On 21 June 2023, Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced at a press conference that he would attend the NATO Leaders’ Summit to be held in Vilnius, Lithuania on 11–12 July, following which he would travel to Brussels for a visit to the headquarters of the European security grouping.1 Subsequent to the announcement, Jiji Press sources highlighted that Kishida's government was hard at work drafting a new Japan–NATO Individually Tailored Partnership Programme (ITPP), to replace the existing Japan–NATO Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP).2 The IPCP, which has nine focus areas including cybersecurity and maritime security cooperation, is now expected to be augmented by cooperation on emerging domains of conflict such as outer space and disinformation campaigns in the social media sphere.

Another objective of Kishida’s visit will be to push for his government’s proposal to host a NATO liaison office in Tokyo, the first in Asia.3 First revealed by the Nikkei newspaper earlier in June, the new office is envisioned as providing a contact point for NATO members to carry on security-related dialogue with prominent Asian security actors such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. This would replace the current system, whereby the Danish Embassy in Tokyo served as the contact point for dialogue with NATO.

Japan’s proposal has run into obstacles in the form of objections by NATO members led by France, which has opposed the setting up of a new office in Asia as a distraction from the alliance’s core task of ensuring security in Europe, especially given Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and beyond. Kishida’s visit to Vilnius would thus be a well-timed opportunity to press the flesh, as it were, and ensure that the objections to Tokyo’s proposal are softened or withdrawn.

History of Japan and NATO relations

To be sure, Japan has had a long association with the NATO alliance.4 It has the distinction of being the oldest ‘contact partner’ of NATO, with its initial outreach stretching back to 1979. In the 1980s, Foreign Minister Shintarō Abe travelled to major European capitals on behalf of Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone to campaign for a Japan–NATO consultation mechanism, but was stymied by French objections. The formal opening of consultations between the two was pushed to the 1990s, after NATO had lost its bete noire, the Soviet Union. After 1991, when then-Secretary General of NATO Manfred Wörner visited Japan, the relationship was upgraded to a formal High-Level Consultation, which has continued to this day.

The Japan–NATO relationship only really came into its own, however, when the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001. Japan’s support of the US-led and NATO-backed International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan included its minesweeping and refueling assistance as well as the manpower contribution by the Japanese Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) set up in pacified districts of Afghanistan. Japan also raised funds for the Afghan reconstruction effort through the 2002 and 2012 Tokyo Conferences on Afghanistan. These contributions led it to be perceived as a trusted partner in NATO’s task of security provision.

Japan’s collaboration with NATO forces then extended to maritime cooperation in the Gulf of Aden and surrounding waters against piracy originating in the Horn of Africa. In this, especially after 2010, a key role was played by Prime Minister Abe, who elevated the relationship to a formal one by signing the 2013 Joint Political Agreement, which was then reflected in the IPCP issued by Japan. By 2017, Abe’s forceful advocacy of the commonality of ‘shared values’ between the NATO countries and Japan, as well as the common threat China’s actions in the East and South China Seas represented to both, was reflected by NATO officials. The relationship seemed poised to take on a myriad of challenges such as cyber-warfare, piracy and non-traditional security cooperation.

Impact of Ukraine

Russia’s advance into Ukraine in February 2022 has upended much of this spirit of partnership, by highlighting anew the deeper structural limitations inherent in the Japan–NATO relationship. Primarily, it has revealed a sense of renewed threat from Russia, which has resumed pride of place in the forefront of European countries’ consciousness. As the US and European countries attempt to support Ukraine while straddling the fine line demarcating their overt intervention in the conflict, Japan is increasingly being expected to accommodate NATO’s priorities while the latter seem to be withdrawing into their European backyards once more.

To his credit, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has adroitly parlayed the Ukraine crisis into a call for greater European attention to the Indo-Pacific by drawing an explicit parallel between Ukraine and Taiwan, most notably, by his statement that “Ukraine today will be the East Asia of tomorrow”.5 French President Macron in China though stated that Europe must remain a third party in the Indo-Pacific and not get involved in other people’s quarrels.6 Though this statement was then walked back, France continues to remain opposed to Tokyo’s desire to host a NATO office in the Indo-Pacific, citing once again NATO’s Euro-Atlantic focus.

Indeed, it may well be said that NATO is gradually withdrawing from its mission of ‘projecting stability’ beyond its core area, as more of its resources are drawn into the Ukraine conflict. This is most evident in the fact that NATO members have varying degrees of consciousness about the security challenges in the Indo-Pacific. While the United States, United Kingdom and France are actively engaged with several Asian partners and allies, Germany, the Eastern European countries and Turkey have a minimal or no footprint there, with no sign of them developing anything more tangible in the near future.

It can thus be said that Prime Minister Kishida’s visit will have to serve primarily two purposes: first, to convince the reluctant members of NATO to make common cause once again against China and Russia in the Indo-Pacific, and second, to demonstrate that Japan, which has committed a whopping 43 billion yen to be invested into the defence budget over the next five years, remains the interlocutor of choice for NATO to work with. How successful he will be in this endeavour may be judged by how detailed the leaders’ communique will be on Chinese actions in Asia, as well as the outcome of the simultaneous meeting currently being coordinated by Japan in association with Australia, South Korea and New Zealand to be held on the sidelines of the main summit.7

In this context, Japan’s quest to attract significant security cooperation from NATO members is a development India would do well to note. The US Senate India Caucus, for instance, is proposing for India to be offered the ‘NATO plus five’ status that Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and Israel currently enjoy. EAM S Jaishankar, though, stated that the template does not apply for India.8 The success or failure of Japan’s diplomacy would hold lessons that could not only justify India’s decision not to engage with NATO as an entity, but also gauge the seriousness of some of the organisation's European members in actually implementing their rhetorical stances on the ‘shared values’ of peace, security and freedom in the Indo-Pacific region by working with the countries of the Global South.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Kishida says he will attend NATO leaders’ summit, stresses need for dialogue with China”, The Asahi Shinbun, 22 June 2023.
• 2. “宇宙、偽情報で協力強化　日NATOが新文書”, Jiji.com, 26 June 2023.
• 3. “NATO to set up liaison office in Tokyo, beef up regional ties, Nikkei reports”, Reuters, 13 June 2023.
• 4. Mirna Galic, “Navigating by Sun and Compass: Policy Brief One: Learning From the History of Japan-NATO Relations”, Policy Brief, Japan Institute of International Affairs, 11 June 2019.
• 5. “‘Ukraine today could be East Asia tomorrow’: Japan PM warns”, France24, 10 June 2022.
• 6. Julian Ryall, “Macron’s comments in China cause concern in Japan”, DW, 12 April 2023.
• 7. “Japan, S. Korea, Australia, N.Z. to Hold Talks at NATO Summit”, The Japan News by the Yomiuri Shimbun, 30 June 2023.
• 8. Sriram Lakshman, “Senate India Caucus to push for ‘NATO plus five’ status for India”, The Hindu, 21 June 2023.

On 19 June 2023, all 193 Member States of the United Nations adopted a groundbreaking treaty on marine biodiversity. Adopted by the Intergovernmental Conference on Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, the Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ), popularly known as the Treaty of the High Seas, establishes regulations to protect biodiversity in waters beyond national boundaries. It is the first-ever legally binding agreement governing the high seas. By establishing a framework for protecting and sustainable use of marine resources beyond national boundaries, the treaty addresses a critical gap in global governance. Moreover, the treaty highlights the significance of multilateralism in addressing global challenges amidst growing geopolitical contestations and unilateral policies across the globe.

Background and Negotiations

The negotiations for the Treaty of the High Seas have a lengthy history. It began in 2004 with establishing of an ad hoc open-ended informal working group by the UN General Assembly to examine the conservation and sustainable utilisation of marine biological diversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction.1 The working group's mandates were to address the environmental impacts of human activities on marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction, promote coordination and cooperation among states and intergovernmental organisations for the conservation and management of marine biodiversity, examine area-based management tools, and propose solutions for any governance or regulatory gaps in the legal frameworks related to marine biodiversity.2

From 2005 to 2011, the Working Group met several times and in 2011, it adopted, by consensus, "a set of recommendations to initiate a process on the legal framework for the conservation and sustainable use of BBNJ.3 The subsequent meetings discussed creating an international instrument under the UN Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As a result, in 2015, the group agreed on recommendations for the 69th session of the UN General Assembly. The most important recommendations were developing a new legally binding instrument on BBNJ under UNCLOS and initiating negotiations for its creation.4 In the same year, a Preparatory Ccommittee was formed based on the group's recommendations, leading to the proposal of a legally binding instrument.5 This proposal culminated in the unanimous passing of Resolution 72/249 by the UN General Assembly on 24 December 2017.6 The resolution called for an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to negotiate a new international treaty under the UNCLOS.

In accordance with the resolution, UN convened four IGC sessions, in September 2018, March 2019, August 2019 and March 2022. The key elements of negotiations were marine genetic resources, area-based management tools, environmental impact assessments, and capacity building with the transfer of marine technology.7 Initially, delegations had been expected to conclude treaty negotiations at IGC-4. However, some of the contentious issues necessitated an additional session.8

After almost 20 years of discussions and five years of negotiations, Member States reached an agreement on 4 March 2023. At the end of that meeting, the Conference also decided to resume later to adopt the Agreement. In this connection, in its decision 77/556 of 18 April  2023, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to convene a further conference session on 19 and 20 June 2023.9 On 19 June 2023, the Conference adopted, by consensus, the Agreement under the UNCLOS on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction.

Major Principles and Provisions of the Treaty

The High Seas Treaty aims to conserve and sustainably use marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction through effective implementation of the UNCLOS and enhanced international cooperation. The Treaty is based on two fundamental principles. The first is the freedom of the high seas, in line with Article 87 of the UNCLOS.10 Second, the legal responsibility of the states to act in the common interests of all humanity to protect and preserve biodiversity outside their national waters. The other key principles include the polluter pays principle, fair benefit-sharing from marine resources, precautionary measures, ecosystem-based management, and the inclusion of indigenous knowledge and rights.11

The Treaty also addresses perceived gaps in UNCLOS, particularly in four main areas—collecting and sharing marine genetic resources; area-based management tools; Environmental impact assessments; Capacity-building and technology transfer. For instance, collecting marine genetic resources has largely been unregulated in the high seas and deep seabed. The Treaty regulates the utilisation of marine genetic resources in the high seas and deep seabed, promoting the best interest of nations and the collective benefit of humanity. Through an established mechanism, it ensures fair and equitable sharing of benefits, including scientific data and financial gains. It aims to establish a multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism, including a global fund.12

Similarly, the Treaty allows States to establish "area-based management tools" in the high seas and deep seabed, including "marine protected areas" with restricted activities. Area-based management tools in the Treaty serve as key structures for protecting the marine environment beyond national boundaries while considering food security, socioeconomic objectives, and cultural values. Previously, global mechanisms for such tools were absent, and regulation was limited to smaller ocean areas and specific sectors. However, States can now implement larger-scale, legally binding, and multi-sectoral area-based management tools under the Treaty.13 Furthermore, it also permits the signatories to adopt measures in emergencies, including natural or human-caused disasters.14

Environmental impact assessment provisions in the Treaty enable reviewing environmentally harmful and polluting projects outside and inside national boundaries. These provisions necessitate pre-authorisation assessments to gauge the potential effects of developmental activities. For instance, Article 28 of the Treaty says, "Parties shall ensure that the potential impacts on the marine environment of planned activities under their jurisdiction or control that take place in areas beyond national jurisdiction are assessed as set out in the Treaty before they are authorized."15

The Treaty mandates the preparation of an environmental impact assessment report, encompassing various elements such as a description of the planned activity, results of the scoping exercise, baseline assessment of the marine environment, potential impacts, prevention and mitigation measures, uncertainties and knowledge gaps, public consultation process, consideration of alternatives, and follow-up actions.16 The Treaty also outlines a comprehensive four-stage process for conducting EIAs, including screening, scoping, impact assessment and evaluation, and prevention, mitigation, and management of potential adverse effects.17

The Treaty includes significant provisions on capacity-building and marine technology transfer. It emphasises State cooperation, especially in assisting developing countries to achieve the Treaty's objectives through capacity-building, technology transfer, and private-sector partnerships.18 It also promotes capacity building and technology transfer through the sharing and utilisation of data, information, knowledge, and research results, information dissemination and awareness-raising, infrastructure development and enhancement, institutional capacity strengthening, resource capability enhancement, technology transfer, development and sharing of manuals, guidelines, and standards, and capacity building for effective monitoring and control.19

A dedicated fund to support developing countries, financed through contributions from States and financial gains derived from exploiting marine genetic resources is another significant development in the Treaty.20 During the negotiations, this was one of the key contentious issues and it is important to note that despite facing strong opposition, developing States successfully established this critical financial assistance mechanism in the Treaty.

These provisions enable the Treaty to actively contribute to marine biodiversity conservation and sustainable utilisation of resources by coordinating and strengthening cooperation among various legal instruments, frameworks, and international bodies. The treaty addresses the triple crises of climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution, recognising the ocean's vital role in the economy and climate regulation. Moreover, the Treaty aligns with the objectives of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Kunming-Montreal Global Framework for Biodiversity. The key priority for the UN at present is the ratification of the Treaty by all parties. To bring the high seas treaty into effect, a minimum of 60 countries must ratify it. The treaty is expected to be implemented before the June 2025 United Nations Ocean Conference in Nice, France.21

Victory of Multilateralism?

The signing and subsequent adoption of the Treaty represent a significant triumph for multilateralism, instilling hope during a period of global uncertainty and fragmented politics. The Treaty is expected to contribute to the revival of ailing multilateralism primarily in two ways. First, it underscores the effectiveness of multilateral cooperation in attaining shared goals and prosperity. Despite the challenges faced by global cooperation and the prevailing backlash against multilateralism, the successful collaboration on this marine instrument stands as a remarkable accomplishment. Negotiators showcased determination and compromise, delivering relief to developing nations and embracing mandatory benefit-sharing provisions.

Second, the Treaty helps to overcome the trust, legitimacy and utility crises of multilateralism. The adoption of the Treaty revitalises faith in global cooperation and multilateralism and reaffirms the UN's capacity to unite nations towards common objectives. It once again underscores that multilateralism matters in global politics. In short, the Treaty of the High Seas is a poignant reminder of multilateralism's importance in global politics.

Furthermore, the Treaty serve as a significant morale boost for India’s G20 presidency priorities. As the current chair of the G20, India is dedicated to revitalising global multilateralism through comprehensive reforms. At the G20, India strives to facilitate consensus on crucial global development and security matters while advancing global public goods. India can showcase the BBNJ Treaty negotiations, signing, and adoption as an exemplary model for future multilateral cooperation.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 17 November 2004”, United Nations, 4 February 2005.
• 2. Ibid.
• 3. “Summary of the First Session of the Intergovernmental Conference on an International Legally Binding Instrument under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction: 4-17 September 2018”, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 20 September 2018.
• 4.  “Outcome of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to study issues relating to the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction and Co-Chairs”, United Nations, 13 March 2015.
• 5. “Preparatory Committee Established by General Assembly Resolution 69/292”, United Nations, 19 June 2015.
• 6. “Resolution and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly during its Seventy-Second Session”, United Nations, 24 December 2017.
• 7. “Summary of the Fourth Session of the Intergovernmental Conference on an International Legally Binding Instrument under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction”, United Nations, 24 March 2022.
• 8. “Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 30 December 2022”, United Nations, 9 January 2023.
• 9. “Summary of the Further Resumed Fifth Session of the Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt an International Legally Binding Instrument under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction: 19-20 June 2023”, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 7 March 2023.
• 10. “Part VII: High Seas”, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982.
• 11. “Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction”, United Nations, 19 June 2023.
• 12. Ibid.
• 13. Ibid., Part III, Articles 17–26.
• 14. Ibid., Article 24.
• 15. Ibid., Part IV, Article 28.
• 16. Ibid., Article 33.
• 17. Ibid., Article 39.
• 18. Ibid., Part V, Articles 40–46.
• 19. Ibid., Article 44.
• 20. Ibid., Article 52.
• 21. “Statement by Ms. Diarra Dime-labille, Legal adviser of France to the United Nations”, Permanent Mission of France, 20 June 2023.

Turkiye discovered the world’s second-largest deposit of rare earth elements (REEs) in the Beylikova district of Eskisehir in 2022. With an estimated reserve size of 694 million tons, the discovered rare earth element deposit ranks second-largest globally.1 China currently holds the top position with its rare earth element field boasting a reserve of 800 million tons. China dominates the global landscape of rare earth minerals, contributing significantly to various stages of their production and processing. Specifically, China holds a commanding position by accounting for 60 per cent of the worldwide rare earth mined production, 85 per cnet of the rare earth processing capacity, and 90 per cent share in the manufacturing of high-strength rare earth permanent magnets.2

Significance of Rare Earth Elements

As per the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), REEs or rare earths consist of 17 distinct metallic elements, encompassing scandium and yttrium, as well as the lanthanide series, which includes 15 elements—lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, and lutetium.3 They play critical roles in various modern industries and technologies, including electronics, magnets, batteries, catalysts, and lighting.

REEs are indispensable for a wide range of defence technologies. These include targeting lasers, precision-guided munitions, communication systems, aerospace engines, airframes, radar systems, optical equipment, electronic countermeasures and sonar.4 REEs are vital components in these technologies, providing enhanced precision, efficiency and capabilities for defence operations. Despite the complexities involving the extraction and processing of REEs, its increasing demand is driven by technological advancements and the quest for renewable energy.

The anticipated growth in the demand for critical minerals, which play a vital role in clean energy and other technological applications, is expected to be substantial in the forthcoming decades. Therefore, in June 2022, the United States and several partner countries introduced the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) 5 , aimed at strengthening critical mineral supply chains. The primary objective of the MSP is to ensure that critical minerals are extracted, processed, and recycled in a manner that maximises the economic benefits derived from geological resources.

MSP intends to facilitate government and private sector investments throughout the entire value chain while upholding the highest standards of environmental sustainability, social responsibility, and governance. The MSP includes Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Commission. These partners are dedicated to establishing responsible and resilient critical mineral supply chains that support both economic prosperity and climate-related objectives. It can be seen as an effort to reduce the dependency on China.

Turkiye’s Progress So Far

Turkiye has a long history of exploration for rare earths, with reports dating back to the early 1970s. However, the most concrete work began in 2011, with Eti Maden, a Turkish state company specialising in mining and geology of these elements. During the six years that followed, 125,193 meters of drilling were carried out, and 59,121 samples were collected from the field. These samples were analysed, leading to the discovery of 694 million tons of rare earth elements.6

Eti Maden plans to initially process around 1,200 tons of ore per year at a pilot facility. However, with a significant investment in a larger industrial facility in the coming years, this amount is expected to increase substantially to approximately 570,000 tons. The processed ore is projected to yield about 10,000 tons of rare earth oxide, 72,000 tons of barite, 70,000 tons of fluorite, and 250 tons of thorium, a nuclear industry fuel.7

According to the then Turkiye’s Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Fatih Donmez, the newly uncovered rare earth element reserve is conveniently located close to the surface. This advantageous positioning implies that the extraction process will be less expensive. He also stated that Turkiye could produce ten rare elements from this reserve. This significant discovery will enable domestic production of rare elements primarily for Turkiye’s industrial sectors while also creating export opportunities.8

As highlighted by Donmez, the Turkish economic model encompasses key principles such as investment, employment, production, and export. In line with this model, the focus is on leveraging Turkiye’s rare earth element reserves to establish a flourishing high-end industry. By transforming the ore into intermediate and end products, the aim is not only to meet the needs of the domestic industry but also to surpass them and create opportunities for exports. This approach encompasses the entire supply chain, from initial production to final products, fostering the production of high-tech, value-added goods that cater to the Turkish market.9

Ultimately, this strategy is designed to drive economic growth, promote investment, generate employment, and enhance Turkiye’s standing in the global economy. While Turkiye's claim has garnered attention, experts urge caution, pointing out that the true extent and quality of the rare earth elements in Turkiye’s deposit remain uncertain and require further assessment. Furthermore, even if Turkiye possesses a significant deposit, the challenge lies in establishing efficient processing capabilities, where China currently holds a competitive advantage.10

Significantly, European Union has been actively involved in partnering with Turkiye for exploration and relevant research on rare earths. For instance, the ERA-MIN Joint Call 2019 project titled “Recovery of rare earth elements from complex ores in Turkey and their potential use in high tech industrial applications” is being undertaken from December 2020 to November 2023. The project, with the acronym RETECH, aims to recover rare earth elements from complex ores in Turkiye and explore their potential applications in high-tech industries. The partners involved in the project include Rare Earth Elements Research Institute (Turkiye), the National R&D Institute for Nonferrous and Rare Metals (Romania), the General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration (Turkiye), Rumelisiad Girisim A.S. (Turkiye), and INCDMRR (Romania).

Turkiye’s General Directorate of Industry has initiated the project titled ‘Enhancing the Rare Earth Elements (REEs) Research and Innovation Capacity of Turkey’11 to establish a national supply chain for REEs in the country, ensure a safe, continuous and reliable supply while increasing Research and Development (R&D) capacity. Over a 24-month duration, starting from 21 July 2022, the project, with the European Union’s contribution of more than Euros 11 million, focuses on specific objectives. These include establishing a reliable supply chain for REEs, recovering and purifying REEs from mineralisation areas, recycling rare earths from electronic waste, undertaking R&D for Neodymium iron boron (NdFeB) permanent magnets and high-value-added products, and developing the research infrastructure and commercialisation of new products using REEs.

The project has aimed to strengthen the national REE ecosystem, improve Munzur University Rare Earth Elements Application and Research Center (MUNTEAM)’s infrastructure, establish a recycling facility at the General Directorate of Mineral Research Exploration (MTA), provide training and consultancy for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and stakeholders, and raise awareness about REEs.

The first sectoral workshop12 of the REE Project was held from 31 January to 1 February 2023 at MTA in Turkiye. The workshop aimed to increase Turkiye’s national R&D capacity in REE and establish a sustainable supply chain for economic development. Participants included SMEs, R&D centres, manufacturing companies, and entrepreneurs in the field. The workshop featured presentations on REE deposits, ore processing, purification techniques, production from primary and secondary sources, and business potentials. It also involved group work and discussions on resource potential, mining, purification, recycling, and industrial applications of REEs. The workshop facilitated networking and collaboration, showcasing Turkiye’s increasing prioritisation towards REE sector.

Path Ahead

The discovery of substantial rare earth reserve in Turkiye offers the potential to boost its deteriorating economy and diversify the global supply chain. However, Turkiye will have to work on multiple aspects, including lowering extraction costs and setting up a complete and durable industrial chain. In such context, it is yet to be seen whether Turkiye will collaborate with China to gain technical expertise and technology or continue its existing collaboration with the EU. Whatever course it takes, it may be said that there is a long and arduous path ahead for Turkiye to gain the requisite industry experience to become a significant producer of rare earths.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Turkiye uncovers world’s second-largest rare earth element reserve”, Anadolu Agency, 2 July 2022.
• 2. Xianbin Yao, “China is moving rapidly up the rare earth value chain”, BRINK News, 7 August 2022.
• 3. “Rare Earths Statistics and Information”, U.S. Geological Survey (USGS).
• 4. Xianbin Yao, “China is moving rapidly up the rare earth value chain”, BRINK News, 7 August 2022.
• 5. “Minerals Security Partnership”, U.S. Department of State, 14 June 2022.
• 6. Silvia Boltuc, “Turkey Discovered A Massive Reserve Or Rare Earth Elements”, Special Eurasia, 4 July 2022.
• 7. “Turkey touts discovery of world’s 2nd-largest rare element reserve”, Daily Sabah, 12 July 2022.
• 8. “Turkiye uncovers world’s second-largest rare earth element reserve”, Anadolu Agency, 2 July 2022.
• 9. David Boos, “Turkey Discovers World’s 2nd Largest Rare Earth Element Reserve”, The European Conservative, 23 July 2022.
• 10. Chris Baraniuk, “Turkey Probably Hasn’t Found the Rare Earth Metals It Says It Has”, Wired, 13 July 2022.
• 11. “Enhancing the Rare Earth Elements (REEs) Research and Innovation Capacity of Turkey”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkiye, 4 April 2023.
• 12. “Rare Earth Elements Project Held Its First Sectoral Workshop”, Ministry of Industry and Technology, Republic of Turkiye, 31 January 2023.

The abrupt withdrawal of Russia and Ukraine from food markets, coupled with the blockade in the Black Sea region, has significantly impacted global food security. These disruptions, combined with market disturbances, escalating energy and input costs, supply shortages, the effects of climate change, and the persistent high demand for food, have resulted in a notable surge in global food prices.

Within this complex scenario, a stable supply of fertilisers becomes a critical factor in upholding food security worldwide. It is noteworthy that Russia holds a major stake in the global fertiliser market. In 2021, Russia was the top exporter of nitrogen fertilisers, the second-largest exporter of potassic fertilisers, and the third-leading exporter of phosphorus fertilisers.1   As a result of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, fertiliser prices escalated in the initial months and several countries continue to grapple with shortages.2 The challenges of high procurement costs and supply chain disruptions have further exacerbated the issue, creating an urgent need for strategies to address fertiliser insecurity.

India is the world’s second-largest consumer of fertilisers. India has taken policy initiatives to ensure fertiliser security and mitigate challenges arising out of the Russia-Ukraine war. These initiatives have included implementation of the One Nation One Fertiliser policy, subsidy mechanisms as well as increased imports of Russian fertilisers.

Domestic Measures

The recent introduction of the One Nation One Fertiliser scheme, also known as the Pradhanmantri Bhartiya Janurvarak Pariyojna (PMBJP), is a significant step towards fertiliser security.  Under this scheme, fertiliser companies can display their name, brand, logo, and other product details on only one-third of the fertiliser bags. The remaining two-thirds of the space will display the "Bharat" brand name and the logo of the PMBJP.3 This implies that the single brand name for fertilisers like Urea and DAP will become Bharat Urea and Bharat DAP, respectively.

In addition to highlighting the subsidy provisions of the government, the scheme will standardise use, reduce company competition and movement of fertiliser goods. The need for inter-state fertiliser transportation will diminish as the demand for specific fertiliser brands in different areas will reduce.4 This will result in savings on fertiliser and transport subsidies, further reducing prices and the attached costs. 

During the launch of the PMBJP scheme, more than 600 PM-Kisan Samruddhi Kendras (PM-KSK) were also inaugurated.5 PM-KSKs aim to bolster fertiliser security by serving as comprehensive centres that provide a range of agricultural inputs including seeds, fertilisers, and farming tools, alongside soil, seed, and fertiliser testing. It aims to transform approximately 3.25 lakh fertiliser retail stores into PM-KSKs nationwide.

Both schemes significantly enhance the availability, affordability, and accessibility of fertilisers for farmers while also improving quality control measures in the distribution process. In order to curb black marketing of fertilisers in the country, the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilisers also introduced the Fertiliser Flying Squad (FFS). The FFS has carried out 370 surprise inspections in multiple states and seized more than 70,000 bags of counterfeit Urea. The Squad can counter diversion, illegal trade, stockpiling, and distribution of low-quality fertilisers.6

The substantial allocation of subsidies towards fertilisers has also facilitated the mitigation of external shocks and maintained domestic price stability. These subsidies are disbursed through the urea subsidy programme, as well as the Nutrient Based Subsidy (NBS) scheme, targeting essential nutrients such as Nitrogen (N), Phosphorus (P), Potash (K), and Sulphur (S) for Phosphatic and Potassic (P&K) fertilisers. The current approved budget for fertiliser subsidies during the Kharif season of 2023 amounts to Rs 1.08 lakh crore, with the total subsidy expected to exceed Rs 2.25 lakh crore.7 It is noteworthy that fertiliser subsidies were doubled to Rs 2.56 lakh crore last year, effectively managing domestic prices in comparison to the skyrocketing international prices due to the conflict in Ukraine.8

Urea imports have always been a major concern for India’s agriculture sector. India is the top importer of urea, importing 30 per cent of the average 35 million-tonne annual requirement.9 As part of the fertiliser security initiatives, the government aims to end Urea imports by 2025 by reviving and commissioning Urea production plants in Gorakhpur, Talcher, Barauni, Ramagundam and Sindri.10 The plants are expected to produce 6.5 million tonnes of urea annually.

In addition, the production of domestically manufactured low-cost nano urea, which includes nanoparticles of the crop nutrient, is expected to increase to 5 million tonnes by 2025.11 The introduction of nano-urea will also reduce the country’s heavy dependence on urea imports from Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The forthcoming PM Promotion of Alternative Nutrients for Agriculture Management (PM PRANAM) Scheme also seeks to provide incentives to states for promoting the adoption of organic manure, organic and bio-fertilisers, nano-urea and di-ammonium phosphate (DAP).12 While these measures aim to bolster domestic production, there have been several international efforts to stabilise supply and security.

International Efforts

In 2022-23, India implemented various strategies to ensure a secure supply of essential resources and hedge against international price fluctuations. India's growing crude oil imports from Russia have garnered international attention. However, it is noteworthy that India has also experienced a significant surge in its imports of fertilisers from Russia. Table 1 illustrates the notable increase in imports of different categories and sub-categories of minerals and fertilisers. The overall value of fertiliser imports has risen from Rs. 578,504.44 lakhs in 2021-22 to Rs. 2,451,726.89 lakhs in 2022-23, representing a growth of 323.80 per cent. To further facilitate trade with India, Russia increased its export quota of fertilisers in early 2022.13 Additionally, India sealed a three-year agreement with Russia's Phosagro last year, ensuring the supply of 500,000 tonnes of DAP.14  

Consequently, the heightened imports have led to a reduction in India's reliance on Chinese fertilisers. The overall value of Chinese fertiliser imports diminished by 13.83 per cent between 2021-22 and 2022-23.15 As a result of favourable pricing and discounts, Russia surpassed China to become the foremost supplier of fertilisers to India in the first half of the 2022-23 fiscal year.16 The significant growth in fertiliser imports from Russia also indicates a strengthening of the trade relationship between the two countries. This can lead to more collaborations, joint ventures, and investments in the fertiliser industry, which can further enhance fertiliser security for India.

Another key approach has been the expansion of the supplier base through investments in mineral-rich countries and the establishment of multi-year import deals. Indian companies have undertaken investments in countries abundant in mineral resources. For example, they have acquired ownership stakes in Senegal-based companies, which possess significant reserves of rock phosphate.17 By establishing a direct presence in these countries, Indian companies gain more control over the production and supply chain of essential minerals, secure a consistent supply of resources and mitigate the risk of market disruptions.

Indian companies have signed MoUs with Canadian companies for supply of Muriate of Potash (MOP), the demands for which are only met through imports.18 Indian cooperative Krishak Bharati Cooperative (KRIBHCO) has entered into a long-term deal with Saudi Arabia to import one million tonnes of phosphatic fertilisers.19 India has also signed significant long-term agreements with countries like Jordan and Israel. These agreements encompass the supply of various fertilisers such as MOP, rock phosphate, and phosphoric acid.20 Furthermore, in January 2023, India finalised a deal with Morocco for the supply of triple super phosphate (TSP) and DAP.21

Through these measures, India can secure its fertiliser supplies, minimise dependency on a limited number of suppliers and reduce exposure to international price volatility. These developments also indicate a strategic shift in India's approach to fertiliser security. The country is actively diversifying its fertiliser sources and reducing dependence on a single supplier, thereby mitigating risks and strengthening its position in the global fertiliser market.

Conclusion

India’s multipronged approach has effectively navigated the non-traditional security challenges posed by the Russia-Ukraine conflict and facilitated a stable supply of fertilisers. While some measures provide immediate respite, efforts should continue to focus on implementing long-term structural solutions to reduce dependence on fertiliser imports, curb over-utilisation and address the high fiscal burden. A futuristic approach involves self-sufficiency through domestic production, balanced nutrient management, and efficient distribution networks. The climate crisis and its potential impact on agricultural production may also disrupt the estimated fertiliser demand in the future. Promoting sustainable agricultural practices to ensure long-term fertiliser security and agricultural sustainability is key. India’s recent advances in the fertiliser sector have significantly contributed to this approach and facilitated a more resilient and secure supply chain structure.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Richa Kumaria, “Improving Global Food Security: The Impact of the Black Sea Grain Initiative”, Issue Brief, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 27 March 2023.
• 2. Ellen Dyson et al, “Impacts of the Ukraine–Russia Conflict on the Global Food Supply Chain and Building Future Resilience”,  EuroChoice, 17 February 2023.
• 3. Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilisers, “Office Memorandum”, Report, Government of India, 24 August 2022.
• 4. Diksha Munjal, “What is the Centre’s ‘One Nation One Fertilizer’ policy?” The Hindu, 7 September 2022.
• 5. “Prime Minister Inaugurates 600 Pradan Mantri Kisan Samruddhi Kendras”, Press Information Bureau, 17 October 2022.
• 6. “Fertiliser Flying Squads (FFS) Undertake 370 Surprise Inspections; 30 FIRs filed for Diversion of Urea”, PIB, 9 May 2023.
• 7. “Cabinet nod for ₹1.08 lakh crore kharif fertilizer subsidy”, The Hindu, 17 May 2023.  
• 8. “Centre ‘doubles’ fertilizer subsidy as prices see a surge”, The Hindu, 2 November 2022.
• 9. “India aims to end urea imports from 2025; pegs FY23 fertilisers subsidy at $27.2 billion”, The Economic Times, 2 November 2022.
• 10. “Reform in fertilizer sector”, PIB, 1 April 2022.
• 11. “India aims to end urea imports from 2025; pegs FY23 fertilisers subsidy at $27.2 billion”, n. 9.
• 12. “What is the PM PRANAM scheme, likely to be introduced by Govt soon?” The Indian Express, 20 September 2022.
• 13. Dipanjan Roy Chowdhury, “Russia increases export quota of fertilizers easing supply to India”, The Economic Times, 20 April 2022.
• 14. Zia Haq, “India pushes multi-year deals to secure supplies of fertilisers”, The Hindustan Times, 28 August 2022.
• 15. See Export-Import Data Bank, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.
• 16. Rajendra Jadhav, “Discounts lift Russia's fertilizer exports, becomes top supplier to India: Sources”, Reuters, 21 November 2022.
• 17. “India to become Aatmanirbhar in Diammonium Phosphate (DAP)”, PIB, 3 August 2022.
• 18. “Indian Fertiliser companies sign MOU with Canpotex, Canada one of the largest Potash suppliers globally”, PIB, 28 September 2022.
• 19. “India signs long-term fertilisers import deal with Saudi Arabia”, Reuters, 25 August 2022.  
• 20. “India signs fertilizer pacts with Jordan as Ukraine-Russia conflict impacts supplies, prices”, WION, 18 May 2022.
• 21. “Morocco plans to sell India 1.7 million tonnes of fertilisers in 2023”, Reuters, 23 January 2023.