Turkiye held its Presidential election on 14 May 2023. Recep Tayyip Erdogan received 49.52 per cent votes, while his opponents Kemal Kilicdaroglu and Sinan Ogan received 44.88 per cent and 5.17 per cent votes, respectively.1 Since more than 50 per cent votes are mandatory to win the presidential election in Turkiye, a runoff election took place between Erdogan and Kilicdaroglu on 28 May 2023. In the runoff, Erdogan won the presidential election, receiving 52.18 per cent votes, defeating Kilicdaroglu, who could get 47.82 per cent of the votes.2 Given that none of the presidential candidates managed to secure more than 50 per cent of the votes in the first round, the role of Sinan Ogan became decisive in Erdogan’s win because of Ogan’s endorsement for Erdogan in the runoff election.3

Electoral Dynamics of Erdogan’s People’s Alliance

Erdogan led the People’s Alliance, which includes the Justice and Development (AK) Party, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Great Unity Party (BBP) and New Welfare Party (YRP). Erdogan's campaign strategy encompassed several key elements. Firstly, he emphasised on continuity, presenting himself as a leader who can maintain stability and build on past achievements. This messaging aimed to appeal to voters who value a sense of consistency and progress under Erdogan's leadership. Additionally, Erdogan highlighted the potential for instability if the opposition coalition were to win because of the ideological diversity within the opposition and suggested that their differences could hinder effective governance and decision-making.

This narrative sought to create doubts about the ability of the opposition to provide stable and efficient leadership, thereby positioning Erdogan as a safer choice. Identity issues also played a significant role in Erdogan's campaigns. He tapped into religious and nationalist sentiments, appealing to conservative voters who identify strongly with Turkiye's Islamic and cultural heritage. This approach helped him garner support from segments of the population that prioritise identity-related issues and view Erdogan as a defender of their values and interests. By combining these elements—continuity, the potential for opposition instability, and identity-based appeals,4 Erdogan succeeded in solidifying his support base and attracting voters who prioritise stability, effective governance, and Turkish cultural and religious identity.

Defining true nationalism and “Century of Turkiye”5 to the voters, Erdogan asserted that nationalism could not be achieved through mere displays of power but rather through protecting Turkiye's national symbols, such as the red flag with the crescent and star, and highlighted the significance of standing in solidarity with Azerbaijan and the liberation of Karabakh. Erdogan also stressed the establishment of the Organization of Turkish States and the realisation of long-held dreams. According to him, true nationalism was demonstrated by the ability to produce domestic weapons, vehicles and make independent decisions. Erdogan further contended that nationalism involved combating domestic and international terrorist organisations. He presented the People's Alliance as having achieved these goals through unity and proudly representing the nation without compromising its sovereignty. He proposed the “Century of Turkiye” aiming to make the 100th anniversary of the Republic a starting point for a powerful Turkiye built upon the foundations established over the past 21 years.6

During the election campaign, Erdogan made several promises in various policy areas. Regarding earthquake relief, he announced plans to construct 6,50,000 new flats in south-eastern Turkiye, with a commitment to deliver 3,19,000 of them within a year. As the Turkish economy is going through a difficult phase, Erdogan pledged to reduce inflation to 20 per cent by 2023 and below 10 per cent by 2024 while also emphasising his intention to continue decreasing interest rates. With regard to housing, he vowed to introduce additional regulations to protect citizens from excessive rent and sale price hikes.

On the issue of refugees, Erdogan pledged to facilitate more “voluntary” returns of Syrian refugees to their country, citing improving dialogue with Syria mediated by Russia. In foreign policy, Erdogan aimed to normalise Ankara's relations in the wider Arab region and sought to establish an “axis” centred around Turkiye. He expressed a commitment to crack down on “terror” groups such as the Gulen movement and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). However, regarding LGBTQ+ rights, Erdogan took a conservative stance, promising to actively combat what he referred to as “deviant tendencies” that threaten the traditional family structure. He also accused the opposition of being “pro-LGBT”.7

Electoral Dynamics of Opposition Alliance

Kilicdaroglu led the Nation Alliance, the coalition of six parties, which has also been termed as “Table of Six”, including the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Good Party, Democracy and Progress Party, Future Party, Felicity Party and Democrat Party. In terms of governance, the Nation Alliance aimed to abolish the executive presidential system brought by Erdogan in 2017 and reinstate a robust parliamentary system to strengthen democracy in the country. Kilicdaroglu contended that Erdogan's authoritarian tendencies have deepened over the past decade or more, requiring a radical institutional change. He appealed to those who believe that a more balanced power distribution between the legislative and executive branches is crucial for democratic governance. In addition to advocating for institutional change, he promised a different governing approach that is quieter and less paternalistic. It implied a departure from Erdogan's assertive and dominant leadership style, with Kilicdaroglu aiming to present a more collaborative and inclusive approach to governance. By championing a return to a parliamentary system, Kilicdaroglu sought to appeal to voters disillusioned with the current political climate and looking for a change in the existing system of government and the leadership style.

The HDP's (People’s Democratic Party) endorsement of Kilicdaroglu led to significant support for him in eastern Turkiye, having a substantial Kurdish population. It indicates a noteworthy shift in political dynamics and a potential realignment within the country’s political sphere. The HDP's backing of Kilicdaroglu seems to have resonated with Kurdish voters seeking an alternative to the ruling party, bolstering his electoral appeal in the region. In contrast, Erdogan has strategically framed Kilicdaroglu’s ties to the HDP as a means to undermine his credibility, linking the HDP to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), an armed group that has been engaged in a long-standing conflict with the Turkish state since 1984. By associating Kilicdaroglu with “terrorists”, Erdogan aimed to cast doubt on his leadership abilities and appealed to nationalist sentiments within the country. This tactic delegitimised the HDP’s support for Kilicdaroglu to reinforce the perception that any alliance with the HDP is tantamount to supporting terrorism.

During his campaign, Kilicdaroglu made several policy pledges in various areas. In terms of earthquake relief, he vowed to construct houses for victims free of charge and implement a ban on property sales to foreigners until the housing crisis was resolved for Turkish citizens. Regarding the economy, Kilicdaroglu pledged to reintroduce more traditional economic policies, aiming to reduce inflation and criticised Erdogan's low-interest-rate policy. He also expressed the intention to rebuild the confidence of foreign investors and transform Turkiye into a high-value product manufacturing country. Kilicdaroglu further outlined plans to quadruple the social housing inventory within five years and cap social housing lease costs at 20 per cent of the minimum wage.

Concerning refugees, Kilicdaroglu stated his intention to work with the Syrian government to facilitate the return of Syrian refugees to their home country. In terms of foreign policy, he emphasised dialogue with all international actors and repair Turkiye's relations with the West. He specifically mentioned his aim to establish visa-free travel for Turkish citizens to the European Union's Schengen area within months of assuming power.8 It may be argued that despite the involvement of all state institutions in favour of Erdogan’s campaign, Kilicdaroglu garnered 47.82 per cent votes, signifying a remarkable achievement indicating the popular support base in Turkiye for the latter. However, in the electoral campaign, the opposition could not strategically leverage the popular discontent, economic downfall, the government’s lethargic response in the aftermath of the earthquake and its excessive media control, resulting in its ultimate defeat.

Conclusion

The election took place in a challenging economic context pertaining to the currency crisis, high inflation rates, surging living costs and the massive task of infrastructure building in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake. The Turkish lira has experienced significant devaluation against the dollar, losing nearly 95 per cent of its value in the past 15 years. It indicates the need for strong economic policies and management to address the persistent inflation, which remains high at over 40 per cent.9 In the 2018 Turkish Presidential Election, Erdogan garnered 52.59 per cent votes.10 Securing 52.18 per cent votes in 2023 evidently shows that Erdogan has not been able to increase his vote share. However, it can be argued that despite all the pre-election hype of substantial popular support for the opposition, Erdogan has been successful in conserving his traditional votes. His five years tenure is likely to see similar domestic policies and slightly assertive foreign policy in the foreseeable future. It remains to be seen how Erdogan will govern the country in the face of simmering challenges due to economic hardships and fulfil the promise of bringing “Century of Turkiye”, encompassing the entire nation with the welfare of children, youth and women.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Elections 2023”, Anadolu Agency, 22 May 2023.
• 2. “Election Results 2023”, Daily Sabah, 31 May 2023.
• 3. “Sinan Ogan Endorses Erdogan in Turkey’s Presidential Run-off”, Al Jazeera, 22 May 2023.
• 4. Steven A. Cook, “Here’s How to Read Turkey’s Election Results- So Far”, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 May 2023.
• 5. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, “The Century of Turkiye Will Be the Century of Our Entire Nation”, Presidency of the Republic of the Turkiye, 13 May 2023.
• 6. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, “True Nationalism and Turkiye Century”, Twitter, 27 May 2023.
• 7. Umut Uras, “Turkey’s Elections: What are the Key Alliances Promising?”, Al Jazeera, 11 May 2023.
• 8. Ibid.
• 9. Marc Jones, “Analysis: Erdogan Election Showing Cools Turkish Turnaround Hopes”, Reuters, 15 May 2023.
• 10. “2018 Presidential Election Results”, Daily Sabah.

At the onset of the Ukraine crisis, China followed a cautious approach and highlighted its ‘principled neutrality’. China noted that it was not a party to the war and beyond calls for dialogue and restraint, it did not expend much diplomatic effort. However, in the last few months, China has appeared interested in playing a major role as a mediator in the Ukraine crisis. For instance, on the date of the first-year anniversary of the conflict, China published a document titled ‘China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis’ which highlighted 12 points to achieve ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine.1

Further, during his visit to Moscow on 21 March 2023, President Xi Jinping in a meeting with President Vladimir Putin, emphasised his interest to promote a political solution for the Ukraine crisis. Earlier in April, during a meeting with the visiting French President Emmanuel Macron, Xi proposed that China and France should push for a political solution of the crisis.2 More importantly, for the first time since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis, Xi Jinping spoke to the Ukrainian President Volodymr Zelenksy informing him that China’s “core stance is to facilitate talks for peace”.3 These actions have revived discussions among the international strategic community about China’s perception of the Ukraine crisis and its possible role as a mediator.

China’s Perception of the Ukraine crisis

In February 2022, when Russia’s military campaign against Ukraine began, Beijing perceived the war primarily through the lens of major power rivalry and China’s national interest. For instance, then Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s comments during the start of the conflict indicated that Beijing saw the armed conflict as manifestation of a long-standing political rivalry between West and Russia. In his talks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Wang Yi remarked that China recognised the complex historical context and maintained that Cold War mentality should be completely abandoned.4

These remarks referring to extended Cold War rivalry between the West and Russia were reiterated multiple times in public statements by Chinese officials and leaders to emphasise that as the Ukraine conflict is essentially a contest between the West and Russia, it is not comparable to the Taiwan situation, which China considers as an internal matter. Also, it was emphasised that China will not be dragged into major power contestation.5 Besides focusing on the rivalry dimension, the Chinese leadership saw the crisis both as a challenge and opportunity for China’s strategic interests.6

One of the major challenges China envisaged was portrayal of its image as a collaborator because the military operation followed a few weeks after China’s declaration of ‘no-limit’ partnership with Russia. Further, Beijing assessed that the war will strengthen and revive the Trans-Atlantic alliance, deepen the West’s resolve to contain China and strain her relations with the US and the EU in the long-run. However, it was also believed that China might gain as the war could become a distraction for the US and its European allies, drawing them away from the Indo-Pacific. More importantly, a prolonged conflict would probably weaken both Europe and Russia, relaxing China’s strategic environment in both Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific region.

In terms of policy responses, therefore, China did not stand by either Russia or the West. China sought to distance itself from Russia’s actions by calling for dialogue and respect of territorial integrity. Beijing remained very cautious about not appearing to provide concrete material support to Russia in its war efforts against Ukraine. Beijing also assured Ukraine that China will never attack Ukraine or challenge its territorial integrity. Alternatively, China intensified its criticism of NATO and popularised anti-US and NATO propaganda. The Chinese leadership also ignored Western pressure to press Russia to stop the Ukraine war and continued strengthening its strategic and economic partnership with Russia.

A year into the war, China’s perception of the Ukraine crisis has not changed, though its concerns are visible. The state-media Global Times, considered CCP’s mouthpiece, opined that the war has entered a phase of stalemate.7 Since both Russia and Ukraine are determined to maximise territorial gains before being forced to negotiate, the conflict is likely to prolong. The real danger of the war of attrition that China perceives is that Russia’s heightened anxiety could lead to use of tactical nuclear weapons. Highlighting this concern, China’s permanent representative to the UN Zhang Jun emphasised that “nuclear weapons cannot be used and a nuclear war cannot be fought”.10 Considering that Russia followed through with the threat to send its army into Ukraine, Moscow similarly could use nuclear weapons as Putin has threatened to use all weapons systems available if Russia’s “territorial integrity” is threatened.8 According to Western analysts, such a possibility could pose a significant moral dilemma to China, jeopardising China’s balancing act between Russia, Ukraine, US and EU.9  

China’s Role as a Mediator

China’s attempts to engage as a mediator for finding a political solution to the conflict is possibly driven by three factors. First is to prevent further escalation of the Ukraine conflict into a nuclear war. To that end, in November 2022, Beijing signalled its opposition towards use of nuclear weapons when Xi Jinping informed German Chancellor Olaf Scholtz that nuclear weapons cannot be used in the war. This same sentiment was reiterated in the 12 Points Peace Proposal released during the first-year anniversary of Ukraine war in 2023.

In this context, it is noteworthy that although Beijing at this point is unsure whether Russia will follow through with its threat of using tactical nuclear weapons, it is determined not to allow Russia frame China as complicit in the decision. Therefore, Xi Jinping travelled to Moscow in March 2023 to issue a joint pledge against deployment of nuclear weapons outside the national territories.10

The second factor influencing Beijing’s decision could be to ease the geopolitical pressure China has been facing from the US and EU. This can work in different ways. First, China can try to negotiate with the EU and US to recalibrate their policies towards China, in exchange for Beijing pushing Russia to the negotiating table. Second, it can hope to weaken their opposition by deepening the divisions within EU and between US and EU about China by projecting itself as a valuable partner in the Ukraine crisis.

There have been few indications in this regard. For instance, days before French President Macron and EU Chief Ursula von der Leyen’s visit, China’s Envoy to EU called for revival of stalled discussion on Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) trade pact.11 The EU Chief also acknowledged that decoupling from China was not possible, even as she stressed ‘de-risking’ trade ties.12

Meanwhile, the divisions within EU and between EU and the US over China are also apparent. Reportedly, Brussels is struggling to forge a consensus approach on China as some countries are inclined to engage with Beijing over trade and Ukraine crisis.13 Concurrently, as Washington is increasing pressure on its allies to align closely with the US against China, France along with some of EU top officials have openly called for Europe not to follow US policy on China.14

Finally, Beijing also sees this as an opportunity to revamp its image as a stable force in the international realm. China’s feat in brokering a diplomatic thaw between Saudi Arabia and Iran promoted China’s image as a global diplomatic and economic leader. Accordingly, if China is able to facilitate talks between Russia and Ukraine, it will not only help Beijing strengthen its diplomatic clout in Eastern Europe, but could also send a message to the countries in the Indo-Pacific about China being a responsible power and about its peaceful intent.

Conclusion

China’s ability to mediate in the Ukraine crisis is contingent on a number of factors, including on intention of both parties to come to the negotiating table. Moscow has vowed to press on with its offensive. Concurrently, while Kiev has welcomed China’s role as a mediator, it intends to strive for more territorial gains. Distrust of Chinese intentions primarily in EU and the US could also become a major determining factor. The European Commission and the US have dismissed China’s peace proposal as a “political initiative” aimed to distract international attention away from China’s support of Russia.15 At present, the US and the European countries are closely following whether China will provide military aid to Russia. China in the past has kept away from the Ukraine crisis citing its complex historical context. As the situation in Ukraine is constantly evolving, it remains to be seen what role China will play in the resolution of the conflict.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 24 February 2023.
• 2. “Highlights of Xi-Putin Meeting in Moscow”, Xinhua, 21 March 2023; Kawala Xie, “In Meeting With Macron, Xi Jinping Calls On China and France to Push for Political Solution to Ukraine Crisis”, SCMP, 6 April 2023.
• 3. “President Xi Jinping Speaks with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the Phone”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 26 April 2023.
• 4. “Chinese, Russian FMs Hold Phone Conversation”, Xinhua, 24 February 2022.
• 5. “China Has Never Been Involved in Russia-Ukraine Conflict”, Global Times, 14 September 2022.
• 6. Yun Sun, “Ukraine: China’s Desired Endgame”, Stimson Centre, 22 March 2022.
• 7. Liu Xin and Xu Yelu, “Worries Increase as Russia-Ukraine Conflict Enters Stalemate”, Global Times, 24 November 2022.  Also see Jian Junbo, “How to End the Conflict between Russia and Ukraine? Adhere to the Two Principles, the Common Interests of Mankind will be Guaranteed”, Aisixiang, 11 April 2023.
• 8. Jack Lau, “No Nuclear Weapons Over Ukraine, Chinese President Xi Jinping Says, in Clear Message to Russia”, SCMP, 4 November 2022.
• 9. Andrew Scobell, Vikram J. Singh and Alex Stephenson, “What a Russian Nuclear Escalation Would Mean for China and India”, USIP, 10 November 2022.
• 10. Cyril Ip, “China Urges ‘Peaceful’ End to Ukraine War as Russia Plans to Move Nuclear Weapons into Belarus”, SCMP, 27 March 2023.
• 11. Hayley Wong, “China Envoy Renews Call to Revive Stalled CAI Trade Pact with EU”, SCMP, 30 March 2023.
• 12. Paul Haenle, Chan Heng Chee, Liu Yawei and Dan Baer, “Is Europe Aligned on China?”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 9 May 2023.
• 13. Silvia Amaro, “The EU’s Divided Approach on China Might Be Coming to an End — and the U.S. is Unlikely to be Happy About It”, CNBC, 18 April 2023; Finbarr Bermingham, “EU Will Not Follow US’ China Policy, Top Diplomat Says in Fiery Debate with Lawmakers”, SCMP, 23 November 2022. 
• 14. “Macron: Europe Should Not Follow US or Chinese Policy Over Taiwan”, Reuters, 29 April 2023; Suzanne Lynch and Barbara Moens, “Biden Splits EU’s Top Ranks Over China”, Politico, 13 March 2023.
• 15. Jorge Liboreiro, “China's Peace Plan for Ukraine is 'Selective' and Blurs Roles of Aggressor and Victim, Says Brussels”, Euronews, 24 February 2023; Phelim Kine, “U.S. Dismisses China’s Ukraine Peace Proposal as an Attempt to Distract”, Politico, 24 February 2023.

The Commonwealth consists of 56 member countries with historical, cultural and political ties to the United Kingdom (UK). Among the 54 countries in Africa, 21 are a part of the Commonwealth. Even though obituaries for the Commonwealth have been written many times, it continues to attract new members of Lusophone and Francophone countries. Mozambique, for example, joined in 1995, Rwanda in 2009, Gabon and Togo in 2022.1 The Commonwealth could be leveraged to further India’s expanding interests in the Indian Ocean Region and Africa, the continent at the heart of Global South.

Africa’s quest for Non-Alignment

As a result of the Russia–Ukraine crisis, African countries took a major hit due to soaring energy prices and food shortages.2 Furthermore, with the increasing US–China competition, the African countries will be more comfortable with positioning themselves in a neutral platform. In order to protect their interests, a number of Africa countries are rediscovering the appeal of non-alignment and are looking towards multilateral groupings like BRICS3 (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). There are attempts also to revive the Non-Aligned movement.4

Traditionally, India's Africa policy has been closely tied to its membership in the Commonwealth and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which has provided a platform for engagement and collaboration with African countries. While the utility of NAM has dwindled over the course of time, the Commonwealth still has great potential to advance India’s interests, particularly in Africa. Unlike NAM, Commonwealth has a strong institutional capacity which deals with a range of issues including democracy, human rights, development cooperation and sustainable development. 

Moreover, India's increasing engagement with Africa has largely been through bilateral channels, with limited participation in multilateral forums. India's trade volume with Africa for the year 2021–22 is significant, totalling US$ 89.5 billion. The Sub-Saharan region alone accounts for US$ 74.86 billion of this trade volume.5 Even though India has recognised the enormous potential that Africa offers in terms of expanding its engagement with countries beyond its traditional focus, there is room for further expansion in multilateral frameworks.

Besides working within the framework of the India–African Forum Summit (IAFS), the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), IBSA Dialogue Forum (comprising India, Brazil, and South Africa), and BRICS, the Commonwealth presents an optimal platform for prioritising India’s Africa policy. This is because of the substantial representation of African nations in this grouping and its ability to overcome the constraints inherent in both North–South and South–South cooperation frameworks. As such, Commonwealth is the only organisation that bridges all the identities—including North, South, East and West.

Supporting African Democracy and Development

A significant number of African countries are home to sizeable Indian communities. In recent years, India has placed greater emphasis on cultivating relationships with its diaspora. Political instability remains a challenge in several African countries, including those that are members of the Commonwealth. Many African nations continue to face governance issues, social unrest, and democratic deficits. These challenges have repercussions for the well-being and security of Indian diaspora residing in those countries.  In the past, India has used its position as a member of the Commonwealth to express its concerns and to build consensus against South Africa's apartheid regime.

Moreover, the increasing sale of surveillance technologies to politically fragile African countries is a cause for concern.6   To counter these malicious acts, Commonwealth has a range of mechanisms to support the countries facing these challenges, including the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG)7 , which can act in cases of serious or persistent violations of Commonwealth values, including democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

India, as a member of the Commonwealth, could play an important role in promoting these values and working with other member states to address concerns around the use of surveillance technology. This could include sharing best practices and expertise in areas such as cybersecurity, human rights, and governance, as well as supporting the development of regional initiatives to promote greater transparency and accountability.

Furthermore, South–South cooperation has always been touted an important feature of India’s Africa policy. In recent years, it has moved towards triangular framework of cooperation. In 2017, India and Japan launched Asia–Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) to promote sustainable growth and development in Africa through infrastructure development, capacity building, and people-to-people cooperation.8 However, the initiative has not gained much traction in the African region, despite Japan being one of the largest Official Development Assistance (ODA) providers to the continent. In contrast to Japan, India would benefit from forming partnerships with Commonwealth countries of the Global North, as they possess a deeper understanding of African nations.

Finally, India’s engagement with the Commonwealth should not be treated as a subset of its relationship with the UK. India–UK bilateral ties could face divergences due to variety of domestic and structural factors. As India seeks to play a greater role in international institutions, it could encounter resistance from some quarters, including the UK. This may manifest in attempts to interfere in India's domestic politics, among other issues.9 Likely divergences, if any, on account of these and other factors within the India–UK relationship should not hinder the potential role of the Commonwealth in advancing India’s larger geo-strategic interests.

Given the current geopolitical realities, it is imperative for India to not only form and engage with new frameworks but also strengthen old ones, which will increase its options and influence among both developing and developed countries.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Why ex-French Colonies are Joining the Commonwealth”, BBC News, 29 June 2022.
• 2. Bitsat Yohannes-Kassahun, “One Year Later: The Impact of the Russian Conflict with Ukraine on Africa”,     Africa Renewal, UN, 13 February 2023.
• 3.   Ahmed Adel, “About 20 Countries Now Interested in Joining BRICS Despite Ukraine Crisis”, BRICS INFORMATION PORTAL, 28 February 2023.
• 4.   Adekeye Adebajo, “The Global South Revives Non-alignment”, The Guardian, 8 September 2022.
• 5. “Ministry of Commerce and Industry Department of Commerce Government of India Annual Report 2022-23”, Ministry of Commerce and Industry Department of Commerce, Government of India,  31 March 2023.
• 6.   Elisa Braun, “Destination Africa: The Scramble to Sell Cyberweapons to Dictators”, Politico, 7 December 2022.
• 7. “Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group”,  The Commonwealth, 2023.
• 8. “Asia Africa Growth Corridor Partnership for Sustainable and Innovative Development A Vision Document”, Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS), 22 May 2017.
• 9. Syed Akbaruddin, “Is ‘Global Britain’ Inimical to India?”, Hindustan Times, 20 January 2021.

On 11 May, India is completing 25 years of its formally declared nuclear weapons status. India conducted three nuclear tests (45 kiloton thermonuclear, 15 kiloton fission device, and 0.2 sub-kiloton devices) that day in 1998, followed by two more tests in the sub-kiloton category (0.5 and 0.3 kiloton devices) on 13 May the same year. In 1974, India conducted a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE), which it does not accept was a nuclear weapons test.

Where does India stand after 25 years of its declaration to be called a nuclear weapons country? Allaying initial global apprehensions, India sought accommodation in the global nuclear order. The international nuclear community seems to have reconciled to nuclear India, except by granting Nuclear Weapons State status under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It has strived for the task incrementally. Its active candidature for membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is reflective of its desire for nuclear accommodation.

After the 1998 nuclear tests, India engaged with the global non-proliferation order. The tests invited sanctions from a few countries, including the United States, and condemnation from many countries. The United Nations Security Council, too, passed a resolution against the tests. Geopolitical developments like 9/11 on the one hand and India’s diplomacy on the other greatly contributed to the process of India’s engagement with the nuclear order, including the non-proliferation regime.

The Strobe Talbott–Jaswant Singh rounds of talks made India abandon its policy of estrangement from the international non-proliferation order. This estrangement had begun since the entry into force of NPT in 1970. India had actively participated in the negotiations process of the treaty. It had also proposed its own resolution for the construction of the treaty but the international body opted for the Irish resolution.

In those years, its insistence was on stemming both vertical proliferation (qualitative development of nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapons countries) and horizontal proliferation (the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five nuclear weapons states recognised by the NPT). By the beginning of the 21st century, India started accepting the idea of non-proliferation. Over the years, it adopted not only non-proliferation norms but also different non-proliferation tools and mechanisms.  

After the 1998 nuclear tests, the phase of integration with the nuclear order and the non-proliferation regime started. India began the journey from estrangement to engagement and a positive and vibrant relationship with the regime. India harmonised its export control system with the guidelines of the NSG and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Even if India is waiting for the NSG membership, it joined the MTCR.   

The defining moment of India’s relationship with the non-proliferation order came with the 2005 India–United States Civil Nuclear Energy Initiative, popularly known as the Indo-US nuclear deal. It gave an opportunity for India to mainstream itself with the non-proliferation regime. The action saw resistance within India as also from the West. In India, a section of the policy community opposed the deal on the grounds of national security and strategic autonomy.

In the West, the opposition came mainly from the non-proliferation community, which was reluctant to accept an NPT-defined non-nuclear weapons country possessing nuclear weapons getting mainstreamed with the non-proliferation order. The treaty remained intact but the rules, which had evolved over the years to support the treaty, were adjusted to make way for India.  

The NSG’s guidelines became the focus. In 2008, the guidelines of the Group had clean exemptions for India. The divided Western world finally adapted the regime. The new collaboration between the West, and countries like Japan with India started on various nuclear issues. The Western nuclear noise became soothing for India. The entire Western bloc has pushed India’s case for membership of the NSG.

Today, unlike Pakistan and China, India has gained legitimacy as a responsible nuclear weapon country in the comity of nations. The proliferation network-hidden and manifest, sullied the image of India’s two nuclear neighbours. Despite all the independent or combined moves of China and Pakistan, the NSG guidelines, leave alone the membership of the regime, have not been stirred for Pakistan.  As a result, it is still relying on the black or grey market for its nuclear commerce. China, blatantly, assists Pakistan in violating the nuclear laws and norms to which it is a party.

India’s track record as a responsible nuclear weapon country is reflected in its policy of nuclear restraint. This policy, in turn, is based not only on its nuclear doctrine of credible nuclear deterrence and no first use (NFU) but also reflects in exercising control during border crises. Unlike Pakistan, India has never indulged in sabre-rattling, whether against China or Pakistan.

Some may argue that it does not need to give nuclear threats against Pakistan which is conventionally inferior to India. However, India does not do such things even against China, which is perceived conventionally superior to it. It is a different issue that in recent years, many Indian and Western analysts have come out with their writings busting the Chinese conventional superiority myth vis-à-vis India.

Doomsayers maintained that the two South Asian countries had fought the wars in the past and the absence of redlines between the two countries may lead the war-prone countries to fight another war in the nuclear mode. This myth was busted soon. India and Pakistan fought a war in Kargil in 1999. Needless to say, the war was fought without any nuclear exchange.

This war also busted the long-held myth that war between two nuclear weapons countries would compulsorily be nuclear in nature. In a way, nuclearisation of India and to an extent, of Pakistan, rewrote old nuclear theology. It should have silenced the theoreticians of a nuclear holocaust in South Asia but after a few more years, the irrational imagination kept coming. For this kind of occasional and sporadic illusion, Pakistan’s nuclear policy is greatly responsible.

India has become a source and supporter of global nuclear stability. It adhered to many of the nuclear initiatives it had opposed once. Despite not signing the NPT, it supports the stabilising role of the treaty. It has made it quite clear that it does not want to rock it. The treaty may thrive or fall on the basis of its own merits and demerits. Similarly, despite maintaining a good friendship with Iran, it advises it to comply with the treaty it has signed.

Today, nuclear India is commemorating its 25th anniversary. The struggle for the nomenclature—de facto or dejure/nuclear weapon or non-nuclear weapon state, has disappeared. India is a nuclear weapon country that possesses robust nuclear deterrence but still believes that a world without nuclear weapons is a safe place. It supports genuine and serious nuclear disarmament initiatives, not arms control screening nuclear disarmament. The synergised Shanti (peace) and Shakti (strength) mantra of India is supporting the contemporary global nuclear order.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.