Chinese Defence Minister Admiral Dong Jun met the US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin at the sidelines of Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore, held from 30 May to 1 June. Reportedly, the meeting covered issues pertaining to Taiwan, Ukraine crisis and Gaza conflict and China’s support to Russia. Though no major announcements were made, Beijing noted that the meeting was positive, practical and constructive.1 Notably, hours before, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu held consultations with Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell in the US and also met White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and the Deputy National Security Advisor Jon Finer.

The simultaneous meetings between the Defence Chiefs of the two countries at Shangri La and Deputy Foreign Ministers in the US underscore the enhanced diplomatic engagement which has emerged as a trend in Sino-US relations. In 2024, the two countries have already had seven high-level exchanges on geopolitical issues, trade and security including a phone call between Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping in early April and Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s meeting with Xi in the same month. The key aspect that emerges is that continuous diplomatic exchanges have become a channel of crisis prevention amidst heightening tensions.2

There is increasing threat perception in Washington that China could launch a pre-emptive attack on the air bases of the US or its allies in the Indo-Pacific if Beijing feels that Washington’s policies towards Taiwan are gravely undermining the cause of Taiwan’s unification with the mainland.3 Historically, Taiwan has been a fundamental bone of contention between the US and China. US security assurances to Taiwan under Taiwan Relations’ Act of 1979 and arms sales to Taipei have kept China suspicious all along about US’ sincerity towards ‘One China’. At present, deteriorating relations between China and the US coupled with dominance of pro-independence DPP in Taiwan’s political scenario fuels Beijing’s distrust, despite US public support for ‘One China’.4 There is concern that China could launch an offensive against Taiwan based on an inflated assessment of its own military capabilities that it will be able to achieve its strategic objectives swiftly.5 Alternatively, within the Chinese leadership, there is mounting concern that the US and her allies are seeking to contain China’s regional and global influence, undermine China’s territorial integrity and engineer regime change through diplomatic and economic coercion.6

Experts contend that Sino-US relations could be at the edge of chaos as increasing hostility over differences on geopolitical, trade and technological issues compounded by deepening threat perception could trigger an armed confrontation.7 It is noteworthy that besides strategic circles, such apprehensions are also being expressed occasionally at the high levels of leadership in both countries. Last year, a high-ranking US General in an official memo assessed the possibility of war with China in 2025.8 This sentiment was mirrored by the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives (HoR), Michael McCaul who reiterated that odds of conflict with China over Taiwan are very high.9 Concomitantly, former State Councillor Qin Gang also warned shortly after being appointed as Foreign Minister that conflict and confrontation are inevitable unless Washington changed its course.10

What appears worrying to observers is that increasing insecurity over strategic and economic issues and perceived need to project an assertive image to domestic audience and international allies could result in gray zone tactics being used by both sides spiralling out of control. Thereby, in this context, continuous diplomatic exchanges have emerged as an important tool for conveying critical boundaries and prevent unintended escalation to armed confrontation. As was expressed by the Defence Secretary Austin during the Shangri La Dialogue that ‘talks’ are necessary to identify the issues that are troublesome and place guardrails to ensure there are no misperceptions and miscalculations that can spiral out of control.11

One of the prominent examples of this endeavour was observed during the balloon crisis in 2023 which triggered considerable public acrimony between the two countries. Media reports about the sighting of the balloon in American airspace on 1 February 2023 caused massive public outrage in the US. Washington terming the incident as ‘unacceptable violation’, cancelled Blinken’s visit to China that was scheduled on 3 February and shot down the balloon on 4 February.12 Further, Wendy Sherman, the Deputy Secretary of State declared that the Biden administration was reviewing its strategy towards China and would invest diplomatically in the Pacific to counter China.13

Beijing initially expressed regret, noting that the breach was unintended but condemned US action as ‘over abuse of force’ and violation of international practice, and warned of necessary response.14 The incident was viewed by observers to have derailed efforts to mend ties and resume regular high-level talks, inducing further strain to bilateral relations. However, on the contrary, within two weeks of the balloon incident, President Biden in an interview to NBC News stated that Xi did not intend to damage relations with the US.15

Thereafter, Secretary Blinken and then Director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, Wang Yi met on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference in Germany on 18 February to chalk out an exit strategy from the diplomatic deadlock. The two sides did exchange sharp words, with Blinken warning that the act must never again occur and Wang Yi warning that the US would bear the consequences of escalating the balloon incident.16

Notably, no major crisis erupted in Sino-US relations following the meeting and interestingly, the tone shifted in the following months.17 Departing from the diplomatic acrimony, the US Secretary of Treasury in April noted that the US did not seek a winner take all competition with China. There were meetings between then Foreign Minister Qin Gang and the US Ambassador to China R. Nicholas Burns and later Wang Yi and Jake Sullivan in May discussing ways to stabilise bilateral competition.18 Furthermore, in June, Biden acknowledged China’s previous claim and noted that the Chinese leadership was unaware that the balloon had blown off course.19

More recently, diplomatic engagement to avoid unforeseen escalation was evident as the US–PRC Defence Policy Coordination talks focusing on Taiwan (along with other issues) was the first dialogue to be held between the two sides in 2024 on the eve of Taiwan Presidential elections conducted on 13 January. Further, a day before the elections, Secretary Blinken met top Chinese diplomat Liu Jianchao to discuss ways to manage rising tensions in the Taiwan Straits.20  Interestingly, China’s reaction to Taiwan election and Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) victory this time was muted than usual.21 Further, the Taiwan elections, which has been one of the major irritants for Beijing in the past, received minimal coverage and criticism in Xinhua, the official press agency of China. More importantly, Secretary Blinken while congratulating President Lai Ching-te reiterated that the US did not support Taiwan independence.22

A meeting between Wang Yi and Antony Blinken discussing the US sanctions against Chinese individuals and companies was held on the sidelines of the Munich Conference in February 2024 weeks before the issue of ban on Tik Tok surfaced. Also, President Xi and Biden spoke on phone over areas of cooperation and differences, shortly after US HOR passed the bill to ban Tik Tok over allegations of Byte Dance handing over US users’ data to the Chinese government.23

Incidentally, a day after President Biden’s signing of the disinvestment bill to ban Tik Tok on 24 April, Secretary Blinken landed in Beijing on 25 April for talks with Chinese officials. Thereafter, following Biden’s signing of the Tik Tok ban bill into law, Chinese diplomats asked repeatedly about US decision remained muted in their defence of the app. Beijing in the past had termed US actions against Tik Tok as instance of US suppression and bullying.24 In the US on the other hand, despite signing of the bill and the public rhetoric of security concerns, Joe Biden’s re-election campaign embraced the platform, indicating possibility of a lenient approach in the future.25 Further, as the Congress will not be able to outright ban the social media platform unless the allegations of serious security and privacy concerns are proven, room for negotiations remain. Notably, the US Department of Justice has already dropped one of the most serious allegations against Tik Tok regarding user data security breach. 26 Preceding Blinken’s visit on 25 April, a Chinese official acknowledged that bilateral ties were stabilising and are likely to advance on a sustainable path.27

While the Sino-US diplomatic engagement has been successful in limiting emergence of unforeseen tensions and fostering a modicum of stability between the two countries, contentions on Taiwan, South China Sea, advanced technology, trade and supply chains remain. Despite continuous engagement, given that the leadership in both countries continue to publicly securitise the economic and geostrategic issues, the danger of miscalculations persists.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Seong Hyeon Choi and Amber Wang, “China-US Relations: Defence Ministers Dong and Austin Hold ‘Positive, Practical and Constructive’ Meeting, Says Beijing”, SCMP, 31 May 2024. 
• 2. “US-China Relations in the Biden Era: A Timeline”, China Briefing, 5 June 2024.
• 3. Michael Hirsh, “The Pentagon is Freaking Out About a Potential War With China”, Politico, 6 September 2023.
• 4. According to People’s Republic of China’s Constitution and the 1946 Republic of China’s constitution which is enforced in Taiwan, Taiwan is a part of China. Further, majority of the countries recognise China’s claims on Taiwan and China itself does not recognise dual recognition. It is noteworthy that any action that gives semblance of de jure independence is not acceptable to China. Also, Taiwan has existed as a de facto independent state and has never declared formal or de jure independence from China.
• 5. Michael Hirsh, “ The Pentagon is Freaking Out About a Potential War With China”, no. 3.
• 6. Jessica Chen Weiss, “Even China Isn’t Convinced It Can Replace the U.S.”, The New York Times, 4 May 2023; “President Xi Jinping Meets with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 26 April 2024.
• 7.   Sulmaan Wasif Khan, “China and the U.S. are Numb to the Real Risk of War”, Foreign Policy, 12 May 2024; Howard W. French, “Almost Nothing Is Worth a War Between the U.S. and China”, Foreign Policy, 21 August 2023.
• 8. “U.S. four-star General Warns of War with China in 2025”, Reuters, 28 January 2023.
• 9. “‘Very High’ Odds of War with China, US Republican Warns”, Al Jazeera, 29 January 2023.
• 10. Eric Baculinao and Jennifer Jett, “Conflict with China is Inevitable Unless the U.S. Changes Course, Beijing's New Foreign Minister Warns”, NBC News, 7 March 2023.
• 11. David Rising, “US Defense Secretary Says War with China Neither Imminent Nor Unavoidable, Stressing Need for Talks”, Associated Press, 1 June 2024.
• 12. “China Condemns US Military Strike on Suspected Spy Balloon”, Al Jazeera, 4 February 2023.
• 13. Julian Borger, “Chinese Balloon was ‘Clearly’ for Spying, Says US”, The Guardian, 9 February 2023.
• 14. Ananth Krishnan, “China Lodges Protest Over U.S. Shooting Down ‘Civilian Airship’”, The Hindu, 9 February 2023; “US Shoots Down Chinese Spy Balloon, Drawing Beijing's Ire”, The Times of India, 5 February 2023.
• 15. Peter Alexander and Rebecca Shabad, “Biden Says Chinese President Xi Doesn't Want to Damage Relations with U.S. after Spy Balloon, in Exclusive Interview”, NBC News, 16 February 2023.
• 16. Mark Magnier and Orange Wang, “China-US Relations: At Munich Meeting, Antony Blinken Tells Wang Yi Balloon Incident ‘Must Never Again Occur’”, SCMP, 19 February 2023.
• 17. Hal Brands, “The US and China’s Newfound Friendship Can’t Last”, American Enterprise Institute, 23 April 2024.
• 18. “US-China Relations in the Biden Era: A Timeline”, no. 2.
• 19.   Akayla Gardner and Justin Sink, “Biden Says Xi Was Unaware of Wayward Balloon, Wants Relationship”, Bloomberg, 21 June 2023.
• 20. Didi Tang, “Blinken Meets Chinese and Japanese Diplomats, Seeks Stability as Taiwan Voters Head To The Polls”, Associated Press, 12 January 2024.
• 21. Leila Fadel and Emily Feng, “China Has Had a Muted Response to Taiwan's Weekend Elections”, NPR, 15 January 2024; Helen Davidson and Amy Hawkins, “China’s Muted Reaction to Taiwan’s Election Result May Signal a Waiting Game”, The Guardian, 18 January 2024.
• 22. Dalia Parete, “One Election Two Results”, China Media Project, 23 January 2024.
• 23. “US-China Relations in the Biden Era: A Timeline”, no. 2.
• 24. Liza Lin and Chun Han Wong, “Why China Is Holding Its Fire as U.S. Moves to Ban TikTok”, The Wall Street Journal, 26 April 2024.
• 25. Nandita Bose, “Biden's Re-Election Campaign Won't Stop Using TikTok”, Reuters, 24 April 2024.
• 26. “US Drops Claims that TikTok Misled Users Over Chinese Access in Privacy Lawsuit”, Bloomberg, 21 June 2024; Dan Lohrmann, “What Would a TikTok Ban Mean?”, Government Technology, 28 April 2024.
• 27. “China-US Relations Stable Despite US 'Interference', Chinese Official Says”, Reuters, 23 April 2024.

Threat actors linked to Hamas and its allies have been incessantly targeting Israel since the onset of the Israel–Hamas conflict in October 2023. According to the Israel National Cyber Directorate (INCD), which is responsible for securing Israel’s national cyberspace, the intensity of cyberattacks has increased threefold since the beginning of the conflict.1 The head of the agency also shared concern over coordinated attacks by Iran and Hezbollah across various sectors in Israel. In response to growing attacks against its infrastructure by formidable adversaries like Iran and its proxies, Israel recently announced that they are building a ‘cyber-dome’ or a digital ‘Iron Dome’ system to protect Israel’s cyberspace to defend against online attacks.2

Explaining Cyber Dome

While there are no definite details regarding the mechanism and tools that constitute the cyber-dome initiative, one can parse the official statements and specific initiatives to get an overview of the rationale behind such a system. The concept can be traced back to the first public speech in 2022 by Gaby Portnoy after being appointed as the Director General of INCD. He presented the cyber-dome as a new big data and AI-driven approach to proactively defending domestic cyberspace.3 He singled out Iran as Israel’s dominant rival in cyberspace. The initiative aims to provide tools and services to elevate the protection of national assets by synchronising real-time detection of threats at a national level to mitigate emerging threats. Furthermore, Portnoy also emphasised the need to replicate cybersecurity protocols used for critical infrastructure in other sectors.

The cyber-dome also leverages generative AI platforms to filter out genuine threats from a plethora of available threat intelligence.4 Consolidation of strengths and expertise from various agencies augments the efficacy of the initiative. Officials who are involved come from a wide range of agencies and departments within Israel’s security establishment. These individuals are drawn from the Defence Intelligence Unit 8200, J6 Cyber Defence Directorate, and other cyber units of intelligence services.5

The joint coordinated efforts, coupled with AI and secretly built Israel Defence Forces (IDF) platforms are used for threat detection, followed by intelligence sharing with stakeholders. Once the threat intelligence is shared, the Computer Emergency Response Team of Israel (CERT-IL), which is the operational unit of INCD, takes appropriate action.6 The AI-powered systems collect, analyse and interpret data to detect anomalies and alert national systems.

Despite the fact that the project is in its initial phase, the synergy between various agencies and the integration of efforts to tackle emerging threats in cyberspace offers an interesting test case to other countries. The cyber-dome initiative also includes a multinational component, reflecting the global nature of cyberattacks. Given the nature of the conflict in cyberspace the escalation often transcends beyond the primary parties involved, encompassing their allies as well. For instance, nations that are supposedly seen as supporting Israel have faced a rise in cyber incidents since the beginning of the armed conflict.7

Other INCD-led initiatives can potentially complement the cyber-dome initiative, with a particular focus on international cooperation. One such project is ‘Global Cybernet’, which aims to share information about cyber defence between countries.8 Touted as the first network of its kind in the world, it was built to share cyber incidents or any anomaly to respond effectively. Moreover, Israel has also been attempting to gather regional partners to explore concrete defensive solutions to address cyber threats. One such summit mulled over the merits of rapid information sharing and conducting joint cyber investigations to augment the efficacy of responding to cyber threats.9 Furthermore, the participants also contemplated the possibility of developing a joint regional cyber-dome.

Cyber incidents targeting Israel

According to INCD’s assessment, Israel has witnessed a surge in cyber incidents against its infrastructure, particularly since the beginning of IDF’s operation in the Gaza Strip.10 Drawing parallels between the techniques, tactics and procedures (TTP) being deployed in the Ukraine–Russia war, the assessment revealed the use of influence operations against Israel by using social media networks. Israeli networks are also facing ransomware threats and increased use of wipers, a class of malware intended to render data inaccessible and unusable.11

The report also uncovered the pattern that threat actors have been using to get unauthorised access to Israeli networks and systems. Threat actors are increasingly employing spraying attacks and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks and have also made attempts to breach managed service providers (MSPs), which constitute a critical part of the supply chain. These attacks encompass almost all the essential sectors, including health, academic, energy and transportation sectors, including maritime shipping.

Portnoy also alleged that Iran-affiliated groups are proactively targeting Israeli infrastructure and have also been directing operations against Israel’s key allies.12 A major cyber incident attributed to Iran and Hezbollah was an attempted breach in Ziv Hospital in November 2023.13 Joint investigation by the INCD, IDF and the Israeli Security Agency noted that the attack was orchestrated by the group affiliated with the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Hezbollah’s cyber unit.14

Iranian influence operations have evolved through distinct phases since the beginning of Israel–Hamas armed conflict, according to an assessment. In the first phase, Iranian-linked cyber operations appeared reactive following the Hamas terror attack on 7 October 2023.15 During this time, threat actors used pre-existing access and re-used old data for leaks. In the second phase, the Iran-linked group made concerted efforts to disrupt Israeli infrastructure, with dozens of groups involved. In the third phase, these threat actors expanded their operations to target countries like Albania and Bahrain, perceived as supporters of Israel.16

Israel’s cybersecurity strategies

In 2017, INCD issued a national cybersecurity strategy with the aim of streamlining national efforts to ensure a stable and secure cyberspace.17 The document put forth a strategy with three distinct operational layers—aggregate cyber robustness, systemic cyber resilience and national cyber defence. The distinct role of private organisations is also envisioned in the document. Given the nature of cyberspace, these layers are conceptualised as mutually dependent and complementing each other.18

The first layer is designed to strengthen the public and private sector’s overall ability to prevent and mitigate cyberattacks to ensure robustness across industries. The second layer is crucial as it charts out a plan to build systematic ability to confront cyberattacks. This layer is event-driven. In times of an unauthorised breach, systemic cyber resilience will ensure that the affected organisation continues its operation while mitigating the threat. To facilitate seamless operation in times of crisis, the document encourages information sharing and assisting organisations during cyber incidents. The national cyber defence layer is required against ‘severe threats by determined, resource-rich attackers’ suggestive of state actors or those supported by states. The three-layer approach takes into account the level of risk, the nature of the threat, and the appropriate response.

To complement the national cybersecurity strategy and to address the global aspect of cyber threats, the INCD issued the Israel International Cyber Strategy in 2021.19 The international strategy outlines the need for collective resilient efforts through information sharing, securing the global supply chain, and financially incentivising security in organisations. The document also summarised Israel’s position in global cybersecurity discourse.

The cyber-dome initiative fundamentally constitutes an active defence encompassing enhanced detection, investigation and mitigation of threats along with the expansion of existing information-sharing mechanisms. The coordinated detection and response efforts involving all agencies, including the IDF, underscore the importance of collaborative action in an interconnected domain. The centralised, real-time and AI-enabled system proactively protecting Israeli cyberspace is an extension of its national and international cybersecurity strategy.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Head of the Israel National Cyber Directorate Gaby Portnoy at the Cybertech Conference: The Intensity of Cyber Attacks has Increased Threefold During the War”, Israel National Cyber Directorate (INCD), 10 April 2024.
• 2. “As Iranian Hackers Grow More Skilled, Israel Builds ‘Cyber Dome’ to Protect Itself”, The Times of Israel (TOI), 3 May 2024.
• 3. “Gaby Portnoy, Director General of Israel National Cyber Directorate at CyberWeek: We are Promoting a National Cyber-Dome”, INCD, 28 June 2022.
• 4. “AI-Powered Israeli 'Cyber Dome' Defense Operation Comes to Life”, Dark Reading, 19 October 2023.
• 5. Namrata Biji Ahuja, “How Israel is Planning for Hybrid Wars of the Future with Cyber Dome”, The Week, 15 October 2023.
• 6. Ibid.
• 7. “Nations, including India, Supporting Israel Face Uptick in Hacking Activities”, The Statesman,1 November 2023.
• 8. “Global Cybernet”, INCD, 26 July 2021.
• 9. “The First Regional Cyber Summit: Israel, Morocco, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates Gather in a first of its kind Meeting”, INCD, 14 December 2022.
• 10. “‘Iron Swords’ War in Cyber Sphere: Insights, Recommendations and Mitigations”, INCD, 7 January 2024.
• 11. Ibid.
• 12. "Iran is Cyber-Attacking its Allies", INCD, 25 June 2024.
• 13. “Iran and Hezbollah Behind an Attempted Cyber Attack on an Israeli Hospital”, INCD, 18 December 2023.
• 14. Ibid.
• 15. Clint Watts, “Iran Accelerates Cyber Ops Against Israel from Chaotic Start”, Microsoft, 6 February 2024.
• 16. Ibid.
• 17. “Israel National Cyber Security Strategy In Brief”, INCD, September 2017.
• 18. Charles D. Freilich, Matthew S. Cohen and Gabi Siboni, Israel and the Cyber Threat: How the Startup Nation Became a Global Cyber Power, Oxford University Press (Kindle Edition).
• 19. “Israel International Cyber Strategy: International Engagement for Global Resilience”, INCD, July 2021.

The slogan ‘Workers of the World Unite!’ mentioned in The Communist Manifesto, published in 1848 by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels is popular, especially amongst certain factions of the society. Three centuries ahead, the world is again witnessing scores of people united for a purpose, except that these aren’t the blue collared workers but farmers across the European Union (EU), from Poland in the east to France in the west. The issues are no longer restricted to certain sections of Europe or economies of a certain size but have managed to gain traction across boundaries, impacting the decisions of the European Parliament and the European Commission.

The current farmer protests are not a recent problem but have their roots in the Netherlands beginning since 2019. Many consider Spain or Portugal to be the most agriculturally oriented countries within Europe. However, it may be a surprise to note that Netherlands is the most farmed European country. Globally, it is the second biggest exporter of agricultural produce, after the United States, valued at around 65 billion Euros annually, comprising more than 17 per cent of total Dutch exports. Agriculture combined with horticulture is a crucial segment of the Dutch economy and employment, contributing 10 per cent.1

Forceful implementation of agricultural laws or policies are therefore bound to face resistance at a large scale and that is exactly what happened in October 2019. Abundant agriculture and livestock numbers contribute to significant nitrogen emissions, which is a formidable contributor to the climate crisis. In an attempt to cut these emissions to half by 2030, the Dutch government decided to buy out and shut off farms and reduce livestock numbers by half.

This did not go down well with the farmers and they did not wait until policy formulations to let their anger known. More than 2,000 tractors blocked the highways and roads leading to the seat of the government in Hague. Placards reading ‘No Farmers No Food’ and ‘How Dairy You’ were displayed across the city.2 In the last five years, a snowballing effect has led to the protests spreading far and wide within Europe. So much so that by now only four European countries are left untouched—Austria, Denmark, Finland and Sweden.

Even though farmers’ grievances vary from one country to another, certain overlaps can be observed. In Germany and France, protests are against the governments’ plans to end subsidies or tax breaks on agricultural diesel. Cheap grain imports from Ukraine and strict EU regulations are an issue in Poland. Spain and Portugal’s grievances include bureaucratic procedures and insufficient state support to agriculture in the face of competition from cheaper imports.

Farmers’ struggle to stay competitive in the market vis-à-vis the imported goods, falling prices, increasing input costs, increased cost of pesticides, high energy prices leading to expensive agricultural diesel, electricity and transport of the produce from farm to market, after effects of the pandemic and the strict provisions of the EU policies especially the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) are therefore some of the common threads across Europe. 

These issues were simmering since months but the advent of Russia–Ukraine war exacerbated the problem by intensifying the issue. Prior to the war, Europe was heavily relying on Russia for bulk of its energy imports, mainly natural gas. However, once the bloc decided to put sanctions on Russia and reduce its bilateral trade across sectors, the energy supply was severely affected in Europe. The prices shot up overnight, goods became expensive due to short supply, households faced exponential bills for heating/electricity, energy intensive industries like glass manufacturing and automobiles had to temporarily (in many cases permanently) suspend production.

This energy crisis affected the farmers in two crucial ways. The price of electricity, agricultural diesel and transport went up drastically, thereby increasing the input costs. This not only affected the market price of crops but also made the procurement of agricultural diesel and transport vehicles competitive for the farmers. These factors were the ones which had an immediate impact on the crop season. Long run impact was evident in the case of Western sanctions imposed on Russia which included those on potash and other fertilizers. Europe was heavily reliant on Russia and Belarus for its fertilizer requirement, especially for potash, phosphate and ammonia. Not only Europe, even the world relied heavily on Russia and Belarus as the former is the largest global exporter of fertilizers and the two together exported 40 per cent of Potash in 2022.3

Fertilizer trade had earlier been disrupted in 2020 owing to the COVID-19 pandemic and was now facing a second round of disruptions post the Russia–Ukraine crisis. EU had sanctioned the bilateral trade of Russian potash and phosphate but these sanctions did not apply to non-EU traders and businesses. However, once the Western sanctions were in place, Russian fertilizer trade faced difficulties in obtaining product insurance, shipping vessels, maritime routes passing through the EU territory were blocked and certain Russian banks could not process payments as they were banned from the SWIFT international payments network.

Meanwhile, China (one of the top 5 global fertilizer exporters) temporarily imposed a ban on the export of phosphates to protect its domestic agrarian market. Collectively, it resulted in an exponential rise in fertilizer prices, peaking in May 2022. This affected the 2022 crop season whereby the prices of staples like wheat and maize skyrocketed due to short supply and low yield. Much of the food crisis was also attributed to Ukraine’s inability to export its grain stock but within Europe, farmers faced a shortage of affordable agricultural inputs.

Yet another contributing factor in the agrarian crises was the European Commission’s June 2022 decision to lift quotas and tariffs on the import of Ukrainian grains. This move was aimed at providing Ukraine an alternative route to export its grains (since the Black Sea export route was blocked by Russia), which are extremely crucial for the global food security. As a result, heavy volumes of Ukrainian exports started to flood the European markets. Ukrainian grain’s low production cost, higher carbon footprint and big volumes gave an unfair competition to the European farmers, who owned smaller landholdings and whose produce was regularised by strict EU guidelines. The supply shock led to reduced prices in the EU single market and this enraged the farmers, especially of the countries bordering Ukraine.

In April 2023, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia slapped overnight bans on certain sensitive products. This encouraged farmers from across the EU to demand similar measures. The EU put in place measures such as that in March 2024 which deemed products/produce such as  eggs, poultry, maize, honey, etc., as ‘sensitive’ and subject to pre-war tariffs should their import volume increase beyond the average in the last three years.

The measure also gave power to the EU members to impose ‘remedial measures’ if they faced market disruptions. Some EU members wanted wheat too to be labelled as a sensitive product but the European Council did not heed to those demands. Instead, it assured that it will enhance the monitoring of wheat supply to ensure it does not add to the market turmoil. The extended EU–Ukraine free trade agreement was approved by the European Parliament on 23 April 2024.4 Having passed the legislative obstacles, the farmers now await its real-time impact on the market.

These measures are expected to cushion farmers’ discontent before the European Parliamentary elections, thereby hopefully helping the incumbent political parties to hold on to power. For now, it does seem that the EU has managed to balance its support to Ukraine with the need to protect its agricultural markets. However, it remains to be seen if the new European Parliament can continue to maintain this balance in lieu of its various commitments and the impending climate crises.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Agriculture and Horticulture”, Government of The Netherlands.
• 2. Paul Tullis, “Nitrogen Wars: The Dutch Farmers’ Revolt That Turned a Nation Upside-Down”, The Guardian, 16 November 2023.
• 3. Jennifer Kee, Lila Cardell and Yacob Abrehe Zereyesus, “Global Fertilizer Market Challenged by Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine”, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 18 September 2023.
• 4. Lalita AVD, “Ukrainian Grain Import Restrictions to Prevent EU Agriculture Market Disturbances: WFO Official”, S&P Global, 29 April 2024.

Introduction

On 17 April 2024, over 300,000 eligible voters across 50 constituencies in the Solomon Islands participated in the island country’s first ever Joint Election1 overseen by 400 independent observers. This landmark exercise of democratic rights was supported by the European Union, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and Australia, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and New Zealand.2 Troops from these countries were deployed in Solomon Islands to provide logistical support and security.

Australia’s financial contribution towards the conduct of the Joint Elections stood at AU$ 25 million.3 Its assistance to Hoinara, in cooperation with Solomon Islands Electoral Commission (SIEC), included the deployment of additional Australian Federal Police (AFP) and Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel, training electoral officials, logistical support, a delegation of four parliamentary observers, and other initiatives.4

Similarly, the Royal New Zealand Air Force deployed two of its No. 3 Squadron helicopters to aid New Zealand Defence Force’s Joint Task Force cooperation with SIEC, in its efforts at ensuring the successful collection and delivery of polling kits and ballot across the 29,000 km² expanse of Solomon Islands.5

The Results

The results of National General Elections (NGE) created quite a buzz in the country. With the incumbent government failing to secure adequate votes in order to return to power, despite holding the highest number of seats, the major parties resorted to coalition building and lobbying. Manasseh Sogavare’s inability to obtain a decisive victory over his political rivals led to his exit from the Prime Ministerial race, ultimately making way for Jeremiah Manele’s nomination and subsequent election as the new Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands.

Sogavare, the face of the Ownership, Unity and Responsibility Party’s (OUR) electoral campaign, had worked hard to project development as a major deliverable of the incumbent Democratic Coalition Government for Advancement (DCGA). However, the development agenda did not galvanise public support in the way that the DCGA would have imagined.

The incumbent Democratic Coalition Government for Advancement (DCGA), led by OUR Party, polled at a dismal 27.3 per cent of the total vote share, with a combined tally of 18 seats.6 Sogavare himself witnessed a 10.5 percentage point drop in vote share at his constituency of East Choiseul.7 To his credit, in spite of the underwhelming electoral performance, Sogavare’s OUR Party managed to fare better than its rivals, having secured 15 seats out of the total 50 seats in the National Parliament.8

The inconclusive election results left the political parties scrambling to form the national government.  The Coalition for Accountability, Reform, and Empowerment (CARE), led by Matthew Wale, signed a coalition agreement with the Solomon Islands United Party (SIUP).  Altogether, the four-party coalition was able to secure 20 seats in the parliament, yet fell short of 26 seats majority needed to form the government.9

In a surprising turn of events, Sogavare announced his exit from the Prime Ministerial race four days prior to the selection of the new Prime Minister by Solomon Island lawmakers.10 Instead, he put his weight behind the nomination of Jeremiah Manele, the Foreign Minister under the DCGA dispensation. Eventually, Manele emerged victorious against fellow contender and CARE leader Matthew Wale, winning 31 votes out of 49.11

The new Government for National Unity and Transformation (CNUT) has 28 members in the National Parliament.12 It is reasonable to speculate that the absence of a landslide victory could make it relatively harder for the incoming government to pass contentious legislations, unlike CNUT’s predecessor that benefitted from commanding a comfortable two-thirds majority of 33 seats in the National Parliament.13 The general elections results reflect the public’s lukewarm response to Sogavare’s domestic and foreign policy priorities.

On the other hand, it is necessary to note that although the vocal anti-China faction led by firebrand politicians Matthew Wale and Kenilorea Jr. was able to secure 20 seats, the bloc was yet unable to successfully prevent the OUR Party from returning to power. Therefore, the opposition’s failure to win a majority may be interpreted as Chinese influence in the country having not been outwardly rejected by the public.

Seeking a Balance at the Provincial Level?

A notable result at the provincial level was the former Malaita premier Daniel Suidani’s re-election to the provincial assembly. His vocal opposition to Chinese inroads in Solomon Islands, having taken a concrete form through the Auki Communiqué, and his subsequent ouster brought him international fame as one of the public faces of anti-Chinese sentiment in the country. Certain provisions within the Suidani government’s Auki Communiqué caused friction between the provincial government and the Centre. Sudaini’s ban on projects with “investors connected directly or indirectly with the Chinese Communist Party” was deemed problematic by the Sogavare administration in its quest to open up the island country to Chinese investment.14

The provincial government had suspended the Fiu Bridge reconstruction project, funded by the World Bank under the Solomon Islands Road and Aviation Project (SIRAP), upon China Harbour Engineering winning the bid.15 What followed was a political tussle between the governments, resulting in a no-confidence motion that removed Suidani from office in 2023. The succeeding Malaita New Government for Fundamental Redirection (MNGFR) provincial government led by Martin Fini announced the repeal of Auki Communique as one of its first orders since formation, re-opening the province to Chinese investment.16

The Fini administration also signed an MOU on “Sister Relationship between Malaita Province and Jiangsu Province of China” just a few days prior to the Joint Elections.17 The elections, however, have denied the Malaita premier a re-election to the provincial assembly.18 On the other hand, Suidani has emerged victorious, having secured 54.9 per cent of votes in his constituency of West Fataleka.19 In his interview with The Sunday Guardian regarding the post-election lobbying, Suidani discussed the opposition’s outreach to his camp with the implicit support of Sogavare’s party. He alleged the opposition’s promise of projects and money in order to win support for their provincial candidates.20

However, in a surprising turn of events, Suidani announced his withdrawal from the premiership nomination a week prior to the elections in Auki.21 Subsequently, Kwato’o from the Suidani camp lost to Elijah Asilaua 12 votes to 21. Although his province has already opened to Chinese projects under the Fini administration, Suidani camp’s victory could have possibly acted as a bulwark against further PRC involvement in Malaita, thereby creating an interesting interplay of Centre–States relations. Contrary to the policy direction of their rival faction, the triumphant Malaita Government for Redirection, led by new Premier Asilaua is set to continue the former premier’s favourable policy towards China.22

Foreign Policy Implications

Given his role as the Foreign Minister at the time of the 2019 realignment, and the increasing economic dependence on China, Manele can be expected to continue the DCGA dispensation’s policy of close cooperation with the PRC. However, the new CNUT administration may tone down the anti-West rhetoric.23 Sogavare, the poster child of Chinese influence in the Pacific, had become a very polarising figure in the region’s geopolitical landscape.

Having branded the first US-Pacific Island Forum Leader’s Summit as an unproductive exercise, the fiery Solomon Island PM skipped the second edition to reportedly avoid Washington’s “lectures”.24 He antagonised the country’s traditional developmental partner, the Republic of China-Taiwan, by “misrepresenting” the UNGA Resolution 2758 to justify the 2019 switch of diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China.25

Predictably, Sogavare’s 2024 electoral campaign featured pro-China messaging. His political rally in Auki, capital of the Malaita province that resisted Chinese projects under the premiership of Daniel Suidani, sought to push a pro-China narrative. In his speech, Sogavare chastised “democracy” for encouraging LGBTQ advocacy around the globe, hailed the Chinese “socialist system of government” and its economic model, and attempted to justify the 2019 diplomatic switch to the PRC by claiming that the decision “put the Solomon Islands on the map”.26

Analysts such as Mihai Sora reckon that although a continuation in the pro-China policy is certain, Manele will be more receptive to dialogue with Australia and the United States than his predecessor.27 The focus of Manele’s tenure will remain on domestic issues such as health, infrastructure and the economy. Delivering development for the local population will be the topmost priority for the CNUT administration.

Once a seasoned diplomat, Manele will find himself seeking positive engagement with developmental partners, thus entailing a balanced approach towards China and other regional powers. Although the status of “partner of choice” is unlikely for Canberra in the near future, Manele’s appraisal of Australia as an “equal partner” vis-à-vis China is an indicator of a less turbulent bilateral relationship.

Similarly, the United States may also aim for a relative amelioration of ties with Hoinara in the absence of Sogavare at the helm of affairs. However, the presence of Sogavare in the cabinet as the new Finance Minister may influence the foreign policy decisions of CNUT, acting as a variable in any potential rapprochement efforts with the United States.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

Aditi Dhaundiyal, Intern, Southeast Asia and Oceania Centre, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi

• 1. “Election Updates: Historic Joint Polls Marked by High Turnout”, In-depth Solomons, 18 April 2024.
• 2. “Eight Women Declared and 94% of Seats Complete. A Motivated Turnout”, Solomon Islands Electoral Commission, 24 April 2024.
• 3. “Australia Supports the 2024 Solomon Islands Joint Elections”, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Senator the Hon Penny Wong, Australia, 16 April 2024.
• 4. Ibid.
• 5. “NZDF Working with Pacific Neighbours to Support Solomon Islands Election”, Defence Force, New Zealand, 17 April 2024.
• 6. “NGE Results 2024”, Solomon Islands Election Commission, 2024.
• 7. “East Choiseul- NGE Results 2024”, Solomon Islands Election Commission, 2024.
• 8. “Solomon Islands Elects Jeremiah Manele as New Prime Minister”, Al Jazeera, 2 May 2024.
• 9. “CARE and SIUP Signs Coalition Pact”, Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation, 27 April 2024.
• 10. Kirsty Needham, “Pro-China Sogavare Out of the Race as Solomon Islands Votes for Next Leader”, Reuters, 30 April 2024.
• 11. Charley Piringi, “Solomon Islands Chooses China-friendly Ex-diplomat Jeremiah Manele as New Prime Minister”, The Guardian, 2 May 2024.
• 12. Fredrick Kusu, “Coalition for National Unity and Transformation Nominates Jeremiah Manele as PM Candidate”, Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation, 29 April 2024.
• 13. “New Coalition Group Formed, Claims 33 MPs”, Solomon Times, 15 April 2019.
• 14. David Gegeo and Anouk Ride, “Malaita and the Provincial-National Divide in Solomon Islands”, Analysis, United States Institute of Peace, 15 February 2024.
• 15. Alfred Sasako, “Rejected Projects Back!”, Solomon Star, 12 February 2023.
• 16. Alfred Sasako, “Communique to be Axed”, Solomon Star, 17 February 2023.
• 17. “China’s Ambassador Outlines China commitments to Solomon Islands”, Solomon Islands Government, 9 April 2024.
• 18. “Solomon Islands Election Count Under Way, China Critic Suidani Regains Seat”, The Straits Times, 19 April 2024.
• 19. “West Baegu/Fataleka- PA Results 2024”, Solomon Islands Election Commission, 2024.
• 20. Cleo Paskal, “17 People in Malaita Stand in Way of China’s Takeover of the Solomons”, Sunday Guardian Live, 5 May 2024.
• 21. Ronald Toito'ona, “Suidani Opts Out of Premier’s Election Race in Malaita”, In-Depth Solomons, 8 May 2024.
• 22. Cleo Paskal and Grant Newsham, “How China is Winning the Solomon Islands”, The National Interest, 13 May 2024.
• 23. Parker Novak, “What to Expect from the Solomon Islands’ New Prime Minister on China, the West, and More”, Atlantic Council, 2 May 2024.
• 24. Kritsy Needham, “Solomon Islands Leader Says He Skipped Biden Summit to Avoid 'Lecture'”, Reuters, 27 September 2023.
• 25. “MOFA Response to False Claims Made by Solomon Islands Prime Minister Sogavare”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), 29 January 2024.
• 26. “Solomon Islands PM Praises China’s Governance While Criticising Democracy as Immoral”, South China Morning Post, 20 March 2024.
• 27. Mihai Sora, “Can Solomon Islands’ New Prime Minister Really be Friends to All?”, The Interpreter, 3 May 2024.