterrupted supplies of minerals critical to fuel their climate mitigation initiatives. About 30 to 50 minerals have been listed as critical to energy transition or strategic to national security, by many major economies.
While Canada, Australia and many European countries are major producers of some minerals, a significant share of critical minerals pivotal for energy clean technologies are sourced from many developing and least developed economies, which are rich in biodiversity and have fragile systems. The overlap of mining locations and areas rich in biodiversity threatens serval species of flora and fauna.2 For example, studies note that one-third of Africa’s great ape population faces mining-related risks,3 while several migratory fish species and river-dwelling birds are affected by mining related water pollution in Brazil.4
Critical mineral mining related adverse impacts are not limited to the biodiversity in one or two regions, but happens on a global scale mostly due to the increasing land usage and the corresponding impact on water resources, land and air.5 Weak governance mechanisms and not so stringent environmental regulations in these developing economies help the mining and processing industry to flourish. The fact that the industry contributes to economic and social benefits in terms of resource rent and employment opportunities, also justifies less stringent regulations by the government.6 However, the larger adverse impact on the environment, people and society – mostly related to the mining, processing, and waste management activities, are often not paid adequate attention in policy making.
Key challenges and crosscutting issues in the value chain demand efficient policy, governance, technology and financial measures to enable just and equitable transition to climate neutrality
Source: Authors
The environmental impacts include biodiversity loss, land degradation, water resource depletion and pollution stemming from the extraction and processing. Social implications range from disruptions to local communities and livelihoods to altering employment scenarios in mining regions. Economic challenges are particularly acute for producing countries, where the ripple effects of environmental and social impacts can have far-reaching consequences on national economy. Technical challenges within the value chain include inefficient processing, usage, and limited recycling of critical minerals, exacerbating resource inefficiencies and environmental degradation. In addition to these core challenges, cross-cutting issues such as equity, gender and justice concerns, impact on agrifood systems, and transition risks for businesses further complicate the landscape.
While part of the world is accelerating towards clean energy future, many poor economies will eventually end up damaging their environment This raises the question how well is the world prepared to steer towards a just and equitable transition to net-zero future.
To address these challenges, robust policies and governance mechanisms are essential. Stakeholders across the globe must collaborate to establish transparent regulatory frameworks, promote responsible mining practices, and enforce environmental and social standards throughout the value chain. Additionally, financial support and technological innovations are crucial for enhancing the sustainability and efficiency of critical mineral production and utilisation.
What Can the World do for Risk Alleviation?
To alleviate these risks and ensure a smooth transition, three specific efforts must be made, in addition to the conventional approaches. First, while supply challenges and geopolitical tensions are significant concerns in the critical mineral value chain, focusing solely on these aspects overlooks the broader spectrum of risks. Stakeholders will need to expand the scope of planning beyond traditional supply-centric perspectives, to develop strategies that address the multifaceted risks of the value chain. A starting point could be to shape and implement stringent regulations to ensure responsible mining practices, improving transparency in the value chain, and investing in technologies that enhances efficient processing of minerals. Stakeholders will also need to ensure equitable distribution of benefits to the local and indigenous population whose livelihood may be affected due to the mining impacts.
Secondly, many of the mining activities lead to innumerable impact on biodiversity and natural resources. While sustainable practices are essential, aiming for regenerative approaches can yield even greater benefits. Regenerative strategies that seek to restore ecosystems, protect biodiversity, and ensure well-being of the local communities are essential. Regenerative outcome is also closely linked to how efficiently stakeholders are adopting circular economic principles. Designing processes with end-of-life recycling stakeholders can manage waste and maximise resource efficiency in key operations in mining and processing.
Lastly, responsible transition is utmost important. The race to climate neutrality must be guided by responsible practices and environmental stewardship is paramount. The businesses will also need to embrace responsible transition initiatives and engage in meaningful dialogue with local communities. However, it is important to make these interventions transformational unlike the current landscape where environmental, social and governance (ESG) norms are often criticised for being limited to mere target meeting exercise.7
Conclusion
Addressing the challenges of the critical mineral value chain requires a concerted effort from governments, industry players, civil society and local communities. By implementing robust policies, fostering transparency and accountability, investing in technological innovation, and prioritising social equity, countries can navigate the complexities of the energy transition while minimising environmental impacts and promoting inclusive development. By looking beyond supply challenges and geopolitics, embracing sustainable and regenerative practices, and transitioning responsibly, the world can foster a resilient and equitable transition to a sustainable energy future.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
India's evolving defence diplomacy reflects its growing strategic ambitions.
As India’s profile as a security partner has improved in concert with its economic and scientific growth and its military stands out as a stabilising factor in the region, the need to engage with the rest of the world on defence issues has become more relevant. Providing a strategic context to defence cooperation efforts in the changing security environment is important.
Historically, India has used instruments of military power not only to protect its national interests, but also to safeguard, when requested, the interests of friendly countries against internal disturbances and disorders, including in Korea, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. As per the terms of the Indo-Bhutan treaty, India has discharged its obligation to defend the security of Bhutan. It has maintained a key Indian military training establishment in Bhutan since 1969.
India has extended military expertise and assistance to Mauritius and Seychelles and other countries in restoring order in lesser known operations. In Central Asia, India has an air force facility and a military hospital. India has provided training and infrastructure development assistance to a large number of countries in Africa, Asia, and Central Asia. India has also been a significant contributor to UN Peacekeeping efforts since independence. On a number of occasions, India has successfully used diplomatic and defence instruments in responding to humanitarian and natural disasters worldwide.
In the emerging geopolitical environment, defence cooperation is increasingly becoming a dynamic tool for achieving India’s overall diplomatic objectives. India’s diplomatic interactions with other countries have increased significantly over the last two decades. The joint statements issued at the highest levels invariably include defence and military cooperation.
India has defence cooperation agreements of one kind or the other with over 50 countries. The emphasis is on security dialogues, joint military exercises, and cooperation amongst Special Forces, intelligence sharing, maritime domain awareness, co-production and co-development of high technology equipment and defence research and development. With some countries, training and capacity building is given high priority.
Overall, India's evolving defence diplomacy reflects its growing strategic ambitions. By continuing to effectively address the challenges and capitalising on the opportunities, India can significantly enhance its security and position as a major global player. India can not only safeguard its own interests, but also contribute to global and regional peace and stability, with focused attention to defence diplomacy in the coming years.
In this context, the decision of the government as reported on 10 April 2024 to increase defence representation in several countries is indeed noteworthy. International defence representation by way of positioning a military officer as a Defence Attaché in missions abroad is an internationally accepted norm for enhancing defence cooperation with other countries. It is an ideal tool to advance a nation’s foreign policy objectives by building bridges of friendship that can be operationalised in times of crises and conflicts.
It is equally true that many countries have enhanced their international defence representation in India manifold, recognising the utility of the office of Defence Attachés. There are over 120 Defence Attachés from over 70 countries stationed in India, with frequent requests for further enhancements. This shows the importance attached by other countries to enhance defence cooperation with India.
In contrast, India, for several years had around 50 defence wings abroad. Thus, the announcement of new billets of 16 defence attaches from the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force to be posted to various locations is a significant development that reflects India's growing strategic ambitions and its focus on expanding its military partnerships around the world. Not doing so would have opportunity costs which India can ill afford and is a very positive sign of a pro-active policy in responding to the challenges of a fast evolving geopolitical scenario.
Evidently, the established international order is under stress and becoming less effective in dealing with the emerging challenges. This move is likely a response to growing geopolitical competition and India's desire to strengthen its strategic ties and military diplomacy with these countries. There are several first-time deployments including several African nations. The focus seems to be on strategically important regions like Africa, Asia (including the Philippines and Armenia), and Europe (Poland).
Recommendations
A major drawback is that the Defence Attachés are on a one-time assignment with little previous experience in international diplomacy. It is a one-time posting for high performing officers who usually only report to the Service Intelligence Directorates. There is a need to professionalise the training of Defence Attachés to include language skills and attachment with the territorial division of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).
Defence Attachés are often under conflicting pressure of functioning between their controlling agency (Director General, Defence Intelligence Agency) and the parent service (respective service Intelligence Directorates). The MoD may in consultation with the MEA consider creating a cadre of specialists from the Defence Forces. They will benefit by spending some time in the concerned divisions of the MEA. MoD and MEA could create a dedicated cadre of area experts including language experts from Armed Forces who can be rotated between missions, service headquarters and the MEA.
Defence Attaches need to be considered as an extension of the diplomatic missions and there has to be clear objective settings and goals for them other than that which is accorded by the Service Headquarters. Defence Attachés could be called by the MoD to India for an Annual Review where their goals could be evaluated and stipulated pro-actively.
The officers with experience and the talent could be seconded to regional organisations that are considered essential in furthering India’s national security and foreign policy objectives. There are several regional organisations like the Indian Ocean Association for Regional Cooperation (IORA), ASEAN, African Union (AU), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). India engages significantly with some of these organisations on defence and security matters. The government could identify specific organisations which could have representation for furthering defence cooperation. The Armed Forces may also create a pool of Liaison Officers (LO) based in the service HQ to coordinate and also to undertake visits, if necessary, to the these organisations. Such LOs' can function from the IDS or Service HQs.
The Armed Forces could also consider sending on deputation serving and retired armed forces experts for overseeing projects and infrastructure being constructed overseas. Indian missions and Defence Attachés need to be specifically tasked to explore the potential of beneficial defence collaborations, for marketing and co-development and export of defence products. This would not just be to co-develop defence items but to give a fillip to their own defence R&D.
Transfer of Technology guidelines may be game changers in time to come if the right policies and opportunities are provided and markets are exploited. Indian Missions abroad should be tasked to identify companies that can be acquired, technology that can be sourced as well as facilitate the entry of Indian private companies into foreign supply chains.
The Ministry of Defence also conducts two major international defence exhibitions viz., the biennial Air Show and DEFEXPO. In both these events, leading indigenous and foreign defence industries participate showcasing their latest systems and inventories. A large number of delegations, often headed by the Defence Ministers or Chiefs of Armed Forces, participate in these two prestigious events. These events can continue to be utilised as opportunities to further defence collaborations. India should also continue to actively participate in global expositions and air shows to establish markets for Indian defence exports.
DRDO, DPSU, new corporatised Ordnance factories should develop capabilities to customise their products for export requirement in concert with the Indian private industry and fully exploiting opportunities available. There is also a need to formalise an export policy.
Conclusion
Defence cooperation has been an important component of India’s overall defence diplomacy. India has been using its Armed Forces to further the country’s national interests by contributing proactively to achieve international peace and security as well as creating conducive conditions for accelerating India’s ongoing transformation from an importer of defence equipment to an exporter. The decision to increase Defence Attache representation will no doubt help build capacities in furtherance of national interests.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The GCC’s ‘Vision for Regional Security’ is a conscious move on the part of the GCC to reaffirm its cohesion at the time of fast-evolving regional crises.
For the first time since its inception, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) announced its ‘Vision for Regional Security’ at a ceremony held in its headquarters in Riyadh on 28 March 2024. While announcing the launch of the document, GCC Secretary General Jasem Mohamed Al Budaiwi stated that the “Vision for Regional Security is not just a political commitment, but an ethical dedication that unites us all.”1 He also stated that “our common security is the foundation upon which we build our hopes and dreams for a better future.”2 Similar sentiments have been previously expressed by the leaders of the GCC on multiple occasions. However, the national interests of the individual countries, the fluid nature of regional security and the complex geopolitics have hindered unity against the common security challenges.
Principles, Objectives and Commitments
The ‘Vision for Regional Security’ emphasises that it is based on the principles of shared destiny and indivisible security of the member states, and any threat to one is a threat to all the member States.3 This was also earlier mentioned in the Joint Defence Agreement of the GCC signed in 2000.4 The vision document is based on the principles of respecting sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of the States. Based on these principles, the GCC aims to preserve regional security and stability, tackle the challenges facing them and settle the disputes through peaceful means. It also intends to build regional and international partnerships to deal with the regional threats.5
To achieve these objectives, the vision document emphasises joint efforts on the part of all the member states to avoid the use of force and prioritise dialogue and negotiation to resolve their differences. The Vision for Regional Security enlists a number of old and some new issues affecting regional security of the GCC. The document reiterates the traditional concern of the GCC countries on terrorism and extremism. It urges the member states to combat terrorism and extremism, stopping the flow of money to the hands of the terrorists and combat money laundering.6
The concern of the GCC countries over maritime security has also been reflected in the document. It calls for regional and international coordination to ensure maritime security and ensure trade and energy supply routes. As all the GCC countries are key suppliers of energy, any disruption in the sea lines of communication will directly affect their national economies.
As the threat of a nuclear arms race in the region looms large with Iran and Israel having nuclear programmes, the GCC has urged to make the region a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ). It calls for a nuclear non-proliferation regime in West Asia, and at the same time, supports the right of the States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.7
With growing digitisation and the use of the internet, the number of cyber-attacks has also increased. They are also apprehensive that in case of any conflict, they would be highly vulnerable to cyber-attacks from their adversaries. Therefore, the vision document urges the member states to take effective steps to combat cyber security challenges.
Apart from the traditional security issues, climate change, water and food security, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), energy security, defending economic resources and creating investment opportunities have also been prioritised and included in their conception of regional security.8 Historically, the GCC has consistently emphasised the imperative of collaboration among the member states in addressing these shared challenges. These non-traditional security issues have increasingly occupied the attention of the GCC rulers in recent years and have been articulated in the vision document.
This is a clear reflection of the widening ambit of the GCC’s conception of regional security. The GCC has moved beyond the traditional interpretation of regional security and its analysis of regional security has become more comprehensive in nature and scope. Previously, the regional security issues were primarily articulated through official communiqués issued after the high-level summit meetings of the GCC. The unveiling of the vision document constitutes a formal and unambiguous articulation of their regional security vision and a reiteration of their commitment to work together in this regard.
Geopolitical Context
The document has come at a time when the West Asian region is engulfed in a turmoil since the beginning of the Israel–Hamas War in October 2023. The vision document makes explicit reference to the Israel–Palestine issue and calls for activating the Arab Peace Initiative.9 Among others, it calls for a two-State solution, the withdrawal of Israeli forces to the pre-June 1967 borders and the establishment of an independent Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as its capital. It seems like the devastating consequences of the ongoing Israel–Hamas War and its regional implications have had an impact on the formulation of the vision document. The GCC often expresses its concerns over other regional issues such as the crisis in Yemen, Syria, Libya, Lebanon etc., but the Israel–Palestine issue is the only regional issue which finds a mention in the vision document.
The Israel–Hamas War has impacted the wider region as well, spilling over into the neighbouring Red Sea. The Houthis, whom the GCC member countries except Oman have fought against, have again become active. They have been targeting the ships in the Red Sea and as a result, a new tension has been created in the high seas. A coalition of more than 20 countries led by the US has started ‘Operation Prosperity Guardian’ to ensure the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. The tensions in the Red Sea affects all the GCC countries, more specifically Saudi Arabia, as it shares a long border with the Red Sea. While Riyadh’s engagement with the Houthis was moving in a positive direction following the Saudi–Iran rapprochement, the Houthis involvement in the Israel–Hamas War has brought the Houthi trouble back for the Kingdom.
The Israel–Hamas War has once again brought the US–Iran tension in the region to the fore. Recent months have witnessed an increasing number of attacks on the US forces by different militia groups in GCC’s neighbourhood in Iraq, Syria and Jordan. The US has alleged that these groups are backed by Iran. The GCC countries are worried about any further military escalation between the US and Iran in their neighbourhood.
The announcement of the document at this point is a conscious move on the part of the GCC to reaffirm its cohesion at the time of fast-evolving regional crises. It proposes a comprehensive framework of regional security which promotes negotiation and dialogue to overcome disagreements, violence and conflict. Furthermore, it reinforces the role of the organisation in mediating as well as resolving regional conflicts. While the vision document is an effort in the right direction, executing this framework in a volatile geopolitical and security environment will test the commitment of the individual member states and the unity of the GCC as a collective.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The launch of the ADITI Scheme reflects the government’s commitment to promote innovations in defence technologies by Indian start-ups for the armed forces.
The Innovations for Defence Excellence-Defence Innovation Organisation (iDEX-DIO), under the aegis of Department of Defence Production (DDP), Ministry of Defence, organised the DefConnect 2024 on 4 March 2024 in New Delhi. Raksha Mantri (RM) Rajnath Singh inaugurated the key event, which witnessed the involvement of notable stakeholders including the military, defence sector, emerging businesses, educational institutions and decision-makers, aiming to foster cooperation among them. The aim of the event was to
The RM, while delivering the inaugural address, stressed on the importance of achieving Aatmanirbharta in defence production. He launched the ‘Acing Development of Innovative Technologies’ with iDEX (ADITI) Scheme with the objective to “promote innovations in critical and strategic defence technologies”.2 The RM noted that iDEX has been expanded to iDEX Prime with the innovation grants being raised from Rs 1.5 Cr to Rs 10 Cr and stated that the intent behind these schemes was to enable India to transform in to a knowledge society. He expressed confidence that the initiatives like iDEX and ADITI Schemes will bolster the defence sector and reduce the reliance on imports.
In the course of DefConnect 2024, Raksha Mantri Singh reiterated the significance of attaining self-reliance by reducing the dependence on import of weapon systems and stressed that “getting a hold on state-of-the-art defence technology [is] the most crucial aspect to achieve self-reliance due to the increasing role of cutting-edge technology in warfare in today’s time”.3 He outlined two approaches to achieving technological self-reliance—adopting the latest innovations from other countries or fostering indigenous capabilities through research and development (R&D).4 Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan noted that the event was a great initiative to connect the vision of MoD, services and innovators in the defence manufacturing sector.5
Key Features of the ADITI Scheme
iDEX was established in 2018 under the Defence Innovation Organisation (DIO) as a ‘not for profit’ company as per Section 8 of the Companies Act 2013, to create an ecosystem with necessary infrastructure support and incubation in Defence by engaging industries, start-ups, MSMEs, even academia, for R&D and technology development. The ADITI Scheme, which is a sub-scheme within iDEX, encompasses a corpus of Rs 750 crore covering the period 2023–2024 to 2025–2026, and is to be administered by the DIO to encourage “innovations in critical and strategic defence technologies”.6
Technologies deemed ‘Critical and Strategic’ encompass
Critical and strategic technologies will increasingly drive innovation and modernisation efforts of the Indian Armed Forces to bolster combat potential and capacity building. The ADITI Scheme aims to foster the development of critical and advanced technologies essential for national security, filling gaps where existing capabilities are lacking. Stakeholder interactions, including with the Armed Forces, start-ups, MSMEs, and academic incubators, underscored the need for increased funding for projects concerning critical and strategic technologies, as highlighted during the Ministry of Defence’s Chintan Shivir in July 2023.8
The scheme offers grants of up to 50 per cent of the Product Development Budget (PDB) with a maximum limit of Rs 25 crore, potentially leading to a PDB of Rs 50 crore or more. The scheme is intended to be monitored by the team with the DIO Board chaired by Secretary (DP) ‘through partner incubators to ensure regular guidance and adequate resources for oversight’.9 The project consists of 6 milestones, with a payment limit of Rs 9 lakh per case, amounting to Rs 1,50,000 for each milestone, allocated for Partner Incubator (PIs) upon completion of each milestone by the respective challenge winner.
In total, the estimated expenditure for PIs is approximately Rs 3 crore. These grants will facilitate research and development intended towards innovations in defence technology. Its objective is to accelerate the development of approximately 30 deep-tech critical and strategic technologies by 2026.10 These 30 technologies will primarily serve defence applications with export potential.
Secondly, it aims to foster collaboration between start-ups, MSMEs and established industry players to bring these technologies to fruition, and reduce dependence on foreign Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). The ADITI Scheme leverages the existing iDEX Scheme to streamline the development process. The Scheme endeavours to create a ‘Technology Watch Tool’, as a mechanism to close the capability gap in the armed forces, and to strengthen the country’s defence innovation ecosystem.
The purpose of the ‘Technology Watch Tool’ is to bridge the gap between modern armed forces’ needs and defence innovation ecosystem capabilities, facilitating strategic policy formation and milestone monitoring. The technology watch tool will also ensure no overlap in technologies through technology foresight workshops. Within the technology watch tool, an estimated 3 per cent of the grant in aid amount is estimated for challenge winners and Partner Incubators (PIs) is expected to accommodate the specialised services required from external agencies and subject matter experts for the curation and evaluation of critical high-cost technologies.11
The problem statements initiated under the ADITI Scheme will be termed as ADITI challenges. In the first edition of launch of the scheme, 17 challenges have been launched out of which three were from the Indian Army, five each from the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force and four from the Defence Space Agency.12 Furthermore, ADITI seeks to enhance these critical technologies through continuous development and integrate them with products and technologies from the existing iDEX scheme.
Enhanced funding and collaborative efforts are essential for advancing defence technology, and national security interests. The embedded framework will also enable the integration of cutting-edge defence systems and technologies into the defence establishment. There are several important components with regard to implementation of the ADITI Scheme.
Firstly, it provides support for up to two winners per challenge in the ADITI programme, with each applicant eligible for only one challenge at a time, ensuring a fair process.13 The Scheme primarily benefits start-ups, MSMEs and Partner Incubators (PI). A network of approximately 10 Partner Incubators is proposed to be established to offer specialised support to bolster India’s self-defence capabilities and defence exports by fostering the creation of innovative technologies and products.
Moreover, there will be direct engagement with military and government agencies to align technology-driven requirements of the armed forces of the country. Stringent oversight mechanisms will ensure proper utilisation of government funds, including a comprehensive grant management system and close monitoring through an IT platform and dashboard. Lastly, any supplementary activities deemed necessary to advance the scheme's core objectives will be undertaken.
In addition to launch of the ADITI Scheme, the 11th edition of the Defence India Start-up Challenge (DISC) was launched at DefConnect 2024 where 22 problem statements were introduced. Among these, four were from the Indian Army, five from the Indian Navy, five from the Indian Air Force, seven from the Armoured Vehicles Nigam Limited, and one from the Hindustan Shipyard Limited.14 As part of the DefConnect event, a technology showcase was also organised by the iDEX-DIO. It featured a variety of technology start-ups leading innovation in the defence sector, specialising in areas such as
These start-ups represented cutting-edge technologies and innovations, offering solutions to bolster defence capabilities and strengthen national security.
Observations
The launch of the ADITI Scheme, after the expansion of iDEX to iDEX Prime on 22 April 2022, reflects the government’s commitment to promote innovations in defence technologies by Indian start-ups for the armed forces. Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman in the Interim Budget 2024–25 had also announced a corpus of Rs 1 lakh crore to promote Innovation and Startups coupled with a new scheme for Deep Tech Startups in Defence.16
The creation of the corpus of Rs 750 crore and the allotment of Rs 25 crore is well appreciated as the development of prototypes and hardware requires more capital. The significant rise in funding is widely acknowledged, recognising the greater financial resources needed for the development of new prototypes and hardware. The 30 identified critical and strategic technologies will largely benefit from this increase in funding.
Defence innovation funding is being pursued using a dual approach, employing both the iDEX framework and the Technology Development Fund (TDF).17 The TDF aims to capitalise on the existing domestic capabilities within Indian industries, particularly MSMEs and start-ups.18 With these two strategies in place, the introduction of additional schemes with a larger fund pool however could lead to redundant efforts, a scenario that can be mitigated by integrating such schemes within these existing frameworks. Doing so not only prevents duplication but also facilitates more effective oversight of these initiatives.
In conclusion, the ADITI Scheme represents a pivotal initiative towards achieving self-reliance in defence technology, aligning with the broader goal of promoting indigenous innovation and bolstering India’s defence capabilities. The coordinated efforts of various stakeholders, coupled with effective oversight mechanisms, are essential for the successful implementation of such schemes, ultimately contributing to national security and economic growth.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Pages