Cambodia’s Funan-Techno Canal Project and Regional Concerns
Temjenmeren Ao
August 09, 2024
Regional countries such as Vietnam have expressed environmental and security-related concerns as regards the Chinese-funded Funan-Techno Canal in Cambodia.
Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Manet on 5 August 2024 launched the mega connectivity project, the Funan-Techno Canal. At the ground-breaking ceremony for the construction of the US$ 1.7 billion Funan-Techno Canal, Manet stated that the project will help Cambodia strengthen its political independence in terms of waterway transport.1 This will be Cambodia’s first historical mega transport project which will provide a new link from the Mekong River and give access to the sea through the Gulf of Thailand. As per the blueprint, the 100 meters wide and of 5.4 meters deep canal would allow for two shipping lanes with vessels carrying up to 3,000 deadweight tonnages. For seamless connectivity, the initiative would also include building of other transport-related infrastructure such as dams and bridges.2
As indicated in Figure 1, the 180 km canal will run from the Phnom Penh Autonomous port, located southeast of the capital, into a new port facility at Kep in the Gulf of Thailand. Currently, ocean-bound shipping from Phom Penh passes through Vietnam’s Mekong Delta to ports near Ho Chi Minh City. The Funan-Techno Canal would provide an alternative to transit via Vietnam and will reduce dependence on Vietnamese ports and give Cambodia sea access for commercial and other uses.
The project is expected to be completed by 2028, as per the report submitted to the Mekong River Commission (MRC) in August 2023 by Cambodia. Once completed, it will create an estimated 1.6 million jobs in the inland provinces of Kandal, Takeo and Kampot along the route of the canal. The Funan-Techno Canal is expected to develop Cambodia’s agricultural sector as it would provide water for crops, improve water management during the rainy season and boost freshwater fishing.3 The canal which will alter the course of the water is also being envisioned as a catalyst for environmental sustainability by enhancing flood mitigation and water resource conservation and management.4
The momentum around the Funan-Techno Canal began when a feasibility study pact was announced between Cambodia and China during the Belt and Road Forum held in October 2023. Following the pact signed with state-owned China Bridge and Road Cooperation (CBRC), a feasibility study on the project was conducted. In January 2024, Cambodian Transport Minister announced that the canal project will begin construction in late 2024.5
The first section of the Funan-Techno Canal runs from the lower Mekong River of Prek Takeo to the Bassac River in Saang district, covering a distance of approximately 21 km. The project’s second section, extends from Koh Thom to Kep province, spanning more than 130 kilometres. The Funan-Techno Canal will be built as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model, which is used for financing large projects through public-private partnerships.6
Under the BOT model, this venture would comprise Cambodian state-owned company, the Sihanoukville Autonomous Port, the Phnom Penh Autonomous Port, and a private enterprise which jointly have a 51 per cent stake. The other 49 per cent stake will be taken up by CBRC, which as a major stakeholder in the project will be funding the construction of the canal. It is suggested that Chinese BOT will build and run the canal for a certain number of years before handing it back to the Cambodian government.7
Key Risks and Concerns
Amongst Southeast Asian countries, Cambodia and China share strong economic relations, with the former also being one of the key partners for Beijing in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The broad spectrum of their bilateral engagement also includes connectivity and infrastructure projects being funded and build by China. At the first BRI in May 2017, then Prime Minister Hun Sen led a large delegation and China pledged US$ 240 million in grant to Cambodia. Further, both sides also signed 13 agreements in areas such as infrastructure development, trade, maritime cooperation and tourism.8
There are however, significant concerns not only from the risk of increasing economic interdependency on Beijing, but also relating to the socio-economic impact on account of water availability, agricultural production, and the ecology in the Mekong delta.
Environmental Impacts and Concerns
The primary concern on the Funan-Techno Canal centres around the potential environmental impacts that it might have on the Mekong Region. The Mekong River and its tributaries which is a lifeline for millions in Southeast Asia is of strategic significance in terms of security, prosperity and stability of the whole sub-region. According to the estimate by the MRC, the Mekong River is about 4,909 km in length, and its basin supports about 65 million people including a large and diverse biodiversity.
The Lower Mekong basin which covers a total area of 630,000 km2 is critical in order to maintain the region’s water resources and the ecosystem. The Mekong region known as ‘Asia’s Rice Bowl’ depends on the river and its tributaries for not only water availability but also its role in regulating and replenishing soil fertility. The Mekong Delta also has the world’s largest inland fishery which accounts for a quarter of the global fresh water catch and supports the livelihood of millions in the region.9
Given the project’s potential impact on water resources and the ecosystem in the Mekong Delta, Vietnam has shared its concerns as this could disrupt its agricultural production, particularly in its southern provinces of An Giang and Kien Giang. Further, Vietnam also noted that alteration of the water stream could impact the biodiversity of vulnerable species in the Mekong region.10 PM Hun Manet during his visit to Hanoi in December 2023 assured his Vietnamese counterpart Pham Minh Chinh that preliminary studies indicated that altering the course of the Mekong River will not have a transboundary impact on the water resources or the natural biodiversity.11 Despite the Cambodian government dismissing these concerns, Vietnam remains apprehensive on account of the fact that the project will be Chinese-funded and built.
Regional Security Concerns
The Funan-Techno Canal under the broader framework of China’s BRI is aimed at realising its ‘Industrial Development’ and ‘Rice and Fish Corridors’, through an enhanced and seamless regional connectivity. Apart from bolstering socio-economic development through the Funan-Techno Canal, China is also seeking to further enhance its regional influence. Cambodia’s deepening economic reliance on Beijing would reduce Vietnam’s influence, altering the geopolitics of the Mekong region. The canal’s 100 meter-wide and depth of 5.4 meters could provide a passage for navy ships to come close to the Cambodian-Vietnamese border.
The military aspect of the project emerges also from the fact that the new port facility to be built in Kep is about 100 km from Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base in Sihanoukville.12 The potential of a strategically important military outpost for Beijing on the Gulf of Thailand is a vital concern for Vietnam. Given that Vietnam would now not only have Beijing trying to shape the geopolitics of the Mekong region but it could also have wider implication in context of its ongoing territorial dispute in the South China Sea. Therefore, apart from Vietnam’s concerns about the potential environmental impact and the reduced shipping earnings, there is also anxiety with regard to the impact of the project on regional security.
Conclusion
The Funan-Techno Canal symbolises Cambodia’s quest for greater economic autonomy by strengthening its trade competitiveness through enhanced connectivity and reducing its dependence on foreign ports. However, since the announcement of this initiative, there has been multifaceted concerns, as pointed above. The mega project brings to light the increasing trajectory of Cambodia–China relations. Despite its touted benefits, given that the project has the potential to enhance Beijing’s role in shaping the geopolitics of the Mekong region, regional countries have expressed environmental and security-related concerns.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Pakistan has re-evaluated its counter-terror strategy in the aftermath of the visit of Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif and Army Chief General Asif Munir to China in June 2024.
Pakistan announced the launch of the Azm-i-Istehkam (Resolve for Stability) operation in June 2024 to eradicate terrorism, the 12th such military operation since 2007. The federal government has advanced this to address the backlash of nurturing and facilitating violent extremism and terrorism across its borders for decades.
The Broader Context
Pakistan’s confrontation with terrorist threats has surged over the years, with 2023 proving to be the deadliest year, mainly for military and police personnel. The suicide bombing attack at a mosque inside the Peshawar Cantonment area in January 2023 killed approximately 100 and injured no less than 150 devotees. Within six months, it experienced another fatal attack when Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazl’s (JUI-F) political rally was targeted in July, killing over 50 attendees and wounding more than 200.
As per the Global Terrorism Index Report 2024, Pakistan ranks as the fourth country most affected by terrorism-related activities, moving up from its previously held seventh rank. A report by the Pak Institute for Peace Studies in January 2024 noted that 17,785 terror-related events have resulted in 72,203 casualties since 2006.11
Pakistan has charged the Afghan Taliban for allegedly harbouring TTP fighters and allowing Afghanistan to be used as a launch-pad to undermine its national security. Against this backdrop, Baloch insurgents have also scaled up their attacks, with TTP inflicting maximum damage and casualties mainly in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces.
What seems to have inevitably pushed Pakistan’s federal government to re-evaluate its counter-terror strategy was the intensifying pressure imposed after Shahbaz Sharif and Army Chief General Asif Munir visited China in June 2024. While Chinese personnel have been targeted by Baloch insurgents and TTP operatives for the last several years, in the lead-up to this visit, at least three terror attacks occurred, including the March 2024 suicide bombing that killed five Chinese engineers and one Pakistani in the restive Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.
During this five-day visit, President Xi Jinping reportedly underscored the need for Pakistan to safeguard Chinese citizens stationed to work on the US$ 62 billion China–Pakistan Economic Corridor project and ‘provide a safe, stable, and predictable business environment’.22 Public outrage was also expressed by Chinese officials such as Liu Jianchao (Head of the International Department of the CCP) when he stated that “in Pakistan’s case, the primary factor shaking the confidence of Chinese investors is the security situation”.33 Beijing apparently issued an ultimatum threatening to deploy around 1,200 personnel44 to safeguard its interests in Pakistan.
Islamabad’s announcement could be an effort to bide time and prevent further Chinese interference at the risk of providing an excuse to the jihadi entities at home to exploit its acquiescence to Chinese demands as another example of it being un-Islamic. It could also be seeking to deny further momentum to Baloch groups who have demonstrated growing hostility to Beijing’s expanding influence in Gwadar.
Simultaneously, Pakistan’s decision to rejuvenate its counter-terror framework was imperative to retain the much-needed Chinese investment to navigate the recurring economic turbulence and prevent isolating its closest partner in the United Nations Security Council, it frequently relies on to prevent the blacklisting of terror operatives backed by Islamabad.
Considering that similar campaigns, including the Zarb-e-Azb (Strike of the Prophet’s Sword or sharp and cutting strike or blow) operation launched in 2014 to neutralise terrorism in its tribal belts, proved futile, there is little optimism regarding Azm-i-Istehkam’s success in upholding Pakistan’s national security. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Chief Minister, Ali Amin Gandapur, allegedly accused the federal government of being kept in the dark about the counter-terror campaign, widening the fault-lines between Islamabad and a province that has been afflicted with decades-long violent campaigns and instability.
Where It Can Go Wrong
Pakistan’s military and political leadership faces multi-pronged challenges in ensuring the success of Azm-i-Istekham primarily due to the following factors.
Lack of Political–Civil Society Consensus
One of the most significant challenges facing the political–military leadership pushing for Azm-e-Istehkam is the lack of political and nationwide consensus on the scope and objectives of the counter-terror operation, largely due to the ambiguity surrounding this initiative. This will obstruct the nationwide support the government and military require to take swift and decisive measures due to the public criticism and condemnation that will inevitably follow, having their concerns dismissed to accommodate Chinese interests.
A major operation such as this requires support across political and ideological lines, including among the electorate that has borne the long-term socio-economic, physical and psychological impact of terrorism and violent extremism. On the one hand, there is deep-rooted mistrust among civilians (including civil society activists) about the state’s ability to contain the operation to specifically weed out terrorists and extremists as a result of the mass displacement and dispossession that has occurred in the past due to kinetic operations carried out by the armed forces.
Moreover, Asad Iqbal Butt, the Chairperson of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) has flagged issues relating to the lack of transparency and the adverse impact the military operation could have on ordinary citizens. He noted that the operation should not be “used to justify further enforced disappearances, the use of interment centres or military courts, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, or custodial torture”.55
On the other hand, political parties, including Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf and JUI-F, have criticised the government’s decision regarding the operation’s launch and its ambiguity. For example, JUI-F’s Chief, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, has, after holding a grand tribal jirga, declared that “the jirga expressed its lack of trust in the operation and declared that this was not Azm-i-Istekham, rather Adam-I-Istekham (Instability)”.66
However, there are also leaders such as Mahmood Khan Achakzai (Leader of the Opposition Alliance Tahreek-e-Tahafuz Ayin Pakistan) who have been critical of the government’s dismissal of the provincial concerns and refusal to work towards a nationwide consensus before formulating such a policy. He has warned77 Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s government that the opposition could internationalise a domestic policy by bringing it to the attention of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). This announcement was made after holding a jirga, similar to the resistance tactic applied by JUI-F’s Chief, where a resolution88 against its implementation was passed.
Regardless of the legal challenges he would face pursuing this case, his statement appears to be a well-calculated move to extract concessions of some kind from the political leadership based in Islamabad. How far he and others standing in solidarity against the government can leverage the polarised socio-political climate remains to be seen. For now, anti-government rallies across provinces such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa continue to hinder the process of acquiring the nationwide legitimacy this refurbished operation requires to have even a modicum of chance of success. Opposition leaders might exploit the electorate’s concerns to further their agenda and consolidate greater power.
Ambiguity Concerning the Operation’s Mandate
Despite the initial announcement that the counter-terror operation involved a comprehensive kinetic action, Inter-Services Public Relations, the media wing of the Pakistani army, appears to have backtracked on this. Widespread expression of concerns about possible mass displacement and instability that would follow, as has been the case with earlier military operations like Zarb-e-Azb, appears to have compelled a shift in the armed forces’ rhetoric, which has avowedly denied99 Azm-e-Itehkam being a full-fledged military campaign, which could result in mass displacement of the local populace.
The federal government also had to step in and issue a clarification to mobilise the Pakistani society which finds itself more divided than ever and despite the multiple security threats emanating from Baloch rebels, Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP), or TTP and disproportionate violence accompanying it. The following declaration issued by the federal government accepted the fact that population displacement was ‘required’ as part of its short-term strategy to combat terrorism and dismantle the hideouts of violent non-state actors in the past, but the army was no longer contemplating any such move today.
PTV News, the state broadcaster of Pakistan, announced on 25 June 2024 in a detailed post on X (formerly Twitter) that
In previous armed operations, terrorists were removed from known locations that were no-go zones…these operations required massive displacement of the local population…There are currently no such no-go zones in the country…therefore, large-scale military operations that would require population displacement are not being contemplated.1010
At the same time, the framework outlined in a press release points to broad themes without underscoring the nuances, resulting in significant confusion about the long-term objectives and implications of yet another military operation. As per the document, the government emphasised that the operation would be:
...empowered by effective legislation to address legal voids that hindered the effective prosecution of terrorism-related cases and award of exemplary punishments to them…the campaign would be duly comprehended by socioeconomic measures aimed at addressing the genuine concerns of the people and creating an environment that discouraged extremist tendencies.1111
However, there has been little indication of such assurances allaying the critics’ fears. This has mainly been the case, considering the precedent set by the earlier armed operations, which has provided the public with sufficient evidence about the socio-economic impact borne by civilians even as the government and law enforcement personnel have struggled to eradicate terrorism from its roots. Additionally, the state agencies have been unable to clarify how they would avoid civilians being targeted in the crossfire and correctly differentiate between them and terrorists who have constantly changed their locations to avoid the gaze of the law enforcement agencies.
The uptick in deadly violence, along with failed rehabilitation of those displaced and dispossessed due to past kinetic operations, signals to the locals in provinces such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan (worst affected by terrorism across Pakistan) about the adverse implications of Azm-i-Istehkam. It is also entirely possible that counter-terror operations might be used as a ruse to more brutally repress the Baloch insurgency, as transparency and civic liberties are likely to further backslide in the wake of any such operation.
Domestic Militancy Calculus
Any misstep on the state’s part could reignite the militancy wave akin to the period following the siege of and military assault on the Lal Masjid in July 2007 after former President Hu Jintao tasked Pervez Musharraf’s military government with rescuing Chinese workers who had reportedly been held hostage by students associated with Jamia Hafsa Madrassa. It could be construed as another example to mobilise the anti-Pakistan jihadis by calling on a state which claims to be Islamic yet cooperates with Chinese infidels,1212 a term frequently used by ISIS in its propaganda. Notably, China has faced acute criticism and threats from various terrorist groups for its reported mistreatment of the Uyghur community in Xinjiang Province.
Conclusion
Multifold hindrances remain in Islamabad’s path to eradicating terrorism. They range from the ambiguity regarding the scope, the desired end-state, no definite blueprint of the counter-terror operation, widespread criticism from political opposition and civil society critics, and the absence of any success in earlier operations, on which Azm-e-Istekham is modelled, to the growing Chinese pressure to safeguard its geo-economic interests and its personnel stationed in Pakistan. Given the military campaign’s deficiencies and low probability of success, it is expected to result in mass dispossession, displacement and civilian killings without achieving its primary goal.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
China’s Economic Growth and ‘New Quality Productive Forces'
Opangmeren Jamir
August 01, 2024
China is seeking to drive ‘green’ and sustainable economic growth through high technology manufacturing and R&D investments.
Chinese President Xi Jinping propounded the idea of “new quality productive forces” in September 2023 as a blueprint for future Chinese economic development during a tour in Heilongjiang province.1 The communique of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) of the Third Plenum session, held in Beijing from 15 to 18 July 2024 declared that
We will improve the institutions and mechanisms for fostering new quality productive forces in line with local conditions so to fully stimulate the assimilation between ‘real economy’ and ‘digital economy’, including service sector, infrastructure and supply chains.2
The promulgation of “new quality productive forces” is unsurprising as it comes when several economists and institutions like the International Monetary Fund have expressed reservations about the deep structural reforms needed within China, including the financial sector3 and challenges from demographic changes and climate change.4 Economists have cautioned that if China wants to maintain a sustained growth rate then it “has to move to a growth model that is based more on innovation and productivity increase than in the past”.5
Improving or maintaining the quality of economic and social development is a common goal pursued by all countries in the world. China in the 1970s under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping initiated reforms and opened up its economy to the world. Since then, high growth rates have been a major feature of the Chinese economy. At the 19th National Congress of CPC in 2017, however, China announced the transitioning of its economic development from a period of “rapid growth to a stage of high-quality development”.6
In other words, China is seeking not merely growth but better growth and quality over quantity, which it will drive mainly by ‘emerging industries’ and ‘future oriented industries’ which include artificial intelligence, robotic, quantum technology, etc. Besides, outdated production industries and equipment will be discontinued and replaced by ‘green emerging industries’. In high-quality development, the fundamental aspect is green development where it will develop a “harmonious relationship between humans and nature”. To accomplish the objective of high-quality development in China, the “new quality productive forces”, have been propounded which essentially refer to, “advanced productivity freed from the traditional economic growth models and productivity development paths” featuring “high-technology, high efficiency and high quality”.7
There are several elements envisaged in the implementation of new quality productive forces. One of the foremost core element, as underlined by Xi Jinping, is ‘innovation’, i.e., scientific and technological innovation or revolutionary technological breakthroughs. The idea is embodied in the Marxist theory of productive force, where Marx emphasises that ‘technology’ is the sole force for historical change.8
Technological innovation is critical for advancing economic growth where it significantly impacts the manufacturing industries. However, under the new quality productive forces, industrial innovation will be mainly powered by advanced technologies like semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology and nanotechnology, generating new industries, new models and developing new quality productivity. While promoting new quality productive forces, old and/or traditional industries will not be neglected or abandoned; instead, they will be encouraged to transform and upgrade their technology.
Another novelty in the “quality productive forces” is the upgrading and expansion of labour, the means of labour and objectives of labour. In this regard, the Chinese Minister of Science and Technology, Yin Hejun has emphasised a thorough revamp of science and technology and education management systems with the objective to cultivate more creative workers with the requisite skills, including investment in R&D, expansion of the higher education sector, reform in the evaluation of the performance of scientists and engineers, open and inclusive scientific project collaborations with different countries and creating an environment to attract outstanding scientists from different countries to innovate and start business in China.9
The third important aspect is the promotion of green development. Xi Jinping underlined “green development is the foundation of high-quality development”. Hence, the “new quality productive forces” require promotion of green development by accelerating technology innovation and advanced application of green technologies, and the development of green and low-carbon industries and supply chains, to achieve sustainable development.
Faced by a series of humiliating defeats at the hand of imperial powers in the 19th century, the Communist Party of China realised that only ‘science’ can ‘save’ China.10 From 1949 onwards, the CPC has unceasingly shown a strong commitment to technology-driven economic development and strong state leadership in science is “taken as an article of faith” by Chinese leaders. Thus, the concept of “new quality productive forces” where the central elements is science and technology, provides fresh hope and motivation for China to transform its economic development speedily. It reflects that Chinese officials have comprehended that the ‘old’ technology/industries or traditional model, relying on debt-fueled investment to drive growth, are subject to the law of diminishing returns.
Zheng Shanjie, Chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission stated that under the “new quality productive forces”, it will not only promote its own domestic growth but also inject new momentum into “global economic recovery and growth”. To this end, Zheng declared, robust reforms are taking place to boost industrial innovation through technological innovation in the fields of bio-manufacturing, commercial flights, new materials and low-altitude economy.11 Meanwhile, Chinese Finance Ministry in 2024 announced a massive budget of 370.828 billion Yuan (US$ 51.51 billion) on science and technology, an increase of 10 per cent compared to previous year as well as the largest percentage of funding sector.12 Additionally, to advance “high-quality development”, Chinese Ministry of Finance Lan Fo’an outlined several measures, including financial support for innovation and upgradation of industries and allocation of more financial support to education, healthcare, social security and environmental protection.13
It is too early to ascertain the success of Chinese economic development based on the “new quality productive forces”, though Chinese officials have expressed confidence in generating sustained growth. In an interview with Newsweek, Xie Feng, the Chinese Ambassador to the United States, stated, “it will serve as a catalyst that further brings out the vitality and potential of China’s supersized market”. And also “energizes China’s growth, and generates huge investment and consumption needs”.14 At the World Economic Forum, Chinese Premier Li Qiang while presenting the opportunities bought by sci-tech in China, encouraged companies to invest, especially in cutting-edge technology, and encouraged the effort “to foster a market oriented, world-class business environment within a sound legal framework”.15
Challenges
Reaping the benefits from the “new quality productive forces” will depend on several factors. One of the foremost determinants will be how far the Chinese government is able to undertake deep structural reforms, particularly in mitigating the property sector crisis and local government debt risk, building confidence for domestic consumption, investment in education, including training and re-skilling and quality health care, which in turn will deliver higher labour productivity and incomes and address the emerging challenges of climate change.16
Another challenge, as highlighted by Chinese economist Cai Fang, will be how far the Chinese entrepreneurs truly embrace the Schumpeter principle of ‘creative destruction’. As per Schumpeter, economic growth is characterised by continuous disruptions of the old order and in the process, certainly existing business and workers for some time could experience big losses and be replaced by a new order.17 Hence, any entrepreneur that fails to compete and/or innovate should accept ‘failure’. Otherwise, it will perpetuate the “operation of zombie companies” surviving on bailouts and thereby undermine economic growth.18
Jeffrey Sachs points out that the current U.S. administration policy is “anti-China” where it is actively trying to slow down the Chinese economy through technology blockage and erecting trade barriers.19 Some of the recent US policies towards this end have included the imposition of high tariffs on some of the imported Chinese goods such as electric vehicles (EVs), EV batteries, semiconductors, medical products, ship to shore cranes, solar cells and steel and aluminum items,20 the ‘Biosecure Act’ to restrict Chinese biotech and manufacturing from accessing US funding and collaborating with pharma companies21 and July 2024 White House guidelines to US universities to safeguard US research.22 The ongoing Sino-US bilateral tensions will, therefore, also significantly impact the Chinese growth trajectory.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
India and Armenia are critical regional partners, and their collaboration and cooperation may soon transform into a strategic partnership.
Since the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War of 2020, Armenia has sought to diversify outside traditional partners such as Russia, as part of its long-term complementarist foreign policy. India has been one country with which Armenia has deepened its relationship in recent times, particularly in defence and security. With Armenia’s foreign policy shift and diversification efforts, India is well-positioned to be a significant partner for Yerevan. This partnership offers various mutual benefits, from economic growth to security. The India–Armenia relationship is a win-win situation, demonstrating that both countries stand to gain from their cooperation.
Background
India and Armenia share a robust relationship that is deeply rooted in history. The Armenians first arrived in India as traders and later established their diaspora. The relationship gained prominence after the Soviet collapse and the emergence of the newly independent nation of Armenia. Over the years, it has gained further importance, and there is vigour in both countries to improve and add to the ever-growing relationship. This historical connection between India and Armenia forms a strong foundation for their current and future cooperation.
Current Dynamics
Currently, the relationship continues to grow in various fields of cooperation, including political, economics and defence. The relationship is complemented by foreign policy initiatives followed by both countries. India's strategic autonomy and focus on its extended neighbourhood are acknowledged in the Caucasus, where Armenia is an essential component. Armenia’s multi-vector foreign policy has place for the involvement of major regional powers and this is where India fits in.
Defence
The relationship's main foundation is defence. Recently, the two nations have been planning to explore capacity-building and not limit themselves to technical defence cooperation.1 The two nations have seen substantial growth in this field. India recently sent its first Defence Attaché to Yerevan2 after the Indian Air Force agreed to post additional defence attachés, thus expanding its space in military diplomacy with Armenia.
The two nations in May 2024 decided on a joint action plan for 2024–2025, to include military education, arms supplies, tactical training and experience exchange.3 India has already supplied Armenia with Pinaka multi barrel rocket launchers, anti-tank missiles, rockets, ammunition, anti-drone systems and Advanced Towed Artillery Gun Systems (ATAGS).
Multilateral Partnerships
India and Armenia have also engaged each other in various multilateral forums and have formed bilateral and trilateral partnerships. One important partnership is the India, Iran and Armenia trilateral partnership. The partnership has created a tripartite platform where senior officials met in 2023 to discuss the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and another corridor to connect with Russia and Europe.4
Iran is important for India’s regional connectivity projects, with Chabahar being the base for the INSTC. Armenia also gained access to Chabahar and Bandar Abbas in January 2024 for its trade with India.5 All three nations share a robust relationship, and trilateral cooperation can boost the relationship further and help both India and Armenia.
Apart from the trilateral with Iran, there have been discussions on the possibility of a quadrilateral collaboration between Armenia, Greece, France and India in the defence field. The Greek Minister of Defence, Nikolaos Dandanis, highlighted this during his meeting with Armenian Defence Minister Suren Papakiyan in March 2024.6 This is a significant opportunity for multilateral cooperation between four nations that share a robust relationship and have seen substantial positive shifts, particularly in defence.
The Azerbaijani Factor
One major factor in the India–Armenia relationship has been the role of Armenia's adversarial neighbour, Azerbaijan. India and Azerbaijan do share cordial relations, and it is one of the major trade partners of New Delhi in the South Caucasus. Despite such ties, there are still some issues that could cause significant obstacles in the relationship.
The biggest impediment is the unequivocal support of Azerbaijani leadership for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Even during his recent visit to Pakistan, AzerbaijaniPresident Ilhan Aliyev stressed on this.7 Armenia, on the other hand, has reiterated on various occasions that it supports India’s stance on Kashmir.
Regarding the conflict in the South Caucasus, i.e., the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Pakistanis have openly endorsed the Azerbaijani cause since the first Karabakh war and have not established diplomatic relations with Armenia. India has taken a more neutral stance, supported diplomatic efforts for a long-term solution, and encouraged the nations towards long-term peace and security.8
Future Prospects
One significant prospect of cooperation is the technology sector. Armenia is going through a technological revolution. The two countries could further collaborate to enhance their technological outreach and improve their relationship. India is globally known for its pharmaceutical production and medical diplomacy. This was evident during the COVID-19 pandemic with its Vaccine Maitri policy. The two nations could create opportunities for cooperation in the field of pharmaceuticals, with Armenian pharma also becoming one of the rapid, vibrant and rapidly expanding sectors in the field of allopathy medicines. Armenia also houses a small fraction of Indian students who are engaged in medical studies.
The two nations can also focus on the cultural aspects of the relationship. India's soft power outreach includes International Yoga Day, which was celebrated in Armenia. The presence of an Armenian diaspora in India also create opportunities for further enhancement of the culture. The connected history, including Armenians in India in the past, giving rise to Armenian nationalism, the first Armenian printing press, and the presence of an Armenian diaspora throughout history means that Armenians have historical connections to India. Therefore, the relationship in the cultural sense could contribute to solidify ties and enhance people-to-people interactions. Strong cultural connections create ample space for the enhancement of cooperation.
The two nations can cooperate in natural disaster management. India and Armenia both suffer from floods. They could also collaborate to jointly develop earthquake resistant technologies to prevent major damage during earthquakes.
Conclusion
India and Armenia are critical regional partners, and their collaboration and cooperation may soon transform into a strategic partnership. The transformation of the relationship could see a new era of India’s focus on the South Caucasus, where Armenia could play an important role. However, there are still some limitations that the two nations need to tackle to enhance the relationship further. One of the noteworthy limitations that the two nations need to tackle is the lack of connectivity. The recent Iran–Armenia agreement on using Chabahar could improve the situation, but there is still a need to further enhance connectivity.
Not only trade connectivity but also the need to further people-to-people connections would require focus. This can be enhanced through regular direct flights between the two nations. Armenia is the only country in the region with which India doesn’t have direct flight connectivity with, whereas Georgia and Azerbaijan are directly connected with New Delhi. If connectivity is improved, that would provide newer opportunities for cooperation between the two nations.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The proliferation of China’s Overseas Police Stations underscores the urgent need for international scrutiny and diplomatic actions.
As China has emerged as a great power, it has sought to augment its overseas presence in the international arena through measures like the establishment of Confucius Institutes and military bases and access points worldwide.1 The setting up of overseas police stations is a recent development that has invited international scrutiny, sparking serious concerns regarding the breach of international norms and the erosion of host countries’ sovereignty.2
On the surface, the Chinese government has presented these Overseas Police Stations as entities created to assist Chinese citizens abroad, especially in light of the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic.3 According to Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin, these stations serve as overseas Chinese service centers, catering to the needs of the Chinese diaspora and tourists.4 Supposedly, their primary objective is to provide assistance to Chinese nationals in foreign lands, including support with lost passports, legal issues and various emergencies.
However, the reality behind their operations paints a far more troubling picture. What make these stations particularly concerning are their covert nature and the methods employed by Chinese officials operating within them. The gravity of this issue became even more apparent with the disclosure of startling statistics by China’s Ministry of Public Security. On 14 April 2022, the Vice Minister of the Ministry of Public Security revealed that 210,000 individuals were persuaded to return to China in the previous year.5 This number surged further, with Chinese authorities claiming on 17 August 2022 that between April and July of the same year, they had persuaded more than 230,000 Chinese nationals to return from abroad to face criminal proceedings in China.6
These revelations not only highlight the scale of China’s overseas operations but also underline the urgency of addressing this issue which may be a prelude to a crisis. According to a comprehensive investigation conducted by the European Union registered human rights organisation Safeguard Defenders, which primarily monitors human rights situation in China and Vietnam, these stations have been set up in various countries. They are reportedly functioning in Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Africa, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, and the United States.7
It is believed that these Overseas Police Stations are being utilised as tools for coercive measures, employing three distinct methods categorised as Type 1, Type 2 and Type 3.8 In Type 1, Chinese officials from the Ministry of Public Security track down the family members and relatives of individuals living abroad, exerting pressure through intimidation, harassment, detention or even imprisonment. The objective is to persuade these individuals voluntarily to return to China. Type 2 involves direct approaches through online means or undercover agents from the Ministry of State Security within the host country. The last and most alarming method, Type 3, entails the alleged physical abduction of individuals on foreign soil, taking them back to China, where further legal proceedings await.9
These stations, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Security, are therefore being utilised as tools for long-arm policing and transnational repression by the Communist Party of China.10 The methods employed are disconcerting, and are believed to involve coercion, intimidation, harassment and even abduction of Chinese nationals living abroad. These activities are not only a violation of international norms but may also pose a significant threat to the human rights of Chinese citizens residing outside their homeland and rule of law in the host country.
Such mass repatriations challenge the territorial integrity and judicial sovereignty of host nations, undermining their legal autonomy and casting doubt on the adherence to due process and human rights. The unilateral actions by Chinese authorities may strain diplomatic relations, potentially disrupting international cooperation on law enforcement, counter-terrorism and extradition agreements. The lack of transparency in legal processes and the potential for coercion in persuading individuals to return suggest a disregard for established international norms. From a security standpoint, the forcible repatriation poses the risk of transferring sensitive information to Chinese authorities, compromising the security interests of the countries where these individuals have resided.
This alarming trend has not gone unnoticed by the international community. Christopher Wray, Director of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), expressed his concerns about these police stations while testifying before a U.S. Senate committee in November 2022 when he stated that he was “very concerned about these police stations. We are aware of the existence of these stations.” He emphasised that these stations are unauthorised. Republican U.S. Representative, Mike Gallagher, has called for the shutdown of these stations.11
In the United Kingdom, Yvette Cooper, the then Shadow Secretary of State urged the Home Secretary to make a statement regarding the secret police stations operated by the Chinese Communist Party in the UK. In response, Chris Philp, the Minister for Crime, Policing, and Fire, acknowledged the gravity of the situation. He stated that
these overseas police stations are, of course, of great concern, and our police forces and intelligence agencies are working diligently on this issue. We take a proactive approach to protecting individuals and communities from threats, deploying security measures and guidance where necessary.12
Canada took a strong measure by issuing a ‘cease and desist’ warning in November 2022. It summoned the Chinese ambassador, Cong Peiwu, and conveyed its concerns. Additionally, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police announced investigations into two police stations in Quebec.13
Rita Schwarzeluhr Sutter, the Parliamentary State Secretary for Interior and Community of Germany, highlighted that two police stations of ‘Overseas 110’ remain operational in Germany, violating the country’s sovereignty. ‘Overseas 110’ refers to various extralegal stations established by the Chinese government. She pointed out that these stations are run by individuals with strong connections to the diplomatic missions of the People’s Republic of China who enjoy the trust of the Chinese security authorities. Furthermore, they are involved in Chinese United Front organisations, raising concerns about their activities and influence within Germany.14
Conclusion
The proliferation of China’s Overseas Police Stations underscores the urgent need for international scrutiny and diplomatic actions. The coercive methods employed by these stations are not only a violation of human rights and international law but also a challenge to international security. There is a legitimate fear that these stations may be exploited by the intelligence agents of the Ministry of State Security, further escalating the risks posed by their operations.
The affected countries must hold China accountable. Diplomatic efforts, coupled with legal measures, must be collectively pursued to curb unlawful Chinese actions. Moreover, raising awareness among Chinese nationals about their rights in the host country and establishing support networks are crucial steps in mitigating the impact of any such actions. The presence of China’s Overseas Police Stations is a call to action for all nations to prioritise the protection of persons within their territorial jurisdictions.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Khalistan Movement in Canada: A Political Consensus
Abhishek Verma
July 26, 2024
Since the early 1980s, the Canadian political landscape, irrespective of the political parties in power, has been permissive, if not sympathetic, to the Khalistan movement.
Introduction
On 22 July 2024, the BAPS Swaminarayan Mandir in Edmonton was vandalised by the Khalistan separatists with hateful and anti-India graffiti.1 This incident occurred on the heels of another incident on 19 June 2024 wherein the Canadian parliament observed a minute’s silence on the first death anniversary of designated Khalistani terrorist Hardeep Singh Nijjar. A moment of silence in the parliament reflects an unequivocal consensus among representatives of all the political parties in the House of Commons.2
Such non-partisan consensus vis-à-vis Khalistani separatists has not been uncommon in Canada. Since the early 1980s, the Canadian political landscape, irrespective of the political parties in power, has been permissive, if not sympathetic, to the Khalistan movement. The driving forces behind such political consensus have ranged from Cold War dynamics before 1990s to domestic politics at present.
For years, successive Canadian governments, regardless of the political parties in power, have demonstrated a tendency to overlook Indian security concerns and have adopted a lenient approach towards Khalistan-related activities. While doing so, the Canadian government's attitude has been shaped by three overarching factors—Cold War dynamics; political stance on freedom of expression; and considerations of vote bank politics.
Cold War Era Dynamics
During the Cold War, in alignment with other Western countries, Canada engaged with India through various bilateral avenues such as project financing, food aid and technical assistance. This was exemplified by the establishment of the CIRUS nuclear reactor at the Trombay Atomic Energy Establishment in 1954. However, bilateral relations between the two nations experienced a downturn following India's peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974 with fissile materials sourced from the aforementioned reactor.
During this phase (1970s–1980s), the Liberal Party government of Pierre Trudeau and subsequent government of Progressive Conservative Brian Mulroney largely aligned their foreign policy with the United States. The tendency became particularly evident as Cold War dynamics exerted influence in the Indian subcontinent, notably marked by the India–Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1971 and the subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Amidst the height of Khalistani militancy in India during 1980s, the Canadian government neglected the burgeoning Khalistani secessionist activities within Canada. In one such incident, despite repeated requests for the extradition of a notorious Khalistani terrorist Talwinder Singh Parmar in 1982, the government of Pierre Trudeau rejected Parmar's extradition on frivolous grounds related to Commonwealth protocols. As per the Canadian government, extradition could not proceed because India only recognises Her Majesty as Head of the Commonwealth, and not as Head of State.3 Moreover, the Canadian government’s indifference was further underscored by the failure to bring the perpetrators of the Air India ‘Kanishka’ Bombing of 1985 to justice.
Subsequent administrations, including those of Jean Chretien, Paul Martin, and Stephen Harper, witnessed a partial improvement in Indo-Canadian relations owing to India's enhanced rapport with the broader Western world. However, Canada maintained its longstanding stance on the issue of Khalistan. It affirmed unequivocal support for a united India while concurrently upholding the view that freedom of expression is an inalienable democratic right. They insisted that mere advocacy for a Khalistani homeland in Punjab did not inherently constitute illegal activity.
Vote Bank Politics: A Political Consensus
Since the formation of Justin Trudeau’s government in 2015, considerations of vote banks has induced political parties to adopt a policy of Sikh appeasement. Under Trudeau’s Liberal party government, pro-Khalistan sentiments have been strategically utilised for electoral purposes. Following the 2015 general election, Trudeau's Liberal Party secured a majority with 184 Members of Parliament (MPs). The new Parliament had 18 Sikhs, four of which were cabinet members.
With the increasing numbers and significance of Sikhs in Canadian Parliament, Prime Minister Trudeau's first term witnessed the implementation of specific populist measures aimed at mobilising Sikh community. In 2017, the ruling Liberal Party in the Ontario Provincial Legislative Assembly passed a resolution characterising the anti-Sikh riot of 1984 as an act of genocide.
Interestingly, a report issued by Canada's Ministry of Public Safety titled ‘2018 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada’4 explicitly identified Sikh extremism as a security threat to Canada. However, following a formidable backlash from the Sikh community, the Trudeau administration revised the Report and republished it without any reference to Sikh extremism.
On the other hand, a motion was also brought by opposition Conservative party's Erin O'Toole and Candice Bergen in February 2018, indicating similar sentiments of the opposition towards Khalistan extremists. The said motion was introduced on 27 February 2018 in the House of Commons by the conservative party members to:
Value the contributions of Canadian Sikhs and Canadians of Indian origin in our national life;
Condemn in the strongest terms all forms of terrorism, including Khalistani extremism and the glorification of any individuals who have committed acts of violence to advance the cause of the Khalistani state in India; and
Stand with a united India.
Various Sikh organisations like the Canadian Sikh Association and the World Sikh Organisation of Canada, among others, strongly denounced the motion. They believed the motion unfairly targeted the entire Sikh community by designating them as terrorists. Following a considerable backlash, the party decided to drop the motion in the House of Commons.5
During subsequent years, the political significance of the community continued to increase due to increasing Sikh demography and the formation of a minority government in Canada. In an extraordinary event on 18 September 2023, Prime Minister Trudeau alleged a “potential link between agents of the Government of India and the killing of a Canadian citizen, Hardeep Singh Nijjar”.6 Initially, the Conservative Party questioned the Prime Minister's judgement and demanded evidence for the assertion. Later on, the Party's MPs condemned the killing and took a somewhat sympathetic turn towards the Khalistani extremists.
In Canadian political discourse, the Liberal Party and New Democratic Party have, in general, adopted the policy of appeasement towards the Canadian Sikh community as well as a section of it that advocates an independent state of Khalistan. However, current political dynamics indicate that the Conservatives (like the liberals and others) prefer to garner as much Sikh political support as possible.
In the recently concluded Ipsos poll conducted for Canadian news platform Global News, 44 per cent of Canadians think that Pierre Poilievre, leader of the Conservative Party, would make the best Prime Minister of Canada. In the same poll, Trudeau ranked a distant second, with 25 per cent votes in his favour. While Trudeau's supporters fell by 6 per cent since September 2023, support for Poilievre increased by 4 per cent during the same period.7 With such favourable poll performance and increased prospects of forming the next government in Canada, the Conservatives do not want to antagonise the Sikh community through their anti-Khalistan rhetoric.
Conclusion
The above analysis indicates mutual consensus across the political and ideological spectrum in Canadian politics on the issue of Khalistan movement. The nature of this consensus has evolved over a period of time. During the initial phase of pro-Khalistan advocacy in Canada, Cold War dynamics guided the government’s approach towards the issue of Khalistan and other anti-India activities. Aligning its policies with the larger Western consensus, Canada adopted a permissive approach towards anti-India and pro-Khalistan movement in Canada while dismissing India’s security concerns. Subsequently, as the Sikh diaspora and their political significance increased, vote bank politics started guiding Canadian politics towards the issue of Khalistan movement.
In the current political landscape, the three mainstream political parties—the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party and the New Democratic Party—have explicitly demonstrated their sympathy towards Sikh extremists’ agenda, granting further impunity to the anti-India elements inside Canada. This trend of bipartisan support will continue in the near future considering the growing population of Sikh community in Canada and their substantial influence on domestic politics.
Against this background, India–Canada relations can be expected to remain sour primarily due to Canada’s unwillingness to acknowledge and act on India’s concerns.8 The veneer of freedom of speech, expression and protest cannot be indefinitely invoked to incite secessionist tendencies in other countries. Non-interference in the internal affairs of other sovereign state is an equally important international norm and democratic virtue as are freedoms relating to speech and expression.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
3. Terry Milewsky, in his recent book, sheds light on this issue. He writes, “Canadian diplomats had to tell their Indian counterparts that the extradition protocols between Commonwealth countries would not apply because India only recognized Her Majesty as Head of the Commonwealth, and not as Head of State. Case closed”. See Terry Milewsky, Blood for Blood: Fifty Years of Global Khalistan, HarperCollins India, 2021.
Putin’s Visits to North Korea and Vietnam Amidst the Ukraine War
Anusua Ganguly
July 23, 2024
President Vladimir Putin’s visits to North Korea and Vietnam reinforce Moscow’s relationships with these two countries at a time of regional and global flux.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visits to North Korea and Vietnam have resulted in new military and economic agreements. Russia and North Korea signed the ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement’, which has put neighbours in the region, mainly South Korea and Japan, on high alert. During his visit to Vietnam, President Putin and Vietnamese President To Lam signed 11 agreements in areas such as oil and gas exploration and nuclear science and technology, among others.
North Korea: Old Friend, New Ties
Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) shared ideological affinity as communist states during the Cold War era. In 1961, the two countries signed the Russo-North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, which included provisions
for extending mutual assistance in the event of aggression.1
During the 1990s, the Russian-North Korean economic ties declined dramatically, with trade plummeting from US$ 2.35 billion in 1990 to US$ 65 million in 1998.2 Russia under President Boris Yeltsin leaned towards the Republic of Korea (ROK), anticipating it to grow to be a significant economic partner. During his visit to Seoul in November 1992, President Yeltsin signed the treaty on basic relations, which laid down the main principles of Russia–South Korean relations. With President Kim En Sam’s visit to Moscow in June 1994, exchanges at the ministerial level and between military delegations, and cooperation in areas such as education and culture, expanded.
In 2008, Russia and ROK upgraded their ties to the level of strategic cooperative partnership, with the aim to promote relations across security, energy and aerospace among other aspects.3 By 2015, the ROK had become Russia's seventh-largest trading partner, albeit the mix of Russian exports to South Korea noticeably lacked diversity, with natural resources (exclusively oil and natural gas) accounting for roughly three-quarters of Russian exports to South Korea. On the other hand, the majority of South Korea's exports to Russia were made up of cars, machinery and other technological goods.4 Bilateral relations though were hit in the aftermath of the start of the Ukraine war in February 2022 with South Korea implementing sanctions against Moscow.
Kim Jong Un’s September 2023 visit to Russia followed by Putin’s recent visit to North Korea and the signing of the strategic partnership treaty have noticeably increased the momentum of Moscow–Pyongyang ties. North Korea has emerged as a key supplier of conventional weapons, including artillery shells to Russia during the ongoing Ukraine conflict.5 Since 2023, North Korea has shipped an estimated 6,700 containers of munitions via rail and sea routes.6 In turn, Pyongyang secured resources, such as energy, food, raw material and parts used in weapons manufacturing. In 2023 itself, Russia sent more than 1,00,000 barrels of refined petroleum to Pyongyang.7 Additionally, since the start of 2024, Russia has supplied thousands of tons of flour and corn to North Korea.8
The newly signed Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between DPRK and the Russian Federation states in Article 4 that
If either side is attacked by an individual state or several states and enters a state of war, the other side will provide military and other assistance without delay by all means at its disposal.9
This is similar to the 1961 Treaty’s provision of mutual defence, where in Article 1 it mentioned:
Should either of the Contracting Parties suffer armed attack by any State or coalition of States and thus find itself in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately extend military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal.10
Analysts note that a likely consequence of the treaty could be an increase in collaboration in the production of munitions, with North Korea producing more weapons for Russia. In turn, Russia could offer more technical support for North Korea's ballistic missile and satellite programmes, most likely including assistance in the ‘development of submarines capable of launching ballistic nuclear missile’.11
This would entail significant implications for the regional security landscape, especially for South Korea and Japan. The South Korean Foreign Minister, Cho Tae-yul and the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken have condemned the treaty and called it a violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions, stating that ‘the agreement poses a grave threat to the security of both the ROK and the U.S., as well as to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the broader region’.12
South Korea has provided humanitarian aid and other support to Ukraine, while joining U.S.-led economic sanctions against Russia. In August 2023, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol announced financial aid of 520 billion won (US$ 394 million) for Ukraine. This aid package includes 130 billion won for reconstruction, 260 billion in humanitarian aid, and another 130 billion won through international organisations.13 South Korea has not directly provided arms to Kyiv, citing a long-standing policy of not sending weapons to countries actively involved in combat. This could, however, change due to the recent Russia–North Korea treaty signing, with reports noting that South Korea is considering supplying arms to Ukraine.
Vietnam: Neutral, but Close
Vietnam’s robust ties with Russia date back many decades, owing to the military, economic and diplomatic support provided by the Soviet Union to the communist leadership in North Vietnam in the 1950s. As one of Asia’s fastest-growing economies, manufacturing powerhouse and leading exporter of goods, Hanoi has a multi-vector approach known as ‘Bamboo Diplomacy’, aimed at balancing Vietnam’s relations with the major powers by not taking sides, being self-reliant and demonstrating flexibility to maintain its agency and interests, helping it take advantage of economic opportunities created by major power competition.
Vietnam has upgraded its relations with important global actors such as the United States, Japan and Australia, demonstrating its growing influence on the world stage. While Russia’s agreement with North Korea has raised significant security concerns about the Korean Peninsula, the last leg of Putin’s Asia tour focused on strengthening the traditional Russia–Vietnamese relations. Both leaders have stated their aims to further the cooperation between the two nations in education, science and technology, oil and gas exploration and clean energy. The two nations agreed to collaborate on a roadmap for a nuclear science and technology centre in Vietnam.14
The Southeast Asian nation has chosen to abstain from various resolutions at the United Nations condemning Russia’s actions, yet maintained good relations with Ukraine and even sent some aid to Kyiv. In 2022, the Vietnamese government provided US$ 500,000 as humanitarian aid to support the people affected in the Ukraine conflict.15 Following its long-held foreign policy, Vietnam has maintained a neutral stance on the Ukraine conflict and is trying to court major powers equally. It is the only country to successfully host leaders from the US, China and Russia in recent times and is one of the largest importers of Russian arms. In the period 2016–2022, Vietnam bought 5.9 per cent of Russia’s weapons at US$ 1.7 billion.16 However, it plans to diversify its arms imports and reduce reliance on its traditional ally.
Amid tensions with China, these improving ties with Russia could also help Vietnam protect its disputed waters. With the aim to deepen relations in the energy sector, Vietnam has licensed Zarubezhneft, a Russian state-controlled oil company, to develop an offshore block on its southeastern coast.17 The so-called Block 11-2, however, appears to be inside the disputed nine-dash-line, a part of the area that China claims to be its own.18 Therefore, this offshore block might help Vietnam to maintain its claims in the contested part of the South China Sea.
Furthermore, Putin’s visit ahead of the October 2024 BRICS Summit under the Russian Chairmanship, also shows support for Vietnam’s keen interest in joining the group of emerging economies. Formally joining the grouping would benefit Vietnam by aligning their foreign policy of using multilateral diplomatic institutions to promote a multipolar world order and enhance economic ties with emerging economies.19
Key Takeaways
Amidst the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, Russia has sought to strengthen its ties with DPRK and Vietnam in face of the growing isolationism due to the West’s sanctions. Russia and DPRK’s upgraded partnership broadens their collaboration across multiple areas and could lead to significant changes in the dynamics of Northeast Asian security. South Korea and Japan, the two non-nuclear powers, may further strengthen diplomatic and security cooperation with the United States as well as strengthen their own defence profiles to counter the threats posed by DPRK in the region.20 On the other hand, for Vietnam, Russia is an important source of military assistance and a valued partner in the former’s energy sector. While some analysts note that Russia–Vietnam cooperation in the hydrocarbon sector could strengthen Vietnam’s claims in the South China Sea, Russia is less likely to take measures that might jeopardize Chinese interests in this region, given the increasing robustness in Moscow–Beijing ties.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Kaladan Transport Project Amidst the Civil War in Myanmar
Om Prakash Das
July 22, 2024
Ongoing conflicts involving groups such as the Arakan Army and the Myanmar military junta have delayed the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project.
On 2 April 2008, India and Myanmar signed a Framework Agreement to construct and operate a Multi-Modal Transit Transport facility on the Kaladan River, connecting Sittwe Port in Myanmar with Mizoram in India. The project's primary objective was to enhance bilateral relations and economic cooperation through improved transportation infrastructure.1 In October 2015, the Indian government approved a Revised Cost Estimate (RCE) of Rs 2904.04 crores for the project.2
The Kaladan project integrates multiple transportation modes, including a 539 km shipping route from Kolkata to Sittwe Port in Myanmar, facilitating maritime transport; a 158 km inland water transport (IWT) route from Sittwe to Paletwa along the Kaladan River; a 110 km road connecting Paletwa to the Indo-Myanmar border; and finally, a 100 km road link from the border to NH-54 at Lawngtlai in India.3
Before the formal Framework Agreement between the two countries, Detailed Project Reports (DPRs) were prepared for the waterways component, including the Port and Inland Waterways Terminal (IWT) in April 2003 and for the road component in March 2005.4 M/s RITES Limited, a Public Sector Undertaking under the Ministry of Railways, suggested a waterway route from Sittwe Port to Kaletwa (225 km) along the Kaladan River, followed by a roadway from Kaletwa to the India–Myanmar border (62 km).5
By 2016, the Sittwe Port and Paletwa Inland Water Transport Terminal were completed.6 A DPR for a new container terminal was prepared, and a MoU for the operation and maintenance of the facilities was signed in October 2018, appointing A to Z Exim Limited as the private operator from January 2020. The Indian government allocated Rs 1921.05 crores for the road component, with IRCON International appointed as the Project Implementing Agency in March 2022.7 Construction commenced from both Paletwa and Zorinpui ends to facilitate the project's implementation.
On 9 May 2023, the first Indian cargo ship arrived at the newly inaugurated Sittwe Port in Myanmar's Rakhine State. The ship departed from Kolkata's Syama Prasad Mookerjee Port and was received by Sarbananda Sonowal, Minister for Ports, Shipping, and Waterways. Myanmar's Deputy Prime Minister and Union Minister for Transport and Communications, Tin Aung San, also attended the occasion. This project is expected to reduce the cost and time of transporting goods between Kolkata and cities like Agartala and Aizawl by more than 50 per cent, leveraging a route from Kolkata to Sittwe, then onward to Paletwa and further by road to Northeast India.8
India attributed the success of the KMTTP to the visionary 'Act East' policy, emphasising that this initiative has unlocked significant commercial opportunities not just for Northeast India but also for Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Myanmar and the broader Southeast Asia region. The project was poised to transform Sittwe Port in Myanmar into a major hub for regional trade. Key exports from Myanmar through Sittwe Port will include rice, timber, fish, seafood, petroleum products and textiles, while major imports will consist of construction material such as cement, steel and bricks.9
Strategically, Sittwe Port will provide Northeast India with an alternative, more efficient trade and transit route, reducing dependency on traditional pathways and fostering economic development in the region.10 For Myanmar, especially the Rakhine State, the port is expected to enhance trade and commerce, facilitating closer economic integration with India. The project thus represents a crucial step in bridging South Asia with Southeast Asia, promoting regional prosperity and cooperation.11
The KMTTP is expected to provide a strategic link to the North-East, thereby reducing pressure on the Siliguri Corridor.12 The Siliguri Corridor, colloquially termed the ‘chicken neck’, is a constricted expanse of territory linking India's northeastern states to the broader Indian mainland. The ‘Chicken’s Neck’ corridor has an approximate width of 33 km on the eastern end and 21 km on the western end.13
Challenges
The Kaladan project faced a significant setback, following the capture of Paletwa township near the Mizoram border, by Arakan Army (AA) in January 2024. In February 2024, while a United League of Arakan (ULA) spokesperson affirmed the safety of the KMTTP and expressed readiness to cooperate with India for mutual benefit, reports noted that the KMTTP has ‘almost died’ after the AA seized control of Paletwa.14 The AA now controls most major towns and supply routes in the region. Consequently, the Kaladan project has reached a near-standstill, as Paletwa is critical to the project's progress and is no longer under the control of the military junta.
The project road extends in a south-north direction within the Chin State of Myanmar, running parallel to the Kaladan River. It originates from the eastern bank of the Kaladan River,
Where a jetty for a waterway terminal has been proposed as part of the ‘Waterway Project’ linking Sittwe port and Paletwa. The road concludes at the India-Myanmar border. The total projected length of the road alignment is approximately 109.200 kilometers, with Package I (Paletwa to Kaletwa) covering 60.700 kilometers and Package II (Kaletwa to Zorinpui/India-Myanmar border) spanning 48.500 kilometers.15
Currently, the highway from Paletwa to Zorinpui is not yet built.16
This route goes through one of the areas hardest hit by the ongoing conflict between the Myanmar military and resistance forces. Against this backdrop, the Adani Group divested its investment in Myanmar's Sittwe port earlier this year, amidst escalating conflict between the military junta and the AA insurgents.17 The KMTTP traverses through two states in Myanmar—Rakhine and Chin. Following the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021, an armed civil war erupted, leading ethnic rebel and pro-democratic armed forces to take control of substantial parts of the country, including significant areas in Rakhine.
Prior to the military coup, the Kaladan project had also faced delays for various reasons, including the Rohingya crisis that emerged in 2017. The recent developments have also raised concerns about a potential tripartite conflict involving the junta's forces, the AA, and rebels from Chin State, given that Paletwa has traditionally been a Chin-majority township. The Chin State, located on the border with Mizoram, represents a particularly intense battleground. This region has witnessed close coordination between the Chinland Defense Force, the People’s Defense Force (PDF), and the Chin National Army in their struggle against the military junta.18
By early July 2024, the civil conflict in Rakhine State has significantly intensified. Since late 2023, the AA has made substantial territorial gains, including key townships near the Bangladesh border. The State Administration Council (SAC), primarily military-controlled, has responded with severe tactics, causing significant civilian casualties and widespread destruction. Rising tensions between the ethnic Rakhine population and Rohingya Muslims further complicate the situation.19 Estimates indicate that the AA now controls 50 per cent to 75 per cent of Rakhine State, with their hybrid governance system playing a pivotal role in this power shift.20
Apart from Rakhine, the Junta generals are fighting similar EAOs in Chin, Sagaing, Shan, Kachin and Kayah State near the Thailand border. Moreover, western Myanmar is currently controlled by two powerful armed groups—the Arakan Army representing the Arakanese and the Chin National Front/Army (CNF/A) representing the Chin. This conflict is significant for India’s strategic interests in the region, necessitating balanced engagement with both the AA and CNF/A, as well as other political actors within the Chinland Council. During recent months, resistance forces have made unprecedented advances against the military SAC. A key front is Rakhine State where the AA now controls a majority of townships. By May 2024, the AA captured 10 township centres in northern and central Rakhine State and southern Chin State, including Pauktaw, Kyauktaw, Mrauk-U, Minbya, Myebon, Ponnagyun, Rathedaung, Buthidaung, Ramree and Paletwa.21
The AA forces territorial advancements have hindered road construction efforts from Paletwa in Chin state to Zorinpui on the Mizoram border.22 Prior to the latest escalation of the civil conflict, the AA had formulated plans to impose taxes on infrastructural initiatives and commercial enterprises within the Rakhine and Chin states, notably targeting the Kaladan project.23 This maneuver sought to bolster their fiscal resources and consolidate authority, thereby potentially influencing developmental initiatives. The AA also abducted five Indian workers from a project site in November 2019.
Conclusion
The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project has encountered numerous obstacles, primarily due to Myanmar's political instability, ethnic armed groups, and law and order issues. The situation worsened after the February 2021 militay coup, which escalated into a severe civil war in October 2023, initiated by various ethnic armed groups against the military. Rakhine State, where the project is located, remains partially under military control, with the Arakan Army consolidating its influence near the borders of Bangladesh and India. Significant portions of the project are still under construction. Security concerns can be expected to persist until Myanmar achieves political stability and the civil war ends.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Unchecked inflation and a low tax-to-GDP ratio are some of the key economic woes plaguing Pakistan.
Pakistan’s Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb presented an ambitious PKR 18.9 trillion finance bill1 in the National Assembly on 12 June 2024. This was passed after due deliberation and minor amendments on 28 June 2024.2 While acknowledging the challenges before the economy in terms of depleting foreign reserves, continuous depreciation of its currency, stagnant economic growth and soaring inflation, he also underlined the slightly improved economic outlook of late3 due to inflows of funds from outside.
The budget aims at a modest 3.6 per cent GDP growth for Fiscal Year 2024–2025 with a whopping tax collection target of PKR 13 trillion, 40 per cent higher than last year’s target, which requires additional revenue measures at least to the tune of PKR 2 trillion. Direct taxes are increased by 48 per cent, whereas indirect taxes have gone up by 35 per cent. Besides, the budget intends to generate PKR 3.5 trillion from non-tax revenue and PKR 30 billion from privatisation. Compared to last year, the total outlay, a sum total of expenditure and net lending, has increased by 30 per cent and now stands at PKR 18.877 trillion.
Source: Business Recorder
Debt servicing forms the single largest component of the expenditure and consumes more than half of the total budget outlay amounting to PKR 9,775 billion. This is distantly followed by expenditure on Defence4 excluding pensions amounting to PKR 2,122 billion, Grants and Transfers to Provinces PKR 1,777 billion, and Development Spending and Net Lending PKR 1674 billion. PKR 1363 billion is earmarked under the head of Subsidies, followed by PKR 1152 billion allotted to the running of civil government & emergency provision, whereas PKR 1014 billion is meant for Pensions.5
The claims about right-sizing the government falls flat in the absence of any tangible policy measures.6 The expenditures have actually gone up by 21 per cent. The attempt to ensure fiscal consolidation may have its utilities to deepen stability, sustainable economic recovery remains a dream as it continues to depend upon outside inflows. Zahid Hussain terms the entire exercise of the Finance Minister as “Budgetary Jugglery”7 whereas Najam Sethi feels that the new budget is going to adversely impact the take home money for the people which would lead to lesser demands in the market.8
Table 1 shows the major components of the Pakistani budget over the last five years. Debt servicing and spending on defence have been constantly growing. Interest payments increased to PKR 9,775 billion in 2024–25 from PKR 2,964 in 2020–21. Similarly, spending on Defence has gone up to PKR 2,122 billion in 2024–25 from PKR 1,289 in 2020–21. Net external receipts increased from PKR 810 billion in 2020–21 to PKR 2,724 billion in 2023–24, but decreased to PKR 666 billion in 2024–25. Spending on federal Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) has increased from PKR 650 billion in 2020–21 to PKR 1,400 billion in 2024–25.
Table 1. Major Components of Budget (2020–2025)
(All Figures are in PKR in billion)
Budget
Receipts
Expenditure
Total Outlay
Tax Revenue
Net External Receipts
Interest Payments
Defence
PSDP
2020-21
7,137
5,464
810
2,964
1,289
650
2021-22
8,487
5,829
1,246
3,060
1,370
900
2022-23
9,579
7,470
1,611
3,950
1,563
727
2023-24
14,484
9,415
2,724
7,303
1,804
950
2024-25
18,877
12,970
666
9,775
2,122
1,400
Source: Compiled from Pakistan’s Federal Budgets, Respective Years.
Key Economic Woes
Pakistan, at present, is in the firm grip of a multifaceted crisis that requires long-term systemic and structural reforms at various levels to address the existing lacunas. There exists a near consensus among Pakistan observers and analysts that the country needs systemic changes instead of short-term measures. This was acknowledged by Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb himself during his budget presentation when he cautioned the House that progress could not be made overnight and one would have to have patience and make collective efforts to achieve required and sustainable economic growth and development. He went on to argue that government was looking to broaden the tax net in a way that does not burden the existing tax payers.
As the house debated the budgetary provisions, Aurangzeb termed the budget as growth budget and stated it is based on a well thought out homegrown strategy to boost economic growth.9 He further claimed that the budget was aimed to expand revenues, cut unnecessary expenditures and narrow the fiscal deficit.10 It is in this context one needs to situate the increased tax collection target for Federal Bureau Reserve (FBR) in the budget.
Problem of Taxation
Tax to GDP ratio is an important parameter to assess the capacity of a state to mobilise resources to fuel growth and development. The Pakistan Economic Survey 2021–22 notes that the Tax to GDP ratio is the real index to measure tax compliance, capacity and efficiency in the tax system.11 A higher Tax to GDP Ratio allows the government to tap domestic resources to meet developmental expenditures and decreases its reliance on external sources. As per the World Bank, Tax to GDP Ratio above 15 per cent is ‘an important tipping point to make a state viable and put it on a path to growth’.12
In Pakistan, the Tax to GDP ratio has historically been abysmally low. In the last six years, the Federal Bureau of Reserve’s (FBR) Tax to GDP ratio hovered between 8.4 to 9.8 per cent.13 The situation is not improving much despite the fact that Pakistan remains the most heavily taxed country in the entire region.14 Unlike in industrialised and other developed countries with higher Tax to GDP Ratios, Pakistan heavily relies on indirect taxes compared to direct taxes that form a meagre share of the overall revenue.
The taxation system also has a range of exemptions that costs the economy dearly. In 2022, the tax exemptions were recorded at PKR 1.757 trillion which increased to PKR 3.9 trillion in 2023. Notwithstanding, the affluent class, super rich, landed elites and other powerful sections find ways to exploit loopholes to evade taxes. Pakistan has a poor Tax to GDP ratio due to a number of reasons including “a narrow tax base, massive evasion and avoidance, lack of effective enforcement, poor documentation, exemptions/concessions, and fragmentation across provinces”.15
Contrary to claims made by the Finance Minister, the budget fails to introduce major reforms to broaden the tax base. Instead of widening the tax net, the budget burdens the existing tax payers, especially the salaried class. About five million out of a total 240 million Pakistanis pay direct taxes which on one hand reflects administrative inefficiency and on the other epitomizes a systemic crisis.16 Heavy reliance on indirect taxes makes the fiscal system regressive and places the burdens uniformly on all consumers irrespective of their economic status in the society.
The average annual growth in taxes during last five years had been recorded at around 20 per cent. However, as per the new budget, it has gone up to 30 per cent this time. Although, the government has set a high target for tax collection, many in Pakistan doubt FBR’s capacity to achieve the “tax miracle”.17 Instead of resorting to structural reforms, the government is going to squeeze those already in the tax bracket. The budget aims to address certain concerns of IMF so that it could secure a new programme of US$ 6–8 billion to avoid economic default in near term. Key among those concerns related to increasing FBR tax collection and reducing consolidated budget deficit. The IMF appears to be somewhat satisfied with the budget as it has reached a staff level agreement on 12 July 2024 for an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) amounting US$ 7 billion for a period of 37 months.18
Unchecked Inflation
Inflation is another area that needs proper attention by those framing economic policies in the country. Pakistani people have been suffering from the longest and the most intense form of inflation. Ever since May 2022, the inflation rates surged above 20 per cent. By May 2023, the inflation had reached a record high of 38 per cent. After that, a slowdown was recorded and it took almost a year when inflation came down to 20 per cent. At present, it stands at 12.6 per cent which is higher than the last month’s recorded data at 11.8 per cent.
Source: Business Recorder
Situations like these, if got unchecked, could potentially lead to unforeseen consequences including civil unrest. Khurram Hussain in his recent Op-ed in Dawn English daily argued that:
The inflation engulfing the country is no longer just an economic problem. It is a danger to the social order. It is not clear when a tipping point will be reached, nor what it will trigger if and when it does arrive.19
Instead of widening the tax net, the budget burdens the existing tax payers, especially the salaried class. About five million out of a total 240 million Pakistanis pay direct taxes which on the one hand reflects the administrative inefficiency and on the other epitomizes a systemic crisis. Heavy reliance on indirect taxes makes the fiscal system regressive and places the burdens uniformly on all consumers irrespective of their economic status in the society. The average annual growth in taxes during last five years had been recorded at around 20 per cent. However, as per the new budget it has gone up to 30 per cent this time. Although, the government has set a high target for tax collection, many in Pakistan doubt FBR’s capacity to achieve the “tax miracle”.
Conclusion
The budget lacks major reforms to address the root cause of Pakistan’s economic mess. At a time when everyone was hoping for certain structural reforms to broaden the tax net and downsizing exemptions to the bare minimum to put the economy back on track and provide relief to the people suffering from intense bouts of inflation, Pakistan resorted to a window-dressing approach. Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb seems to have pieced together the ingredients of the same old recipe in hope of serving a new dish altogether. This was probably done to address certain concerns raised by IMF in recent past. While this has helped Pakistan reach an agreement with the IMF for US$ 7 billion EFF for a period of 37 months, it will not change the economic situation on the ground.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Emperor Naruhito’s Visits to Indonesia and the UK in Context
Arnab Dasgupta
July 11, 2024
Emperor Naruhito’s Visits to Indonesia and the UK in Context
Introduction
Japan’s Imperial Family, with the Emperor and Empress at its centre, has been a significant moderating influence on Japanese politics in the post-war era. Though debarred from any significant political role by the new Constitution adopted under the United States-led Allied Occupation in 1947, the Imperial Family remains the constitutional ‘symbol of the nation’. One of the striking ramifications of this is that the Imperial couple, or even members of their extended family, can be said to have emerged as remarkably effective tools of diplomatic soft power. The current Emperor’s two recent foreign trips to Indonesia and the United Kingdom denotes how the Emperor forms a complex nexus between Japan’s 20th century history and its modern status as a member of good standing with the Global North.
The Japanese Emperor in Modern Diplomacy
Japan’s monarch regained diplomatic significance only when the reign of the samurai was overthrown in 1868. As the Japanese polity underwent modernisation and a new German-inspired Constitution was promulgated in 1889, Emperor Meiji and his descendants became not only the final arbiters of domestic policy, but also the key decision-makers in foreign policy. It was on Meiji’s authority that the Japanese army invaded and annexed Okinawa, Manchuria and Korea in 1879, 1905 and 1910 respectively. His son Taisho was the authority behind Japan’s occupation of German colonial territories in Liaodong and Shantung in China after the First World War, while his grandson Showa presided over the great conflagration that was the Second World War.
With the announcement of Japan’s surrender on 15 August 1945, the Emperor’s war-making prerogatives were finally taken from him. The Allied Occupation, led by the United States, instead drafted a new Constitution in 1947 that returned him to the status of a disenfranchised figurehead.1 Some diplomatic powers remained with the Imperial Household, namely the receiving of credentials from foreign envoys and making formal visits to key countries. Even this, however, was strictly circumscribed by the powerful Imperial Household Agency, which remains the office ‘in charge of’ the Imperial Household’s affairs.
Nevertheless, the post-war Emperor became a powerful sign of Japan’s goodwill. Emperor Showa’s visit to Britain in 1971 and the US in 1975 marked Japan’s rehabilitation as a key Asian ally in the Cold War. The visit of the then Crown Prince Akihito and his new bride Crown Princess Michiko to India in 1960 was an early premonition of the importance Japan would come to attach to ties with India, reconfirmed by their return in 2019 as Emperor and Empress.
Upon assuming the throne in 1990, Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko (who are still alive and therefore not customarily referred to by their regnal name, Heisei) proved to be indefatigable practitioners of koushitsu gaikou (Imperial diplomacy)2, visiting over 36 countries in their 30-year-long reign. In 1992, the Imperial couple visited China, where they delighted their hosts—and dismayed Japanese conservatives—by issuing a statement of regret for Japan’s actions during the Second World War.3
Conservatives were further disappointed by his public statement of apology to Koreans for his country’s actions there between 1910 and 1945, a statement that was promptly accepted by then-President Roh Moo Hyun.4 Akihito even broke a deeply-controversial ‘taboo’ when he acknowledged that his ancestors, who he technically claims descent from in an unbroken lineage stretching back to the mythological Sun Goddess, may have been from the Korean peninsula.5
Significance of the Emperor’s Indonesia Visit
After Emperor Akihito announced his abdication in 2019, his son, Emperor Naruhito, took the throne with the regnal name Reiwa. As his accession occurred in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, Naruhito and Empress Masako, a former career diplomat, spent the two initial years of their reign holding socially distanced events with select individuals. As the threat of the disease receded in 2023, the Imperial couple took to touring again.
Their tour of Indonesia in June 2023 was their first foreign foray, which demonstrated Naruhito’s inheritance of his father’s style of diplomacy. The six-day trip conducted between 17 and 23 June saw the royal couple engaging deeply with Indonesian culture and people in a variety of settings. Characteristically, it also featured the Emperor’s open acknowledgement of the ‘difficult time in our relations with Indonesia’, which referred to Japan’s brutal occupation of what was then called the Dutch East Indies during the Second World War.6
However, the visit also had a pronounced political and strategic objective. This can be best understood by the Emperor’s remarks prior to his departure, when he clearly stated that “[w]orking with new and developing countries is becoming increasingly important to resolve global issues such as climate change, energy, and food”.7
Indonesia is not only the largest economy among the ASEAN countries, but also a traditional investment and aid destination for the Japanese. By 2022, the country had received over 380.5 billion yen in Official Development Assistance for technical cooperation, while Japan–Indonesia trade reached over US$ 32 billion in 2023.8 A survey conducted by the Japanese Foreign Ministry in 2022 found that over 59 per cent of Indonesians feel that Japan is an important partner, as against 54 per cent who felt that China played that role best.9 As such, the visit was an opportunity not only to reaffirm post-Cold War Japan’s ‘Asia-centric’ diplomacy, but also the sincerity of its outreach towards the countries of the Global South.10
Significance of the Emperor’s UK Visit
In June 2024, Japan’s Emperor Naruhito and Empress Masako departed for the United Kingdom for an eight-day state visit.11 Their visit, their second foreign trip, was touted by the Japanese media as a sort of homecoming, as both the Emperor and Empress are alumni of Oxford University, and the Emperor has been on record as stating he feels a sense of kinship to the UK.12
During the trip, the Imperial couple attended several functions hosted by the British royal family mixed in with personal visits to sites of interest such as the Thames Barrier (on which the Emperor wrote a dissertation) and Oxford University itself. However, it is the speech he delivered at Buckingham Palace on 26 June during the official banquet hosted by King Charles III and Queen Camilla that is most worthy of attention here, as it illustrates perfectly how the Imperial institution serves as a diplomatic vehicle for Japan’s key foreign policy interests.13
In the early years of the 20th century, as Japan rapidly modernised its economic and military structures, the UK, then at the head of the British Empire, had signed a landmark treaty of alliance with the Empire of Japan in 1902. This treaty, which formed the basis of what is called the Anglo-Japanese alliance (nichiei domei), was intended as a counter to perceived Russian expansion and accepted the principle of an exclusive sphere of interest for Japan in Korea as well as a share of the spoils in China.14 Renegotiated and extended up to 1922 as the ‘marrow’ of Japanese foreign policy,15 the Alliance in effect gave space to Japan to expand its empire deeper into Northeast Asia while it protected British imperial interests in Southeast Asia from challenge.
In contemporary times, the United Kingdom and Japan are once again on the road to convergence. The former is currently one of the few European powers that actually has a robust Indo-Pacific strategy and is a member of several Indo-Pacific minilateral groupings such as AUKUS as well as the Five Eyes, both of which Japan is keen to join.16 It is also a collaborator with Japan and Italy on the advanced fighter design programme called the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP),17 making it a pivotal power bridging Europe and East Asia. Finally, Japan and the UK share common outlooks regarding issues such as support for Ukraine against Russia and pursuing active diplomacy with the Global South.
The Emperor’s speech at Buckingham Palace, with its references to a ‘friend[ship] like no other’ and a ‘close friendship based on mutual understanding of the importance of international rules and global institutions forged from the lessons of history, including its darkest years’, conveyed the same message tailored to audiences in the Global North. The speech solidified not only the Imperial couple’s deep personal connections to the UK, but also signified a deeper strategic synergy that harkened back to the past as much as to the future.
Conclusion
The Imperial institution since 1945 has been a story of rediscovery, as the occupants of the Chrysanthemum Throne have attempted to mould it to serve a Japan which no longer pursues territorial expansion and eschews aggressive war. At the same time, Emperor Naruhito rules over a Japan that is dealing with pressing issues that require innovative solutions devised in tandem with the world to solve. As such, the nation’s First Ambassador now has his task cut out for him.
In future, it is suggested that the Government of Japan could give more thought to having the Imperial couple visit India again, an event the Government of India would—and should—surely approve of. Additionally, visits to African countries, especially Kenya or South Africa, could further cement Japan’s outreach to the Global South even as it relieves them from the burden of apologising for their history.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. Barak Kushner, The Thought War: Japanese Imperial Propaganda, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 2005, pp. 157, 177.
2. Kenneth J. Ruoff, Japan’s Imperial House in the Postwar Era 1945-2019, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2020, p. 135.
3. Ibid., pp. 164, 294. Opposition by conservatives is covered on p. 168.
14. Shigeru Murashima, “The Opening of the Twentieth Century and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1895-1923”, in Ian Nish and Yoichi Kibata (eds), The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, Volume 1: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1600-1930, Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London, 2000, pp. 162, 168.
17.“「グローバル戦闘航空プログラム（GCAP）政府間機関の設立に関する条約」の署名” (Signing of Convention on the Establishment of the “Global Combat Air Programme – GCAP International Government Organisation”), 外務省 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan), 14 December 2023.
Regional countries such as Vietnam have expressed environmental and security-related concerns as regards the Chinese-funded Funan-Techno Canal in Cambodia.
Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Manet on 5 August 2024 launched the mega connectivity project, the Funan-Techno Canal. At the ground-breaking ceremony for the construction of the US$ 1.7 billion Funan-Techno Canal, Manet stated that the project will help Cambodia strengthen its political independence in terms of waterway transport.1 This will be Cambodia’s first historical mega transport project which will provide a new link from the Mekong River and give access to the sea through the Gulf of Thailand. As per the blueprint, the 100 meters wide and of 5.4 meters deep canal would allow for two shipping lanes with vessels carrying up to 3,000 deadweight tonnages. For seamless connectivity, the initiative would also include building of other transport-related infrastructure such as dams and bridges.2
Source: Indo-Pacific Defence Forum
As indicated in Figure 1, the 180 km canal will run from the Phnom Penh Autonomous port, located southeast of the capital, into a new port facility at Kep in the Gulf of Thailand. Currently, ocean-bound shipping from Phom Penh passes through Vietnam’s Mekong Delta to ports near Ho Chi Minh City. The Funan-Techno Canal would provide an alternative to transit via Vietnam and will reduce dependence on Vietnamese ports and give Cambodia sea access for commercial and other uses.
The project is expected to be completed by 2028, as per the report submitted to the Mekong River Commission (MRC) in August 2023 by Cambodia. Once completed, it will create an estimated 1.6 million jobs in the inland provinces of Kandal, Takeo and Kampot along the route of the canal. The Funan-Techno Canal is expected to develop Cambodia’s agricultural sector as it would provide water for crops, improve water management during the rainy season and boost freshwater fishing.3 The canal which will alter the course of the water is also being envisioned as a catalyst for environmental sustainability by enhancing flood mitigation and water resource conservation and management.4
The momentum around the Funan-Techno Canal began when a feasibility study pact was announced between Cambodia and China during the Belt and Road Forum held in October 2023. Following the pact signed with state-owned China Bridge and Road Cooperation (CBRC), a feasibility study on the project was conducted. In January 2024, Cambodian Transport Minister announced that the canal project will begin construction in late 2024.5
The first section of the Funan-Techno Canal runs from the lower Mekong River of Prek Takeo to the Bassac River in Saang district, covering a distance of approximately 21 km. The project’s second section, extends from Koh Thom to Kep province, spanning more than 130 kilometres. The Funan-Techno Canal will be built as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model, which is used for financing large projects through public-private partnerships.6
Under the BOT model, this venture would comprise Cambodian state-owned company, the Sihanoukville Autonomous Port, the Phnom Penh Autonomous Port, and a private enterprise which jointly have a 51 per cent stake. The other 49 per cent stake will be taken up by CBRC, which as a major stakeholder in the project will be funding the construction of the canal. It is suggested that Chinese BOT will build and run the canal for a certain number of years before handing it back to the Cambodian government.7
Key Risks and Concerns
Amongst Southeast Asian countries, Cambodia and China share strong economic relations, with the former also being one of the key partners for Beijing in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The broad spectrum of their bilateral engagement also includes connectivity and infrastructure projects being funded and build by China. At the first BRI in May 2017, then Prime Minister Hun Sen led a large delegation and China pledged US$ 240 million in grant to Cambodia. Further, both sides also signed 13 agreements in areas such as infrastructure development, trade, maritime cooperation and tourism.8
There are however, significant concerns not only from the risk of increasing economic interdependency on Beijing, but also relating to the socio-economic impact on account of water availability, agricultural production, and the ecology in the Mekong delta.
Environmental Impacts and Concerns
The primary concern on the Funan-Techno Canal centres around the potential environmental impacts that it might have on the Mekong Region. The Mekong River and its tributaries which is a lifeline for millions in Southeast Asia is of strategic significance in terms of security, prosperity and stability of the whole sub-region. According to the estimate by the MRC, the Mekong River is about 4,909 km in length, and its basin supports about 65 million people including a large and diverse biodiversity.
The Lower Mekong basin which covers a total area of 630,000 km2 is critical in order to maintain the region’s water resources and the ecosystem. The Mekong region known as ‘Asia’s Rice Bowl’ depends on the river and its tributaries for not only water availability but also its role in regulating and replenishing soil fertility. The Mekong Delta also has the world’s largest inland fishery which accounts for a quarter of the global fresh water catch and supports the livelihood of millions in the region.9
Given the project’s potential impact on water resources and the ecosystem in the Mekong Delta, Vietnam has shared its concerns as this could disrupt its agricultural production, particularly in its southern provinces of An Giang and Kien Giang. Further, Vietnam also noted that alteration of the water stream could impact the biodiversity of vulnerable species in the Mekong region.10 PM Hun Manet during his visit to Hanoi in December 2023 assured his Vietnamese counterpart Pham Minh Chinh that preliminary studies indicated that altering the course of the Mekong River will not have a transboundary impact on the water resources or the natural biodiversity.11 Despite the Cambodian government dismissing these concerns, Vietnam remains apprehensive on account of the fact that the project will be Chinese-funded and built.
Regional Security Concerns
The Funan-Techno Canal under the broader framework of China’s BRI is aimed at realising its ‘Industrial Development’ and ‘Rice and Fish Corridors’, through an enhanced and seamless regional connectivity. Apart from bolstering socio-economic development through the Funan-Techno Canal, China is also seeking to further enhance its regional influence. Cambodia’s deepening economic reliance on Beijing would reduce Vietnam’s influence, altering the geopolitics of the Mekong region. The canal’s 100 meter-wide and depth of 5.4 meters could provide a passage for navy ships to come close to the Cambodian-Vietnamese border.
The military aspect of the project emerges also from the fact that the new port facility to be built in Kep is about 100 km from Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base in Sihanoukville.12 The potential of a strategically important military outpost for Beijing on the Gulf of Thailand is a vital concern for Vietnam. Given that Vietnam would now not only have Beijing trying to shape the geopolitics of the Mekong region but it could also have wider implication in context of its ongoing territorial dispute in the South China Sea. Therefore, apart from Vietnam’s concerns about the potential environmental impact and the reduced shipping earnings, there is also anxiety with regard to the impact of the project on regional security.
Conclusion
The Funan-Techno Canal symbolises Cambodia’s quest for greater economic autonomy by strengthening its trade competitiveness through enhanced connectivity and reducing its dependence on foreign ports. However, since the announcement of this initiative, there has been multifaceted concerns, as pointed above. The mega project brings to light the increasing trajectory of Cambodia–China relations. Despite its touted benefits, given that the project has the potential to enhance Beijing’s role in shaping the geopolitics of the Mekong region, regional countries have expressed environmental and security-related concerns.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Pakistan has re-evaluated its counter-terror strategy in the aftermath of the visit of Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif and Army Chief General Asif Munir to China in June 2024.
Pakistan announced the launch of the Azm-i-Istehkam (Resolve for Stability) operation in June 2024 to eradicate terrorism, the 12th such military operation since 2007. The federal government has advanced this to address the backlash of nurturing and facilitating violent extremism and terrorism across its borders for decades.
The Broader Context
Pakistan’s confrontation with terrorist threats has surged over the years, with 2023 proving to be the deadliest year, mainly for military and police personnel. The suicide bombing attack at a mosque inside the Peshawar Cantonment area in January 2023 killed approximately 100 and injured no less than 150 devotees. Within six months, it experienced another fatal attack when Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazl’s (JUI-F) political rally was targeted in July, killing over 50 attendees and wounding more than 200.
As per the Global Terrorism Index Report 2024, Pakistan ranks as the fourth country most affected by terrorism-related activities, moving up from its previously held seventh rank. A report by the Pak Institute for Peace Studies in January 2024 noted that 17,785 terror-related events have resulted in 72,203 casualties since 2006.11
Pakistan has charged the Afghan Taliban for allegedly harbouring TTP fighters and allowing Afghanistan to be used as a launch-pad to undermine its national security. Against this backdrop, Baloch insurgents have also scaled up their attacks, with TTP inflicting maximum damage and casualties mainly in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces.
What seems to have inevitably pushed Pakistan’s federal government to re-evaluate its counter-terror strategy was the intensifying pressure imposed after Shahbaz Sharif and Army Chief General Asif Munir visited China in June 2024. While Chinese personnel have been targeted by Baloch insurgents and TTP operatives for the last several years, in the lead-up to this visit, at least three terror attacks occurred, including the March 2024 suicide bombing that killed five Chinese engineers and one Pakistani in the restive Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.
During this five-day visit, President Xi Jinping reportedly underscored the need for Pakistan to safeguard Chinese citizens stationed to work on the US$ 62 billion China–Pakistan Economic Corridor project and ‘provide a safe, stable, and predictable business environment’.22 Public outrage was also expressed by Chinese officials such as Liu Jianchao (Head of the International Department of the CCP) when he stated that “in Pakistan’s case, the primary factor shaking the confidence of Chinese investors is the security situation”.33 Beijing apparently issued an ultimatum threatening to deploy around 1,200 personnel44 to safeguard its interests in Pakistan.
Islamabad’s announcement could be an effort to bide time and prevent further Chinese interference at the risk of providing an excuse to the jihadi entities at home to exploit its acquiescence to Chinese demands as another example of it being un-Islamic. It could also be seeking to deny further momentum to Baloch groups who have demonstrated growing hostility to Beijing’s expanding influence in Gwadar.
Simultaneously, Pakistan’s decision to rejuvenate its counter-terror framework was imperative to retain the much-needed Chinese investment to navigate the recurring economic turbulence and prevent isolating its closest partner in the United Nations Security Council, it frequently relies on to prevent the blacklisting of terror operatives backed by Islamabad.
Considering that similar campaigns, including the Zarb-e-Azb (Strike of the Prophet’s Sword or sharp and cutting strike or blow) operation launched in 2014 to neutralise terrorism in its tribal belts, proved futile, there is little optimism regarding Azm-i-Istehkam’s success in upholding Pakistan’s national security. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Chief Minister, Ali Amin Gandapur, allegedly accused the federal government of being kept in the dark about the counter-terror campaign, widening the fault-lines between Islamabad and a province that has been afflicted with decades-long violent campaigns and instability.
Where It Can Go Wrong
Pakistan’s military and political leadership faces multi-pronged challenges in ensuring the success of Azm-i-Istekham primarily due to the following factors.
Lack of Political–Civil Society Consensus
One of the most significant challenges facing the political–military leadership pushing for Azm-e-Istehkam is the lack of political and nationwide consensus on the scope and objectives of the counter-terror operation, largely due to the ambiguity surrounding this initiative. This will obstruct the nationwide support the government and military require to take swift and decisive measures due to the public criticism and condemnation that will inevitably follow, having their concerns dismissed to accommodate Chinese interests.
A major operation such as this requires support across political and ideological lines, including among the electorate that has borne the long-term socio-economic, physical and psychological impact of terrorism and violent extremism. On the one hand, there is deep-rooted mistrust among civilians (including civil society activists) about the state’s ability to contain the operation to specifically weed out terrorists and extremists as a result of the mass displacement and dispossession that has occurred in the past due to kinetic operations carried out by the armed forces.
Moreover, Asad Iqbal Butt, the Chairperson of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) has flagged issues relating to the lack of transparency and the adverse impact the military operation could have on ordinary citizens. He noted that the operation should not be “used to justify further enforced disappearances, the use of interment centres or military courts, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, or custodial torture”.55
On the other hand, political parties, including Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf and JUI-F, have criticised the government’s decision regarding the operation’s launch and its ambiguity. For example, JUI-F’s Chief, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, has, after holding a grand tribal jirga, declared that “the jirga expressed its lack of trust in the operation and declared that this was not Azm-i-Istekham, rather Adam-I-Istekham (Instability)”.66
However, there are also leaders such as Mahmood Khan Achakzai (Leader of the Opposition Alliance Tahreek-e-Tahafuz Ayin Pakistan) who have been critical of the government’s dismissal of the provincial concerns and refusal to work towards a nationwide consensus before formulating such a policy. He has warned77 Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s government that the opposition could internationalise a domestic policy by bringing it to the attention of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). This announcement was made after holding a jirga, similar to the resistance tactic applied by JUI-F’s Chief, where a resolution88 against its implementation was passed.
Regardless of the legal challenges he would face pursuing this case, his statement appears to be a well-calculated move to extract concessions of some kind from the political leadership based in Islamabad. How far he and others standing in solidarity against the government can leverage the polarised socio-political climate remains to be seen. For now, anti-government rallies across provinces such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa continue to hinder the process of acquiring the nationwide legitimacy this refurbished operation requires to have even a modicum of chance of success. Opposition leaders might exploit the electorate’s concerns to further their agenda and consolidate greater power.
Ambiguity Concerning the Operation’s Mandate
Despite the initial announcement that the counter-terror operation involved a comprehensive kinetic action, Inter-Services Public Relations, the media wing of the Pakistani army, appears to have backtracked on this. Widespread expression of concerns about possible mass displacement and instability that would follow, as has been the case with earlier military operations like Zarb-e-Azb, appears to have compelled a shift in the armed forces’ rhetoric, which has avowedly denied99 Azm-e-Itehkam being a full-fledged military campaign, which could result in mass displacement of the local populace.
The federal government also had to step in and issue a clarification to mobilise the Pakistani society which finds itself more divided than ever and despite the multiple security threats emanating from Baloch rebels, Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP), or TTP and disproportionate violence accompanying it. The following declaration issued by the federal government accepted the fact that population displacement was ‘required’ as part of its short-term strategy to combat terrorism and dismantle the hideouts of violent non-state actors in the past, but the army was no longer contemplating any such move today.
PTV News, the state broadcaster of Pakistan, announced on 25 June 2024 in a detailed post on X (formerly Twitter) that
At the same time, the framework outlined in a press release points to broad themes without underscoring the nuances, resulting in significant confusion about the long-term objectives and implications of yet another military operation. As per the document, the government emphasised that the operation would be:
However, there has been little indication of such assurances allaying the critics’ fears. This has mainly been the case, considering the precedent set by the earlier armed operations, which has provided the public with sufficient evidence about the socio-economic impact borne by civilians even as the government and law enforcement personnel have struggled to eradicate terrorism from its roots. Additionally, the state agencies have been unable to clarify how they would avoid civilians being targeted in the crossfire and correctly differentiate between them and terrorists who have constantly changed their locations to avoid the gaze of the law enforcement agencies.
The uptick in deadly violence, along with failed rehabilitation of those displaced and dispossessed due to past kinetic operations, signals to the locals in provinces such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan (worst affected by terrorism across Pakistan) about the adverse implications of Azm-i-Istehkam. It is also entirely possible that counter-terror operations might be used as a ruse to more brutally repress the Baloch insurgency, as transparency and civic liberties are likely to further backslide in the wake of any such operation.
Domestic Militancy Calculus
Any misstep on the state’s part could reignite the militancy wave akin to the period following the siege of and military assault on the Lal Masjid in July 2007 after former President Hu Jintao tasked Pervez Musharraf’s military government with rescuing Chinese workers who had reportedly been held hostage by students associated with Jamia Hafsa Madrassa. It could be construed as another example to mobilise the anti-Pakistan jihadis by calling on a state which claims to be Islamic yet cooperates with Chinese infidels,1212 a term frequently used by ISIS in its propaganda. Notably, China has faced acute criticism and threats from various terrorist groups for its reported mistreatment of the Uyghur community in Xinjiang Province.
Conclusion
Multifold hindrances remain in Islamabad’s path to eradicating terrorism. They range from the ambiguity regarding the scope, the desired end-state, no definite blueprint of the counter-terror operation, widespread criticism from political opposition and civil society critics, and the absence of any success in earlier operations, on which Azm-e-Istekham is modelled, to the growing Chinese pressure to safeguard its geo-economic interests and its personnel stationed in Pakistan. Given the military campaign’s deficiencies and low probability of success, it is expected to result in mass dispossession, displacement and civilian killings without achieving its primary goal.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
China is seeking to drive ‘green’ and sustainable economic growth through high technology manufacturing and R&D investments.
Chinese President Xi Jinping propounded the idea of “new quality productive forces” in September 2023 as a blueprint for future Chinese economic development during a tour in Heilongjiang province.1 The communique of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) of the Third Plenum session, held in Beijing from 15 to 18 July 2024 declared that
The promulgation of “new quality productive forces” is unsurprising as it comes when several economists and institutions like the International Monetary Fund have expressed reservations about the deep structural reforms needed within China, including the financial sector3 and challenges from demographic changes and climate change.4 Economists have cautioned that if China wants to maintain a sustained growth rate then it “has to move to a growth model that is based more on innovation and productivity increase than in the past”.5
Improving or maintaining the quality of economic and social development is a common goal pursued by all countries in the world. China in the 1970s under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping initiated reforms and opened up its economy to the world. Since then, high growth rates have been a major feature of the Chinese economy. At the 19th National Congress of CPC in 2017, however, China announced the transitioning of its economic development from a period of “rapid growth to a stage of high-quality development”.6
In other words, China is seeking not merely growth but better growth and quality over quantity, which it will drive mainly by ‘emerging industries’ and ‘future oriented industries’ which include artificial intelligence, robotic, quantum technology, etc. Besides, outdated production industries and equipment will be discontinued and replaced by ‘green emerging industries’. In high-quality development, the fundamental aspect is green development where it will develop a “harmonious relationship between humans and nature”. To accomplish the objective of high-quality development in China, the “new quality productive forces”, have been propounded which essentially refer to, “advanced productivity freed from the traditional economic growth models and productivity development paths” featuring “high-technology, high efficiency and high quality”.7
There are several elements envisaged in the implementation of new quality productive forces. One of the foremost core element, as underlined by Xi Jinping, is ‘innovation’, i.e., scientific and technological innovation or revolutionary technological breakthroughs. The idea is embodied in the Marxist theory of productive force, where Marx emphasises that ‘technology’ is the sole force for historical change.8
Technological innovation is critical for advancing economic growth where it significantly impacts the manufacturing industries. However, under the new quality productive forces, industrial innovation will be mainly powered by advanced technologies like semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology and nanotechnology, generating new industries, new models and developing new quality productivity. While promoting new quality productive forces, old and/or traditional industries will not be neglected or abandoned; instead, they will be encouraged to transform and upgrade their technology.
Another novelty in the “quality productive forces” is the upgrading and expansion of labour, the means of labour and objectives of labour. In this regard, the Chinese Minister of Science and Technology, Yin Hejun has emphasised a thorough revamp of science and technology and education management systems with the objective to cultivate more creative workers with the requisite skills, including investment in R&D, expansion of the higher education sector, reform in the evaluation of the performance of scientists and engineers, open and inclusive scientific project collaborations with different countries and creating an environment to attract outstanding scientists from different countries to innovate and start business in China.9
The third important aspect is the promotion of green development. Xi Jinping underlined “green development is the foundation of high-quality development”. Hence, the “new quality productive forces” require promotion of green development by accelerating technology innovation and advanced application of green technologies, and the development of green and low-carbon industries and supply chains, to achieve sustainable development.
Faced by a series of humiliating defeats at the hand of imperial powers in the 19th century, the Communist Party of China realised that only ‘science’ can ‘save’ China.10 From 1949 onwards, the CPC has unceasingly shown a strong commitment to technology-driven economic development and strong state leadership in science is “taken as an article of faith” by Chinese leaders. Thus, the concept of “new quality productive forces” where the central elements is science and technology, provides fresh hope and motivation for China to transform its economic development speedily. It reflects that Chinese officials have comprehended that the ‘old’ technology/industries or traditional model, relying on debt-fueled investment to drive growth, are subject to the law of diminishing returns.
Zheng Shanjie, Chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission stated that under the “new quality productive forces”, it will not only promote its own domestic growth but also inject new momentum into “global economic recovery and growth”. To this end, Zheng declared, robust reforms are taking place to boost industrial innovation through technological innovation in the fields of bio-manufacturing, commercial flights, new materials and low-altitude economy.11 Meanwhile, Chinese Finance Ministry in 2024 announced a massive budget of 370.828 billion Yuan (US$ 51.51 billion) on science and technology, an increase of 10 per cent compared to previous year as well as the largest percentage of funding sector.12 Additionally, to advance “high-quality development”, Chinese Ministry of Finance Lan Fo’an outlined several measures, including financial support for innovation and upgradation of industries and allocation of more financial support to education, healthcare, social security and environmental protection.13
It is too early to ascertain the success of Chinese economic development based on the “new quality productive forces”, though Chinese officials have expressed confidence in generating sustained growth. In an interview with Newsweek, Xie Feng, the Chinese Ambassador to the United States, stated, “it will serve as a catalyst that further brings out the vitality and potential of China’s supersized market”. And also “energizes China’s growth, and generates huge investment and consumption needs”.14 At the World Economic Forum, Chinese Premier Li Qiang while presenting the opportunities bought by sci-tech in China, encouraged companies to invest, especially in cutting-edge technology, and encouraged the effort “to foster a market oriented, world-class business environment within a sound legal framework”.15
Challenges
Reaping the benefits from the “new quality productive forces” will depend on several factors. One of the foremost determinants will be how far the Chinese government is able to undertake deep structural reforms, particularly in mitigating the property sector crisis and local government debt risk, building confidence for domestic consumption, investment in education, including training and re-skilling and quality health care, which in turn will deliver higher labour productivity and incomes and address the emerging challenges of climate change.16
Another challenge, as highlighted by Chinese economist Cai Fang, will be how far the Chinese entrepreneurs truly embrace the Schumpeter principle of ‘creative destruction’. As per Schumpeter, economic growth is characterised by continuous disruptions of the old order and in the process, certainly existing business and workers for some time could experience big losses and be replaced by a new order.17 Hence, any entrepreneur that fails to compete and/or innovate should accept ‘failure’. Otherwise, it will perpetuate the “operation of zombie companies” surviving on bailouts and thereby undermine economic growth.18
Jeffrey Sachs points out that the current U.S. administration policy is “anti-China” where it is actively trying to slow down the Chinese economy through technology blockage and erecting trade barriers.19 Some of the recent US policies towards this end have included the imposition of high tariffs on some of the imported Chinese goods such as electric vehicles (EVs), EV batteries, semiconductors, medical products, ship to shore cranes, solar cells and steel and aluminum items,20 the ‘Biosecure Act’ to restrict Chinese biotech and manufacturing from accessing US funding and collaborating with pharma companies21 and July 2024 White House guidelines to US universities to safeguard US research.22 The ongoing Sino-US bilateral tensions will, therefore, also significantly impact the Chinese growth trajectory.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
India and Armenia are critical regional partners, and their collaboration and cooperation may soon transform into a strategic partnership.
Since the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War of 2020, Armenia has sought to diversify outside traditional partners such as Russia, as part of its long-term complementarist foreign policy. India has been one country with which Armenia has deepened its relationship in recent times, particularly in defence and security. With Armenia’s foreign policy shift and diversification efforts, India is well-positioned to be a significant partner for Yerevan. This partnership offers various mutual benefits, from economic growth to security. The India–Armenia relationship is a win-win situation, demonstrating that both countries stand to gain from their cooperation.
Background
India and Armenia share a robust relationship that is deeply rooted in history. The Armenians first arrived in India as traders and later established their diaspora. The relationship gained prominence after the Soviet collapse and the emergence of the newly independent nation of Armenia. Over the years, it has gained further importance, and there is vigour in both countries to improve and add to the ever-growing relationship. This historical connection between India and Armenia forms a strong foundation for their current and future cooperation.
Current Dynamics
Currently, the relationship continues to grow in various fields of cooperation, including political, economics and defence. The relationship is complemented by foreign policy initiatives followed by both countries. India's strategic autonomy and focus on its extended neighbourhood are acknowledged in the Caucasus, where Armenia is an essential component. Armenia’s multi-vector foreign policy has place for the involvement of major regional powers and this is where India fits in.
Defence
The relationship's main foundation is defence. Recently, the two nations have been planning to explore capacity-building and not limit themselves to technical defence cooperation.1 The two nations have seen substantial growth in this field. India recently sent its first Defence Attaché to Yerevan2 after the Indian Air Force agreed to post additional defence attachés, thus expanding its space in military diplomacy with Armenia.
The two nations in May 2024 decided on a joint action plan for 2024–2025, to include military education, arms supplies, tactical training and experience exchange.3 India has already supplied Armenia with Pinaka multi barrel rocket launchers, anti-tank missiles, rockets, ammunition, anti-drone systems and Advanced Towed Artillery Gun Systems (ATAGS).
Multilateral Partnerships
India and Armenia have also engaged each other in various multilateral forums and have formed bilateral and trilateral partnerships. One important partnership is the India, Iran and Armenia trilateral partnership. The partnership has created a tripartite platform where senior officials met in 2023 to discuss the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and another corridor to connect with Russia and Europe.4
Iran is important for India’s regional connectivity projects, with Chabahar being the base for the INSTC. Armenia also gained access to Chabahar and Bandar Abbas in January 2024 for its trade with India.5 All three nations share a robust relationship, and trilateral cooperation can boost the relationship further and help both India and Armenia.
Apart from the trilateral with Iran, there have been discussions on the possibility of a quadrilateral collaboration between Armenia, Greece, France and India in the defence field. The Greek Minister of Defence, Nikolaos Dandanis, highlighted this during his meeting with Armenian Defence Minister Suren Papakiyan in March 2024.6 This is a significant opportunity for multilateral cooperation between four nations that share a robust relationship and have seen substantial positive shifts, particularly in defence.
The Azerbaijani Factor
One major factor in the India–Armenia relationship has been the role of Armenia's adversarial neighbour, Azerbaijan. India and Azerbaijan do share cordial relations, and it is one of the major trade partners of New Delhi in the South Caucasus. Despite such ties, there are still some issues that could cause significant obstacles in the relationship.
The biggest impediment is the unequivocal support of Azerbaijani leadership for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Even during his recent visit to Pakistan, AzerbaijaniPresident Ilhan Aliyev stressed on this.7 Armenia, on the other hand, has reiterated on various occasions that it supports India’s stance on Kashmir.
Regarding the conflict in the South Caucasus, i.e., the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Pakistanis have openly endorsed the Azerbaijani cause since the first Karabakh war and have not established diplomatic relations with Armenia. India has taken a more neutral stance, supported diplomatic efforts for a long-term solution, and encouraged the nations towards long-term peace and security.8
Future Prospects
One significant prospect of cooperation is the technology sector. Armenia is going through a technological revolution. The two countries could further collaborate to enhance their technological outreach and improve their relationship. India is globally known for its pharmaceutical production and medical diplomacy. This was evident during the COVID-19 pandemic with its Vaccine Maitri policy. The two nations could create opportunities for cooperation in the field of pharmaceuticals, with Armenian pharma also becoming one of the rapid, vibrant and rapidly expanding sectors in the field of allopathy medicines. Armenia also houses a small fraction of Indian students who are engaged in medical studies.
The two nations can also focus on the cultural aspects of the relationship. India's soft power outreach includes International Yoga Day, which was celebrated in Armenia. The presence of an Armenian diaspora in India also create opportunities for further enhancement of the culture. The connected history, including Armenians in India in the past, giving rise to Armenian nationalism, the first Armenian printing press, and the presence of an Armenian diaspora throughout history means that Armenians have historical connections to India. Therefore, the relationship in the cultural sense could contribute to solidify ties and enhance people-to-people interactions. Strong cultural connections create ample space for the enhancement of cooperation.
The two nations can cooperate in natural disaster management. India and Armenia both suffer from floods. They could also collaborate to jointly develop earthquake resistant technologies to prevent major damage during earthquakes.
Conclusion
India and Armenia are critical regional partners, and their collaboration and cooperation may soon transform into a strategic partnership. The transformation of the relationship could see a new era of India’s focus on the South Caucasus, where Armenia could play an important role. However, there are still some limitations that the two nations need to tackle to enhance the relationship further. One of the noteworthy limitations that the two nations need to tackle is the lack of connectivity. The recent Iran–Armenia agreement on using Chabahar could improve the situation, but there is still a need to further enhance connectivity.
Not only trade connectivity but also the need to further people-to-people connections would require focus. This can be enhanced through regular direct flights between the two nations. Armenia is the only country in the region with which India doesn’t have direct flight connectivity with, whereas Georgia and Azerbaijan are directly connected with New Delhi. If connectivity is improved, that would provide newer opportunities for cooperation between the two nations.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The proliferation of China’s Overseas Police Stations underscores the urgent need for international scrutiny and diplomatic actions.
As China has emerged as a great power, it has sought to augment its overseas presence in the international arena through measures like the establishment of Confucius Institutes and military bases and access points worldwide.1 The setting up of overseas police stations is a recent development that has invited international scrutiny, sparking serious concerns regarding the breach of international norms and the erosion of host countries’ sovereignty.2
On the surface, the Chinese government has presented these Overseas Police Stations as entities created to assist Chinese citizens abroad, especially in light of the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic.3 According to Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin, these stations serve as overseas Chinese service centers, catering to the needs of the Chinese diaspora and tourists.4 Supposedly, their primary objective is to provide assistance to Chinese nationals in foreign lands, including support with lost passports, legal issues and various emergencies.
However, the reality behind their operations paints a far more troubling picture. What make these stations particularly concerning are their covert nature and the methods employed by Chinese officials operating within them. The gravity of this issue became even more apparent with the disclosure of startling statistics by China’s Ministry of Public Security. On 14 April 2022, the Vice Minister of the Ministry of Public Security revealed that 210,000 individuals were persuaded to return to China in the previous year.5 This number surged further, with Chinese authorities claiming on 17 August 2022 that between April and July of the same year, they had persuaded more than 230,000 Chinese nationals to return from abroad to face criminal proceedings in China.6
These revelations not only highlight the scale of China’s overseas operations but also underline the urgency of addressing this issue which may be a prelude to a crisis. According to a comprehensive investigation conducted by the European Union registered human rights organisation Safeguard Defenders, which primarily monitors human rights situation in China and Vietnam, these stations have been set up in various countries. They are reportedly functioning in Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Africa, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, and the United States.7
It is believed that these Overseas Police Stations are being utilised as tools for coercive measures, employing three distinct methods categorised as Type 1, Type 2 and Type 3.8 In Type 1, Chinese officials from the Ministry of Public Security track down the family members and relatives of individuals living abroad, exerting pressure through intimidation, harassment, detention or even imprisonment. The objective is to persuade these individuals voluntarily to return to China. Type 2 involves direct approaches through online means or undercover agents from the Ministry of State Security within the host country. The last and most alarming method, Type 3, entails the alleged physical abduction of individuals on foreign soil, taking them back to China, where further legal proceedings await.9
These stations, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Security, are therefore being utilised as tools for long-arm policing and transnational repression by the Communist Party of China.10 The methods employed are disconcerting, and are believed to involve coercion, intimidation, harassment and even abduction of Chinese nationals living abroad. These activities are not only a violation of international norms but may also pose a significant threat to the human rights of Chinese citizens residing outside their homeland and rule of law in the host country.
Such mass repatriations challenge the territorial integrity and judicial sovereignty of host nations, undermining their legal autonomy and casting doubt on the adherence to due process and human rights. The unilateral actions by Chinese authorities may strain diplomatic relations, potentially disrupting international cooperation on law enforcement, counter-terrorism and extradition agreements. The lack of transparency in legal processes and the potential for coercion in persuading individuals to return suggest a disregard for established international norms. From a security standpoint, the forcible repatriation poses the risk of transferring sensitive information to Chinese authorities, compromising the security interests of the countries where these individuals have resided.
This alarming trend has not gone unnoticed by the international community. Christopher Wray, Director of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), expressed his concerns about these police stations while testifying before a U.S. Senate committee in November 2022 when he stated that he was “very concerned about these police stations. We are aware of the existence of these stations.” He emphasised that these stations are unauthorised. Republican U.S. Representative, Mike Gallagher, has called for the shutdown of these stations.11
In the United Kingdom, Yvette Cooper, the then Shadow Secretary of State urged the Home Secretary to make a statement regarding the secret police stations operated by the Chinese Communist Party in the UK. In response, Chris Philp, the Minister for Crime, Policing, and Fire, acknowledged the gravity of the situation. He stated that
Canada took a strong measure by issuing a ‘cease and desist’ warning in November 2022. It summoned the Chinese ambassador, Cong Peiwu, and conveyed its concerns. Additionally, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police announced investigations into two police stations in Quebec.13
Rita Schwarzeluhr Sutter, the Parliamentary State Secretary for Interior and Community of Germany, highlighted that two police stations of ‘Overseas 110’ remain operational in Germany, violating the country’s sovereignty. ‘Overseas 110’ refers to various extralegal stations established by the Chinese government. She pointed out that these stations are run by individuals with strong connections to the diplomatic missions of the People’s Republic of China who enjoy the trust of the Chinese security authorities. Furthermore, they are involved in Chinese United Front organisations, raising concerns about their activities and influence within Germany.14
Conclusion
The proliferation of China’s Overseas Police Stations underscores the urgent need for international scrutiny and diplomatic actions. The coercive methods employed by these stations are not only a violation of human rights and international law but also a challenge to international security. There is a legitimate fear that these stations may be exploited by the intelligence agents of the Ministry of State Security, further escalating the risks posed by their operations.
The affected countries must hold China accountable. Diplomatic efforts, coupled with legal measures, must be collectively pursued to curb unlawful Chinese actions. Moreover, raising awareness among Chinese nationals about their rights in the host country and establishing support networks are crucial steps in mitigating the impact of any such actions. The presence of China’s Overseas Police Stations is a call to action for all nations to prioritise the protection of persons within their territorial jurisdictions.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Since the early 1980s, the Canadian political landscape, irrespective of the political parties in power, has been permissive, if not sympathetic, to the Khalistan movement.
Introduction
On 22 July 2024, the BAPS Swaminarayan Mandir in Edmonton was vandalised by the Khalistan separatists with hateful and anti-India graffiti.1 This incident occurred on the heels of another incident on 19 June 2024 wherein the Canadian parliament observed a minute’s silence on the first death anniversary of designated Khalistani terrorist Hardeep Singh Nijjar. A moment of silence in the parliament reflects an unequivocal consensus among representatives of all the political parties in the House of Commons.2
Such non-partisan consensus vis-à-vis Khalistani separatists has not been uncommon in Canada. Since the early 1980s, the Canadian political landscape, irrespective of the political parties in power, has been permissive, if not sympathetic, to the Khalistan movement. The driving forces behind such political consensus have ranged from Cold War dynamics before 1990s to domestic politics at present.
For years, successive Canadian governments, regardless of the political parties in power, have demonstrated a tendency to overlook Indian security concerns and have adopted a lenient approach towards Khalistan-related activities. While doing so, the Canadian government's attitude has been shaped by three overarching factors—Cold War dynamics; political stance on freedom of expression; and considerations of vote bank politics.
Cold War Era Dynamics
During the Cold War, in alignment with other Western countries, Canada engaged with India through various bilateral avenues such as project financing, food aid and technical assistance. This was exemplified by the establishment of the CIRUS nuclear reactor at the Trombay Atomic Energy Establishment in 1954. However, bilateral relations between the two nations experienced a downturn following India's peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974 with fissile materials sourced from the aforementioned reactor.
During this phase (1970s–1980s), the Liberal Party government of Pierre Trudeau and subsequent government of Progressive Conservative Brian Mulroney largely aligned their foreign policy with the United States. The tendency became particularly evident as Cold War dynamics exerted influence in the Indian subcontinent, notably marked by the India–Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1971 and the subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Amidst the height of Khalistani militancy in India during 1980s, the Canadian government neglected the burgeoning Khalistani secessionist activities within Canada. In one such incident, despite repeated requests for the extradition of a notorious Khalistani terrorist Talwinder Singh Parmar in 1982, the government of Pierre Trudeau rejected Parmar's extradition on frivolous grounds related to Commonwealth protocols. As per the Canadian government, extradition could not proceed because India only recognises Her Majesty as Head of the Commonwealth, and not as Head of State.3 Moreover, the Canadian government’s indifference was further underscored by the failure to bring the perpetrators of the Air India ‘Kanishka’ Bombing of 1985 to justice.
Subsequent administrations, including those of Jean Chretien, Paul Martin, and Stephen Harper, witnessed a partial improvement in Indo-Canadian relations owing to India's enhanced rapport with the broader Western world. However, Canada maintained its longstanding stance on the issue of Khalistan. It affirmed unequivocal support for a united India while concurrently upholding the view that freedom of expression is an inalienable democratic right. They insisted that mere advocacy for a Khalistani homeland in Punjab did not inherently constitute illegal activity.
Vote Bank Politics: A Political Consensus
Since the formation of Justin Trudeau’s government in 2015, considerations of vote banks has induced political parties to adopt a policy of Sikh appeasement. Under Trudeau’s Liberal party government, pro-Khalistan sentiments have been strategically utilised for electoral purposes. Following the 2015 general election, Trudeau's Liberal Party secured a majority with 184 Members of Parliament (MPs). The new Parliament had 18 Sikhs, four of which were cabinet members.
With the increasing numbers and significance of Sikhs in Canadian Parliament, Prime Minister Trudeau's first term witnessed the implementation of specific populist measures aimed at mobilising Sikh community. In 2017, the ruling Liberal Party in the Ontario Provincial Legislative Assembly passed a resolution characterising the anti-Sikh riot of 1984 as an act of genocide.
Interestingly, a report issued by Canada's Ministry of Public Safety titled ‘2018 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada’4 explicitly identified Sikh extremism as a security threat to Canada. However, following a formidable backlash from the Sikh community, the Trudeau administration revised the Report and republished it without any reference to Sikh extremism.
On the other hand, a motion was also brought by opposition Conservative party's Erin O'Toole and Candice Bergen in February 2018, indicating similar sentiments of the opposition towards Khalistan extremists. The said motion was introduced on 27 February 2018 in the House of Commons by the conservative party members to:
Condemn in the strongest terms all forms of terrorism, including Khalistani extremism and the glorification of any individuals who have committed acts of violence to advance the cause of the Khalistani state in India; and
Various Sikh organisations like the Canadian Sikh Association and the World Sikh Organisation of Canada, among others, strongly denounced the motion. They believed the motion unfairly targeted the entire Sikh community by designating them as terrorists. Following a considerable backlash, the party decided to drop the motion in the House of Commons.5
During subsequent years, the political significance of the community continued to increase due to increasing Sikh demography and the formation of a minority government in Canada. In an extraordinary event on 18 September 2023, Prime Minister Trudeau alleged a “potential link between agents of the Government of India and the killing of a Canadian citizen, Hardeep Singh Nijjar”.6 Initially, the Conservative Party questioned the Prime Minister's judgement and demanded evidence for the assertion. Later on, the Party's MPs condemned the killing and took a somewhat sympathetic turn towards the Khalistani extremists.
In Canadian political discourse, the Liberal Party and New Democratic Party have, in general, adopted the policy of appeasement towards the Canadian Sikh community as well as a section of it that advocates an independent state of Khalistan. However, current political dynamics indicate that the Conservatives (like the liberals and others) prefer to garner as much Sikh political support as possible.
In the recently concluded Ipsos poll conducted for Canadian news platform Global News, 44 per cent of Canadians think that Pierre Poilievre, leader of the Conservative Party, would make the best Prime Minister of Canada. In the same poll, Trudeau ranked a distant second, with 25 per cent votes in his favour. While Trudeau's supporters fell by 6 per cent since September 2023, support for Poilievre increased by 4 per cent during the same period.7 With such favourable poll performance and increased prospects of forming the next government in Canada, the Conservatives do not want to antagonise the Sikh community through their anti-Khalistan rhetoric.
Conclusion
The above analysis indicates mutual consensus across the political and ideological spectrum in Canadian politics on the issue of Khalistan movement. The nature of this consensus has evolved over a period of time. During the initial phase of pro-Khalistan advocacy in Canada, Cold War dynamics guided the government’s approach towards the issue of Khalistan and other anti-India activities. Aligning its policies with the larger Western consensus, Canada adopted a permissive approach towards anti-India and pro-Khalistan movement in Canada while dismissing India’s security concerns. Subsequently, as the Sikh diaspora and their political significance increased, vote bank politics started guiding Canadian politics towards the issue of Khalistan movement.
In the current political landscape, the three mainstream political parties—the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party and the New Democratic Party—have explicitly demonstrated their sympathy towards Sikh extremists’ agenda, granting further impunity to the anti-India elements inside Canada. This trend of bipartisan support will continue in the near future considering the growing population of Sikh community in Canada and their substantial influence on domestic politics.
Against this background, India–Canada relations can be expected to remain sour primarily due to Canada’s unwillingness to acknowledge and act on India’s concerns.8 The veneer of freedom of speech, expression and protest cannot be indefinitely invoked to incite secessionist tendencies in other countries. Non-interference in the internal affairs of other sovereign state is an equally important international norm and democratic virtue as are freedoms relating to speech and expression.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
President Vladimir Putin’s visits to North Korea and Vietnam reinforce Moscow’s relationships with these two countries at a time of regional and global flux.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visits to North Korea and Vietnam have resulted in new military and economic agreements. Russia and North Korea signed the ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement’, which has put neighbours in the region, mainly South Korea and Japan, on high alert. During his visit to Vietnam, President Putin and Vietnamese President To Lam signed 11 agreements in areas such as oil and gas exploration and nuclear science and technology, among others.
North Korea: Old Friend, New Ties
Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) shared ideological affinity as communist states during the Cold War era. In 1961, the two countries signed the Russo-North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, which included provisions
for extending mutual assistance in the event of aggression.1
During the 1990s, the Russian-North Korean economic ties declined dramatically, with trade plummeting from US$ 2.35 billion in 1990 to US$ 65 million in 1998.2 Russia under President Boris Yeltsin leaned towards the Republic of Korea (ROK), anticipating it to grow to be a significant economic partner. During his visit to Seoul in November 1992, President Yeltsin signed the treaty on basic relations, which laid down the main principles of Russia–South Korean relations. With President Kim En Sam’s visit to Moscow in June 1994, exchanges at the ministerial level and between military delegations, and cooperation in areas such as education and culture, expanded.
In 2008, Russia and ROK upgraded their ties to the level of strategic cooperative partnership, with the aim to promote relations across security, energy and aerospace among other aspects.3 By 2015, the ROK had become Russia's seventh-largest trading partner, albeit the mix of Russian exports to South Korea noticeably lacked diversity, with natural resources (exclusively oil and natural gas) accounting for roughly three-quarters of Russian exports to South Korea. On the other hand, the majority of South Korea's exports to Russia were made up of cars, machinery and other technological goods.4 Bilateral relations though were hit in the aftermath of the start of the Ukraine war in February 2022 with South Korea implementing sanctions against Moscow.
Kim Jong Un’s September 2023 visit to Russia followed by Putin’s recent visit to North Korea and the signing of the strategic partnership treaty have noticeably increased the momentum of Moscow–Pyongyang ties. North Korea has emerged as a key supplier of conventional weapons, including artillery shells to Russia during the ongoing Ukraine conflict.5 Since 2023, North Korea has shipped an estimated 6,700 containers of munitions via rail and sea routes.6 In turn, Pyongyang secured resources, such as energy, food, raw material and parts used in weapons manufacturing. In 2023 itself, Russia sent more than 1,00,000 barrels of refined petroleum to Pyongyang.7 Additionally, since the start of 2024, Russia has supplied thousands of tons of flour and corn to North Korea.8
The newly signed Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between DPRK and the Russian Federation states in Article 4 that
This is similar to the 1961 Treaty’s provision of mutual defence, where in Article 1 it mentioned:
Analysts note that a likely consequence of the treaty could be an increase in collaboration in the production of munitions, with North Korea producing more weapons for Russia. In turn, Russia could offer more technical support for North Korea's ballistic missile and satellite programmes, most likely including assistance in the ‘development of submarines capable of launching ballistic nuclear missile’.11
This would entail significant implications for the regional security landscape, especially for South Korea and Japan. The South Korean Foreign Minister, Cho Tae-yul and the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken have condemned the treaty and called it a violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions, stating that ‘the agreement poses a grave threat to the security of both the ROK and the U.S., as well as to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the broader region’.12
South Korea has provided humanitarian aid and other support to Ukraine, while joining U.S.-led economic sanctions against Russia. In August 2023, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol announced financial aid of 520 billion won (US$ 394 million) for Ukraine. This aid package includes 130 billion won for reconstruction, 260 billion in humanitarian aid, and another 130 billion won through international organisations.13 South Korea has not directly provided arms to Kyiv, citing a long-standing policy of not sending weapons to countries actively involved in combat. This could, however, change due to the recent Russia–North Korea treaty signing, with reports noting that South Korea is considering supplying arms to Ukraine.
Vietnam: Neutral, but Close
Vietnam’s robust ties with Russia date back many decades, owing to the military, economic and diplomatic support provided by the Soviet Union to the communist leadership in North Vietnam in the 1950s. As one of Asia’s fastest-growing economies, manufacturing powerhouse and leading exporter of goods, Hanoi has a multi-vector approach known as ‘Bamboo Diplomacy’, aimed at balancing Vietnam’s relations with the major powers by not taking sides, being self-reliant and demonstrating flexibility to maintain its agency and interests, helping it take advantage of economic opportunities created by major power competition.
Vietnam has upgraded its relations with important global actors such as the United States, Japan and Australia, demonstrating its growing influence on the world stage. While Russia’s agreement with North Korea has raised significant security concerns about the Korean Peninsula, the last leg of Putin’s Asia tour focused on strengthening the traditional Russia–Vietnamese relations. Both leaders have stated their aims to further the cooperation between the two nations in education, science and technology, oil and gas exploration and clean energy. The two nations agreed to collaborate on a roadmap for a nuclear science and technology centre in Vietnam.14
The Southeast Asian nation has chosen to abstain from various resolutions at the United Nations condemning Russia’s actions, yet maintained good relations with Ukraine and even sent some aid to Kyiv. In 2022, the Vietnamese government provided US$ 500,000 as humanitarian aid to support the people affected in the Ukraine conflict.15 Following its long-held foreign policy, Vietnam has maintained a neutral stance on the Ukraine conflict and is trying to court major powers equally. It is the only country to successfully host leaders from the US, China and Russia in recent times and is one of the largest importers of Russian arms. In the period 2016–2022, Vietnam bought 5.9 per cent of Russia’s weapons at US$ 1.7 billion.16 However, it plans to diversify its arms imports and reduce reliance on its traditional ally.
Amid tensions with China, these improving ties with Russia could also help Vietnam protect its disputed waters. With the aim to deepen relations in the energy sector, Vietnam has licensed Zarubezhneft, a Russian state-controlled oil company, to develop an offshore block on its southeastern coast.17 The so-called Block 11-2, however, appears to be inside the disputed nine-dash-line, a part of the area that China claims to be its own.18 Therefore, this offshore block might help Vietnam to maintain its claims in the contested part of the South China Sea.
Furthermore, Putin’s visit ahead of the October 2024 BRICS Summit under the Russian Chairmanship, also shows support for Vietnam’s keen interest in joining the group of emerging economies. Formally joining the grouping would benefit Vietnam by aligning their foreign policy of using multilateral diplomatic institutions to promote a multipolar world order and enhance economic ties with emerging economies.19
Key Takeaways
Amidst the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, Russia has sought to strengthen its ties with DPRK and Vietnam in face of the growing isolationism due to the West’s sanctions. Russia and DPRK’s upgraded partnership broadens their collaboration across multiple areas and could lead to significant changes in the dynamics of Northeast Asian security. South Korea and Japan, the two non-nuclear powers, may further strengthen diplomatic and security cooperation with the United States as well as strengthen their own defence profiles to counter the threats posed by DPRK in the region.20 On the other hand, for Vietnam, Russia is an important source of military assistance and a valued partner in the former’s energy sector. While some analysts note that Russia–Vietnam cooperation in the hydrocarbon sector could strengthen Vietnam’s claims in the South China Sea, Russia is less likely to take measures that might jeopardize Chinese interests in this region, given the increasing robustness in Moscow–Beijing ties.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Ongoing conflicts involving groups such as the Arakan Army and the Myanmar military junta have delayed the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project.
On 2 April 2008, India and Myanmar signed a Framework Agreement to construct and operate a Multi-Modal Transit Transport facility on the Kaladan River, connecting Sittwe Port in Myanmar with Mizoram in India. The project's primary objective was to enhance bilateral relations and economic cooperation through improved transportation infrastructure.1 In October 2015, the Indian government approved a Revised Cost Estimate (RCE) of Rs 2904.04 crores for the project.2
The Kaladan project integrates multiple transportation modes, including a 539 km shipping route from Kolkata to Sittwe Port in Myanmar, facilitating maritime transport; a 158 km inland water transport (IWT) route from Sittwe to Paletwa along the Kaladan River; a 110 km road connecting Paletwa to the Indo-Myanmar border; and finally, a 100 km road link from the border to NH-54 at Lawngtlai in India.3
Source: “Shri Sarbananda Sonowal to receive the First Indian Cargo Ship docking at the Sittwe Port on May 9, 2023”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, Government of India, 5 May 2023.
Before the formal Framework Agreement between the two countries, Detailed Project Reports (DPRs) were prepared for the waterways component, including the Port and Inland Waterways Terminal (IWT) in April 2003 and for the road component in March 2005.4 M/s RITES Limited, a Public Sector Undertaking under the Ministry of Railways, suggested a waterway route from Sittwe Port to Kaletwa (225 km) along the Kaladan River, followed by a roadway from Kaletwa to the India–Myanmar border (62 km).5
By 2016, the Sittwe Port and Paletwa Inland Water Transport Terminal were completed.6 A DPR for a new container terminal was prepared, and a MoU for the operation and maintenance of the facilities was signed in October 2018, appointing A to Z Exim Limited as the private operator from January 2020. The Indian government allocated Rs 1921.05 crores for the road component, with IRCON International appointed as the Project Implementing Agency in March 2022.7 Construction commenced from both Paletwa and Zorinpui ends to facilitate the project's implementation.
On 9 May 2023, the first Indian cargo ship arrived at the newly inaugurated Sittwe Port in Myanmar's Rakhine State. The ship departed from Kolkata's Syama Prasad Mookerjee Port and was received by Sarbananda Sonowal, Minister for Ports, Shipping, and Waterways. Myanmar's Deputy Prime Minister and Union Minister for Transport and Communications, Tin Aung San, also attended the occasion. This project is expected to reduce the cost and time of transporting goods between Kolkata and cities like Agartala and Aizawl by more than 50 per cent, leveraging a route from Kolkata to Sittwe, then onward to Paletwa and further by road to Northeast India.8
India attributed the success of the KMTTP to the visionary 'Act East' policy, emphasising that this initiative has unlocked significant commercial opportunities not just for Northeast India but also for Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Myanmar and the broader Southeast Asia region. The project was poised to transform Sittwe Port in Myanmar into a major hub for regional trade. Key exports from Myanmar through Sittwe Port will include rice, timber, fish, seafood, petroleum products and textiles, while major imports will consist of construction material such as cement, steel and bricks.9
Strategically, Sittwe Port will provide Northeast India with an alternative, more efficient trade and transit route, reducing dependency on traditional pathways and fostering economic development in the region.10 For Myanmar, especially the Rakhine State, the port is expected to enhance trade and commerce, facilitating closer economic integration with India. The project thus represents a crucial step in bridging South Asia with Southeast Asia, promoting regional prosperity and cooperation.11
The KMTTP is expected to provide a strategic link to the North-East, thereby reducing pressure on the Siliguri Corridor.12 The Siliguri Corridor, colloquially termed the ‘chicken neck’, is a constricted expanse of territory linking India's northeastern states to the broader Indian mainland. The ‘Chicken’s Neck’ corridor has an approximate width of 33 km on the eastern end and 21 km on the western end.13
Challenges
The Kaladan project faced a significant setback, following the capture of Paletwa township near the Mizoram border, by Arakan Army (AA) in January 2024. In February 2024, while a United League of Arakan (ULA) spokesperson affirmed the safety of the KMTTP and expressed readiness to cooperate with India for mutual benefit, reports noted that the KMTTP has ‘almost died’ after the AA seized control of Paletwa.14 The AA now controls most major towns and supply routes in the region. Consequently, the Kaladan project has reached a near-standstill, as Paletwa is critical to the project's progress and is no longer under the control of the military junta.
The project road extends in a south-north direction within the Chin State of Myanmar, running parallel to the Kaladan River. It originates from the eastern bank of the Kaladan River,
Where a jetty for a waterway terminal has been proposed as part of the ‘Waterway Project’ linking Sittwe port and Paletwa. The road concludes at the India-Myanmar border. The total projected length of the road alignment is approximately 109.200 kilometers, with Package I (Paletwa to Kaletwa) covering 60.700 kilometers and Package II (Kaletwa to Zorinpui/India-Myanmar border) spanning 48.500 kilometers.15
Currently, the highway from Paletwa to Zorinpui is not yet built.16
This route goes through one of the areas hardest hit by the ongoing conflict between the Myanmar military and resistance forces. Against this backdrop, the Adani Group divested its investment in Myanmar's Sittwe port earlier this year, amidst escalating conflict between the military junta and the AA insurgents.17 The KMTTP traverses through two states in Myanmar—Rakhine and Chin. Following the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021, an armed civil war erupted, leading ethnic rebel and pro-democratic armed forces to take control of substantial parts of the country, including significant areas in Rakhine.
Prior to the military coup, the Kaladan project had also faced delays for various reasons, including the Rohingya crisis that emerged in 2017. The recent developments have also raised concerns about a potential tripartite conflict involving the junta's forces, the AA, and rebels from Chin State, given that Paletwa has traditionally been a Chin-majority township. The Chin State, located on the border with Mizoram, represents a particularly intense battleground. This region has witnessed close coordination between the Chinland Defense Force, the People’s Defense Force (PDF), and the Chin National Army in their struggle against the military junta.18
By early July 2024, the civil conflict in Rakhine State has significantly intensified. Since late 2023, the AA has made substantial territorial gains, including key townships near the Bangladesh border. The State Administration Council (SAC), primarily military-controlled, has responded with severe tactics, causing significant civilian casualties and widespread destruction. Rising tensions between the ethnic Rakhine population and Rohingya Muslims further complicate the situation.19 Estimates indicate that the AA now controls 50 per cent to 75 per cent of Rakhine State, with their hybrid governance system playing a pivotal role in this power shift.20
Apart from Rakhine, the Junta generals are fighting similar EAOs in Chin, Sagaing, Shan, Kachin and Kayah State near the Thailand border. Moreover, western Myanmar is currently controlled by two powerful armed groups—the Arakan Army representing the Arakanese and the Chin National Front/Army (CNF/A) representing the Chin. This conflict is significant for India’s strategic interests in the region, necessitating balanced engagement with both the AA and CNF/A, as well as other political actors within the Chinland Council. During recent months, resistance forces have made unprecedented advances against the military SAC. A key front is Rakhine State where the AA now controls a majority of townships. By May 2024, the AA captured 10 township centres in northern and central Rakhine State and southern Chin State, including Pauktaw, Kyauktaw, Mrauk-U, Minbya, Myebon, Ponnagyun, Rathedaung, Buthidaung, Ramree and Paletwa.21
The AA forces territorial advancements have hindered road construction efforts from Paletwa in Chin state to Zorinpui on the Mizoram border.22 Prior to the latest escalation of the civil conflict, the AA had formulated plans to impose taxes on infrastructural initiatives and commercial enterprises within the Rakhine and Chin states, notably targeting the Kaladan project.23 This maneuver sought to bolster their fiscal resources and consolidate authority, thereby potentially influencing developmental initiatives. The AA also abducted five Indian workers from a project site in November 2019.
Conclusion
The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project has encountered numerous obstacles, primarily due to Myanmar's political instability, ethnic armed groups, and law and order issues. The situation worsened after the February 2021 militay coup, which escalated into a severe civil war in October 2023, initiated by various ethnic armed groups against the military. Rakhine State, where the project is located, remains partially under military control, with the Arakan Army consolidating its influence near the borders of Bangladesh and India. Significant portions of the project are still under construction. Security concerns can be expected to persist until Myanmar achieves political stability and the civil war ends.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Unchecked inflation and a low tax-to-GDP ratio are some of the key economic woes plaguing Pakistan.
Pakistan’s Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb presented an ambitious PKR 18.9 trillion finance bill1 in the National Assembly on 12 June 2024. This was passed after due deliberation and minor amendments on 28 June 2024.2 While acknowledging the challenges before the economy in terms of depleting foreign reserves, continuous depreciation of its currency, stagnant economic growth and soaring inflation, he also underlined the slightly improved economic outlook of late3 due to inflows of funds from outside.
The budget aims at a modest 3.6 per cent GDP growth for Fiscal Year 2024–2025 with a whopping tax collection target of PKR 13 trillion, 40 per cent higher than last year’s target, which requires additional revenue measures at least to the tune of PKR 2 trillion. Direct taxes are increased by 48 per cent, whereas indirect taxes have gone up by 35 per cent. Besides, the budget intends to generate PKR 3.5 trillion from non-tax revenue and PKR 30 billion from privatisation. Compared to last year, the total outlay, a sum total of expenditure and net lending, has increased by 30 per cent and now stands at PKR 18.877 trillion.
Source: Business Recorder
Debt servicing forms the single largest component of the expenditure and consumes more than half of the total budget outlay amounting to PKR 9,775 billion. This is distantly followed by expenditure on Defence4 excluding pensions amounting to PKR 2,122 billion, Grants and Transfers to Provinces PKR 1,777 billion, and Development Spending and Net Lending PKR 1674 billion. PKR 1363 billion is earmarked under the head of Subsidies, followed by PKR 1152 billion allotted to the running of civil government & emergency provision, whereas PKR 1014 billion is meant for Pensions.5
The claims about right-sizing the government falls flat in the absence of any tangible policy measures.6 The expenditures have actually gone up by 21 per cent. The attempt to ensure fiscal consolidation may have its utilities to deepen stability, sustainable economic recovery remains a dream as it continues to depend upon outside inflows. Zahid Hussain terms the entire exercise of the Finance Minister as “Budgetary Jugglery”7 whereas Najam Sethi feels that the new budget is going to adversely impact the take home money for the people which would lead to lesser demands in the market.8
Table 1 shows the major components of the Pakistani budget over the last five years. Debt servicing and spending on defence have been constantly growing. Interest payments increased to PKR 9,775 billion in 2024–25 from PKR 2,964 in 2020–21. Similarly, spending on Defence has gone up to PKR 2,122 billion in 2024–25 from PKR 1,289 in 2020–21. Net external receipts increased from PKR 810 billion in 2020–21 to PKR 2,724 billion in 2023–24, but decreased to PKR 666 billion in 2024–25. Spending on federal Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) has increased from PKR 650 billion in 2020–21 to PKR 1,400 billion in 2024–25.
(All Figures are in PKR in billion)
Budget
Receipts
Expenditure
Total Outlay
Tax Revenue
Net External Receipts
Interest Payments
Defence
PSDP
2020-21
7,137
5,464
810
2,964
1,289
650
2021-22
8,487
5,829
1,246
3,060
1,370
900
2022-23
9,579
7,470
1,611
3,950
1,563
727
2023-24
14,484
9,415
2,724
7,303
1,804
950
2024-25
18,877
12,970
666
9,775
2,122
1,400
Source: Compiled from Pakistan’s Federal Budgets, Respective Years.
Key Economic Woes
Pakistan, at present, is in the firm grip of a multifaceted crisis that requires long-term systemic and structural reforms at various levels to address the existing lacunas. There exists a near consensus among Pakistan observers and analysts that the country needs systemic changes instead of short-term measures. This was acknowledged by Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb himself during his budget presentation when he cautioned the House that progress could not be made overnight and one would have to have patience and make collective efforts to achieve required and sustainable economic growth and development. He went on to argue that government was looking to broaden the tax net in a way that does not burden the existing tax payers.
As the house debated the budgetary provisions, Aurangzeb termed the budget as growth budget and stated it is based on a well thought out homegrown strategy to boost economic growth.9 He further claimed that the budget was aimed to expand revenues, cut unnecessary expenditures and narrow the fiscal deficit.10 It is in this context one needs to situate the increased tax collection target for Federal Bureau Reserve (FBR) in the budget.
Problem of Taxation
Tax to GDP ratio is an important parameter to assess the capacity of a state to mobilise resources to fuel growth and development. The Pakistan Economic Survey 2021–22 notes that the Tax to GDP ratio is the real index to measure tax compliance, capacity and efficiency in the tax system.11 A higher Tax to GDP Ratio allows the government to tap domestic resources to meet developmental expenditures and decreases its reliance on external sources. As per the World Bank, Tax to GDP Ratio above 15 per cent is ‘an important tipping point to make a state viable and put it on a path to growth’.12
In Pakistan, the Tax to GDP ratio has historically been abysmally low. In the last six years, the Federal Bureau of Reserve’s (FBR) Tax to GDP ratio hovered between 8.4 to 9.8 per cent.13 The situation is not improving much despite the fact that Pakistan remains the most heavily taxed country in the entire region.14 Unlike in industrialised and other developed countries with higher Tax to GDP Ratios, Pakistan heavily relies on indirect taxes compared to direct taxes that form a meagre share of the overall revenue.
The taxation system also has a range of exemptions that costs the economy dearly. In 2022, the tax exemptions were recorded at PKR 1.757 trillion which increased to PKR 3.9 trillion in 2023. Notwithstanding, the affluent class, super rich, landed elites and other powerful sections find ways to exploit loopholes to evade taxes. Pakistan has a poor Tax to GDP ratio due to a number of reasons including “a narrow tax base, massive evasion and avoidance, lack of effective enforcement, poor documentation, exemptions/concessions, and fragmentation across provinces”.15
Contrary to claims made by the Finance Minister, the budget fails to introduce major reforms to broaden the tax base. Instead of widening the tax net, the budget burdens the existing tax payers, especially the salaried class. About five million out of a total 240 million Pakistanis pay direct taxes which on one hand reflects administrative inefficiency and on the other epitomizes a systemic crisis.16 Heavy reliance on indirect taxes makes the fiscal system regressive and places the burdens uniformly on all consumers irrespective of their economic status in the society.
The average annual growth in taxes during last five years had been recorded at around 20 per cent. However, as per the new budget, it has gone up to 30 per cent this time. Although, the government has set a high target for tax collection, many in Pakistan doubt FBR’s capacity to achieve the “tax miracle”.17 Instead of resorting to structural reforms, the government is going to squeeze those already in the tax bracket. The budget aims to address certain concerns of IMF so that it could secure a new programme of US$ 6–8 billion to avoid economic default in near term. Key among those concerns related to increasing FBR tax collection and reducing consolidated budget deficit. The IMF appears to be somewhat satisfied with the budget as it has reached a staff level agreement on 12 July 2024 for an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) amounting US$ 7 billion for a period of 37 months.18
Unchecked Inflation
Inflation is another area that needs proper attention by those framing economic policies in the country. Pakistani people have been suffering from the longest and the most intense form of inflation. Ever since May 2022, the inflation rates surged above 20 per cent. By May 2023, the inflation had reached a record high of 38 per cent. After that, a slowdown was recorded and it took almost a year when inflation came down to 20 per cent. At present, it stands at 12.6 per cent which is higher than the last month’s recorded data at 11.8 per cent.
Source: Business Recorder
Situations like these, if got unchecked, could potentially lead to unforeseen consequences including civil unrest. Khurram Hussain in his recent Op-ed in Dawn English daily argued that:
The inflation engulfing the country is no longer just an economic problem. It is a danger to the social order. It is not clear when a tipping point will be reached, nor what it will trigger if and when it does arrive.19
Instead of widening the tax net, the budget burdens the existing tax payers, especially the salaried class. About five million out of a total 240 million Pakistanis pay direct taxes which on the one hand reflects the administrative inefficiency and on the other epitomizes a systemic crisis. Heavy reliance on indirect taxes makes the fiscal system regressive and places the burdens uniformly on all consumers irrespective of their economic status in the society. The average annual growth in taxes during last five years had been recorded at around 20 per cent. However, as per the new budget it has gone up to 30 per cent this time. Although, the government has set a high target for tax collection, many in Pakistan doubt FBR’s capacity to achieve the “tax miracle”.
Conclusion
The budget lacks major reforms to address the root cause of Pakistan’s economic mess. At a time when everyone was hoping for certain structural reforms to broaden the tax net and downsizing exemptions to the bare minimum to put the economy back on track and provide relief to the people suffering from intense bouts of inflation, Pakistan resorted to a window-dressing approach. Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb seems to have pieced together the ingredients of the same old recipe in hope of serving a new dish altogether. This was probably done to address certain concerns raised by IMF in recent past. While this has helped Pakistan reach an agreement with the IMF for US$ 7 billion EFF for a period of 37 months, it will not change the economic situation on the ground.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Emperor Naruhito’s Visits to Indonesia and the UK in Context
Introduction
Japan’s Imperial Family, with the Emperor and Empress at its centre, has been a significant moderating influence on Japanese politics in the post-war era. Though debarred from any significant political role by the new Constitution adopted under the United States-led Allied Occupation in 1947, the Imperial Family remains the constitutional ‘symbol of the nation’. One of the striking ramifications of this is that the Imperial couple, or even members of their extended family, can be said to have emerged as remarkably effective tools of diplomatic soft power. The current Emperor’s two recent foreign trips to Indonesia and the United Kingdom denotes how the Emperor forms a complex nexus between Japan’s 20th century history and its modern status as a member of good standing with the Global North.
The Japanese Emperor in Modern Diplomacy
Japan’s monarch regained diplomatic significance only when the reign of the samurai was overthrown in 1868. As the Japanese polity underwent modernisation and a new German-inspired Constitution was promulgated in 1889, Emperor Meiji and his descendants became not only the final arbiters of domestic policy, but also the key decision-makers in foreign policy. It was on Meiji’s authority that the Japanese army invaded and annexed Okinawa, Manchuria and Korea in 1879, 1905 and 1910 respectively. His son Taisho was the authority behind Japan’s occupation of German colonial territories in Liaodong and Shantung in China after the First World War, while his grandson Showa presided over the great conflagration that was the Second World War.
With the announcement of Japan’s surrender on 15 August 1945, the Emperor’s war-making prerogatives were finally taken from him. The Allied Occupation, led by the United States, instead drafted a new Constitution in 1947 that returned him to the status of a disenfranchised figurehead.1 Some diplomatic powers remained with the Imperial Household, namely the receiving of credentials from foreign envoys and making formal visits to key countries. Even this, however, was strictly circumscribed by the powerful Imperial Household Agency, which remains the office ‘in charge of’ the Imperial Household’s affairs.
Nevertheless, the post-war Emperor became a powerful sign of Japan’s goodwill. Emperor Showa’s visit to Britain in 1971 and the US in 1975 marked Japan’s rehabilitation as a key Asian ally in the Cold War. The visit of the then Crown Prince Akihito and his new bride Crown Princess Michiko to India in 1960 was an early premonition of the importance Japan would come to attach to ties with India, reconfirmed by their return in 2019 as Emperor and Empress.
Upon assuming the throne in 1990, Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko (who are still alive and therefore not customarily referred to by their regnal name, Heisei) proved to be indefatigable practitioners of koushitsu gaikou (Imperial diplomacy)2 , visiting over 36 countries in their 30-year-long reign. In 1992, the Imperial couple visited China, where they delighted their hosts—and dismayed Japanese conservatives—by issuing a statement of regret for Japan’s actions during the Second World War.3
Conservatives were further disappointed by his public statement of apology to Koreans for his country’s actions there between 1910 and 1945, a statement that was promptly accepted by then-President Roh Moo Hyun.4 Akihito even broke a deeply-controversial ‘taboo’ when he acknowledged that his ancestors, who he technically claims descent from in an unbroken lineage stretching back to the mythological Sun Goddess, may have been from the Korean peninsula.5
Significance of the Emperor’s Indonesia Visit
After Emperor Akihito announced his abdication in 2019, his son, Emperor Naruhito, took the throne with the regnal name Reiwa. As his accession occurred in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, Naruhito and Empress Masako, a former career diplomat, spent the two initial years of their reign holding socially distanced events with select individuals. As the threat of the disease receded in 2023, the Imperial couple took to touring again.
Their tour of Indonesia in June 2023 was their first foreign foray, which demonstrated Naruhito’s inheritance of his father’s style of diplomacy. The six-day trip conducted between 17 and 23 June saw the royal couple engaging deeply with Indonesian culture and people in a variety of settings. Characteristically, it also featured the Emperor’s open acknowledgement of the ‘difficult time in our relations with Indonesia’, which referred to Japan’s brutal occupation of what was then called the Dutch East Indies during the Second World War.6
However, the visit also had a pronounced political and strategic objective. This can be best understood by the Emperor’s remarks prior to his departure, when he clearly stated that “[w]orking with new and developing countries is becoming increasingly important to resolve global issues such as climate change, energy, and food”.7
Indonesia is not only the largest economy among the ASEAN countries, but also a traditional investment and aid destination for the Japanese. By 2022, the country had received over 380.5 billion yen in Official Development Assistance for technical cooperation, while Japan–Indonesia trade reached over US$ 32 billion in 2023.8 A survey conducted by the Japanese Foreign Ministry in 2022 found that over 59 per cent of Indonesians feel that Japan is an important partner, as against 54 per cent who felt that China played that role best.9 As such, the visit was an opportunity not only to reaffirm post-Cold War Japan’s ‘Asia-centric’ diplomacy, but also the sincerity of its outreach towards the countries of the Global South.10
Significance of the Emperor’s UK Visit
In June 2024, Japan’s Emperor Naruhito and Empress Masako departed for the United Kingdom for an eight-day state visit.11 Their visit, their second foreign trip, was touted by the Japanese media as a sort of homecoming, as both the Emperor and Empress are alumni of Oxford University, and the Emperor has been on record as stating he feels a sense of kinship to the UK.12
During the trip, the Imperial couple attended several functions hosted by the British royal family mixed in with personal visits to sites of interest such as the Thames Barrier (on which the Emperor wrote a dissertation) and Oxford University itself. However, it is the speech he delivered at Buckingham Palace on 26 June during the official banquet hosted by King Charles III and Queen Camilla that is most worthy of attention here, as it illustrates perfectly how the Imperial institution serves as a diplomatic vehicle for Japan’s key foreign policy interests.13
In the early years of the 20th century, as Japan rapidly modernised its economic and military structures, the UK, then at the head of the British Empire, had signed a landmark treaty of alliance with the Empire of Japan in 1902. This treaty, which formed the basis of what is called the Anglo-Japanese alliance (nichiei domei), was intended as a counter to perceived Russian expansion and accepted the principle of an exclusive sphere of interest for Japan in Korea as well as a share of the spoils in China.14 Renegotiated and extended up to 1922 as the ‘marrow’ of Japanese foreign policy,15 the Alliance in effect gave space to Japan to expand its empire deeper into Northeast Asia while it protected British imperial interests in Southeast Asia from challenge.
In contemporary times, the United Kingdom and Japan are once again on the road to convergence. The former is currently one of the few European powers that actually has a robust Indo-Pacific strategy and is a member of several Indo-Pacific minilateral groupings such as AUKUS as well as the Five Eyes, both of which Japan is keen to join.16 It is also a collaborator with Japan and Italy on the advanced fighter design programme called the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP),17 making it a pivotal power bridging Europe and East Asia. Finally, Japan and the UK share common outlooks regarding issues such as support for Ukraine against Russia and pursuing active diplomacy with the Global South.
The Emperor’s speech at Buckingham Palace, with its references to a ‘friend[ship] like no other’ and a ‘close friendship based on mutual understanding of the importance of international rules and global institutions forged from the lessons of history, including its darkest years’, conveyed the same message tailored to audiences in the Global North. The speech solidified not only the Imperial couple’s deep personal connections to the UK, but also signified a deeper strategic synergy that harkened back to the past as much as to the future.
Conclusion
The Imperial institution since 1945 has been a story of rediscovery, as the occupants of the Chrysanthemum Throne have attempted to mould it to serve a Japan which no longer pursues territorial expansion and eschews aggressive war. At the same time, Emperor Naruhito rules over a Japan that is dealing with pressing issues that require innovative solutions devised in tandem with the world to solve. As such, the nation’s First Ambassador now has his task cut out for him.
In future, it is suggested that the Government of Japan could give more thought to having the Imperial couple visit India again, an event the Government of India would—and should—surely approve of. Additionally, visits to African countries, especially Kenya or South Africa, could further cement Japan’s outreach to the Global South even as it relieves them from the burden of apologising for their history.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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