Nuclear Weapons Use in Japan and the Status of Nuclear Disarmament
Rajiv Nayan
August 14, 2023
Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use, dreadfully experienced in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has had little policy impact on concluding a genuine nuclear disarmament convention.
The world is commemorating the 78th anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima (6 August) and Nagasaki (9 August). The number of persons killed and badly affected as a result of the atomic bombings has been a subject of contention. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists states that “the most credible estimates cluster around a ‘low’ of 110,000 mortalities and a ‘high’ of 210,000”.1 Highlighting this wide gap in estimates, the author seems perplexed that the varied estimates are made by experts and credible institutions.
Although the remembrance services are organised all over the world, the two bombed cities become the focus of tributes and speech-making every year. This year, too, speeches have been that term the bombings horrific. The release of the movie Oppenheimer is drawing more attention to the destruction caused to the two Japanese cities by the efforts of the ‘father of the atomic bomb’. The need for disarmament is repeated in the speeches of the Mayors of the two cities and statements of other organisations and groups involved in disarmament efforts.
On these two dates, the world overwhelmingly realises the imperative need for a world without nuclear weapons. This annual ritual builds norms for nuclear disarmament, but the reality of nuclear disarmament is yet to be realised. On the somber occasion, it is imperative to assess the state of affairs of nuclear disarmament. How are the regimes and institutions along with other actors treating the idea of nuclear disarmament? Is the world serious about it? The stark reality is that the world appears paying only lip service to nuclear disarmament and the regimes and the institutions are not able to break the deadlock.
The most-famed legal instrument, which includes the element of nuclear disarmament as part of a grand bargain, is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Article VI of the treaty lays down provisions for nuclear disarmament. It asks the member countries of the treaty which are possessing nuclear weapons to start negotiations for not merely halting the nuclear arms race but also nuclear disarmament. The Review Conference of the NPT held from 1 to 26 August 2022, in which several grand ideas were exchanged, also had to pass through the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombing days. Nuclear disarmament also came up for discussion during the 2022 RevCon.
At the 2022 NPT Review Conference (RevCon), the Group of the Non-Aligned States Parties to the treaty gave a presentation which emphasised nuclear disarmament. Similarly, the New Agenda Coalition consisting of countries from both the developing and the developed worlds, established in 1998, did express its concern about completely ignoring ‘the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons’ by the nuclear weapon states of the NPT.
Nuclear Disarmament has been a contentious issue among the member states of the treaty. Some of the RevCons of the 21st century failed to agree to outcome documents and reports, predominantly due to differences on nuclear disarmament. Quite notably, the nuclear disarmament related article has been interpreted2 differently by and in the nuclear weapons states, especially the United States for a long period. A section of the policy community refuses to accept that Article VI obliges nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT to pursue nuclear disarmament. The US government though struck a reconciliatory tone at the 2022 RevCon by stating that the objective of the Non-Nuclear Weapons States and the Nuclear Weapons States was the same—‘a world free of nuclear weapons’.
The outcome document of the 2022 NPT RevCon, though not adopted, underlines the fact that the treaty provides a ‘foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament’, and stipulates ‘legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament in accordance with the Treaty’. It further recognises the reality that nuclear disarmament can promote international peace and security. The ‘total elimination’ of the nuclear stockpile is considered the ultimate solution. The same document also mentions unilateral, bilateral, regional, and multilateral methods to cut, and finally end the nuclear stockpile. The roadmap to achieve it, however, is clearly missing in the document.
Unfortunately, a section of the international community interprets that Article VI merely suggests negotiations in good faith to stop the arms race and to go for the reduction of nuclear arsenals and if possible, for nuclear disarmament. Some of them also maintain that as long as nuclear weapons exist, a nuclear weapons state may have to rely on nuclear weapons for its security.
The Mayor of Hiroshima in 2023 once again asked the nuclear weapons states to move away from nuclear deterrence and go for nuclear disarmament. The state and the global civil society pay tribute to the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki but remain ineffective in realising nuclear disarmament.
Instead of going for nuclear disarmament, the dominant section of the international community appears to prefer arms control, nuclear proliferation, and reduction of nuclear risks. Even the 2022 NPT outcome document considers ‘miscalculation, miscommunication, misperception, or accident’ quite relevant. This is relevant because nuclear disarmament is not in sight.
Quite significantly, arms control mechanism like New Start Treaty are struggling. The new Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty is also out of the horizon. Even the non-proliferation regime, which has the NPT as a mainstay, is under pressure. The leading powers and their allies do not vote on the key UN resolutions for reducing nuclear dangers.
The humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons are highlighted in different forums and documents. The 2022 outcome document too reflects the humanitarian angle when it affirms that
the immediate, mid-and long-term consequences of nuclear weapon detonations, inter alia, on health, the environment, biodiversity, infrastructure, food security, climate, development, social cohesion, and the global economy are interlinked, and would not be constrained by national borders but have regional or global effects and that a nuclear war could even threaten the survival of humanity.3
However, it seems that the humanitarian consequences, highlighted in different meetings and dreadfully experienced in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has had little policy impact on concluding a genuine nuclear disarmament convention.
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is being touted as a nuclear disarmament convention. The treaty, which has been adopted and opened for signature in 2017, became operational in January 2021.4 Currently, it has 92 signatories and 68 of them are state parties which have ratified or acceded to the treaty.5 However, all the nuclear weapons possessing countries are outside the TPNW and did not even participate in the negotiations process of the treaty. Moreover, almost all the NATO countries stayed away from negotiations, and none of them have joined the treaty as yet.
The TPNW was seen by many as undermining the NPT process and giving a backdoor exit to its nuclear member states and their nuclear disarmament commitment. Yet, for a country like India, ‘this Treaty does not constitute or contribute to the development of customary international law; nor does it set any new standards or norms’.6 Despite being a nuclear weapons country, India envisions a world without nuclear weapons. Quite touchingly, the Indian Parliament pays tribute to the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki every year.
Negotiating the treaty in the Conference on Disarmament would have given it legitimacy, and it would have been negotiated probably with better expertise. A comprehensive convention could have required provisions for the proper implementation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. As of now, the treaty looks ad hoc with several loopholes and limitations.
The crisis generated by the Ukraine–Russia conflict is going to complicate the future nuclear disarmament scenario. The world does not seem to be realising the urgency of nuclear disarmament. The general apprehension is that the security of non-nuclear weapons states vis-à-vis nuclear weapons states may become a powerful tool for the spread of nuclear weapons if the doctrine of negative security assurance is not adopted by the nuclear weapons states.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The controversy regarding President Vladimir Putin’s participation in the BRICS Summit at Johannesburg due to an arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court highlights the geopolitical overtones and inadequacies of the ICC in the contemporary world.
The clouds of confusion on the BRICS Summit to be held in Johannesburg, South Africa from 22–24 August 2023 have cleared as speculations regarding Russian President Vladimir Putin’s participation in the event have been put to rest. Russian authorities confirmed that President Putin shall participate in the high-profile event in a virtual mode, while his Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov will attend in person.1 South Africa, as Chair of the BRICS, had decided to go ahead with hosting the Summit meeting2 amidst controversy in the wake of International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant issued against Putin in March 2023.3
Given that South Africa is a signatory and ratifier of the Rome Statute, ICC expected the warrant to be executed when Putin attended the meeting. Putin has been accused of being responsible for unlawful deportation and transfer of children from the battleground in Ukraine to the Russian Federation.4 However, the arrest of the leader of a powerful BRICS member country in South Africa would have been a diplomatic disaster.
South Africa was contemplating extending sovereign immunity to a Head of State as per international convention and not go ahead with arresting President Putin. But this would have meant going against the ICC obligations and defaulting on an international statutory commitment. The confusion however ended with the announcement of the Russian decision, and the Summit will be organised as per its schedule in Johannesburg.
South Africa and ICC
This was not the first occasion that an international summit in South Africa was under scanner due to dilemmas and repercussions related to her membership of the ICC. South Africa faced a similar situation in 2015, when Omar Al-Bashir, the erstwhile President of Sudan attended the African Union (AU) Summit meeting in the country.5 The ICC had issued an arrest warrant against Bashir for acts of crime against humanity, war crimes, and genocide committed in Darfur, Sudan between 2003 and 2008. South Africa however did not execute the warrant citing Bashir’s sovereign immunity.
It must be noted that Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute but was acquired in the jurisdiction of the ICC through a referral by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) under Article 13(b) of the Statute for investigating and trying only the crimes and atrocities committed in Darfur under President Bashir.
In July 2017, the Pre-Trial Chamber II of the ICC concluded that South Africa violated the Rome Statute by not arresting Bashir. It also concluded that by agreeing to host AU Summit meeting, South Africa could not automatically assign immunity to President Bashir. Nevertheless, the negative observation by the Chamber did not lead to the reference of South African non-compliance to the Assembly of State Parties (ASP) to the Rome Statute or the UN Security Council (UNSC) for further action.6
Had the case been referred to ASP, the country could have faced further referral to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), while in case of UNSC, the Russian veto would have nullified any action. There are no punitive provisions in the Rome Statue for a state failing to cooperate and execute its orders. However, if referred to the ICJ or UNSC, the countries in question may face binding obligations failing which they shall be liable to UN actions under Chapter VI or VII depending on the severity of the case.
The ICC has been institutionalised as a complementary Court which is supposed to act if the national administration and courts of a country—where a war crime, crime against humanity, or genocide has been committed, or to which the perpetrators belong to, fail to act in prosecuting and punishing them.
South African courts had taken note of the non-compliance and concluded that South Africa defaulted by not arresting Bashir.7 The Pre-Trial Chamber II seemed satisfied by the proceedings in the South African courts and given the record of previous referrals to ASP or UNSC did not see any benefit in escalating the case for further action.8 But the Chamber would have been under immense pressure if it repeated the same in case of South Africa failing to arrest Putin.
As South Africa is a member of both ICC and BRICS, the country sometimes finds herself divided between the two. It was reported that the Russians insisted for the meeting to be offline with physical presence of all the BRICS leaders,9 while South Africa was trying hard to find a middle path which resulted in the current Russian decision. The Russian President’s decision not to attend the BRICS Summit physically therefore rescued both South Africa and the ICC from a diplomatic quagmire.
ICC and Geopolitics
The Rome Statute is seen as politicising the prosecution process with the inclusion of provisions of referral of even non-state members by the UNSC. Another provision of the Court allows it to try perpetrators from a non-party state without her consent.10 Such provisions are viewed as legal aggression in the traditional sovereign jurisdictions, by BRICS countries like Russia.
Since Russia possesses veto in the UNSC, the ICC Prosecutor took up the Ukrainian case via another route. Ukraine, through two separate declarations, accepted the Court’s jurisdiction for the crimes committed on its territory from 21 February 2013 onwards. The investigation of the recent situation in Ukraine was initiated by the head of the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICC. Lithuania, a party to Rome Statute and member of NATO, referred the alleged crimes by Putin to the ICC. A total of 43 State parties to the Court, especially EU members, backed the referral of the Ukrainian situation for investigation to put diplomatic pressure on Putin.11 This put South Africa, one of the endorsers of the idea of the ICC, in a difficult spot, so much so that it seriously contemplated pulling out of the Rome Statute. The country decided not to go for the extreme step only recently.12
The South African situation highlights the complexities of the functioning of international system. Being a prominent economy and a middle power from Africa, the country has assumed a larger role of supporting peace and order on the continent. For this, it has aligned and cooperated with regional or international bodies that promise to bring a semblance of peace and eliminate impunity from the continent. South Africa signed the Rome Statute in one of its idealist moments that had emerged due to the impunity prevalent primarily in Africa and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s.
South Africa and other countries who joined in the Court prioritised the need to bring to justice the perpetrators of violence over the universally accepted principle of national sovereignty in certain cases. For the signatories of the Rome Statue, this was the price to be paid for eliminating impunity and creating a sense of justice in international society. However, several major powers and European countries were not on the same page on this point. The US, China, Russia and India have since then kept out of the Rome Statute for similar reasons. The Court has also been accused of double standards and Eurocentrism. All the 31 cases that have been confirmed and listed in the court are from Africa.13
The controversy regarding Putin’s participation in the BRICS Summit in Johannesburg due to the ICC arrest warrant highlights the geopolitical overtones and inadequacies of the ICC in the contemporary world. BRICS is one of the most important international groupings representing around 42 per cent of humanity and contributing more than a quarter of the global GDP.14 The case of warrant against Sudan’s Bashir was technically the same but substantively and politically very different from that of Putin.
Arresting one of the heads of BRICS states with one of the strongest militaries possessing nuclear weapons and a veto in the UNSC would have led to far greater consequences as against the Bashir case. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa stated in a document submitted to the court that “Russia has made it clear that arresting its sitting President would be a declaration of war.”15 The issue caused diplomatic discomfort between the two countries, which now stands resolved due to the understanding shown by both the sides.
Looking into the Future
The set of events highlight a world in flux and the tight rope walk by middle powers like South Africa. Brazil, another middle power and party to the Rome Statute, may be seen walking the same tight rope during its presidency of BRICS. Therefore, the Rome Statute has the potential to create diplomatic issues and geopolitical discord among countries. Many countries see the ICC as an agenda which is not in sync with conditions of the contemporary world. The party states either have to press for amendments in the Statute to avoid such situations in future or be ready to see the ICC decrees being violated and becoming ineffective due to geopolitical interplays. The positions taken by BRICS countries during the deliberations before signing and enforcement of the Rome Statute may guide such amendments.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Turkiye’s Support of Sweden’s NATO Accession and Implications
Abhishek Yadav
August 04, 2023
Erdogan extracted significant concessions while maximising Turkish national interest by supporting Sweden’s accession into NATO.
In May 2022, Finland and Sweden expressed interest in joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Finland’s application was approved, and the country became a member in April 2023. However, Sweden’s accession faced an obstacle as Turkiye, one of NATO’s 31 members, blocked the process. Turkiye alleged that Sweden was harbouring Kurdish separatists. As a result, Sweden’s membership in NATO remained pending due to this contentious issue raised by Turkiye.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has prompted NATO to reinforce its collective defence. On 10 July 2023, in a joint press statement with Ulf Kristersson, Prime Minister of Sweden and Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary General of NATO, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan endorsed Swedish accession into NATO. Turkiye has agreed to submit the Accession Protocol concerning Sweden to the Grand National Assembly of Turkiye (GNAT) and collaboratively engage with the Assembly to ensure and facilitate the ratification process.1
Erdogan has achieved many desired outcomes in favour of Turkiye by supporting Sweden’s accession into NATO. He has successfully extracted significant concessions while maximising Turkish national interest. After winning the Turkish presidential election in May 2023, Erdogan has continued his government’s assertive foreign policy. Turkiye is pursuing a multidimensional and multidirectional foreign policy while taking care of its strategic autonomy.2
Hard Bargain with Sweden
The visits of Swedish PM Ulf Kristersson on 8 November 2022 and Foreign Minister Tobias Billstrom on 22 December 2022 to Turkiye3 laid a good foundation for further cooperation and strategic partnership between Sweden and Turkiye. Fulfilling the mutually agreed provisions outlined in the Trilateral Memorandum of 2022, involving Sweden, Turkiye and Finland, Sweden has made constitutional amendments. It has substantially enhanced its counter-terrorism cooperation with Turkiye in dealing with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a terror group and resumed exporting arms to Turkiye.4
Sweden’s new anti-terrorism law, which went into force on 1 June 2023, aims to address Turkiye’s main demands for ratifying the Nordic country’s NATO membership. The law criminalises membership in terrorist organisations and imposes up to four years in prison for individuals involved in terrorist activities or supporting such organisations. Billstrom highlighted that the law would help assuage Turkiye’s concerns, particularly related to the PKK’s activities in Sweden.5
Under a new bilateral Security Compact between Sweden and Turkiye, the ministerial level meeting will take place annually. During the inaugural meeting of the Security Compact, Sweden will present a roadmap outlining its ongoing efforts to combat terrorism in all its forms. Sweden reaffirmed its stance of not providing support to the People’s Protection Units (YPG), Democratic Union Party (PYD), and the organisation referred to as Fethullah Terrorist Organisation (FETO) in Turkiye.6 Moreover, Sweden has committed to actively support endeavours to revitalise Turkiye’s accession process to the EU. This commitment includes advocating for the modernisation of the EU–Turkiye Customs Union as well as promoting visa liberalisation initiatives between Turkiye and the EU.7
Re-Energising Relations with the EU
Before heading to Lithuania to attend the NATO Summit, Erdogan highlighted that Turkiye has been fulfilling the commitments relating to the open door policy of NATO, supporting its expansion. Despite that, he lamented that “Turkiye has for over 50 years been kept waiting at the door of the European Union.”8 Erdogan demanded Turkish membership in the EU and stated “first clear the path to the EU in front of Turkiye and then we will clear the path in front of Sweden, just as we did for Finland”.9 At the NATO Summit, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg supported Turkiye’s ambitions to become a member of the EU.10
The Foreign Affairs Council of the EU held discussions on EU–Turkiye relations, emphasising the need for the EU to re-engage with Turkiye and foster cooperation based on common interests while addressing existing differences. They highlighted the importance of achieving a sustainable de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean and finding a solution to the Cyprus question under relevant UN Resolutions for regional stability and security. Additionally, upholding fundamental freedoms and values, as defined in the European Convention of Human Rights, was underscored as essential, given Ankara’s party status to the Convention.11 These positions do indicate that the prospects for Turkish membership in the EU seems bleak as of now.
Advancing Bilateral Relations with the US
Turkiye’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defence system has caused prolonged tensions with the US and NATO due to concerns about compromising security and interoperability. Both the US and NATO have cautioned Turkiye that the S-400 system is incompatible with NATO’s defence infrastructure, which could potentially expose sensitive information to Russia. Despite these warnings, Turkiye has persisted with the deal, leading to the US taking punitive actions such as suspending Turkiye from the F-35 fighter jet programme in 2019 and imposing sanctions on Turkish entities and officials involved in the S-400 purchase.12
In October 2021, Turkiye requested the US to purchase US$ 20 billion worth of 40 Lockheed Martin F-16 fighter jets, along with approximately 80 modernisation kits for its existing fleet of warplanes.13 In that regard, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin recently remarked that the US supports Turkiye’s military modernisation. Additionally, US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan explicitly hinted towards moving forward with the request of Turkiye to purchase F-16 fighter jets in consultation with Congress.14 However, the congressional concerns relating to Turkish belligerence against Greece and Armenia and the deterioration of the human rights situation in Turkiye15 are likely to be factored in the discussion regarding the F-16 sale.
US President Joe Biden welcomed Erdogan’s readiness to promptly ratify the Accession Protocol for Sweden’s membership into the NATO to GNAT for ratification. He expressed his readiness to collaborate closely with Erdogan and Turkiye in strengthening defence and deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic region.16 At the NATO Summit in Lithuania, Biden and Erdogan exchanged perspectives on defence and economic priorities, underscoring their commitment to strengthen collaboration in these areas.17
Canada and Netherlands Policy Shift
The export of certain drone technology from Canada to Turkiye was suspended in 2020 following the determination that Azerbaijan’s forces had utilised the equipment during the conflict with Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.18 Following Ankara’s endorsement of Sweden’s NATO membership, Canada has decided to resume discussions with Turkiye regarding lifting export controls on drone parts, including optical equipment.19
It may be seen as a potentially significant development for the Turkish defence industry. Canadian PM Justin Trudeau met Erdogan in Lithuania and discussed shared priorities, including collective security, investment and people-to-people ties. He thanked Erdogan for his leadership on the Black Sea Grain Initiative.20
The Netherlands has lifted its arms restrictions against Turkiye, which were imposed in 2019 due to its military actions in Syria. The Dutch government abolished its “presumption of denial policy” regarding arms exports.21 The move by Turkiye to support Sweden’s accession led to a shift in the Dutch position. Despite the policy change, the Netherlands will continue monitoring the use of its goods in conflicts in Northern Syria and Yemen. Previously, the Netherlands mainly exported tank and armoured vehicle parts, fighter plane technology, and attack helicopter components to Turkiye.22
Conclusion
Erdogan has continued his government’s assertive foreign policy that has yielded positive outcomes. While endorsing Sweden’s accession to NATO, Ankara has compelled Sweden to be more accountable vis-à-vis Turkish security concerns. Turkiye has re-energised its efforts to improve relations with the EU. The Netherlands’ decision to lift the arms sanctions on Turkiye is also likely to benefit the Turkish economy and defence sector.Moreover, the resumption of talks with Canada on lifting export controls and the US sending positive signals on approval for F-16 reflects a significant step forward for the Turkish defence economy. Although challenges relating to chronic inflation and weakened Lira persist, Turkiye’s efforts to strengthen defence cooperation and re-establish itself as a key player in NATO demonstrate the positives flowing out of its assertive foreign policy stance.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Okinawa prefecture has the potential to be a new factor affecting Japan-China relations, unless the Japanese government can manage local grievances.
On 3 July 2023, a delegation of 80-odd members of the Japanese Association for the Promotion of International Trade, led by former House of Representatives speaker Yohei Kono, visited Beijing for a four-day trip to meet with senior Chinese officials.1 Among the delegation was Denny Tamaki, Governor of Okinawa prefecture, Japan’s southernmost set of islands. During the visit, Tamaki paid his respects at the collective grave of people from his prefecture interred on the outskirts of Beijing. The graves are of people who died due to various causes during the later half of the Qing dynasty (1636–1911).2 Tamaki then headed to Fujian province in the south of China, where he met local Communist Party officials, including the governor of the province.3 After returning to Japan, he expressed satisfaction with his visit, and prayed for good relations to continue.
Tamaki’s visit may mark a unique case of Japanese subnational diplomacy, but his itinerary has raised quite a few eyebrows in Tokyo. This is because his comments at the gravesite mentioned above were quite unexpected. Tamaki promised to “inherit and firmly maintain ties between Okinawa and China” in order to create a “peaceful and rich era”. Earlier, before departing for Beijing, he commented that he intended Okinawa to “maintain connections with various countries” instead of “being concerned about increasing tensions”.
These statements echo the June 2023 remarks by a former governor of Fujian province, President Xi Jinping, who in a visit to the national archives of China flagged the historical ties between Fujian province and Okinawa, then known as Ryukyu.4 Xi also expressed hope for the future relationship between the two.
Some sections of Japanese political and policy circles are concerned that China might be positioning itself to eventually raise doubts about Japanese control over Okinawa , or claim Okinawa as “traditional Chinese territory” . To be sure, there is merit to these speculations, as this is the same strategy China has used before in its territorial disputes with Japan over the Senkaku Islands, the Philippines and Vietnam over the South China Sea reefs, and with Tibet in the middle of the 20th century. However, just the act of questioning Japan’s sovereignty over these islands may be enough to significantly destabilise Japan’s security posture and divert significant resources away that could deter China from invading Taiwan. Furthermore, a closer look at Okinawa’s history reveals that the problem, such as it is, is partly one of Japan’s own making. This is because, until 1872, Okinawa was not Japanese territory at all.
Okinawa’s Complex History
Okinawa was originally known as Ryukyu (Luchu to the Chinese) and was an independent kingdom under its own government. In the 15th century, the kingdom rose to prominence as a trade hub between the Japanese and Chinese empires, and entered into tributary relations with both Ming China and later the feudal samurai lords of the Satsuma domain (presently Kagoshima prefecture) in Japan.
The small island kingdom was able to maintain its de facto independence for almost 500 years, until Western ships began appearing near Japanese shores, collapsing the mainland’s military government and its policy of sakoku, or National Isolation. A newly revamped Empire of Japan, seeking to secure its rear flank and eager to acquire an overseas empire of its own, invaded and occupied Ryukyu in 1872, ending its independence by annexing the country as Okinawa prefecture in 1879.
Even before the Second World War, Japanese policies of assimilation, such as banning the Okinawan language and dress, were unpopular among the people of the islands. However, it was in the heat of the Second World War that Okinawa endured its toughest trial, in the form of the Battle of Okinawa in 1945, also called the ‘typhoon of steel’. Over 12,000 American and 1,00,000 Japanese servicemen lost their lives, alongside 1,00,000 Okinawan civilians, most of whom were ordered to kill themselves by the Japanese military.5
After the war, Okinawa remained under the control of the victorious United States for more than 20 years beyond the San Francisco Peace Treaty that officially ended the American occupation in the rest of the country. Even after reversion in 1972, the Okinawan islands, representing less than one per cent of the total Japanese landmass, played host to over 70 per cent of US forward bases placed there to protect the Japanese mainland from external attack.
As a result, the islands became home to an active anti-war movement, alongside other left-wing ideologies. The US bases became especially objectionable after several crimes committed by US servicemen in Okinawan cities, such as the rape and murder of a high school girl in 1995, galvanised a profound sense of antipathy and alienation among an already disaffected populace. Many Okinawans today are hesitant to identify with the mainland, and remain opposed to Tokyo’s security concerns.
The constant military movements impact the residents’ physical and mental well-being, as well as the tropical ecosystem of the islands.6 Okinawa is the poorest prefecture in Japan, with an unemployment rate of over 3.2 per cent in 2022, as compared to the Japanese average of 2.64 per cent.7 Further, the placement of advanced missile interceptor systems such as Patriot-3 batteries around the islands has raised the anxieties of locals, as these are sure to be targeted in the event of a conflict.
China’s goals
It is these anxieties that China wishes to exploit. By cultivating a sense that Okinawans are an independent entity, the Chinese may be able to stoke opposition to the bases, and embolden anti-base activists to oppose the facilities more stridently. They could also encourage the Okinawans to seek alternative sources of investment and trade from Chinese sources in order to counter the tight financial control exercised by Tokyo, enabling Okinawa to stand up to the latter in matters of national security. Should Japan oppose this or place artificial controls on Okinawan investment, China could easily make the case that Japan’s control of the islands is coercive after all, and help to dent Japan’s image in the eyes of the international community, as any controls would effectively violate Japan’s democratic norms.
More insidiously, in the event of an invasion of Taiwan, Okinawa, which is only 628 kilometres away, must be taken out of the picture.8 In this, the nuisance value of the anti-base movement plays a vital role, as it may cripple Japan’s response to the attack by means of strikes and other demonstrations. Statements made by Governor Tamaki already paint such a picture: in an interview he gave to Global Times, he said that he “cannot allow Okinawa to become an easier target for attack simply because U.S. military bases are concentrated here”.9 In this sense, a divided Okinawa hampers the rapid movement of Japanese Self-Defence Forces to some extent, even if it may not hamper US forces.
Conclusion
If Okinawans’ genuine concerns are to be assuaged, an acknowledgement of Japan’s ethnic diversity would go a long way. The government made a good start in 2019 by acknowledging through legislation that the Ainu community of Hokkaido are the indigenous inhabitants of Japan.10 A similar legislation that notes Ryukyu’s independent history and acknowledges mainland Japanese assimilation policies as oppressive would take the sting out of several points of criticism. Additionally, in order to prevent the base issue from festering, Japan could consider moving a sizeable number of US bases out of the prefecture to other places around the Japanese mainland. Doing so would not only lighten the burden currently borne by Okinawa, but also improve national security, as dispersed bases in multiple locations would make it harder for China to launch missile strikes against them.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
S-70 Okhotnik UCAV Debuts on the Russia–Ukraine Battlefield
Akshat Upadhyay
July 31, 2023
UCAVs can impose a major decision dilemma on the adversary and act as a part of a combined arms offensive in the air, in their role as ‘loyal wingman’ for manned fighter jets.
The Russian S-70 Okhotnik (Hunter) unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) was reportedly used on the Ukrainian battlefield on 27 June 2023, where it struck Ukrainian military facilities in the regions of Sumy and Kremenchuk.1 This is an important development in the war since it showcases Russian capability to move beyond tactical and ad-hoc equipped drones like Orlan-10, Lastochka, Forpost-R and Orion,2 commercial Chinese quadcopters (DJI and Air series)3 and the Shahed and Mohajer series loitering munitions (LMs) imported from Iran,4 to staking a major technological claim in the form of a UCAV. In the short term, Russia will still depend on Iranian expertise in LMs given that a manufacturing plant has been set up inside Russia.5 The successful strikes by the S-70, with the option of manned–unmanned teaming (MUM-T) with the Su-57 fighter jet, provide the country with a deployable option, still under development by other powers like the US and the UK.
The Okhotnik project has been in the making since 20116 and has been envisaged as a “loyal wingman” for the Su-57.7 A loyal wingman is a UCAV which, using onboard AI, can collaborate with manned fighters and is seen as being significantly low-cost than its manned counterpart.8 This expands the tasking and deployment options for the pair (at the very least one UCAV and one manned fighter are being considered but the numbers of UCAV can increase depending on the cognitive load on the pilot). The project is being jointly developed by Sukhoi and Mikoyan as a sixth-generation heavy UCAV.9 A sixth generation air vehicle has parameters like onboard data fusion and artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities, advanced stealth airframes, advanced variable cycle engines and integration of directed energy weapons (DEW).10 Two prototypes have been developed so far, the first one with a circular exhaust and the latter with a more square-shaped one to increase stealth.11 Two more are under development and these are supposedly similar to the ones which will finally undergo serial production.12
The design of the S-70 is that of a ‘flying wing’, similar to that of the F-117 Nighthawk, the RQ-170 and the Shahed-136.13Okhotnik’s first autonomous flight testing, which included a flight time of around 30 minutes, alongside an Su-57, was conducted on 27 September 2019.14 The Su-57 has been used as a flying laboratory for testing the Hunter’s avionics. Unguided bombs were tested in 2021,15 followed by the test-firing of Kh59 Mk2 precision guided munition (PGM) in May 2022.16 The current version of Su-57 is a single-seat fighter but a twin-seater variant has been flight-tested with the Hunter where the co-pilot will be exclusively responsible for controlling and monitoring the UCAV, with the pilot performing his/her basic functions.
Certain other developments in this project merit attention. When operationally ready, each Su-57 will command up to four S-70s.17 Already, four Su-57s have been used to conduct suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) in Ukraine on 9 June 2022.18 The interesting part was that all four were “linked to a single information network to destroy air defense systems through automatic communication systems, data transmission, navigation and identification in real-time”.19 The Okhotnik has also been trialed with the Mig-29.20 In a standalone mode, it may also be deployed on the still-in-development Project 23900 Ivan Rogonov helicopter carriers, each of which has a capacity to accommodate 4 S-70s.21 Russian analysts have also dubbed the S-70 the world’s first “outer space” drone.22
Manned–Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T)
The Okhotnik’s strikes in Ukraine can act as proof of concept for the MUM-T concept, under development in a number of countries including India. MUM-T has been defined differently by different armed forces across the world. While the US Army Aviation Centre (USAACE) defines MUM-T as “synchronized employment of soldier, manned and unmanned air and ground vehicles, robotics, and sensors to achieve enhanced situational understanding, greater lethality, and improved survivability”,23 the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)’s standardisation agreement (STANAG) calibrates five levels of interoperability (LOI) between manned and unmanned platforms,24 with the first being indirect receipt of UAV-related data, going up to level five which relates to the control and monitoring of the UAV along with launch and recovery functions.25
In India, the Combat Air Teaming System (CATS) is meant as an umbrella term for a combination of manned and unmanned assets which can reduce human casualties, perform air-to-air and air-to-ground strikes from a standoff distance and also act as atmospheric satellites for high altitude surveillance.26 The initial prototypes are being tested on the Jaguar aircraft and will later be fitted on the Tejas light combat aircraft (LCA) acting as the “mothership”.27
Similar projects are being developed in the US (collaborative combat aircraft or CCA)28, Australia (air teaming system or ATS)29 and the UK (Project Tempest).30 Within the US, a number of parallel programs are in progress. The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is field testing the Skyborg program with the Kratos’ X-58 Valkyrie.31 The Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is moving ahead with the air combat evolution (ACE) program,32 and in a simulation featuring a US Air Force (USAF) pilot competing with an AI pilot under the AlphaDogFight program, had shown that AI could beat human pilots in number of fighter manoeuvres and targeting actions.33 There were obviously some caveats and one could say that the dice was loaded in favour of the AI. However, even granting those advantages to the AI, the performance has been nothing short of impressive and heralds the future of air combat.
MUM-T, when implemented during conventional combat scenarios, offers the advantage of combining the strengths of manned and unmanned aircrafts, while complementing each other’s shortfalls. The UCAV can be sent ahead in a dense air defence (AD) environment to scout for targets, perform SEAD and force the adversary to reveal its surface to air missile (SAM) sites. This data, most of which is computed within the UCAV using edge processing, can be sent back to the manned fighter, already at standoff range, and used for conducting air and ground attacks. The UCAV, when equipped with either air-to-air or air-to-ground (AAM/AGM) missiles can also act as a ‘flying magazine’ for the manned fighter, increasing the inventory and range of the aircraft.
With the number of unmanned platforms under the pilot’s control increasing and the unmanned platforms themselves carrying LMs, similar to what is envisaged in the CATS program, the pilot now has the opportunity to conduct what this writer calls “simultaneous multi-roles” (SMRs) where the capabilities of the manned fighter will increase manifold. At the same instant, the pilot can engage air targets, perform precision bombing against pin-point high value targets and saturate the battlefield with LMs and conventional unguided bombs.
Air combat is likely to undergo a major change with the entry of UAVs of all shapes and sizes. Countries which can proactively take advantage of this phase of air combat evolution are likely to have a greater edge over their adversaries. As the Okhotnik trials and later operational use shows, the combination of the human mind and computational strength of microchips, integrated into a single system, has the potential to impose on the adversary a major decision dilemma regarding the system to be countered and can act as a combined arms offensive in the air.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The paradox of South Africa being formally neutral on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, yet parallelly deepening military relationship with Russia, is continuing to strain US–South Africa relations.
Following months of speculations, a decision has finally been made—Russian President Vladimir Putin won’t attend the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) Summit which is taking place in Johannesburg from 22 to 24 August 2023. The development comes as a relief for South African officials as it helps Pretoria dodge an awkward diplomatic and legal dilemma. Being a signatory to the Rome Statute which governs the International Criminal Court (ICC), South African officials would have been obliged to arrest Putin upon arrival. In March 2023, ICC issued a warrant for Putin’s arrest over alleged war crimes committed in Ukraine.1 Two other members of BRICS—India and China—are not signatories to the Rome Statute. Brazil is a member but since it wasn’t hosting the meeting, it did not have to deal with this situation.
The moment speculations about Putin’s possible attendance began, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa employed every possible means to diffuse the situation and navigate his way out of the tight diplomatic spot. First, his administration proposed Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov lead the Russian delegation instead of Putin. This request was denied by Moscow. Secondly, rumors began to fuel speculations that the BRICS summit could become a virtual summit or may even get shifted to China.2 Such rumors were categorically denied by Ramaphosa as his administration insisted on hosting a physical summit. Moreover, President Ramaphosa is trying to consolidate his own domestic standing and garner support from various flanks of his ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), with the South African general elections scheduled to take place in 2024.
US Ambassador’s Allegation
The troubled period for South African administration began on 11 May when the United States Ambassador to South Africa Reuben Brigety held a press conference in which he accused South African officials of allegedly loading weapons onto a sanctioned Russian ship in December 2022.3 This triggered a long drawn diplomatic spat between Washington and Pretoria. It was claimed that the Russian cargo ship known as The Lady R docked at Simon’s Town naval base near Cape Town last December with its tracking device switched off. This prompted questions whether the ship was loaded with arms before returning to Russia.
Even before this development, tensions between US and South Africa were already palpable. On the anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine in February 2023, South African military participated in a ten-day exercise – Exercise Mosi, along with Russia and China. This provoked criticism both at home and abroad.4 With Ambassador Brigety’s accusation, South Africa’s officially proclaimed “non-aligned” position on the Russian invasion of Ukraine came under scrutiny. Following the press conference, the immediate fallout was felt in the financial markets with the South African Rand plummeting to a record low of 19.51 to the dollar.5
The other implication was the possibility of South Africa being suspended from the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which is due to expire in 2023. Under AGOA, South Africa currently enjoys preferential duty-free market access to the US, South Africa’s third-largest trading partner. If South Africa’s preferential status indeed gets suspended, then industries like wine, citrus and motor would be gravely affected, leading to job losses and reduced export revenues.6
In response, the South African government categorically denied US accusations and defended its decision to participate in military exercise with Russia and China citing its right to pursue its own international policy since it is a sovereign nation. South Africa’s Minister of Defence Thandi Modise claimed that the Lady R docked to deliver a shipment of ammunition for the South African National Defence Force’s Special Forces Regiment, equipment that had been ordered prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.7 Owing to the seriousness of the allegations and its potential impact on South Africa’s international image, Ramaphosa established a three-person panel to investigate the incident.8 However, the timeline for completing the investigation and providing a final report remains undetermined for the time being.
South Africa’s Rhetoric of Non-Alignment
The paradox of being formally neutral on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, yet parallelly deepening military relationship with Russia is continuing to strain US–South Africa relations. Right from the start, South Africa has insisted that it supports the “peaceful resolution” of the conflict.9 Pretoria along with a group of five African countries volunteered to visit both Moscow and Kyiv and constitute a “peace mission”. The delegation put forward a 10-point plan that stressed on unimpeded grain exports through the Black Sea. Yet in practical terms, Africa’s peace mission failed to yield meaningful results.10 The delegation faced several logistical and security challenges.
Problems with the US have been further complicated with South Africa continuing to abstain on voting at the UN General Assembly resolutions calling for an end to the war and Russia’s withdrawal from Ukrainian territory. India has followed a similar path whereas China has voted against such resolutions. Although there are no cultural or linguistic ties between South Africa and Russia, the former’s support for the latter could be attributed to the roots of the ANC. Being Africa’s oldest liberation movement fighting against white minority rule in South Africa, the ANC relied heavily on support from the erstwhile Soviet Union. The armed wing of the ANC—known as Umkhonto we Sizwe—received arms, ammunitions, and military training from the Soviets in 1960s. With such historical affinities, it is understandable why South Africa would be standing on the fence on the Russia–Ukraine conflict. However, the question of whether South Africa has been able to substantiate its doctrine of non-alignment or usage of the term non-aligned is debatable.11
Additionally, the West had raised the stakes for South Africa to pursue a course of action tantamount to economic sabotage. Apart from potential suspension from AGOA, Putin’s arrival and South Africa’s failure to arrest him would have subjected Pretoria to penalties such as exclusion from various Western payments platform and protocols. On 9 June 2023, US Congressional leaders also issued a bipartisan letter urging President Joe Biden to question South Africa’s eligibility for continued inclusion in the AGOA and to consider moving the venue of 2023 AGOA Forum from South Africa to another country.12
Apart from these challenges, the principal line of argument coming from South African officials relates to its own role in negotiation and mediation on peace and security issues. Currently, there are not many states that have access to both President Putin and President Volodymyr Zelensky and can engage with the two parties simultaneously. This sentiment has been echoed by South Africa’s Minister for International Relations and Cooperation Dr Grace Naledi Pandor. However, by being a signatory to the Rome Statute, South Africa has inadvertently put itself in a difficult position when it comes to hosting leaders in the future. Unless the Rome Statute of 2002 is amended, the question of any future state visit by the President of Russia to South Africa will remain in question. With South Africa slated to host the G20 Summit in 2025, similar kind of diplomatic pressure may continue to be applied unless the statue is amended.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
US Voluntary Code of Conduct on AI and Implications for Military Use
Akshat Upadhyay
July 28, 2023
The suggestions being offered to rein in the advancements in AI need to move into the domain of regulation, to ensure that the unwarranted effects of these technologies do not spill over onto the modern battlefield.
Seven technology companies including Microsoft, OpenAI, Anthropic and Meta, with major artificial intelligence (AI) products made voluntary commitments regarding the regulation of AI at an event held in the White House on 21 July 2023.1 These eight commitments are based on three guiding principles of safety, security and trust. Areas and domains which are presumably impacted by AI have been covered by the code of conduct. While these are non-binding, unenforceable and voluntary, they may form the basis for a future Executive Order on AI, which will become critical given the increasing military use of AI.
The voluntary AI commitments are the following:
Red-teaming (internal and external) products to be released for public use. Bio, chemical and radiological risks and ways in which barriers to entry can be lowered for weapons development and design are some of the top priorities. The effect on systems which have interactions and the ability to control physical systems needs to be evaluated apart from societal risks such as bias and discrimination;
Information sharing amongst companies and governments. This is going to be challenging since the entire model is based on secrecy and competition;
Invest in cybersecurity and safeguards to protect unreleased and proprietary model weights;
Incentivize third party discovery and reporting of issues and vulnerabilities;
Watermarking AI generated content;
Publicly report model or system capabilities including discussions of societal risks;
Accord priority to research on societal risks posed by AI systems; and
Develop and deploy frontier AI systems to help address society’s greatest challenges.2
The eight commitments of US’s Big Tech companies come a few days after the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the first time convened a session on the threat posed by AI to global peace and security.3 The UN Secretary General (UNSG) proposed the setting up of a global AI watchdog comprising experts in the field who would share their expertise with governments and administrative agencies. The UNSG also added that UN must come up with a legally binding agreement by 2026 banning the use of AI in automated weapons of war.4
The discussion at the UNSC can be seen as elevating the focus from shorter term AI threat of disinformation and propaganda in a bilateral context between governments and Big Tech companies to a larger, global focus on advancements in AI and the need to follow certain common standards, which are transparent, respect privacy of individuals whose data is ‘scraped’ on a massive scale, and ensure robust cybersecurity.
Threat posed by AI
Lawmakers in the US have been attempting to rein in the exponential developments in the AI field for some time now, since not much is known about the real impact of the technology on a longer-term basis. The reactions to the so-called danger of AI have been polarizing, with some even equating AI with the atom bomb and terming the current phase of growth in AI as the ‘Oppenheimer moment’5, after the scientist-philosopher J. Robert Oppenheimer, under whom the Manhattan Project was brought to a fruitful conclusion with the testing of the first atomic bomb. This was the moment that signaled the start of the first nuclear age—an era of living under the nuclear shadow that persists to this day. The Oppenheimer moment, therefore, is a dividing line between the conventional past and the new present and presumably the unknown future.
Some academics, activists and even members of the Big Tech community, referred to as ‘AI doomers’ have coined a term, P(doom), in an attempt to quantify the risk of a doomsday scenario where a ‘runaway superintelligence’ causes severe harm to humanity or leads to human extinction.6 Others refer to variations of the ‘Paperclip Maximiser’, where the AI is given a particular task to optimise by the humans, understands it in the form of maximising the number of paperclips in the universe and proceeds to expend all resources of the planet in order to manufacture only paperclips.7
This thought experiment was used to signify the dangers of two issues with AI: the ‘orthogonality thesis’, which refers to a highly intelligent AI that could interpret human goals in its own way and proceed to accomplish tasks which have no value to the humans; and ‘instrumental convergence’ which implies AI taking control of all matter and energy on the planet in addition to ensuring that no one can shut it down or alter its goals.8
Apart from these alleged existential dangers, the new wave of generative AI9, which has the potential of lowering and in certain cases, decimating entry barriers to content creation in text, image, audio and video format, can adversely affect societies in the short to medium term. Generative AI has the potential to birth the era of the ‘superhuman’, the lone wolf who can target state institutions through the click of his keyboard at will.10
The use of generative AI in the hands of motivated individuals, non-state and state actors, has the potential to generate disinformation at scale. Most inimical actors and institutions have so far struggled to achieve this due to the difficulties of homing onto specific faultlines within countries, using local dialects and generating adequately realistic videos, among others. This is now available at a price—disinformation as a service (DaaS)—at the fingertips of an individual, making the creation and dissemination of disinformation at scale, very easy. This is why the voluntary commitments by the US Big Tech companies are just the beginning of a regulatory process that needs to be made enforceable, in line with legally binding safeguards agreed to by UN members for respective countries.
Military Uses of AI
Slowly and steadily, the use of AI in military has been gaining ground. The Russia-Ukraine war has seen deployment of increasingly efficient AI systems on both sides. Palantir, a company which specialises in AI-based data fusion and surveillance services,11 has created a new product called the Palantir AI Platform (AIP). This uses large language models (LLMs) and algorithms to designate, analyse and serve up suggestions for neutralising adversary targets, in a chatbot mode.12
Though Palantir’s website clarifies that the system will only be deployed across classified systems and use both classified and unclassified data to create operating pictures, there is no further information on the subject available in the open domain.13 The company has also assured on its site that it will use “industry-leading guardrails” to safeguard against unauthorized actions.14 The absence of Palantir from the White House declaration is significant since it is one of the very few companies whose products are designed for significant military use.
Richard Moore, the head of United Kingdom’s (UK) MI6, on 19 July 2023 stated that his staff was using AI and big data analysis to identify and disrupt the flow of weapons to Russia.15 Russia is testing its unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) Marker with an inbuilt AI which will seek out Leopard and Abrams tanks on the battlefield and target them. However, despite being tested in a number of terrains such as forests, the Marker hasn’t been rolled out for combat action in ongoing conflict against Ukraine.16
Ukraine has fitted its drones with rudimentary AI that can perform the most basic edge processing to identify platforms like tanks and pass on only the relevant information (coordinates and nature of platform) amounting to kilobytes of data to a vast shooter network.17 There are obviously challenges in misidentifying objects and the task becomes exceedingly difficult when identifying and singling out individuals from the opposing side. Facial recognition softwares have been used by the Ukrainians to identify the bodies of Russian soldiers killed in action for propaganda uses.18
It is not a far shot to imagine the same being used for targeted killings using drones. The challenge here of course is systemic bias and discrimination in the AI model which creeps in despite the best intentions of the data scientists, which may lead to inadvertent killing of civilians. Similarly, spoofing of the senior commanders’ voice and text messages may lead to passing of spurious and fatal orders for formations. On the other hand, the UK-led Future Combat Air System (FCAS) Tempest envisages a wholly autonomous fighter with AI integrated both during the design and development phase (D&D) as well as the identification and targeting phase during operations.19 The human, at best, will be on the loop.
Conclusion
The military use of AI is an offshoot of the developments ripping through the Silicon Valley. As a result, the suggestions being offered to rein in the advancements in AI need to move beyond self-censorship and into the domain of regulation. This will be needed to ensure that the unwarranted effects of these technologies do not spill over into the modern battlefield, already saturated with lethal and precision-based weapons.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
India’s Turn to Mini-lateralism in West Asian Context
Deepika Saraswat
July 21, 2023
India’s participation in mini-lateral frameworks together with the US and its West Asian allies has been a transformative development in its West Asia policy.
On 7 May 2023, India's National Security Advisor Ajit Doval participated in a meeting with his counterparts from the US, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia in Riyadh.1 A White House readout of the meeting noted that the purpose was to advance their shared vision of a more secure and prosperous Middle East region interconnected with India and the world. Earlier, in October 2021, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar during his visit to Israel had participated in a quadrilateral meeting with the Foreign Ministers of Israel, the US and the UAE, focussing on closer economic cooperation in infrastructure, energy and food security.2 Since then, the grouping has come to be known as the I2U2.
Over the last two years, India’s participation in mini-lateral frameworks together with the US and its West Asian allies has been a transformative development in its West Asia policy.
US mini-lateral turn in West Asia
Mini-laterals, where small number of states with better understanding of each other’s needs and strengths, collaborate to find practical solutions to their shared challenges first and foremost emerge from strong bilateral partnerships and convergences between states.3 I2U2 therefore, culminated from India’s deepening strategic partnerships with the UAE, the US, and Israel.
Secondly, the US-brokered 2020 Abraham Accords, which normalised ties between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain and several other Arab countries, opened the space for US-led regional initiatives with participation from Israel. To allay fears among its regional allies about the US disengagement from the region, the Biden administration has prioritised fostering greater regional cooperation, and integration of its “unrivaled network of allies and partners” from Middle East and Indo-Pacific. The US National Security Strategy 2022 noted that it was time for the United States “to eschew grand designs in favor of more practical steps that can advance U.S. interests and help regional partners lay the foundation for greater stability, prosperity for the people of the Middle East and for the American people”.4
In doing so, the US has sought to recalibrate its traditional role as the external security guarantor through bilateral alliances to that of an ‘integrator’ of regional mechanism that will act as bulwark against domination of the region by rival powers like China and Russia. This strategy is visible in the post-Accords US-backed regional mini-lateral/multilateral initiatives involving Israel such as the Negev Summit (March 2022), the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, and the I2U2.
I2U2: A trade and technology cooperation initiative
Over the last two years, the I2U2 has emerged as a Trade and technology cooperation initiative leveraging relative strengths and trade synergies between the four countries, namely the UAE’s capital, Israel’s technological prowess, India’s market-size and production capacity. At the first I2U2 virtual summit during US President Joe Biden’s visit to Israel in July 2022, consensus was reached on advancing joint investments and initiatives encompassing the six areas of energy, food security, health, space, transportation and water.5 Three of these areas, namely energy, food security, and water, can be bracketed under technology-energy-climate change nexus, where India has been cooperating with the UAE and Israel on a bilateral basis.
In 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic further drove home the importance of resilient supply-chains for food security, under the India–UAE Food Corridor, major companies such as Dubai-based Emaar group, DP World and other private sector players committed investments up to US$ 7 billion over next three years in integrated mega food parks, related warehousing and logistics infrastructure, in various Indian cities.6
Israel, which has established itself as a leader in climate tech, has been cooperating with India in tackling climate-change related challenges to food security and agriculture. The Indo-Israel Agricultural Cooperation Project, which was started in 2008, has been a success story, with 30 ‘Centres of Excellence’ jointly established across India disseminating best agricultural practices, and capacity building through professional training programmes.7
To build on these synergies, following the I2U2 Summit, the UAE pledged to invest US$ 2 billion to develop a series of integrated food parks across India, with the involvement of US and Israeli private sector to lend their expertise and innovative solutions to contribute to the overall sustainability of the project. The second joint project announced at the I2U2 summit was a US$ 300 million hybrid renewable energy project (300 MW of wind and solar capacity) in Gujarat. Subsequently, a joint business coalition of the I2U2 was established in April 2023, to mobilise private sector capital and expertise for joint projects in sustainable and renewable energy, areas where the UAE is focussing in the run-up to hosting of the COP-28.8
India–US Convergence in West Asia
What is noteworthy about these ‘mini-laterals’ is that they are issue-specific in nature. They are not to be confused with alliances, which entail enduring security commitment between allies, and usually have a broader remit including economic, technological, and diplomatic components. Delhi’s participation in these quadrilaterals underscores India–US regional convergence in West Asia based on their shared vision of an ‘interconnected’ or networked region.
Given that small regional states like the UAE and Israel, who are determined to simultaneously deepen ties with constellation of powers such as the US, China, India, and Russia, mini-laterals are flexible and informal mechanisms and do not entail significant political costs, while at the same time strengthening their ability to manoeuvre great power competition.9 Mini-laterals such as I2U2 serve to strengthen the capabilities of regional states in dealing with shared challenges. At the same time, as a regional mechanism, they can limit the potential hegemonic designs of great powers making inroads into the region.
Further, India’s participation in I2U2 framework alongside Israel indicates that New Delhi has not only de-hyphenated its bilateral ties with Israel and Palestine, but is playing a crucial role in integrating Israel with the region on mutually beneficial terms. From Israel's point of view, to make this de-hyphenation permanent, it seeks to deepen and broaden the ties across the board so that the relationship with Israel will become so widely accepted and beneficial that it remains unaffected through the change of government in New Delhi, just as is the case in Washington.10
The issue-specific, and flexible nature of ‘mini-laterals’ also implies that countries can align with different sets of countries on different issues. Therefore, for India, participation in these frameworks is unlikely to impinge on its traditionally balanced approach towards the region. In Riyadh, Doval discussed with Saudi Arabia and the UAE about a railway network among Gulf States which will be linked to an Indian port in the Arabian Sea and Israeli port on the Mediterranean, namely the India-Arab- Mediterranean corridor.
A week before that, Doval had visited Tehran to hold consultations with top Iranian officials, including President Ebrahim Raisi. Their talks focussed on the situation in Afghanistan, the possibilities for reviving trade ties by activating the rial-rupee mechanism, and cooperation in Chabahar port, which is being jointly developed by India and Iran as a key transit hub between the Persian Gulf and Central Asia.
As India finds common ground with the US in advancing a regional approach for addressing shared development challenges, it will continue to maintain its independent strategic vision of its extended neighbourhood in West Asia.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Hybridity in Warfare: A Compelling Dimension in Modern Wars
Harinder Singh
July 21, 2023
Policy-makers need to recalibrate modernisation programmes from the earlier focus on traditional military capability needs to a mix of kinetic and non-kinetic hybrid war-fighting capabilities.
The Cold War symbolised a strong deterrent posture. Both the West and the Soviet Union, while maintaining formidable conventional military capabilities, successfully deterred each other by deploying strong nuclear forces. The fear of a military conflict spiralling into a nuclear holocaust prevented both these blocs from going to war, thereby reinforcing the salience of nuclear weapons in maintaining robust deterrence. However, the Soviet Union’s sudden collapse in the nineties brought a revelatory change in the world order, thus partly diminishing the importance of nuclear weapons to deter adversaries and future conflicts.
In the Cold War era, while inter-state wars took a backseat, the non-state and third-party actors became important disrupters in the geo-strategic environment. Proxies became the new tools in the hands of global powers to leverage power and influence. At a broader level, warfare was reduced to ideological power plays and shifts, motivated regime changes, proxy wars and insurgencies, resource exploitation, and imposition of trade monopolies and sanctions. For almost a quarter of a century following the end of the Cold War era, the world witnessed the uncontested primacy of the United States. This order is yet at another inflection point, where it is often argued that neither the history has ended nor has the ideological competition diminished any bit.
With the rise of China and other regional powers which are as disruptive as the rising ones, inter-state wars seem to be re-emerging as a pre-eminent form of conflict, albeit in a newer form. Conventional wars are returning with little regard to a nuclear overhang, but surely in the shadows of a newer form of conflict, which is largely hybrid in nature and has the potential to re-write the nature and character of future wars.
The Digital Age and Warfare
Hybridity in warfare is becoming the defining feature of this century. Arguably, the digital age is shaping the geopolitics and future of warfare, in ways the nuclear weapons shaped deterrence and conflict in the 20th century This raises the question of whether the growing competition in the field of cyber and other digital technologies has the potential to produce a comparable impact on the emerging international world order, and in turn a deterrent effect on war and conflict.
The Ukraine conflict highlights the increasing salience of hybridity in warfare which is driven by an unprecedented revolution in new-age technologies and the corporatisation of warfare by global tech-giants. Today, a surfeit of technologies from cyber to aerospace, precision munitions to unmanned platforms, hyper-sonics to autonomous systems, AI and quantum computing to blockchain technologies is driving hybridity in warfare. The uniqueness of battlefield sensors, the stealth of non-crewed platforms, the power of computing and algorithms, and the open-source revolution have brought us to a point where a sea of data can be accessed and stored.
Relying on AI, and its incredible manipulative power, these inconceivable amounts of information and geo-data are being routinely fed into machines to connect the dots and predict the battle outcomes.
Tech Competition in Warfare
A secure and reliable cyber space is the key to national security. Be it the economy, food, health, energy, infrastructure, banking and financial sectors, all of these domains contribute to the security and well-being of the state. But there is nothing as significant as cyber security, which no country can manage alone, thus necessitating hi-tech cooperation and collaboration at a trans-national level. The fact that cyber-security has become the foundational layer to all domains of national security can no longer be ignored, as it impacts national security planners and practitioners across the public policy spectrum.
Nation-states perforce have no choice but to strengthen their cyber security capabilities for a few reasons. First, the boundaries between wartime and peacetime needs have blurred due to the fading distinction between kinetic and non-kinetic domains, resulting in enhanced scope and necessity for national security. Second, the management of cyber security threats is no longer a matter of concern for the governments in power alone, but also of utmost interest to non-governmental agencies and business corporations. And third, the cyber-attacks are often organisation-neutral, which highlights the importance of strong collaboration between the government, the military and the private sector in terms of information sharing, response and mitigation.
The security implications of an increasing cyber and technological rivalry between adversarial states are therefore immense. For instance, any disruption in the key information infrastructure or hi-technology related production lines can have severe implications and consequences for national security. This challenge calls for like-minded states, allies and partners to be resilient by remaining competitive, and innovative in key war-fighting technologies and domains. Whether it is AI, or computing power, or satellite imagery and secure data transmission, or round the clock transparency on the battlefield, these new-age niche technologies are revolutionary to the future planning and conduct of warfare.
In order to maintain a pre-eminent position in these niche technologies, there is a need to collaborate with like-minded countries and mega-tech corporations pioneering in innovation. The private sector leads the cutting-edge of innovation and development of hi-tech platforms required to shape and fight future wars. The manner in which militaries could leverage these niche technologies to coerce or defeat an adversary is creating a new dilemma amongst security planners and practitioners. This fear is also partly redefining the salience of nuclear weapons to deter future wars and conflict.
Threats, Terrain and Technologies
Three aspects, i.e., the hybrid threats, the continuously expanding terrain of hybrid warfare and the niche technologies, are increasingly shaping our understanding on the nature and character of future wars.
First, security threats are evolving at an unthinkable pace. From well-defined and clear-cut conventional threats, several shades of hybrid warfare are defining the new-age security threats. Historically, the threats have always been evolving over time, but what is new is the sheer expanse and reach of these new-age threats in the digital domain. Deep fakes, real-like videos and disinformation campaigns are manifestly overwhelming the national security planners, thereby making it difficult to discern truth from fiction. With generative AI emerging as another important threat actor, the role of cyberspace in warfare and its real impact on the battlefield cannot be precisely predicted or defined. Simply put, these new-age threats need a new definition much beyond the normally explained constructs of external, internal or human security.
Second, wars are increasingly turning trans-national, if not trans-continental or trans-corporation. The Ukraine war is reflective of this novel and emerging trend in warfare. The new-age wars strengthen the notion of a collaborative and collective effort to deter, fight and defeat a mutual adversary. No country has the necessary money, mind-space, manpower, machines and material to tackle these new-age threats and their sheer expanse and technological dimension. This not only necessitates like-minded countries to come together, but also bring the private sector led by the global tech giants closer to the government and the military, to increase their involvement. War-fighting is stepping into an era, where military and non-military personnel will have to ideate, plan and fight alongside to win hybrid wars. This be a compelling policy choice rather than an exception.
And third, with the increasing range and dimensions of hybrid threats, governments and militaries have to operate in an ever-expanding security environment and landscape. This is leading to increased experimentation with hybrid war-fighting technologies that might or might not produce durable battle outcomes. As generative AI expands in theory and practice, both the defender and the offender will struggle to shape and direct new attack vectors. Harmonising this `kill-chain` amongst a range of emerging kinetic and non-kinetic war-fighting technologies will be doctrinal challenge. For instance, Search and Seek, Strike and Scoot, and Survive to Strike are a few doctrinal dyads that would necessitate seamless integration of new-age technologies to produce battle winning effects. At yet another level, future wars may well translate into AI versus AI wars, with each side trying to outwit the adversary on the digital battlefield. Warfare in the long term might translate into a story of innumerable hybrid hits and misses, till one or the other side establishes mastery over these technologies and threats.
The Modernisation Challenge
Nation-states are pursuing military modernisations to meet a range of security challenges at speed and cost as never before. The capability development paths adopted by most military powers often intersect in terms of preferred new-age or legacy technologies and indigenous industrial bases, thus providing an opportunity for like-minded governments and militaries to collaborate in tackling both new-age and age-old threats. The fundamental shift in hybrid threats due to the rise in cyber and technological competition amongst adversarial states requires policy-makers and practitioners to recalibrate modernisation programmes from the earlier focus on traditional military capability needs to a mix of kinetic and non-kinetic war-fighting capabilities.
The real challenge lies In quantifying the inter-se requirement of kinetic or non-kinetic capability needs. Though earlier, the challenge was related to sharing available resources amongst the traditional pillars of national security, now the need has arisen for equitable sharing of the same resources in the development and fielding of hybrid and non-hybrid capabilities. It therefore requires a quantification of all new-age security threats—hybrid or otherwise—against a model or theoretical construct that satisfies both conditions. This is the new risk to the military modernisation challenge.
In the absence of any credible planning data, governments and militaries are likely to mis-define the requirement of non-kinetic hybrid competencies, resulting in an imbalance between the two requirements. Military planners and practitioners often tend to over-estimate or under-estimate the non-kinetic capability needs and there lies the need for caution and precision. With increasing budgetary allocations to India’s military modernisation effort, a policy alignment might be necessary to maintain the right balance in the development, production and fielding of required kinetic and non-kinetic war-fighting capabilities.
In the current digital age, policy, process and preparedness on traditional and non-traditional security threats to a nation-state will have to be a healthy mix of sound ideas, capital and coordinated action between the public and private sectors. Nation-states are today moving towards a nature of war governance where the political leadership and the state bureaucracies—both civil and military—will have to co-opt the civilian technological expertise and `nationalist` hi-tech corporations in the planning and conduct of future wars.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Hybrid War
Military Affairs, North America & Strategic Technologies
African Peace Mission to the Russia–Ukraine Conflict
Mohanasakthivel J
July 13, 2023
The African Peace Mission to Ukraine and Russia coincided with escalatory actions by both the antagonists.
South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, along with a group of African leaders, embarked on a peace mission in an attempt to help resolve the Russia–Ukraine conflict. The delegation comprised leaders and representatives from seven countries—Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville, Egypt, Senegal, Uganda, Zambia, apart from South Africa. It arrived in Ukraine on 16 June 2023 and headed to Russia a day later to discuss a pathway for a peaceful resolution of the ongoing war. The delegation presented a 10-point agenda for Presidents Zelensky and Putin, aiming for peaceful conflict resolution, including open communication, diplomacy, de-escalation, respect for sovereignty, security guarantees, grain flow restoration, humanitarian efforts, prisoner release, reconstruction, and dialogue promotion.1
While President Zelensky insisted on Russian troop withdrawal for meaningful progress in the peace talks, Moscow demanded Ukrainian recognition of Russian sovereignty in the occupied territories. Peace plans have also been proposed by Brazil2 and Indonesia,3 which were not considered by Ukraine and Russia. The two countries however were receptive to the idea of the African Peace Plan.
Africa had previously been involved in peace efforts during the Arab–Israeli conflict in the 1970s. These initiatives demonstrate Africa's efforts to promote peace and stability beyond its own borders.4 The Russia–Ukraine conflict and its impact on food, fuels, and fertilisers poses challenges for vulnerable populations across the world. Africa is a continent of significant size, complexity, and remarkable diversity. Its 54 countries and territories exhibit unique circumstances, histories, and varying relationships with both Russia and Western nations.
Assessment
The Peace mission, though, did not have high-level political representation from Congo, Uganda, and Egypt. The Presidents of these countries did not personally participate in the mission but instead sent their representatives. This lack of direct involvement from key leaders raised concerns about the plan's effectiveness and the commitment of these countries. In addition, the absence of Nigeria, despite having the largest population and economy in Africa, was a glaring inadequacy as regards the peace mission, lessening the group’s legitimacy.
Polish authorities refused entry to the South African Presidential Protection Services and journalists, citing the absence of original permits for the security team's heavy weaponry.5 The incident raised concerns about President Ramaphosa's safety as he travelled to Kyiv with reduced security. These acts undermined the peace mission and conveyed a message of disregard for the visiting delegation and their efforts towards promoting peace.
The timing of a peace process plays a significant role in determining its outcome. The mission arrived in Kiev when the city was subjected to a Russian missile attack. The timing of Russia's missile attack on Kyiv, coinciding with the presence of the seven-nation African delegation, including four presidents, was perceived as a display of disrespect.6 Ukraine also simultaneously launched a counteroffensive. These acts of escalation which prioritised military operations diverted attention and resources away from the African peace mission.
In addition, it is essential to highlight the absence of the African Union (AU), an organisation renowned for its expertise in leading peace initiatives. The participation of the African Union (AU) in a peace process would have lent greater significance and credibility, superseding the efforts of a coalition of nations.
President Ramaphosa announced the peace initiative shortly after the US ambassador to South Africa Reuben Brigety, accused the country of supplying arms to Russia, an accusation that South African officials have denied.7 This backdrop cast doubt on South Africa's involvement in the peace process. Ramaphosa in his meeting with President Putin also deliberated on the issue of the Russian President’s prospective participation in the August 2023 BRICS Summit in South Africa.
Due to an indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC), South African authorities would be obligated to arrest Putin if he were to visit. South Africa, however, made the decision to grant diplomatic immunity to Putin.8 Due to this, in a notable departure from previous years, South Africa was absent from the invite list for the June 2023 G-7 summit held in Japan. This development potentially signifies the initiation of a process whereby the country faces the prospects of further isolation or even exclusion from Western nations.9
Going Forward
It is pertinent to note that African nations have become wary of Russia's efforts in adding to the militarisation of the continent. The presence of the Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary organisation, for instance, is a cause for concern for African nations as the group poses major challenges to UN Peacekeeping Operations in countries like Mali and Central African Republic (CAR).10 Despite the rebellion of its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner group's deployments and business network in Africa remain unaffected.11
African countries therefore are evaluating the implications of engaging with Russia, and ensure that their policies align with long-term development goals without compromising their sovereignty or security. President Paul Kagame of Rwanda recently emphasised the necessity for Africa to cultivate resilience as a means of safeguarding itself against external factors. The role played by external actors such as Russia has been significant in facilitating the erosion of democracy in various regions, including in Africa.12 Over the past two decades, Russia's Africa policy has aimed at undermining democratic principles by targeting countries with weak domestic checks and balances. This approach has allowed Russia to exert influence in regions where authoritarian governments are prevalent.13
During the upcoming Second Russia–Africa Summit to be held from 26–29 July 2023, African leaders are expected to take a strong stance against Russia's use of food supply as a leverage for negotiation with Western countries. By adopting a prudent approach to external engagements, African nations could seek to safeguard their interests while contributing to regional stability and sustainable progress.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use, dreadfully experienced in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has had little policy impact on concluding a genuine nuclear disarmament convention.
The world is commemorating the 78th anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima (6 August) and Nagasaki (9 August). The number of persons killed and badly affected as a result of the atomic bombings has been a subject of contention. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists states that “the most credible estimates cluster around a ‘low’ of 110,000 mortalities and a ‘high’ of 210,000”.1 Highlighting this wide gap in estimates, the author seems perplexed that the varied estimates are made by experts and credible institutions.
Although the remembrance services are organised all over the world, the two bombed cities become the focus of tributes and speech-making every year. This year, too, speeches have been that term the bombings horrific. The release of the movie Oppenheimer is drawing more attention to the destruction caused to the two Japanese cities by the efforts of the ‘father of the atomic bomb’. The need for disarmament is repeated in the speeches of the Mayors of the two cities and statements of other organisations and groups involved in disarmament efforts.
On these two dates, the world overwhelmingly realises the imperative need for a world without nuclear weapons. This annual ritual builds norms for nuclear disarmament, but the reality of nuclear disarmament is yet to be realised. On the somber occasion, it is imperative to assess the state of affairs of nuclear disarmament. How are the regimes and institutions along with other actors treating the idea of nuclear disarmament? Is the world serious about it? The stark reality is that the world appears paying only lip service to nuclear disarmament and the regimes and the institutions are not able to break the deadlock.
The most-famed legal instrument, which includes the element of nuclear disarmament as part of a grand bargain, is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Article VI of the treaty lays down provisions for nuclear disarmament. It asks the member countries of the treaty which are possessing nuclear weapons to start negotiations for not merely halting the nuclear arms race but also nuclear disarmament. The Review Conference of the NPT held from 1 to 26 August 2022, in which several grand ideas were exchanged, also had to pass through the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombing days. Nuclear disarmament also came up for discussion during the 2022 RevCon.
At the 2022 NPT Review Conference (RevCon), the Group of the Non-Aligned States Parties to the treaty gave a presentation which emphasised nuclear disarmament. Similarly, the New Agenda Coalition consisting of countries from both the developing and the developed worlds, established in 1998, did express its concern about completely ignoring ‘the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons’ by the nuclear weapon states of the NPT.
Nuclear Disarmament has been a contentious issue among the member states of the treaty. Some of the RevCons of the 21st century failed to agree to outcome documents and reports, predominantly due to differences on nuclear disarmament. Quite notably, the nuclear disarmament related article has been interpreted2 differently by and in the nuclear weapons states, especially the United States for a long period. A section of the policy community refuses to accept that Article VI obliges nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT to pursue nuclear disarmament. The US government though struck a reconciliatory tone at the 2022 RevCon by stating that the objective of the Non-Nuclear Weapons States and the Nuclear Weapons States was the same—‘a world free of nuclear weapons’.
The outcome document of the 2022 NPT RevCon, though not adopted, underlines the fact that the treaty provides a ‘foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament’, and stipulates ‘legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament in accordance with the Treaty’. It further recognises the reality that nuclear disarmament can promote international peace and security. The ‘total elimination’ of the nuclear stockpile is considered the ultimate solution. The same document also mentions unilateral, bilateral, regional, and multilateral methods to cut, and finally end the nuclear stockpile. The roadmap to achieve it, however, is clearly missing in the document.
Unfortunately, a section of the international community interprets that Article VI merely suggests negotiations in good faith to stop the arms race and to go for the reduction of nuclear arsenals and if possible, for nuclear disarmament. Some of them also maintain that as long as nuclear weapons exist, a nuclear weapons state may have to rely on nuclear weapons for its security.
The Mayor of Hiroshima in 2023 once again asked the nuclear weapons states to move away from nuclear deterrence and go for nuclear disarmament. The state and the global civil society pay tribute to the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki but remain ineffective in realising nuclear disarmament.
Instead of going for nuclear disarmament, the dominant section of the international community appears to prefer arms control, nuclear proliferation, and reduction of nuclear risks. Even the 2022 NPT outcome document considers ‘miscalculation, miscommunication, misperception, or accident’ quite relevant. This is relevant because nuclear disarmament is not in sight.
Quite significantly, arms control mechanism like New Start Treaty are struggling. The new Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty is also out of the horizon. Even the non-proliferation regime, which has the NPT as a mainstay, is under pressure. The leading powers and their allies do not vote on the key UN resolutions for reducing nuclear dangers.
The humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons are highlighted in different forums and documents. The 2022 outcome document too reflects the humanitarian angle when it affirms that
the immediate, mid-and long-term consequences of nuclear weapon detonations, inter alia, on health, the environment, biodiversity, infrastructure, food security, climate, development, social cohesion, and the global economy are interlinked, and would not be constrained by national borders but have regional or global effects and that a nuclear war could even threaten the survival of humanity.3
However, it seems that the humanitarian consequences, highlighted in different meetings and dreadfully experienced in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has had little policy impact on concluding a genuine nuclear disarmament convention.
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is being touted as a nuclear disarmament convention. The treaty, which has been adopted and opened for signature in 2017, became operational in January 2021.4 Currently, it has 92 signatories and 68 of them are state parties which have ratified or acceded to the treaty.5 However, all the nuclear weapons possessing countries are outside the TPNW and did not even participate in the negotiations process of the treaty. Moreover, almost all the NATO countries stayed away from negotiations, and none of them have joined the treaty as yet.
The TPNW was seen by many as undermining the NPT process and giving a backdoor exit to its nuclear member states and their nuclear disarmament commitment. Yet, for a country like India, ‘this Treaty does not constitute or contribute to the development of customary international law; nor does it set any new standards or norms’.6 Despite being a nuclear weapons country, India envisions a world without nuclear weapons. Quite touchingly, the Indian Parliament pays tribute to the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki every year.
Negotiating the treaty in the Conference on Disarmament would have given it legitimacy, and it would have been negotiated probably with better expertise. A comprehensive convention could have required provisions for the proper implementation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. As of now, the treaty looks ad hoc with several loopholes and limitations.
The crisis generated by the Ukraine–Russia conflict is going to complicate the future nuclear disarmament scenario. The world does not seem to be realising the urgency of nuclear disarmament. The general apprehension is that the security of non-nuclear weapons states vis-à-vis nuclear weapons states may become a powerful tool for the spread of nuclear weapons if the doctrine of negative security assurance is not adopted by the nuclear weapons states.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The controversy regarding President Vladimir Putin’s participation in the BRICS Summit at Johannesburg due to an arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court highlights the geopolitical overtones and inadequacies of the ICC in the contemporary world.
The clouds of confusion on the BRICS Summit to be held in Johannesburg, South Africa from 22–24 August 2023 have cleared as speculations regarding Russian President Vladimir Putin’s participation in the event have been put to rest. Russian authorities confirmed that President Putin shall participate in the high-profile event in a virtual mode, while his Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov will attend in person.1 South Africa, as Chair of the BRICS, had decided to go ahead with hosting the Summit meeting2 amidst controversy in the wake of International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant issued against Putin in March 2023.3
Given that South Africa is a signatory and ratifier of the Rome Statute, ICC expected the warrant to be executed when Putin attended the meeting. Putin has been accused of being responsible for unlawful deportation and transfer of children from the battleground in Ukraine to the Russian Federation.4 However, the arrest of the leader of a powerful BRICS member country in South Africa would have been a diplomatic disaster.
South Africa was contemplating extending sovereign immunity to a Head of State as per international convention and not go ahead with arresting President Putin. But this would have meant going against the ICC obligations and defaulting on an international statutory commitment. The confusion however ended with the announcement of the Russian decision, and the Summit will be organised as per its schedule in Johannesburg.
South Africa and ICC
This was not the first occasion that an international summit in South Africa was under scanner due to dilemmas and repercussions related to her membership of the ICC. South Africa faced a similar situation in 2015, when Omar Al-Bashir, the erstwhile President of Sudan attended the African Union (AU) Summit meeting in the country.5 The ICC had issued an arrest warrant against Bashir for acts of crime against humanity, war crimes, and genocide committed in Darfur, Sudan between 2003 and 2008. South Africa however did not execute the warrant citing Bashir’s sovereign immunity.
It must be noted that Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute but was acquired in the jurisdiction of the ICC through a referral by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) under Article 13(b) of the Statute for investigating and trying only the crimes and atrocities committed in Darfur under President Bashir.
In July 2017, the Pre-Trial Chamber II of the ICC concluded that South Africa violated the Rome Statute by not arresting Bashir. It also concluded that by agreeing to host AU Summit meeting, South Africa could not automatically assign immunity to President Bashir. Nevertheless, the negative observation by the Chamber did not lead to the reference of South African non-compliance to the Assembly of State Parties (ASP) to the Rome Statute or the UN Security Council (UNSC) for further action.6
Had the case been referred to ASP, the country could have faced further referral to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), while in case of UNSC, the Russian veto would have nullified any action. There are no punitive provisions in the Rome Statue for a state failing to cooperate and execute its orders. However, if referred to the ICJ or UNSC, the countries in question may face binding obligations failing which they shall be liable to UN actions under Chapter VI or VII depending on the severity of the case.
The ICC has been institutionalised as a complementary Court which is supposed to act if the national administration and courts of a country—where a war crime, crime against humanity, or genocide has been committed, or to which the perpetrators belong to, fail to act in prosecuting and punishing them.
South African courts had taken note of the non-compliance and concluded that South Africa defaulted by not arresting Bashir.7 The Pre-Trial Chamber II seemed satisfied by the proceedings in the South African courts and given the record of previous referrals to ASP or UNSC did not see any benefit in escalating the case for further action.8 But the Chamber would have been under immense pressure if it repeated the same in case of South Africa failing to arrest Putin.
As South Africa is a member of both ICC and BRICS, the country sometimes finds herself divided between the two. It was reported that the Russians insisted for the meeting to be offline with physical presence of all the BRICS leaders,9 while South Africa was trying hard to find a middle path which resulted in the current Russian decision. The Russian President’s decision not to attend the BRICS Summit physically therefore rescued both South Africa and the ICC from a diplomatic quagmire.
ICC and Geopolitics
The Rome Statute is seen as politicising the prosecution process with the inclusion of provisions of referral of even non-state members by the UNSC. Another provision of the Court allows it to try perpetrators from a non-party state without her consent.10 Such provisions are viewed as legal aggression in the traditional sovereign jurisdictions, by BRICS countries like Russia.
Since Russia possesses veto in the UNSC, the ICC Prosecutor took up the Ukrainian case via another route. Ukraine, through two separate declarations, accepted the Court’s jurisdiction for the crimes committed on its territory from 21 February 2013 onwards. The investigation of the recent situation in Ukraine was initiated by the head of the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICC. Lithuania, a party to Rome Statute and member of NATO, referred the alleged crimes by Putin to the ICC. A total of 43 State parties to the Court, especially EU members, backed the referral of the Ukrainian situation for investigation to put diplomatic pressure on Putin.11 This put South Africa, one of the endorsers of the idea of the ICC, in a difficult spot, so much so that it seriously contemplated pulling out of the Rome Statute. The country decided not to go for the extreme step only recently.12
The South African situation highlights the complexities of the functioning of international system. Being a prominent economy and a middle power from Africa, the country has assumed a larger role of supporting peace and order on the continent. For this, it has aligned and cooperated with regional or international bodies that promise to bring a semblance of peace and eliminate impunity from the continent. South Africa signed the Rome Statute in one of its idealist moments that had emerged due to the impunity prevalent primarily in Africa and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s.
South Africa and other countries who joined in the Court prioritised the need to bring to justice the perpetrators of violence over the universally accepted principle of national sovereignty in certain cases. For the signatories of the Rome Statue, this was the price to be paid for eliminating impunity and creating a sense of justice in international society. However, several major powers and European countries were not on the same page on this point. The US, China, Russia and India have since then kept out of the Rome Statute for similar reasons. The Court has also been accused of double standards and Eurocentrism. All the 31 cases that have been confirmed and listed in the court are from Africa.13
The controversy regarding Putin’s participation in the BRICS Summit in Johannesburg due to the ICC arrest warrant highlights the geopolitical overtones and inadequacies of the ICC in the contemporary world. BRICS is one of the most important international groupings representing around 42 per cent of humanity and contributing more than a quarter of the global GDP.14 The case of warrant against Sudan’s Bashir was technically the same but substantively and politically very different from that of Putin.
Arresting one of the heads of BRICS states with one of the strongest militaries possessing nuclear weapons and a veto in the UNSC would have led to far greater consequences as against the Bashir case. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa stated in a document submitted to the court that “Russia has made it clear that arresting its sitting President would be a declaration of war.”15 The issue caused diplomatic discomfort between the two countries, which now stands resolved due to the understanding shown by both the sides.
Looking into the Future
The set of events highlight a world in flux and the tight rope walk by middle powers like South Africa. Brazil, another middle power and party to the Rome Statute, may be seen walking the same tight rope during its presidency of BRICS. Therefore, the Rome Statute has the potential to create diplomatic issues and geopolitical discord among countries. Many countries see the ICC as an agenda which is not in sync with conditions of the contemporary world. The party states either have to press for amendments in the Statute to avoid such situations in future or be ready to see the ICC decrees being violated and becoming ineffective due to geopolitical interplays. The positions taken by BRICS countries during the deliberations before signing and enforcement of the Rome Statute may guide such amendments.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Erdogan extracted significant concessions while maximising Turkish national interest by supporting Sweden’s accession into NATO.
In May 2022, Finland and Sweden expressed interest in joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Finland’s application was approved, and the country became a member in April 2023. However, Sweden’s accession faced an obstacle as Turkiye, one of NATO’s 31 members, blocked the process. Turkiye alleged that Sweden was harbouring Kurdish separatists. As a result, Sweden’s membership in NATO remained pending due to this contentious issue raised by Turkiye.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has prompted NATO to reinforce its collective defence. On 10 July 2023, in a joint press statement with Ulf Kristersson, Prime Minister of Sweden and Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary General of NATO, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan endorsed Swedish accession into NATO. Turkiye has agreed to submit the Accession Protocol concerning Sweden to the Grand National Assembly of Turkiye (GNAT) and collaboratively engage with the Assembly to ensure and facilitate the ratification process.1
Erdogan has achieved many desired outcomes in favour of Turkiye by supporting Sweden’s accession into NATO. He has successfully extracted significant concessions while maximising Turkish national interest. After winning the Turkish presidential election in May 2023, Erdogan has continued his government’s assertive foreign policy. Turkiye is pursuing a multidimensional and multidirectional foreign policy while taking care of its strategic autonomy.2
Hard Bargain with Sweden
The visits of Swedish PM Ulf Kristersson on 8 November 2022 and Foreign Minister Tobias Billstrom on 22 December 2022 to Turkiye3 laid a good foundation for further cooperation and strategic partnership between Sweden and Turkiye. Fulfilling the mutually agreed provisions outlined in the Trilateral Memorandum of 2022, involving Sweden, Turkiye and Finland, Sweden has made constitutional amendments. It has substantially enhanced its counter-terrorism cooperation with Turkiye in dealing with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a terror group and resumed exporting arms to Turkiye.4
Sweden’s new anti-terrorism law, which went into force on 1 June 2023, aims to address Turkiye’s main demands for ratifying the Nordic country’s NATO membership. The law criminalises membership in terrorist organisations and imposes up to four years in prison for individuals involved in terrorist activities or supporting such organisations. Billstrom highlighted that the law would help assuage Turkiye’s concerns, particularly related to the PKK’s activities in Sweden.5
Under a new bilateral Security Compact between Sweden and Turkiye, the ministerial level meeting will take place annually. During the inaugural meeting of the Security Compact, Sweden will present a roadmap outlining its ongoing efforts to combat terrorism in all its forms. Sweden reaffirmed its stance of not providing support to the People’s Protection Units (YPG), Democratic Union Party (PYD), and the organisation referred to as Fethullah Terrorist Organisation (FETO) in Turkiye.6 Moreover, Sweden has committed to actively support endeavours to revitalise Turkiye’s accession process to the EU. This commitment includes advocating for the modernisation of the EU–Turkiye Customs Union as well as promoting visa liberalisation initiatives between Turkiye and the EU.7
Re-Energising Relations with the EU
Before heading to Lithuania to attend the NATO Summit, Erdogan highlighted that Turkiye has been fulfilling the commitments relating to the open door policy of NATO, supporting its expansion. Despite that, he lamented that “Turkiye has for over 50 years been kept waiting at the door of the European Union.”8 Erdogan demanded Turkish membership in the EU and stated “first clear the path to the EU in front of Turkiye and then we will clear the path in front of Sweden, just as we did for Finland”.9 At the NATO Summit, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg supported Turkiye’s ambitions to become a member of the EU.10
The Foreign Affairs Council of the EU held discussions on EU–Turkiye relations, emphasising the need for the EU to re-engage with Turkiye and foster cooperation based on common interests while addressing existing differences. They highlighted the importance of achieving a sustainable de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean and finding a solution to the Cyprus question under relevant UN Resolutions for regional stability and security. Additionally, upholding fundamental freedoms and values, as defined in the European Convention of Human Rights, was underscored as essential, given Ankara’s party status to the Convention.11 These positions do indicate that the prospects for Turkish membership in the EU seems bleak as of now.
Advancing Bilateral Relations with the US
Turkiye’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defence system has caused prolonged tensions with the US and NATO due to concerns about compromising security and interoperability. Both the US and NATO have cautioned Turkiye that the S-400 system is incompatible with NATO’s defence infrastructure, which could potentially expose sensitive information to Russia. Despite these warnings, Turkiye has persisted with the deal, leading to the US taking punitive actions such as suspending Turkiye from the F-35 fighter jet programme in 2019 and imposing sanctions on Turkish entities and officials involved in the S-400 purchase.12
In October 2021, Turkiye requested the US to purchase US$ 20 billion worth of 40 Lockheed Martin F-16 fighter jets, along with approximately 80 modernisation kits for its existing fleet of warplanes.13 In that regard, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin recently remarked that the US supports Turkiye’s military modernisation. Additionally, US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan explicitly hinted towards moving forward with the request of Turkiye to purchase F-16 fighter jets in consultation with Congress.14 However, the congressional concerns relating to Turkish belligerence against Greece and Armenia and the deterioration of the human rights situation in Turkiye15 are likely to be factored in the discussion regarding the F-16 sale.
US President Joe Biden welcomed Erdogan’s readiness to promptly ratify the Accession Protocol for Sweden’s membership into the NATO to GNAT for ratification. He expressed his readiness to collaborate closely with Erdogan and Turkiye in strengthening defence and deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic region.16 At the NATO Summit in Lithuania, Biden and Erdogan exchanged perspectives on defence and economic priorities, underscoring their commitment to strengthen collaboration in these areas.17
Canada and Netherlands Policy Shift
The export of certain drone technology from Canada to Turkiye was suspended in 2020 following the determination that Azerbaijan’s forces had utilised the equipment during the conflict with Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.18 Following Ankara’s endorsement of Sweden’s NATO membership, Canada has decided to resume discussions with Turkiye regarding lifting export controls on drone parts, including optical equipment.19
It may be seen as a potentially significant development for the Turkish defence industry. Canadian PM Justin Trudeau met Erdogan in Lithuania and discussed shared priorities, including collective security, investment and people-to-people ties. He thanked Erdogan for his leadership on the Black Sea Grain Initiative.20
The Netherlands has lifted its arms restrictions against Turkiye, which were imposed in 2019 due to its military actions in Syria. The Dutch government abolished its “presumption of denial policy” regarding arms exports.21 The move by Turkiye to support Sweden’s accession led to a shift in the Dutch position. Despite the policy change, the Netherlands will continue monitoring the use of its goods in conflicts in Northern Syria and Yemen. Previously, the Netherlands mainly exported tank and armoured vehicle parts, fighter plane technology, and attack helicopter components to Turkiye.22
Conclusion
Erdogan has continued his government’s assertive foreign policy that has yielded positive outcomes. While endorsing Sweden’s accession to NATO, Ankara has compelled Sweden to be more accountable vis-à-vis Turkish security concerns. Turkiye has re-energised its efforts to improve relations with the EU. The Netherlands’ decision to lift the arms sanctions on Turkiye is also likely to benefit the Turkish economy and defence sector. Moreover, the resumption of talks with Canada on lifting export controls and the US sending positive signals on approval for F-16 reflects a significant step forward for the Turkish defence economy. Although challenges relating to chronic inflation and weakened Lira persist, Turkiye’s efforts to strengthen defence cooperation and re-establish itself as a key player in NATO demonstrate the positives flowing out of its assertive foreign policy stance.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Okinawa prefecture has the potential to be a new factor affecting Japan-China relations, unless the Japanese government can manage local grievances.
On 3 July 2023, a delegation of 80-odd members of the Japanese Association for the Promotion of International Trade, led by former House of Representatives speaker Yohei Kono, visited Beijing for a four-day trip to meet with senior Chinese officials.1 Among the delegation was Denny Tamaki, Governor of Okinawa prefecture, Japan’s southernmost set of islands. During the visit, Tamaki paid his respects at the collective grave of people from his prefecture interred on the outskirts of Beijing. The graves are of people who died due to various causes during the later half of the Qing dynasty (1636–1911).2 Tamaki then headed to Fujian province in the south of China, where he met local Communist Party officials, including the governor of the province.3 After returning to Japan, he expressed satisfaction with his visit, and prayed for good relations to continue.
Tamaki’s visit may mark a unique case of Japanese subnational diplomacy, but his itinerary has raised quite a few eyebrows in Tokyo. This is because his comments at the gravesite mentioned above were quite unexpected. Tamaki promised to “inherit and firmly maintain ties between Okinawa and China” in order to create a “peaceful and rich era”. Earlier, before departing for Beijing, he commented that he intended Okinawa to “maintain connections with various countries” instead of “being concerned about increasing tensions”.
These statements echo the June 2023 remarks by a former governor of Fujian province, President Xi Jinping, who in a visit to the national archives of China flagged the historical ties between Fujian province and Okinawa, then known as Ryukyu.4 Xi also expressed hope for the future relationship between the two.
Some sections of Japanese political and policy circles are concerned that China might be positioning itself to eventually raise doubts about Japanese control over Okinawa , or claim Okinawa as “traditional Chinese territory” . To be sure, there is merit to these speculations, as this is the same strategy China has used before in its territorial disputes with Japan over the Senkaku Islands, the Philippines and Vietnam over the South China Sea reefs, and with Tibet in the middle of the 20th century. However, just the act of questioning Japan’s sovereignty over these islands may be enough to significantly destabilise Japan’s security posture and divert significant resources away that could deter China from invading Taiwan. Furthermore, a closer look at Okinawa’s history reveals that the problem, such as it is, is partly one of Japan’s own making. This is because, until 1872, Okinawa was not Japanese territory at all.
Okinawa’s Complex History
Okinawa was originally known as Ryukyu (Luchu to the Chinese) and was an independent kingdom under its own government. In the 15th century, the kingdom rose to prominence as a trade hub between the Japanese and Chinese empires, and entered into tributary relations with both Ming China and later the feudal samurai lords of the Satsuma domain (presently Kagoshima prefecture) in Japan.
The small island kingdom was able to maintain its de facto independence for almost 500 years, until Western ships began appearing near Japanese shores, collapsing the mainland’s military government and its policy of sakoku, or National Isolation. A newly revamped Empire of Japan, seeking to secure its rear flank and eager to acquire an overseas empire of its own, invaded and occupied Ryukyu in 1872, ending its independence by annexing the country as Okinawa prefecture in 1879.
Even before the Second World War, Japanese policies of assimilation, such as banning the Okinawan language and dress, were unpopular among the people of the islands. However, it was in the heat of the Second World War that Okinawa endured its toughest trial, in the form of the Battle of Okinawa in 1945, also called the ‘typhoon of steel’. Over 12,000 American and 1,00,000 Japanese servicemen lost their lives, alongside 1,00,000 Okinawan civilians, most of whom were ordered to kill themselves by the Japanese military.5
After the war, Okinawa remained under the control of the victorious United States for more than 20 years beyond the San Francisco Peace Treaty that officially ended the American occupation in the rest of the country. Even after reversion in 1972, the Okinawan islands, representing less than one per cent of the total Japanese landmass, played host to over 70 per cent of US forward bases placed there to protect the Japanese mainland from external attack.
As a result, the islands became home to an active anti-war movement, alongside other left-wing ideologies. The US bases became especially objectionable after several crimes committed by US servicemen in Okinawan cities, such as the rape and murder of a high school girl in 1995, galvanised a profound sense of antipathy and alienation among an already disaffected populace. Many Okinawans today are hesitant to identify with the mainland, and remain opposed to Tokyo’s security concerns.
The constant military movements impact the residents’ physical and mental well-being, as well as the tropical ecosystem of the islands.6 Okinawa is the poorest prefecture in Japan, with an unemployment rate of over 3.2 per cent in 2022, as compared to the Japanese average of 2.64 per cent.7 Further, the placement of advanced missile interceptor systems such as Patriot-3 batteries around the islands has raised the anxieties of locals, as these are sure to be targeted in the event of a conflict.
China’s goals
It is these anxieties that China wishes to exploit. By cultivating a sense that Okinawans are an independent entity, the Chinese may be able to stoke opposition to the bases, and embolden anti-base activists to oppose the facilities more stridently. They could also encourage the Okinawans to seek alternative sources of investment and trade from Chinese sources in order to counter the tight financial control exercised by Tokyo, enabling Okinawa to stand up to the latter in matters of national security. Should Japan oppose this or place artificial controls on Okinawan investment, China could easily make the case that Japan’s control of the islands is coercive after all, and help to dent Japan’s image in the eyes of the international community, as any controls would effectively violate Japan’s democratic norms.
More insidiously, in the event of an invasion of Taiwan, Okinawa, which is only 628 kilometres away, must be taken out of the picture.8 In this, the nuisance value of the anti-base movement plays a vital role, as it may cripple Japan’s response to the attack by means of strikes and other demonstrations. Statements made by Governor Tamaki already paint such a picture: in an interview he gave to Global Times, he said that he “cannot allow Okinawa to become an easier target for attack simply because U.S. military bases are concentrated here”.9 In this sense, a divided Okinawa hampers the rapid movement of Japanese Self-Defence Forces to some extent, even if it may not hamper US forces.
Conclusion
If Okinawans’ genuine concerns are to be assuaged, an acknowledgement of Japan’s ethnic diversity would go a long way. The government made a good start in 2019 by acknowledging through legislation that the Ainu community of Hokkaido are the indigenous inhabitants of Japan.10 A similar legislation that notes Ryukyu’s independent history and acknowledges mainland Japanese assimilation policies as oppressive would take the sting out of several points of criticism. Additionally, in order to prevent the base issue from festering, Japan could consider moving a sizeable number of US bases out of the prefecture to other places around the Japanese mainland. Doing so would not only lighten the burden currently borne by Okinawa, but also improve national security, as dispersed bases in multiple locations would make it harder for China to launch missile strikes against them.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
UCAVs can impose a major decision dilemma on the adversary and act as a part of a combined arms offensive in the air, in their role as ‘loyal wingman’ for manned fighter jets.
The Russian S-70 Okhotnik (Hunter) unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) was reportedly used on the Ukrainian battlefield on 27 June 2023, where it struck Ukrainian military facilities in the regions of Sumy and Kremenchuk.1 This is an important development in the war since it showcases Russian capability to move beyond tactical and ad-hoc equipped drones like Orlan-10, Lastochka, Forpost-R and Orion,2 commercial Chinese quadcopters (DJI and Air series)3 and the Shahed and Mohajer series loitering munitions (LMs) imported from Iran,4 to staking a major technological claim in the form of a UCAV. In the short term, Russia will still depend on Iranian expertise in LMs given that a manufacturing plant has been set up inside Russia.5 The successful strikes by the S-70, with the option of manned–unmanned teaming (MUM-T) with the Su-57 fighter jet, provide the country with a deployable option, still under development by other powers like the US and the UK.
The Okhotnik project has been in the making since 20116 and has been envisaged as a “loyal wingman” for the Su-57.7 A loyal wingman is a UCAV which, using onboard AI, can collaborate with manned fighters and is seen as being significantly low-cost than its manned counterpart.8 This expands the tasking and deployment options for the pair (at the very least one UCAV and one manned fighter are being considered but the numbers of UCAV can increase depending on the cognitive load on the pilot). The project is being jointly developed by Sukhoi and Mikoyan as a sixth-generation heavy UCAV.9 A sixth generation air vehicle has parameters like onboard data fusion and artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities, advanced stealth airframes, advanced variable cycle engines and integration of directed energy weapons (DEW).10 Two prototypes have been developed so far, the first one with a circular exhaust and the latter with a more square-shaped one to increase stealth.11 Two more are under development and these are supposedly similar to the ones which will finally undergo serial production.12
The design of the S-70 is that of a ‘flying wing’, similar to that of the F-117 Nighthawk, the RQ-170 and the Shahed-136.13 Okhotnik’s first autonomous flight testing, which included a flight time of around 30 minutes, alongside an Su-57, was conducted on 27 September 2019.14 The Su-57 has been used as a flying laboratory for testing the Hunter’s avionics. Unguided bombs were tested in 2021,15 followed by the test-firing of Kh59 Mk2 precision guided munition (PGM) in May 2022.16 The current version of Su-57 is a single-seat fighter but a twin-seater variant has been flight-tested with the Hunter where the co-pilot will be exclusively responsible for controlling and monitoring the UCAV, with the pilot performing his/her basic functions.
Certain other developments in this project merit attention. When operationally ready, each Su-57 will command up to four S-70s.17 Already, four Su-57s have been used to conduct suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) in Ukraine on 9 June 2022.18 The interesting part was that all four were “linked to a single information network to destroy air defense systems through automatic communication systems, data transmission, navigation and identification in real-time”.19 The Okhotnik has also been trialed with the Mig-29.20 In a standalone mode, it may also be deployed on the still-in-development Project 23900 Ivan Rogonov helicopter carriers, each of which has a capacity to accommodate 4 S-70s.21 Russian analysts have also dubbed the S-70 the world’s first “outer space” drone.22
Manned–Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T)
The Okhotnik’s strikes in Ukraine can act as proof of concept for the MUM-T concept, under development in a number of countries including India. MUM-T has been defined differently by different armed forces across the world. While the US Army Aviation Centre (USAACE) defines MUM-T as “synchronized employment of soldier, manned and unmanned air and ground vehicles, robotics, and sensors to achieve enhanced situational understanding, greater lethality, and improved survivability”,23 the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)’s standardisation agreement (STANAG) calibrates five levels of interoperability (LOI) between manned and unmanned platforms,24 with the first being indirect receipt of UAV-related data, going up to level five which relates to the control and monitoring of the UAV along with launch and recovery functions.25
In India, the Combat Air Teaming System (CATS) is meant as an umbrella term for a combination of manned and unmanned assets which can reduce human casualties, perform air-to-air and air-to-ground strikes from a standoff distance and also act as atmospheric satellites for high altitude surveillance.26 The initial prototypes are being tested on the Jaguar aircraft and will later be fitted on the Tejas light combat aircraft (LCA) acting as the “mothership”.27
Similar projects are being developed in the US (collaborative combat aircraft or CCA)28 , Australia (air teaming system or ATS)29 and the UK (Project Tempest).30 Within the US, a number of parallel programs are in progress. The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is field testing the Skyborg program with the Kratos’ X-58 Valkyrie.31 The Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is moving ahead with the air combat evolution (ACE) program,32 and in a simulation featuring a US Air Force (USAF) pilot competing with an AI pilot under the AlphaDogFight program, had shown that AI could beat human pilots in number of fighter manoeuvres and targeting actions.33 There were obviously some caveats and one could say that the dice was loaded in favour of the AI. However, even granting those advantages to the AI, the performance has been nothing short of impressive and heralds the future of air combat.
MUM-T, when implemented during conventional combat scenarios, offers the advantage of combining the strengths of manned and unmanned aircrafts, while complementing each other’s shortfalls. The UCAV can be sent ahead in a dense air defence (AD) environment to scout for targets, perform SEAD and force the adversary to reveal its surface to air missile (SAM) sites. This data, most of which is computed within the UCAV using edge processing, can be sent back to the manned fighter, already at standoff range, and used for conducting air and ground attacks. The UCAV, when equipped with either air-to-air or air-to-ground (AAM/AGM) missiles can also act as a ‘flying magazine’ for the manned fighter, increasing the inventory and range of the aircraft.
With the number of unmanned platforms under the pilot’s control increasing and the unmanned platforms themselves carrying LMs, similar to what is envisaged in the CATS program, the pilot now has the opportunity to conduct what this writer calls “simultaneous multi-roles” (SMRs) where the capabilities of the manned fighter will increase manifold. At the same instant, the pilot can engage air targets, perform precision bombing against pin-point high value targets and saturate the battlefield with LMs and conventional unguided bombs.
Air combat is likely to undergo a major change with the entry of UAVs of all shapes and sizes. Countries which can proactively take advantage of this phase of air combat evolution are likely to have a greater edge over their adversaries. As the Okhotnik trials and later operational use shows, the combination of the human mind and computational strength of microchips, integrated into a single system, has the potential to impose on the adversary a major decision dilemma regarding the system to be countered and can act as a combined arms offensive in the air.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The paradox of South Africa being formally neutral on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, yet parallelly deepening military relationship with Russia, is continuing to strain US–South Africa relations.
Following months of speculations, a decision has finally been made—Russian President Vladimir Putin won’t attend the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) Summit which is taking place in Johannesburg from 22 to 24 August 2023. The development comes as a relief for South African officials as it helps Pretoria dodge an awkward diplomatic and legal dilemma. Being a signatory to the Rome Statute which governs the International Criminal Court (ICC), South African officials would have been obliged to arrest Putin upon arrival. In March 2023, ICC issued a warrant for Putin’s arrest over alleged war crimes committed in Ukraine.1 Two other members of BRICS—India and China—are not signatories to the Rome Statute. Brazil is a member but since it wasn’t hosting the meeting, it did not have to deal with this situation.
The moment speculations about Putin’s possible attendance began, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa employed every possible means to diffuse the situation and navigate his way out of the tight diplomatic spot. First, his administration proposed Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov lead the Russian delegation instead of Putin. This request was denied by Moscow. Secondly, rumors began to fuel speculations that the BRICS summit could become a virtual summit or may even get shifted to China.2 Such rumors were categorically denied by Ramaphosa as his administration insisted on hosting a physical summit. Moreover, President Ramaphosa is trying to consolidate his own domestic standing and garner support from various flanks of his ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), with the South African general elections scheduled to take place in 2024.
US Ambassador’s Allegation
The troubled period for South African administration began on 11 May when the United States Ambassador to South Africa Reuben Brigety held a press conference in which he accused South African officials of allegedly loading weapons onto a sanctioned Russian ship in December 2022.3 This triggered a long drawn diplomatic spat between Washington and Pretoria. It was claimed that the Russian cargo ship known as The Lady R docked at Simon’s Town naval base near Cape Town last December with its tracking device switched off. This prompted questions whether the ship was loaded with arms before returning to Russia.
Even before this development, tensions between US and South Africa were already palpable. On the anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine in February 2023, South African military participated in a ten-day exercise – Exercise Mosi, along with Russia and China. This provoked criticism both at home and abroad.4 With Ambassador Brigety’s accusation, South Africa’s officially proclaimed “non-aligned” position on the Russian invasion of Ukraine came under scrutiny. Following the press conference, the immediate fallout was felt in the financial markets with the South African Rand plummeting to a record low of 19.51 to the dollar.5
The other implication was the possibility of South Africa being suspended from the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which is due to expire in 2023. Under AGOA, South Africa currently enjoys preferential duty-free market access to the US, South Africa’s third-largest trading partner. If South Africa’s preferential status indeed gets suspended, then industries like wine, citrus and motor would be gravely affected, leading to job losses and reduced export revenues.6
In response, the South African government categorically denied US accusations and defended its decision to participate in military exercise with Russia and China citing its right to pursue its own international policy since it is a sovereign nation. South Africa’s Minister of Defence Thandi Modise claimed that the Lady R docked to deliver a shipment of ammunition for the South African National Defence Force’s Special Forces Regiment, equipment that had been ordered prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.7 Owing to the seriousness of the allegations and its potential impact on South Africa’s international image, Ramaphosa established a three-person panel to investigate the incident.8 However, the timeline for completing the investigation and providing a final report remains undetermined for the time being.
South Africa’s Rhetoric of Non-Alignment
The paradox of being formally neutral on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, yet parallelly deepening military relationship with Russia is continuing to strain US–South Africa relations. Right from the start, South Africa has insisted that it supports the “peaceful resolution” of the conflict.9 Pretoria along with a group of five African countries volunteered to visit both Moscow and Kyiv and constitute a “peace mission”. The delegation put forward a 10-point plan that stressed on unimpeded grain exports through the Black Sea. Yet in practical terms, Africa’s peace mission failed to yield meaningful results.10 The delegation faced several logistical and security challenges.
Problems with the US have been further complicated with South Africa continuing to abstain on voting at the UN General Assembly resolutions calling for an end to the war and Russia’s withdrawal from Ukrainian territory. India has followed a similar path whereas China has voted against such resolutions. Although there are no cultural or linguistic ties between South Africa and Russia, the former’s support for the latter could be attributed to the roots of the ANC. Being Africa’s oldest liberation movement fighting against white minority rule in South Africa, the ANC relied heavily on support from the erstwhile Soviet Union. The armed wing of the ANC—known as Umkhonto we Sizwe—received arms, ammunitions, and military training from the Soviets in 1960s. With such historical affinities, it is understandable why South Africa would be standing on the fence on the Russia–Ukraine conflict. However, the question of whether South Africa has been able to substantiate its doctrine of non-alignment or usage of the term non-aligned is debatable.11
Additionally, the West had raised the stakes for South Africa to pursue a course of action tantamount to economic sabotage. Apart from potential suspension from AGOA, Putin’s arrival and South Africa’s failure to arrest him would have subjected Pretoria to penalties such as exclusion from various Western payments platform and protocols. On 9 June 2023, US Congressional leaders also issued a bipartisan letter urging President Joe Biden to question South Africa’s eligibility for continued inclusion in the AGOA and to consider moving the venue of 2023 AGOA Forum from South Africa to another country.12
Apart from these challenges, the principal line of argument coming from South African officials relates to its own role in negotiation and mediation on peace and security issues. Currently, there are not many states that have access to both President Putin and President Volodymyr Zelensky and can engage with the two parties simultaneously. This sentiment has been echoed by South Africa’s Minister for International Relations and Cooperation Dr Grace Naledi Pandor. However, by being a signatory to the Rome Statute, South Africa has inadvertently put itself in a difficult position when it comes to hosting leaders in the future. Unless the Rome Statute of 2002 is amended, the question of any future state visit by the President of Russia to South Africa will remain in question. With South Africa slated to host the G20 Summit in 2025, similar kind of diplomatic pressure may continue to be applied unless the statue is amended.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The suggestions being offered to rein in the advancements in AI need to move into the domain of regulation, to ensure that the unwarranted effects of these technologies do not spill over onto the modern battlefield.
Seven technology companies including Microsoft, OpenAI, Anthropic and Meta, with major artificial intelligence (AI) products made voluntary commitments regarding the regulation of AI at an event held in the White House on 21 July 2023.1 These eight commitments are based on three guiding principles of safety, security and trust. Areas and domains which are presumably impacted by AI have been covered by the code of conduct. While these are non-binding, unenforceable and voluntary, they may form the basis for a future Executive Order on AI, which will become critical given the increasing military use of AI.
The voluntary AI commitments are the following:
The eight commitments of US’s Big Tech companies come a few days after the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the first time convened a session on the threat posed by AI to global peace and security.3 The UN Secretary General (UNSG) proposed the setting up of a global AI watchdog comprising experts in the field who would share their expertise with governments and administrative agencies. The UNSG also added that UN must come up with a legally binding agreement by 2026 banning the use of AI in automated weapons of war.4
The discussion at the UNSC can be seen as elevating the focus from shorter term AI threat of disinformation and propaganda in a bilateral context between governments and Big Tech companies to a larger, global focus on advancements in AI and the need to follow certain common standards, which are transparent, respect privacy of individuals whose data is ‘scraped’ on a massive scale, and ensure robust cybersecurity.
Threat posed by AI
Lawmakers in the US have been attempting to rein in the exponential developments in the AI field for some time now, since not much is known about the real impact of the technology on a longer-term basis. The reactions to the so-called danger of AI have been polarizing, with some even equating AI with the atom bomb and terming the current phase of growth in AI as the ‘Oppenheimer moment’5 , after the scientist-philosopher J. Robert Oppenheimer, under whom the Manhattan Project was brought to a fruitful conclusion with the testing of the first atomic bomb. This was the moment that signaled the start of the first nuclear age—an era of living under the nuclear shadow that persists to this day. The Oppenheimer moment, therefore, is a dividing line between the conventional past and the new present and presumably the unknown future.
Some academics, activists and even members of the Big Tech community, referred to as ‘AI doomers’ have coined a term, P(doom), in an attempt to quantify the risk of a doomsday scenario where a ‘runaway superintelligence’ causes severe harm to humanity or leads to human extinction.6 Others refer to variations of the ‘Paperclip Maximiser’, where the AI is given a particular task to optimise by the humans, understands it in the form of maximising the number of paperclips in the universe and proceeds to expend all resources of the planet in order to manufacture only paperclips.7
This thought experiment was used to signify the dangers of two issues with AI: the ‘orthogonality thesis’, which refers to a highly intelligent AI that could interpret human goals in its own way and proceed to accomplish tasks which have no value to the humans; and ‘instrumental convergence’ which implies AI taking control of all matter and energy on the planet in addition to ensuring that no one can shut it down or alter its goals.8
Apart from these alleged existential dangers, the new wave of generative AI9 , which has the potential of lowering and in certain cases, decimating entry barriers to content creation in text, image, audio and video format, can adversely affect societies in the short to medium term. Generative AI has the potential to birth the era of the ‘superhuman’, the lone wolf who can target state institutions through the click of his keyboard at will.10
The use of generative AI in the hands of motivated individuals, non-state and state actors, has the potential to generate disinformation at scale. Most inimical actors and institutions have so far struggled to achieve this due to the difficulties of homing onto specific faultlines within countries, using local dialects and generating adequately realistic videos, among others. This is now available at a price—disinformation as a service (DaaS)—at the fingertips of an individual, making the creation and dissemination of disinformation at scale, very easy. This is why the voluntary commitments by the US Big Tech companies are just the beginning of a regulatory process that needs to be made enforceable, in line with legally binding safeguards agreed to by UN members for respective countries.
Military Uses of AI
Slowly and steadily, the use of AI in military has been gaining ground. The Russia-Ukraine war has seen deployment of increasingly efficient AI systems on both sides. Palantir, a company which specialises in AI-based data fusion and surveillance services,11 has created a new product called the Palantir AI Platform (AIP). This uses large language models (LLMs) and algorithms to designate, analyse and serve up suggestions for neutralising adversary targets, in a chatbot mode.12
Though Palantir’s website clarifies that the system will only be deployed across classified systems and use both classified and unclassified data to create operating pictures, there is no further information on the subject available in the open domain.13 The company has also assured on its site that it will use “industry-leading guardrails” to safeguard against unauthorized actions.14 The absence of Palantir from the White House declaration is significant since it is one of the very few companies whose products are designed for significant military use.
Richard Moore, the head of United Kingdom’s (UK) MI6, on 19 July 2023 stated that his staff was using AI and big data analysis to identify and disrupt the flow of weapons to Russia.15 Russia is testing its unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) Marker with an inbuilt AI which will seek out Leopard and Abrams tanks on the battlefield and target them. However, despite being tested in a number of terrains such as forests, the Marker hasn’t been rolled out for combat action in ongoing conflict against Ukraine.16
Ukraine has fitted its drones with rudimentary AI that can perform the most basic edge processing to identify platforms like tanks and pass on only the relevant information (coordinates and nature of platform) amounting to kilobytes of data to a vast shooter network.17 There are obviously challenges in misidentifying objects and the task becomes exceedingly difficult when identifying and singling out individuals from the opposing side. Facial recognition softwares have been used by the Ukrainians to identify the bodies of Russian soldiers killed in action for propaganda uses.18
It is not a far shot to imagine the same being used for targeted killings using drones. The challenge here of course is systemic bias and discrimination in the AI model which creeps in despite the best intentions of the data scientists, which may lead to inadvertent killing of civilians. Similarly, spoofing of the senior commanders’ voice and text messages may lead to passing of spurious and fatal orders for formations. On the other hand, the UK-led Future Combat Air System (FCAS) Tempest envisages a wholly autonomous fighter with AI integrated both during the design and development phase (D&D) as well as the identification and targeting phase during operations.19 The human, at best, will be on the loop.
Conclusion
The military use of AI is an offshoot of the developments ripping through the Silicon Valley. As a result, the suggestions being offered to rein in the advancements in AI need to move beyond self-censorship and into the domain of regulation. This will be needed to ensure that the unwarranted effects of these technologies do not spill over into the modern battlefield, already saturated with lethal and precision-based weapons.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
India’s participation in mini-lateral frameworks together with the US and its West Asian allies has been a transformative development in its West Asia policy.
On 7 May 2023, India's National Security Advisor Ajit Doval participated in a meeting with his counterparts from the US, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia in Riyadh.1 A White House readout of the meeting noted that the purpose was to advance their shared vision of a more secure and prosperous Middle East region interconnected with India and the world. Earlier, in October 2021, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar during his visit to Israel had participated in a quadrilateral meeting with the Foreign Ministers of Israel, the US and the UAE, focussing on closer economic cooperation in infrastructure, energy and food security.2 Since then, the grouping has come to be known as the I2U2.
Over the last two years, India’s participation in mini-lateral frameworks together with the US and its West Asian allies has been a transformative development in its West Asia policy.
US mini-lateral turn in West Asia
Mini-laterals, where small number of states with better understanding of each other’s needs and strengths, collaborate to find practical solutions to their shared challenges first and foremost emerge from strong bilateral partnerships and convergences between states.3 I2U2 therefore, culminated from India’s deepening strategic partnerships with the UAE, the US, and Israel.
Secondly, the US-brokered 2020 Abraham Accords, which normalised ties between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain and several other Arab countries, opened the space for US-led regional initiatives with participation from Israel. To allay fears among its regional allies about the US disengagement from the region, the Biden administration has prioritised fostering greater regional cooperation, and integration of its “unrivaled network of allies and partners” from Middle East and Indo-Pacific. The US National Security Strategy 2022 noted that it was time for the United States “to eschew grand designs in favor of more practical steps that can advance U.S. interests and help regional partners lay the foundation for greater stability, prosperity for the people of the Middle East and for the American people”.4
In doing so, the US has sought to recalibrate its traditional role as the external security guarantor through bilateral alliances to that of an ‘integrator’ of regional mechanism that will act as bulwark against domination of the region by rival powers like China and Russia. This strategy is visible in the post-Accords US-backed regional mini-lateral/multilateral initiatives involving Israel such as the Negev Summit (March 2022), the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, and the I2U2.
I2U2: A trade and technology cooperation initiative
Over the last two years, the I2U2 has emerged as a Trade and technology cooperation initiative leveraging relative strengths and trade synergies between the four countries, namely the UAE’s capital, Israel’s technological prowess, India’s market-size and production capacity. At the first I2U2 virtual summit during US President Joe Biden’s visit to Israel in July 2022, consensus was reached on advancing joint investments and initiatives encompassing the six areas of energy, food security, health, space, transportation and water.5 Three of these areas, namely energy, food security, and water, can be bracketed under technology-energy-climate change nexus, where India has been cooperating with the UAE and Israel on a bilateral basis.
In 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic further drove home the importance of resilient supply-chains for food security, under the India–UAE Food Corridor, major companies such as Dubai-based Emaar group, DP World and other private sector players committed investments up to US$ 7 billion over next three years in integrated mega food parks, related warehousing and logistics infrastructure, in various Indian cities.6
Israel, which has established itself as a leader in climate tech, has been cooperating with India in tackling climate-change related challenges to food security and agriculture. The Indo-Israel Agricultural Cooperation Project, which was started in 2008, has been a success story, with 30 ‘Centres of Excellence’ jointly established across India disseminating best agricultural practices, and capacity building through professional training programmes.7
To build on these synergies, following the I2U2 Summit, the UAE pledged to invest US$ 2 billion to develop a series of integrated food parks across India, with the involvement of US and Israeli private sector to lend their expertise and innovative solutions to contribute to the overall sustainability of the project. The second joint project announced at the I2U2 summit was a US$ 300 million hybrid renewable energy project (300 MW of wind and solar capacity) in Gujarat. Subsequently, a joint business coalition of the I2U2 was established in April 2023, to mobilise private sector capital and expertise for joint projects in sustainable and renewable energy, areas where the UAE is focussing in the run-up to hosting of the COP-28.8
India–US Convergence in West Asia
What is noteworthy about these ‘mini-laterals’ is that they are issue-specific in nature. They are not to be confused with alliances, which entail enduring security commitment between allies, and usually have a broader remit including economic, technological, and diplomatic components. Delhi’s participation in these quadrilaterals underscores India–US regional convergence in West Asia based on their shared vision of an ‘interconnected’ or networked region.
Given that small regional states like the UAE and Israel, who are determined to simultaneously deepen ties with constellation of powers such as the US, China, India, and Russia, mini-laterals are flexible and informal mechanisms and do not entail significant political costs, while at the same time strengthening their ability to manoeuvre great power competition.9 Mini-laterals such as I2U2 serve to strengthen the capabilities of regional states in dealing with shared challenges. At the same time, as a regional mechanism, they can limit the potential hegemonic designs of great powers making inroads into the region.
Further, India’s participation in I2U2 framework alongside Israel indicates that New Delhi has not only de-hyphenated its bilateral ties with Israel and Palestine, but is playing a crucial role in integrating Israel with the region on mutually beneficial terms. From Israel's point of view, to make this de-hyphenation permanent, it seeks to deepen and broaden the ties across the board so that the relationship with Israel will become so widely accepted and beneficial that it remains unaffected through the change of government in New Delhi, just as is the case in Washington.10
The issue-specific, and flexible nature of ‘mini-laterals’ also implies that countries can align with different sets of countries on different issues. Therefore, for India, participation in these frameworks is unlikely to impinge on its traditionally balanced approach towards the region. In Riyadh, Doval discussed with Saudi Arabia and the UAE about a railway network among Gulf States which will be linked to an Indian port in the Arabian Sea and Israeli port on the Mediterranean, namely the India-Arab- Mediterranean corridor.
A week before that, Doval had visited Tehran to hold consultations with top Iranian officials, including President Ebrahim Raisi. Their talks focussed on the situation in Afghanistan, the possibilities for reviving trade ties by activating the rial-rupee mechanism, and cooperation in Chabahar port, which is being jointly developed by India and Iran as a key transit hub between the Persian Gulf and Central Asia.
As India finds common ground with the US in advancing a regional approach for addressing shared development challenges, it will continue to maintain its independent strategic vision of its extended neighbourhood in West Asia.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Policy-makers need to recalibrate modernisation programmes from the earlier focus on traditional military capability needs to a mix of kinetic and non-kinetic hybrid war-fighting capabilities.
The Cold War symbolised a strong deterrent posture. Both the West and the Soviet Union, while maintaining formidable conventional military capabilities, successfully deterred each other by deploying strong nuclear forces. The fear of a military conflict spiralling into a nuclear holocaust prevented both these blocs from going to war, thereby reinforcing the salience of nuclear weapons in maintaining robust deterrence. However, the Soviet Union’s sudden collapse in the nineties brought a revelatory change in the world order, thus partly diminishing the importance of nuclear weapons to deter adversaries and future conflicts.
In the Cold War era, while inter-state wars took a backseat, the non-state and third-party actors became important disrupters in the geo-strategic environment. Proxies became the new tools in the hands of global powers to leverage power and influence. At a broader level, warfare was reduced to ideological power plays and shifts, motivated regime changes, proxy wars and insurgencies, resource exploitation, and imposition of trade monopolies and sanctions. For almost a quarter of a century following the end of the Cold War era, the world witnessed the uncontested primacy of the United States. This order is yet at another inflection point, where it is often argued that neither the history has ended nor has the ideological competition diminished any bit.
With the rise of China and other regional powers which are as disruptive as the rising ones, inter-state wars seem to be re-emerging as a pre-eminent form of conflict, albeit in a newer form. Conventional wars are returning with little regard to a nuclear overhang, but surely in the shadows of a newer form of conflict, which is largely hybrid in nature and has the potential to re-write the nature and character of future wars.
The Digital Age and Warfare
Hybridity in warfare is becoming the defining feature of this century. Arguably, the digital age is shaping the geopolitics and future of warfare, in ways the nuclear weapons shaped deterrence and conflict in the 20th century This raises the question of whether the growing competition in the field of cyber and other digital technologies has the potential to produce a comparable impact on the emerging international world order, and in turn a deterrent effect on war and conflict.
The Ukraine conflict highlights the increasing salience of hybridity in warfare which is driven by an unprecedented revolution in new-age technologies and the corporatisation of warfare by global tech-giants. Today, a surfeit of technologies from cyber to aerospace, precision munitions to unmanned platforms, hyper-sonics to autonomous systems, AI and quantum computing to blockchain technologies is driving hybridity in warfare. The uniqueness of battlefield sensors, the stealth of non-crewed platforms, the power of computing and algorithms, and the open-source revolution have brought us to a point where a sea of data can be accessed and stored.
Relying on AI, and its incredible manipulative power, these inconceivable amounts of information and geo-data are being routinely fed into machines to connect the dots and predict the battle outcomes.
Tech Competition in Warfare
A secure and reliable cyber space is the key to national security. Be it the economy, food, health, energy, infrastructure, banking and financial sectors, all of these domains contribute to the security and well-being of the state. But there is nothing as significant as cyber security, which no country can manage alone, thus necessitating hi-tech cooperation and collaboration at a trans-national level. The fact that cyber-security has become the foundational layer to all domains of national security can no longer be ignored, as it impacts national security planners and practitioners across the public policy spectrum.
Nation-states perforce have no choice but to strengthen their cyber security capabilities for a few reasons. First, the boundaries between wartime and peacetime needs have blurred due to the fading distinction between kinetic and non-kinetic domains, resulting in enhanced scope and necessity for national security. Second, the management of cyber security threats is no longer a matter of concern for the governments in power alone, but also of utmost interest to non-governmental agencies and business corporations. And third, the cyber-attacks are often organisation-neutral, which highlights the importance of strong collaboration between the government, the military and the private sector in terms of information sharing, response and mitigation.
The security implications of an increasing cyber and technological rivalry between adversarial states are therefore immense. For instance, any disruption in the key information infrastructure or hi-technology related production lines can have severe implications and consequences for national security. This challenge calls for like-minded states, allies and partners to be resilient by remaining competitive, and innovative in key war-fighting technologies and domains. Whether it is AI, or computing power, or satellite imagery and secure data transmission, or round the clock transparency on the battlefield, these new-age niche technologies are revolutionary to the future planning and conduct of warfare.
In order to maintain a pre-eminent position in these niche technologies, there is a need to collaborate with like-minded countries and mega-tech corporations pioneering in innovation. The private sector leads the cutting-edge of innovation and development of hi-tech platforms required to shape and fight future wars. The manner in which militaries could leverage these niche technologies to coerce or defeat an adversary is creating a new dilemma amongst security planners and practitioners. This fear is also partly redefining the salience of nuclear weapons to deter future wars and conflict.
Threats, Terrain and Technologies
Three aspects, i.e., the hybrid threats, the continuously expanding terrain of hybrid warfare and the niche technologies, are increasingly shaping our understanding on the nature and character of future wars.
First, security threats are evolving at an unthinkable pace. From well-defined and clear-cut conventional threats, several shades of hybrid warfare are defining the new-age security threats. Historically, the threats have always been evolving over time, but what is new is the sheer expanse and reach of these new-age threats in the digital domain. Deep fakes, real-like videos and disinformation campaigns are manifestly overwhelming the national security planners, thereby making it difficult to discern truth from fiction. With generative AI emerging as another important threat actor, the role of cyberspace in warfare and its real impact on the battlefield cannot be precisely predicted or defined. Simply put, these new-age threats need a new definition much beyond the normally explained constructs of external, internal or human security.
Second, wars are increasingly turning trans-national, if not trans-continental or trans-corporation. The Ukraine war is reflective of this novel and emerging trend in warfare. The new-age wars strengthen the notion of a collaborative and collective effort to deter, fight and defeat a mutual adversary. No country has the necessary money, mind-space, manpower, machines and material to tackle these new-age threats and their sheer expanse and technological dimension. This not only necessitates like-minded countries to come together, but also bring the private sector led by the global tech giants closer to the government and the military, to increase their involvement. War-fighting is stepping into an era, where military and non-military personnel will have to ideate, plan and fight alongside to win hybrid wars. This be a compelling policy choice rather than an exception.
And third, with the increasing range and dimensions of hybrid threats, governments and militaries have to operate in an ever-expanding security environment and landscape. This is leading to increased experimentation with hybrid war-fighting technologies that might or might not produce durable battle outcomes. As generative AI expands in theory and practice, both the defender and the offender will struggle to shape and direct new attack vectors. Harmonising this `kill-chain` amongst a range of emerging kinetic and non-kinetic war-fighting technologies will be doctrinal challenge. For instance, Search and Seek, Strike and Scoot, and Survive to Strike are a few doctrinal dyads that would necessitate seamless integration of new-age technologies to produce battle winning effects. At yet another level, future wars may well translate into AI versus AI wars, with each side trying to outwit the adversary on the digital battlefield. Warfare in the long term might translate into a story of innumerable hybrid hits and misses, till one or the other side establishes mastery over these technologies and threats.
The Modernisation Challenge
Nation-states are pursuing military modernisations to meet a range of security challenges at speed and cost as never before. The capability development paths adopted by most military powers often intersect in terms of preferred new-age or legacy technologies and indigenous industrial bases, thus providing an opportunity for like-minded governments and militaries to collaborate in tackling both new-age and age-old threats. The fundamental shift in hybrid threats due to the rise in cyber and technological competition amongst adversarial states requires policy-makers and practitioners to recalibrate modernisation programmes from the earlier focus on traditional military capability needs to a mix of kinetic and non-kinetic war-fighting capabilities.
The real challenge lies In quantifying the inter-se requirement of kinetic or non-kinetic capability needs. Though earlier, the challenge was related to sharing available resources amongst the traditional pillars of national security, now the need has arisen for equitable sharing of the same resources in the development and fielding of hybrid and non-hybrid capabilities. It therefore requires a quantification of all new-age security threats—hybrid or otherwise—against a model or theoretical construct that satisfies both conditions. This is the new risk to the military modernisation challenge.
In the absence of any credible planning data, governments and militaries are likely to mis-define the requirement of non-kinetic hybrid competencies, resulting in an imbalance between the two requirements. Military planners and practitioners often tend to over-estimate or under-estimate the non-kinetic capability needs and there lies the need for caution and precision. With increasing budgetary allocations to India’s military modernisation effort, a policy alignment might be necessary to maintain the right balance in the development, production and fielding of required kinetic and non-kinetic war-fighting capabilities.
In the current digital age, policy, process and preparedness on traditional and non-traditional security threats to a nation-state will have to be a healthy mix of sound ideas, capital and coordinated action between the public and private sectors. Nation-states are today moving towards a nature of war governance where the political leadership and the state bureaucracies—both civil and military—will have to co-opt the civilian technological expertise and `nationalist` hi-tech corporations in the planning and conduct of future wars.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The African Peace Mission to Ukraine and Russia coincided with escalatory actions by both the antagonists.
South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, along with a group of African leaders, embarked on a peace mission in an attempt to help resolve the Russia–Ukraine conflict. The delegation comprised leaders and representatives from seven countries—Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville, Egypt, Senegal, Uganda, Zambia, apart from South Africa. It arrived in Ukraine on 16 June 2023 and headed to Russia a day later to discuss a pathway for a peaceful resolution of the ongoing war. The delegation presented a 10-point agenda for Presidents Zelensky and Putin, aiming for peaceful conflict resolution, including open communication, diplomacy, de-escalation, respect for sovereignty, security guarantees, grain flow restoration, humanitarian efforts, prisoner release, reconstruction, and dialogue promotion.1
While President Zelensky insisted on Russian troop withdrawal for meaningful progress in the peace talks, Moscow demanded Ukrainian recognition of Russian sovereignty in the occupied territories. Peace plans have also been proposed by Brazil2 and Indonesia,3 which were not considered by Ukraine and Russia. The two countries however were receptive to the idea of the African Peace Plan.
Africa had previously been involved in peace efforts during the Arab–Israeli conflict in the 1970s. These initiatives demonstrate Africa's efforts to promote peace and stability beyond its own borders.4 The Russia–Ukraine conflict and its impact on food, fuels, and fertilisers poses challenges for vulnerable populations across the world. Africa is a continent of significant size, complexity, and remarkable diversity. Its 54 countries and territories exhibit unique circumstances, histories, and varying relationships with both Russia and Western nations.
Assessment
The Peace mission, though, did not have high-level political representation from Congo, Uganda, and Egypt. The Presidents of these countries did not personally participate in the mission but instead sent their representatives. This lack of direct involvement from key leaders raised concerns about the plan's effectiveness and the commitment of these countries. In addition, the absence of Nigeria, despite having the largest population and economy in Africa, was a glaring inadequacy as regards the peace mission, lessening the group’s legitimacy.
Polish authorities refused entry to the South African Presidential Protection Services and journalists, citing the absence of original permits for the security team's heavy weaponry.5 The incident raised concerns about President Ramaphosa's safety as he travelled to Kyiv with reduced security. These acts undermined the peace mission and conveyed a message of disregard for the visiting delegation and their efforts towards promoting peace.
The timing of a peace process plays a significant role in determining its outcome. The mission arrived in Kiev when the city was subjected to a Russian missile attack. The timing of Russia's missile attack on Kyiv, coinciding with the presence of the seven-nation African delegation, including four presidents, was perceived as a display of disrespect.6 Ukraine also simultaneously launched a counteroffensive. These acts of escalation which prioritised military operations diverted attention and resources away from the African peace mission.
In addition, it is essential to highlight the absence of the African Union (AU), an organisation renowned for its expertise in leading peace initiatives. The participation of the African Union (AU) in a peace process would have lent greater significance and credibility, superseding the efforts of a coalition of nations.
President Ramaphosa announced the peace initiative shortly after the US ambassador to South Africa Reuben Brigety, accused the country of supplying arms to Russia, an accusation that South African officials have denied.7 This backdrop cast doubt on South Africa's involvement in the peace process. Ramaphosa in his meeting with President Putin also deliberated on the issue of the Russian President’s prospective participation in the August 2023 BRICS Summit in South Africa.
Due to an indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC), South African authorities would be obligated to arrest Putin if he were to visit. South Africa, however, made the decision to grant diplomatic immunity to Putin.8 Due to this, in a notable departure from previous years, South Africa was absent from the invite list for the June 2023 G-7 summit held in Japan. This development potentially signifies the initiation of a process whereby the country faces the prospects of further isolation or even exclusion from Western nations.9
Going Forward
It is pertinent to note that African nations have become wary of Russia's efforts in adding to the militarisation of the continent. The presence of the Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary organisation, for instance, is a cause for concern for African nations as the group poses major challenges to UN Peacekeeping Operations in countries like Mali and Central African Republic (CAR).10 Despite the rebellion of its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner group's deployments and business network in Africa remain unaffected.11
African countries therefore are evaluating the implications of engaging with Russia, and ensure that their policies align with long-term development goals without compromising their sovereignty or security. President Paul Kagame of Rwanda recently emphasised the necessity for Africa to cultivate resilience as a means of safeguarding itself against external factors. The role played by external actors such as Russia has been significant in facilitating the erosion of democracy in various regions, including in Africa.12 Over the past two decades, Russia's Africa policy has aimed at undermining democratic principles by targeting countries with weak domestic checks and balances. This approach has allowed Russia to exert influence in regions where authoritarian governments are prevalent.13
During the upcoming Second Russia–Africa Summit to be held from 26–29 July 2023, African leaders are expected to take a strong stance against Russia's use of food supply as a leverage for negotiation with Western countries. By adopting a prudent approach to external engagements, African nations could seek to safeguard their interests while contributing to regional stability and sustainable progress.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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