On 28 March 2023, the Government of Norway released an important document outlining key priorities for its upcoming Chairship of the Arctic Council.1 Without giving any reference to Russia or to the geopolitical challenges in the context of the Ukraine crisis, the document focuses on addressing the scientific, environmental, economic and human-centric challenges in the region. Four key priority areas have been flagged in the document.

First, Oceans have been listed as the first focus area of Norway’s priorities in the Arctic. Increased human activity, rapid climate change and drastic loss of sea ice are causing severe stress on the Arctic and other ocean ecosystems. Under its Chairship, Norway intends to develop credible ocean management tools such as a digital environmental atlas for Arctic seas and oceans. It also calls for protecting endangered species and ecosystems in the region through area-based conservation measures. An emphasis is also laid on installing scientific observation systems in the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) for collecting scientific data and enabling knowledge sharing among partners. Combating marine litter and strengthening cooperation on emergency preparedness and safe shipping in the Arctic have been further listed as priority objectives of Norway’s Chairship.2

Second, the issue of climate change and environment is another important priority area highlighted in this document. Emphasis on using local traditional knowledge to address climate issues in the region has been advocated. Knowledge sharing and enhancement of scientific research in this regard have been prioritised. Specific reference to address the emerging issues from Black Carbon and Methane has been emphasised. The need to take a multilateral approach to address climate change and environmental issues in the Arctic has been emphasised.3

The third section of the document prioritises Norway’s approach in terms of sustainable economic development of the region. It stresses that green transitional projects, blue economy, sustainable shipping and Arctic food systems will be prioritised. Cooperation with indigenous organisations to use their traditional knowledge to enhance their economic development has been emphasised. Developing and protecting the culture and way of life of indigenous people in the region has been set as a key objective of Norway’s Chairship. Lastly, this section of the document calls for sharing the best technological solutions for developing Arctic Industries.4

The final section takes a people-centric approach and argues that global climate change is altering livelihoods, settlement patterns and living conditions of people in the North. The document calls for developing resilient, diverse and inclusive Arctic communities. Special emphasis is laid on enhancing the role of youth in the Arctic Council’s work and promoting gender equality in the region. It is interesting to note that the word ‘Chairship’ is used instead of ‘Chairmanship’ throughout the document.

Norway also calls for investigating the role of climate change and its impact on regional public health. The need to establish a diverse network of Arctic human biobanks for providing digital health solutions to people in the Arctic is stressed. Lastly, the document calls for prioritising and developing medical preparedness and response systems for all types of emergencies in Arctic communities through projects that could include the use of local and traditional knowledge.5    

Assessment

A continuous emphasis on ‘cooperation’ by avoiding any use of the language of ‘security’ makes this document timely and fully in line with the fundamental principles of the 1996 Ottawa Declaration. A key stress on achieving long-term development goals through support to ongoing activities and projects in the six working and expert groups of the council further leaves space for some level of trust to re-emerge in the council.

While the document presents an optimistic vision for Norway’s upcoming Chairship, given the ongoing geopolitical contestation in the region, it remains to be seen if Norway can realistically achieve these objectives.

First, Norway’s call for cooperation while remaining actively engaged with its allies and partners on geopolitical matters in the Arctic may to an extent outline the country’s balanced approach. Such an approach to ensure cooperation, though, seems not achievable  unless engagement with Russia is re-established. Russia’s senior Arctic official Nikolay Korchunov argues that Russia still considers the Arctic Council an important forum for cooperation in the region.6

Second, Russia accounts for 53 per cent of the Arctic Ocean coastline that extends from the Barents Sea to the Kara Sea to the Laptev Sea, and to the East Siberian Sea. The total continental shelf extent of Russia in the Arctic Ocean is therefore greater than all the other seven Arctic states. Russia’s three major rivers—the Yenisey, the Lena and the Kolyma—end into Kara Sea, Laptev Sea and the East Siberian Sea respectively in the Arctic.7   Therefore, the overall success of Norway’s first priority area in the Arctic is largely dependent on the country’s engagement with Russia in this regard.

Third, Norway in its priority document has called for installing scientific observation systems in the CAO for collecting scientific data and sharing it with its allied partners. The Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf (CLCS) approval of Russia’s extended continental shelves in the CAO8 in February 2023 is bound to increase Russia’s maritime activity in the region in near future. Installation of such observation systems (the data from those which could have dual-use implications) may not be easy in areas approved by CLCS in favour of Russia. In the absence of any formal mechanism of cooperation, such installations might be seen with suspicion, especially in areas viewed as essential to Russia's geo-economic and geostrategic interests.

Fourth, with regard to the issue of enhancing and ensuring safe shipping, search and rescue, emergency preparedness, and disaster risk reduction in the Arctic, the majority of the long-route shipping traffic passes through the Northern Sea Route (NSR) that runs along the Russian coast. Russia maintains substantial infrastructure as compared to other Arctic states to respond to any shipping-related emergency along the NSR. Therefore, this vision seems farfetched without engaging with Russia within or even outside the Arctic Council.

Fifth, the global scientific communities are of the view that science and climate change issues of the Arctic could not be addressed through limited or selective scientific cooperation.9 Scientists need data, knowledge and experience sharing to validate their research. Norway’s emphasis on prioritising the critical issues of Black Carbon, Methane and other related science and climate change issues would need a global approach of cooperation.

Sixth, sustainable economic development and green transition in the Arctic region as a whole could be achieved through cooperation with all Arctic stakeholders, sharing of technology, and collaborations in scientific and social science research. The complete Western withdrawal from joint economic projects with Russia and further imposition of economic sanctions and hindrances in technology transfers has negatively impacted green and sustainable economic development in the Arctic.

Finally, Norway in its document has given great emphasis on prioritising various issues of the indigenous people of the North. The Arctic accounts for a total population of about 4 million, spread across all the eight Arctic states in the region. The Russian Arctic alone accounts for approximately 2 million people divided into various ethnic and indigenous groups.10 Norway’s agenda of pursuing policies for the benefit of Arctic indigenous communities in its upcoming Chairship cannot possibly ignore 50 per cent of the population that lives in the Russian Arctic. Issues related to health and livelihood of all people in the north are equally important and therefore would require careful policies to benefit everyone.

Conclusion

Given the ongoing geopolitical contestations and the current state of Norway’s relations with Russia, Norway may not be able to fully realise the ambitious agenda for its upcoming presidency of the Arctic Council. Cooperation with Russia seems difficult in the near future given the growing level of mistrust between the two countries. Further, some observers states within the council seem divided in their view regarding the future legitimacy of the Council without Russia.11  Therefore, Norway’s upcoming Chairship needs a balanced approach to meet its set objectives.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Norway’s Chairship Arctic Council 2023-2025”, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 March 2023.
• 2. Ibid., p. 7.
• 3. Ibid., p. 11.
• 4. Ibid., pp. 14–15.
• 5. Ibid., pp. 17–18.
• 6. Astri Edvardsen, “Russia's Top Arctic Diplomat: We Still Consider the Arctic Council an Important Forum”, High North News, 28 March 2023.
• 7. “Country Backgrounder: Russia”, The Arctic Institute, 1 August 2022.
• 8. “Summary of Recommendations of the Commission”, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 6 February 2023. Russia had submitted its claim for extended continental shelf in CAO before CLCS in 2001. The CLCS gave its decision approving Russian claims in February 2023.
• 9. Gareth Rees et al, “Arctic Science: Resume Collaborations with Russian Scholars”, Nature, 10 January 2023.
• 10. “Country Backgrounder: Russia”, no. 6.
• 11. Melody Schreiber, “China Will Not Recognize an Arctic Council without Russia, Envoy Says”, Arctic Today, 17 October 2022.

While extensive digitalisation has made lives more convenient, it has also amplified the vulnerabilities making devices and data susceptible to unauthorised breaches. Despite popular notions of cyberspace as an abstract and intangible environment, cybersecurity depends on the individual's actions. The human element of cybersecurity cannot be ignored as it is often identified as the ‘weakest link’ in cybersecurity. Several studies have concluded that cyber-attacks succeed not so much because of technical vulnerabilities but because of human error.1

According to a report by the World Economic Forum, 95 per cent of cybersecurity incidents occur due to human error.2 Further exacerbating the issue, most governments have failed to prioritise cyber awareness within their national cybersecurity strategies.3   Evidence has shown that teaching basic cybersecurity skills such as strong passwords, identifying phishing scams and understanding the significance of data can dramatically improve the safety and security of the digital infrastructure.

Given the more significant role of individuals in ensuring a safe and secure digital space, there is a need to close the human error gap through education. While multilateral forums like G20 and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) are more commonly associated with government-to-government collaboration, their name recognition provides a useful entry point for creating awareness on cybersecurity issues for the common man.

In February 2023, the Ministry  of Electronics & Information Technology (MeitY) inaugurated the G20 Cyber Security Exercise and Drill for domestic and international participants to provide insights on enhancing crisis management, crisis communication and to collectively build joint resilience to respond to cyber incidents.4 It also launched the ‘Stay Safe Online’ campaign intended towards raising awareness among citizens.5

The much-needed initiative is pertinent in the case of India because of the widespread use of social media platforms and the rapid adoption of digital payments within the country. In fact, according to some statistics, India was the most frequently targeted country in the world with cyber attacks on government agencies alone rising to 13.7 per cent in 2022 from 6.3 per cent in 2021.6 The Union government’s Cyber Crime Portal has also been receiving over 3,500 complaints of financial fraud a day highlighting the severity of situation.7 In 2022, according to government agencies, there were a total 13.91 lakh cybersecurity incidents reported in India, which is a substantial increase compared to previous years.8

To close the human error gap and with an objective for a broader outreach, the ‘Stay Safe Online’ campaign involves disseminating content through infographics, puzzles and short videos in English, Hindi and other local languages. Besides this, various promotion and outreach activities are being carried out throughout the year with the involvement of critical stakeholders, including Union ministries, industry, NGOs, etc. The campaign covers various issues including browser security, cyberbullying, data security, email security, internet ethics, and Know Your Customer (KYC) fraud.9 The themes primarily deal with the quotidian digital activities of individuals and seeks to inform them about safe and secure practices in cyberspace.

Similarly, Quad has also been an active forum to discuss cybersecurity issues and challenges. The Quad, which comprises India, Japan, the United States and Australia, is a strategic alliance that focuses on promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific region. In February 2023, the Quad unveiled a new public campaign aimed at promoting greater awareness of cybersecurity and enhancing the resilience of digital infrastructure.10 The ‘Quad Cyber Challenge’ campaign was inaugurated to invite people across the Indo-Pacific and beyond to join the challenge and pledge to practice safe cyber habits.11

The initiative is tailored to provide resources such as basic cybersecurity information and training for participants. It globally unites governments, corporations, non-profits, universities, and schools on the issue of securing cyberspace. The campaign also encapsulates “the spirit of the Quad” to strengthen cooperation against the existing challenges, including cybersecurity.12 In India, the campaign is being coordinated by the National Cyber Security Coordinator with National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS).

The National Cyber Security Coordinator's office leading the campaign highlights the importance of collaboration between these nations to address the challenges posed by cyber threats. Cybersecurity is a critical issue that affects individuals, businesses and governments alike and enhancing cybersecurity in the Quad grouping is vital to protect critical infrastructure, prevent cyber attacks and maintain trust and confidence in the digital ecosystem. This is in line with the Quad’s broader objective of upholding a

free, open, inclusive, prosperous and peaceful Indo-Pacific region based on the principles of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, international law and the rules-based international order.13

The member countries have realised the importance of factoring cybersecurity to appreciate this broader objective. For instance, the Quad Foreign Ministers’ statement on ransomware reaffirmed their shared commitment

…to an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful cyberspace and supported regional initiatives to enhance the capacity of countries to implement the UN Framework for Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace.14

The statement also reiterated the commitment to cooperate on capacity-building programmes and initiatives to improve resilience against ransomware attacks.

As attackers become more sophisticated, the challenges of managing cyber risks and maintaining good cyber hygiene will increase exponentially. Given that personal cybersecurity requires some effort and thought, educating individuals about cybersecurity is an essential step towards the larger goal of securing and maintaining a resilient cyberspace.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Carlos Perez Chalico, “Your Employees Are the Weakest Link in Your Cybersecurity Chain”, EY, 11 March 2022.
• 2. Anna Zhadan, “World Economic Forum Finds That 95% of Cybersecurity Incidents Occur Due to Human Error”, Cybernews, 18 January 2022.
• 3. Paul Mee and Rico Brandenberg, “After Reading, Writing and Arithmetic, The 4th 'r' of Literacy is Cyber-risk”, World Economic Forum, 17 December 2020.
• 4. “Shri Alkesh Kumar Sharma Inaugurates G20 Cyber Security Exercise and Drill”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Electronics & IT, Government of India, 1 February 2023.
• 5. “Shri Ashwini Vaishnaw Launches ‘Stay Safe Online’ Campaign and ‘G20 Digital Innovation Alliance’ as Part of India’s G20 Presidency”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Electronics & IT, Government of India, 28 December 2022.
• 6. Chetan Thathoo, “Cyberattacks on Indian Govt Agencies More Than Doubled in 2022: Report”, INC42, 31 December 2022.
• 7. Aroon Deep, “Over 3,500 Financial Frauds Reported Online Daily, Says National Cyber Security Coordinator”, The Hindu, 8 February 2023.
• 8. Chetan Thathoo, “India Witnessed 13.9 Lakh Cybersecurity Incidents in 2022: Govt”, INC42, 11 February 2023.
• 9. “Awareness Topics”, Stay Safe Online, Government of India.
• 10. Saurav Anand, “Quad Nations Launch Public Campaign to Enhance Cyber Security”, Livemint, 8 February 2023.
• 11. “Quad Cooperation to Promote Responsible Cyber Habits”, Press Information Bureau, National Security Council Secretariat, 8 February 2023.
• 12. “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: ‘The Spirit of the Quad’”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 12 March 2021.
• 13. “Question No-397 Quad Group”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 3 February 2023.
• 14. “Quad Foreign Ministers’ Statement on Ransomware”,  Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 23 September 2022.

More than a year ago, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As the world waited for Kyiv to fall, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky rejected the offer to surrender and signalled his intent to fight.

Russia initially sought to catch Ukraine by surprise. As it failed to do so, it chose to escalate the war by targeting the infrastructure and people of Ukraine. On its part, the Ukrainians avoided targeting Russian civilian infrastructure to limit retaliatory strikes on its population centres. Ever since, both sides have pursued contrasting war aims and objectives.1 While Russia aims to break the Ukrainian will to fight, Ukraine seeks to roll back the Russian advance. Led by a popular leader, an adaptive military hierarchy and a gritty rank and file, the Ukrainian military has held its ground well and perhaps fashioned a new blueprint to fight future wars.

Each new war is a return of old ideas and military beliefs.2 Aspects like trench warfare, hand-to-hand fighting, artillery duels, mechanised manoeuvres and heavy `metal on metal` battles are not new. However, the smooth and seamless employment of old technologies, such as hand-held anti-tank weapons, surface-to-air missiles and long-range artillery, alongside new-age niche military technologies such as drones, autonomous and counter-autonomous systems, AI-driven intelligence platforms, low earth orbit imaging systems and satellite-based communications, have been the highlights of this war.

Two particular aspects have stood out from a future war-fighting perspective.3 First is the corporatisation of military support to Ukraine by the West. The power of crowdsourcing of military budgeting, technology, training and logistic wherewithal has been a significant lesson, in this war.4 Second is the prominent role played by the Ukrainian society to underpin the overall war effort. This ‘community-isation’ of the war effort by Ukraine demonstrates how a militarily weaker state can leverage its strong political will and societal resilience to alter military outcomes on the battlefield.5

Role of Society in War Effort

The Ukraine conflict highlights the role of society and culture in shaping the contours of war. The community-isation of war effort in Ukraine can be explained at three levels: the willing participation of its civilians in territorial defence and partisan operations; the resilience of its populace to withstand incessant missile/air strikes and destruction of civilian infrastructure; and the role of both civilian and military social media influencers in advancing the war-time interests of the Ukrainian state.

Firstly, the Ukrainian military has successfully integrated thousands of its civilians into an effective territorial defence force. Many more might have undertaken missions with grave risks to personal safety, to delay and disrupt the Russian advance.6 From the very inception of this war, the Ukrainian leadership had recognised that, given the significant gaps in its military capacity and capability, the Russian military was likely to overwhelm the country’s conventional defences over time. As a mindful choice, the Ukrainian military has been increasing its reserve force component, by calling its reservists to reinforce the combat units, in support of regional territorial defence components and also promote the raising of resistance outfits in Russian controlled areas.

For this, the law establishing Ukraine’s national resistance strategy entered into force in January, 2022.7 The law gave the Ukrainian armed forces the authority to manage its territorial defence through the commander of the Territorial Defence Forces (TDF). The TDF is presently tasked with securing the local populace and infrastructure, maintaining law and order, supporting operations of the regular military units, and assisting in the raising of pockets of resistance in areas under occupation. The bulk of the force consists of volunteers, both men and women, irrespective of age considerations, and particularly those with prior military or policing experience and who are willing to support the country's war fighting effort without joining the military force as full-time soldiers.

Another force engaged in resistance efforts is the National Guard of Ukraine (NGU). The NGU was created in the wake of Russia’s intervention in the Donbas region to protect the country’s integrity, besides facilitating the coordination and control of the militia units in field. Beyond this, the Ukrainians have also flung open its doors to foreign volunteers.8 Surprisingly, these overseas recruits seem to be committed advocates of the Ukrainian cause and provide a much-needed boost to its military manpower. However, as more and more foreign volunteers arrive, serious integration issues might arise and, in order to mitigate these man-management risks, the Ukrainian government might have to evolve stringent norms and the administrative capacity to quickly absorb and fruitfully employ these foreign recruits.

Secondly, as a well-knit community, the Ukrainian people have demonstrated incredible resilience and patience to bear incessant air/missile attacks and hardships in daily life. Some observers believe that Russia initially intended to achieve absolute air superiority and undermine the Ukrainian ability to coordinate its ground defences and counterattacks. However, the Ukrainian military responded more effectively to Russia’s invasion than most experts had expected. As Mick Ryan, a well-known military commentator has argued, since the beginning of this war, the Ukrainian society has continued to surprise the world with their sense of resilience, purpose and pride in defending their nation.

The Russians might have under-estimated the Ukrainian resistance. In wake of recurrent frontline difficulties, Russia has resorted to increased use of cruise missiles and other precision-guided munitions to strike targets across Ukraine. To increase their writ over contested territories, Russian forces have also conducted intensive operations using private military contractors. Commentators have highlighted the potential for abuse and excesses by these private armies to alter behaviour on the ground. The Ukrainian populace has thus far met these challenges with absolute resoluteness.

And thirdly, by leveraging its tech-savvy citizenry on social media to advance its security interests, the Ukrainian state has expanded its reach and influence in this war.9 Much has been said about Ukraine’s success in the field of information warfare. Ukraine has benefited from its status as an underdog and being invaded by a much stronger power. As a result, the political messaging from Kyiv out-messaged Moscow from the very beginning of this war.10 Ukraine’s political and military leadership has been particularly agile in shaping perceptions world-wide and requisitioning military support to fight the war by innovative use of social media technologies and networks.

In this digital age, when news comes from several sources on the frontline and is rapidly transmitted around the world, governmental and military structures struggle to control narratives or a poorly constructed story. The Ukraine war highlights the immense power of social messaging by its tech-savvy citizens to post content directly to their social media feeds, thereby mitigating the Russian mastery over information warfare. This war also proves that fabricated claims of victory tend to catch up sooner or later, when real stories are reported by those present on the ground.

The Future of Warfare

The Ukraine war is an illustrative case of how militarily less capable yet resilient states can deal with existential threats.11 Even after a year in war, there has been little impact on Ukraine’s will to fight back. In fact, Ukraine’s determination to roll back the Russian advance seems to have become even more strident. While Ukraine has limited resources at its disposal to raise the costs of a continued Russian invasion, sustaining a territorial defence force and resistance movement alongside its conventional military operations would remain a challenge, requiring substantial support in terms of military guidance and wherewithal.

At another level, the Ukraine war illustrates the necessity of a calibrated flow of social media posts that are not only real-time and authentic, but also articulated through reliable voices to shape and influence the prevailing public opinion, nationally and globally. The Ukrainian state with its flourishing army of uniformed and civilian social media influencers seems to have learned this lesson well and with remarkable success. Manpower, machines and material are critical components of warfare. Men (and women) more than other two and despite the hype on technology, the Ukraine war proves the salience of the human element in present day wars beyond doubt. A long drawn `all out` war not only requires willing and motivated manpower from diverse backgrounds, but also across ages and gender, and least of all the uniformed force alone to draw cost effective and conclusive battle outcomes.

The Ukraine War demonstrates that future wars when pitched between unmatched military rivals might not just require a ‘whole of government’ approach, but perhaps a ‘whole of people’s’ approach to achieve favourable outcomes in conflict.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. L. Freedman, “Kyiv and Moscow Are Fighting Two Different Wars: What the Conflict Has Revealed About Contemporary Conflict”, Foreign Affairs, 17 February 2023.
• 2. Mick Ryan, “A Year of War, Part I: Ukraine and the Continuities of War”, Futura Doctrina, February 2023.
• 3. H. Singh, “The Ukraine Conflict: A Blueprint for Future Wars", Indian Defence Review, Vol. 38, No. 1, January–March 2023.
• 4. H. Singh, “The Corporatisation of Ukraine War: A Case of Unfolding Asymmetry in Military Power”, Commentary, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 22 March 2023.
• 5. Jason Matheny, “One Year After Russia Invasion of Ukraine: Experts React”, The Rand Blog, 20 February 2023.
• 6. Stephen Flanagan, “One Year After Russia Invasion of Ukraine: Experts React”, The Rand Blog, 20 February 2023.
• 7. Stephen J. Flanagan and Marta Kepe, “What Kind of Resistance Can Ukraine Mount?”, DefenseNews, 26 February 2022.
• 8. Austin C. Doctor, “Making the Most of Foreign Volunteers in Ukraine”, War on the Rocks, 7 March 2022.
• 9. William Courtney, “One Year After Russia Invasion of Ukraine: Experts React”, The Rand Blog, 20 February 2023.
• 10. Todd Helmus, “One Year After Russia Invasion Of Ukraine: Experts React”, The Rand Blog, 20 February 2023.
• 11. Todd C. Helmus,  “The Ukrainian Army is Leveraging Online Influencers. Can the U.S. Military?”, War on the Rocks, 1 March 2023.

Earthquakes are one of the most devastating natural disasters that can strike anytime with little or no warning. On 21 March 2023, an earthquake of magnitude 6.6 occurred in Afghanistan, the tremors of which shook parts of northern India and were felt as far away as Delhi-NCR, Jaipur and Chandigarh. The destructive power of earthquakes leads to damage to infrastructure, displacement of people and loss of life. Since it is impossible to warn the population of an impending earthquake, it is all the more important to have a precise knowledge of the disaster risk in the region, as it is the only way to provide important information to reduce risk to population.

Disaster risk is determined probabilistically as a function where hazard, exposure and vulnerability are directly proportional (any increase causes an increase in risk) and capacity is inversely proportional (an increase causes a decrease in risk). The magnitude of the earthquake, its proximity to populated places, the kind of terrain, how structures are constructed, the time it strikes, and the response time are some variables that affect the number of casualties and damage to property.

Most earthquake fatalities occur due to structural collapses, and lesser casualties are attributable to non-structural causes and secondary disasters. Besides fatalities, earthquakes cause enormous economic losses, social disruption and psychosocial problems. As nearly 60 per cent of India is vulnerable to moderate to severe earthquakes, it is useful to learn from the experiences of such natural disasters as the February 2023 earthquake that struck Turkey and Syria.

In the 7.8 and 7.5 magnitude earthquakes that struck Turkey and Syria in February 2023, the number of people killed surpassed 45,000. At least one earthquake of magnitude 5 occurs every year in Turkey. The earthquake of 1999 led to the establishment of the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) to effectively manage disasters. AFAD had a Strategic Plan 2019–2023 to build disaster-resilient communities. However, reports flagged inadequate implementation of policy that perhaps led to the worst disaster yet in 2023.

The recent 7.8 magnitude earthquake, which affected 16 per cent of Turkey's population, caused an estimated damage of more than US$ 34 billion in direct property damage, according to a World Bank rapid damage assessment report. This excludes the recovery and reconstruction costs that will undoubtedly be much larger. Rescue and relief efforts were hampered by damaged roads, cold winter and breakdown of communications. An estimated 1,41,000 people from 94 countries participated in the rescue efforts.

India also contributed to the relief efforts by sending its army medical team, National Disaster Relief Force (NDRF) personnel with equipment, dogs and relief materials. The relief supplies included critical medicines, seven C-17 aircraft and a network-independent real-time tracking and messaging module called SANCHAR. The rescue of a six-year-old girl by NDRF and the picture of a Turkish woman kissing an Indian Army medical officer on her cheek has been highlighted in international media, showcasing India’s rescue and relief efforts.

Reducing Risks in the Indian Context

Having experienced numerous earthquakes of magnitude greater than 6, the Himalayan region and the Rann of Katch in India are particularly vulnerable. The earthquakes in Latur (1993), Kashmir (2005) and Bhuj (2001) are grim reminders of the country's vulnerability to earthquakes. While one can't prevent natural disasters from happening, an understanding of disaster risk can help mitigate its effects. India must take lessons from the recent Turkey earthquake for future planning to reduce its impact.

Rapid Urbanisation

Economic growth and better job opportunities have led to urban agglomeration and demographic shifts. Rapid urbanisation has led to a boom in population, property and infrastructure. The percentage of people living in cities increased from 25.72 per cent in 1991 to 35.39 per cent in 2021 in India, indicating an increased risk. The colossal damage wrought by the earthquakes in Turkey is revealed in videos of multi-storey buildings collapsing. A report by Turkey's AFAD states that temporary shelters were supplied for nearly 19 lakh survivors, which is a sign of the extensive damage to residential structures.

Urbanisation cannot be avoided due to economic factors and social benefits to the populace. However, seismic micro zonation in master plans and land use plans, retrofitting of structures, regularisation of illegal colonies/slums and resettlement of such to areas should form an essential part of earthquake risk mitigation measures in the Indian context.

Implementation of Building Codes

Implementing earthquake-resistant building codes is an effective structural measure to mitigate the risks of an earthquake. The structural damages caused in Turkey indicated poor implementation of building code policies. In most countries, building codes are not implemented due to various reasons, including those related to lack of effective oversight mechanisms, funding, a lack of political will, among other factors. Also, builders/owners either do not know the codes or do not have the resources to comply with them, and in many cases look to cut costs, which directly increases the risks of damage in case of natural disasters like earthquakes.

The National Building Code of India was first published in 1970 and underwent a second revision in 2005. Two amendments were then released in 2015. The National Building Code of India 2016 represents a significant milestone and reflects modern, globally applicable best practices. The nation-wide application of these codes must be enforced by the team of building officials appointed by the local authority, to ensure that sufficient disaster risk reduction measures are taken.

Dealing with Mass Casualty Events (MCEs)

The emergency medical services and organisations responding to the situation in Turkey were overwhelmed due to the earthquake, which brought forth challenges such as uncertainty, confusion arising from a lack of contingency plans, delay in the establishment of the Incident Command System, the necessity to alter the medical response, breakdown in communication and directing the response to recover from the effects of the disaster in a timely and efficient manner.

In order to react to disasters, a few states in India have implemented disaster management plans that include both the national and state disaster response forces which are trained and equipped to respond in the event of a disaster. But in order to save priceless lives during the ‘Golden Hour’, an earthquake that hits without any prior notice calls for an effective system. In order to overcome these challenges, the implementation of a Decision Support System, by the District Disaster Management Authority headed by the District Collector, can provide real-time information by mapping the medical facilities available, with details on availability of beds and medicines, location of ambulances, distances and modes of transport, and can save precious lives.

Natech (Natural Hazard Triggering Technological) Disasters

Natech disasters like the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster of 11 March 2011 are technological disasters triggered by natural disasters, which occur conjointly. Such disasters result in the release of toxic air, hazardous materials, fires and explosions, forcing the response force to abandon rescue operations. After a 7.6-magnitude earthquake in 1999, Turkey witnessed Natech disasters, including a significant fire at a refinery in Korfez and an acrylonitrile spill at a facility that produced fibres. Natech catastrophes are more likely to occur as a result of industrialisation, which results in the storage of dangerous chemicals, flammable materials, gas pipelines and explosive materials.

The Seveso III directives were adopted by the European Commission in 2012. Annex. I of those directives explicitly recognised Natech risk as a crucial element of a hazardous site and required methods for identifying, analysing, and preventing accidental risks as part of a comprehensive Natech risk management strategy.

India has in place a ‘National Disaster Management Plan 2019’ which has incorporated a detailed framework for Disaster Resilience to include Industrial disasters, Nuclear and Radiological emergencies and Biological and Public Health emergencies. The inclusion of a risk management strategy to include a comprehensive national policy on prevention, preparedness and mitigation of Natech disasters would assist in ameliorating the effects of Natech disasters.

Public–Private Partnership (PPP) to strengthen Disaster Mitigation

For effective rescue and relief operations, it is essential to build community resilience. This will allow quick response and recovery and make it possible for response teams to use the dispersed resources and focus the effort in a coordinated manner. Analysts have highlighted the lack of specifications or guidelines as regards the PPP model for disaster mitigation in the Turkish context.

 

The Indian government and private sector institutions should invest in building community resilience by promoting social cohesion, strengthening local institutions, and improving access to healthcare and social services through robust public–private partnerships. As losses from disasters exceed available funds and the nation is economically affected, PPP would provide an alternative source for reconstruction and also for preparedness measures that could help the government scale up projects. The non-participation of communities at the design and planning stage could also lead to ownership issues at a later stage. Tax incentives and compliance with the DRR index can act as a catalyst for active private sector participation.

Conclusion

Earthquakes have both economic and social impacts. The economic impact results in financial losses, while the social impact lasts longer and harms the survivors' mental health. India can use the lessons learned from the tragic earthquake in Turkey to better prepare for and respond to natural disasters. India must adhere to strict building codes, risk-mitigating innovations and earthquake preparedness. By being proactive and studying other countries’ experiences and best practices, India can better ensure the safety of its residents and reduce disaster risk.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.