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Introduction

The resignation of Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida triggered widespread discussions within the Chinese strategic community over the impending leadership transition in Japan. While China’s Foreign Ministry’s offered a muted response keeping in line with diplomatic protocols,1 active debate has been underway among foreign policy and strategic observers regarding the cause of the change of leadership, possible foreign policy orientation of a new Japanese government and the likely implication on China–Japan ties.

As expressed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, during a meeting with his Japanese counterpart Yoko Kamikawa in July 2024, Beijing believes that China–Japan ties are at a critical phase.2 Escalating tensions over Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, South China Sea, Taiwan Straits, high-tech export controls, Japan’s discharge of nuclear water from Fukushima plant and China’s ban on import of seafood from Japan are disrupting efforts to maintain a mutually beneficial partnership.3

On account of unresolved territorial issues and geo-economic competition, the friction between the two countries is likely to continue as has been the case over the past decade. China’s response will be shaped largely by Beijing’s assessment of the new Japanese government’s position on three significant issues—Sino-US rivalry; Japan’s military modernisation; and Taiwan Straits.

Japan and Sino-US Rivalry

Chinese strategists see Japan as a key player in Sino-US rivalry. The prevalent opinion among Chinese foreign policy observers is that Japan not only wields considerable diplomatic influence in East and Southeast Asia through its Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) and various other technological and civil assistance programmes but that Tokyo occupies a pivotal role in Washington’s strategy to contain China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific.4 The Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) has become central to the US’ strategy to deal with military challenge from China, thus making Japan a frontline state.5

In view of Japan’s geographical location in East Asia, its integration in the US-led post Second World War security architecture, the intensity of economic, technological and strategic cooperation between the two countries, Chinese policy elites have long recognised Japan’s role in the US strategic calculus vis-à-vis China. However, assessing the down turn in Sino-Japanese relations in the recent years, they perceive that Japan has shifted its previous strategic orientation of maintaining a distance from Sino-US rivalry to closely following US strategic guidance regarding China.

Referring to Japan’s criticism of China on human rights, trade policies, military modernisation and instituting US-like technological controls, Chinese observers contend that Japan is increasingly being driven by the China threat theory and like the US, believes China to be a disruptive power.6 In that context, it is surmised that Tokyo probably considers US hegemonic presence in the Indo-Pacific as the ultimate security guarantee against China and therefore will cooperate closely with the US to jointly suppress China. Moreover, besides strengthening anti-China alliance with the US, Japan using the issues of East and South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits could induce the US to get more involved and intervene deeply in East and Southeast Asia, thus deepening Sino-US rivalry.7

Japanese Military Modernisation

Beijing has traditionally been critical of any move by Japanese leaders to amend Article 9 of the Japanese constitution8 or increase the defence budget. Any proposal to dilute the provisions of the peace constitution or to give the SDF more power is claimed by China as Japan’s return to militarism and violation of its post-war commitment to peaceful development. The publication of the National Security Documents in 2022 which declared Tokyo’s intent to increase defence budget and acquire counter-strike capabilities for SDF, citing increasing strategic challenge from China, prompted strong reactions from Beijing.9

The Chinese Embassy in Japan, evoking memory of Japanese aggression during the Second World War, observed that the documents indicated revival of Japanese militarism and departure from post-war peaceful development.10 Similarly, Japan’s 2024 Defense White Paper drew sharp criticism from China. Taking note of the cover which featured swords, Chinese commentators interpreted that Japan departing from the principle of ‘exclusive defense’ is now developing ‘out-of-area defense capabilities’. 11

The trend in Japanese military modernisation has emerged as a point of concern for Chinese analysts and commentators. Seeing this in tandem with Japan’s deepening convergence with the US, they perceive that Japan is engaged in classic hard-balancing tactic through developing both internal and external checks and balances.12 While strengthening its external strategic and military cooperation with the US and other Western countries, Tokyo is simultaneously enhancing its own military power to reduce dependence on the US military power in the long run. As Japan continues to build offensive and pre-emptive attack capabilities, some observers note that rather than being a shield to the US spear, Japan is now aspiring to become a spear itself against Chinese military.13

Taiwan Straits

Fumio Kishida’s statement in 2022, warning that the invasion of Ukraine would be replicated in Taiwan Straits if major powers failed to act together, alarmed Beijing. It was seen as advancing Shinzo Abe’s position that if something happens to Taiwan, it means something happens to Japan and the Japan–US alliance, and that the United States should abandon its "ambiguous strategy" and clarify its position of "protecting Taiwan with force”.14 Chinese strategists argue that Japan’s defence and security policies have undergone major changes, under the Abe government which was continued by the Kishida administration. They note that Japan is constructing a threat scenario of Chinese military invasion of Taiwan in order to mobilise public support at home for military modernisation.15

As the Japanese public opposes departure from the peace constitution and increase in defence budget amidst economic downturn, the Japanese government considers promotion of China threat theory as a means to build public legitimacy for these decisions.16 Further, Japanese strategy is also to make the US commit more strongly to Sino-Japan alliance. Chinese observers believe that Japan is wary of US future intentions to manage Indo-Pacific affairs and rapprochement between Washington and Beijing could lead to failure of US–Japan alliance. Therefore, the prospect of Chinese military invasion could be a binding factor between the two countries.17

While Chinese strategic community agree that Japan intends to use Taiwan as a ‘strategic chess piece’, they are divided over the prospect of Japanese intervention in Taiwan Straits. While some argue that Japan is unlikely to intervene directly in a military conflict in Taiwan straits owing to domestic public opposition, lack of strategic depth and military power,18 certain sections warn that Japan’s increasing military cooperation with US and Tokyo’s military deployments and infrastructure building in the south-west part of the country facing the first island chain indicates Japan’s intent to militarily intervene.19

Conclusion: Key Takeaways

In view of Tokyo’s close alignment with the US, its rapid military modernisation and tough stand on Taiwan, Chinese policy observers’ strategic assessment of Japan is negative. Also, they perceive that there is very less hope of improvement of bilateral ties in the foreseeable future. Although Japan cannot completely decouple from China and continues to be economically dependent, commentators note that Japan has initiated de-risking to allow it more strategic flexibility.

Chinese policy experts also fear that Japan and the US are likely to follow a containment policy against China more vigorously. Further, besides cooperating with the US, Japan is also trying hard to get closer to the EU and NATO, attempting to shrink China’s strategic space. Moreover, Tokyo’s military normalisation could trigger provocative behaviour on behalf of SDF with regard to Taiwan and in the waters of East and South China Sea.

Finally, Chinese commentators warn that in the short-term, Sino-Japanese ties are full of uncertainty and even high-level dialogue could be a delaying tactic to gain more time and space to strengthen military alliances against China.

As Japan is at the cusp of leadership change, these perceptions are likely to increase Chinese policymakers’ distrust of Japan and deepen the political chasm between the two countries. There are apprehensions about a right-wing leadership coming to power resulting in complete departure from the post-Second World War arrangements. In this context, Japan could be the target of further coercive diplomacy and military pressure as Beijing’s security concerns deepen. China is also likely to enhance strategic, economic and technological cooperation with Russia as a counter to Japan–US alliance.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s Remarks on August 14, 2024”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The People’s Republic of China, 14 August 2024.
• 2. “Chinese Foreign Minister Warns Relations With Japan Risk Going Backwards”, SCMP, 26 July 2024.
• 3. “Ties With China Will Stay On Track If Japan Keeps Word, Principles: Global Times Editorial”, Global Times, 18 November 2023.
• 4. Hu Jiping, “Current Sino-Japanese Relations”, Aisixiang, 5 September 2023; Lu Wei, “Analysis of Japan's Policy Choices in the Context of Sino-US Competition”, Aisixiang, 3 March 2022.
• 5. Wu Yin, “China-Japan Relations Amidst Unprecedented Changes in a Century”, Japanese Journal, No. 3, 2021.
• 6. Meng Xiaoxu, “Japan's Strategic Direction and Sino-Japanese Relations Under the Changing International Situation”, Aisixiang, 25 November 2022; Lu Hao, “Trends in the China-US-Japan Trilateral Relationship and Japan's Strategic Response”, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, No. 5, 2021.
• 7. Wu Huaizhong, “Japan's Security Strategy Towards China: A Recent Analysis of a Balancing Agenda”, Journal of Japanese Studies, No. 5, 10 December 2021; Wu Huaizhong, “ Japan's China Policy has Reached a Critical Crossroads”, Aisixiang, 11 June 2022.
• 8. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution limits Japan’s right to have a fully functional defence force and undertake forward defense.
• 9. “China Condemns Japan's New National Security Strategies for Stoking Regional Tensions”, CGTN, 16 December 2022.
• 10. “Japan's Passage of Defense Documents Brings Country Away from Track of Post-War Peaceful Development: Chinese Embassy”, Global Times, 16 December 2022.
• 11. Leshui, “‘China Threat Theory’ is Not an Excuse for Japan to Expand its Military”, China.com, 18 July 2024; Jun Zhengping, “Forging a Sword is Not for Drawing It? Japan, Which Has Not Thoroughly Reflected on Itself, Has No Right to Say This”, Guancha.cn, 16 July 2024.
• 12. Zhang Wang, “Japan's China Policy Under Abe: From Strategic Checks and Balances to Tactical Risk Aversion”, International Security Studies, No. 2, 2021; Meng Xiaoxu, “Japan's Strategic Direction and Sino-Japanese Relations Under the Changing International Situation”, Aisixiang, 25 November 2022; Zhu Feng, “Where Will China-Japan Relations Go in the ‘post-Abe Era’?”, Aisixiang, 10 July 2022.
• 13. Wu Huaizhong, “An Analysis of the Kishida Cabinet's Military Security Cooperation between Japan and NATO”, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, No. 4, 2023; Wu Huaizhong, “The Deepening of Japan's ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ During the Kishida Period: Background, Manifestations and Impact on China”, Japanese Studies, No. 2, 2023; Lu Hao, “Japan's Strategic Choice in the Context of the United States' Efforts to Contain China”, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, No. 4, 2022.
• 14. Ben Blanchard, “Former PM Abe Says Japan, U.S. Could Not Stand By If China Attacked Taiwan”, Reuters, 1 December 2021;  Abe Shinzō, “US Strategic Ambiguity Over Taiwan Must End”, Project Syndicate, 12 April 2022.
• 15. Sun Moon Tan Tian, “Beware! “If Taiwan Has Problems, Japan Has Problems? Japan Has Taken a Dangerous Step”, CCTV, 15 April 2024.
• 16. Wu Huaizhong, “An Analysis of the Kishida Cabinet's Military Security Cooperation between Japan and NATO”, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, No. 4, 2023; Wu Huaizhong, “The Deepening of Japan's ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ During the Kishida Period: Background, Manifestations and Impact on China”, Japanese Studies, No. 2, 2023; Lu Hao, “Japan's Strategic Choice in the Context of the United States' Efforts to Contain China”, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, No. 4, 2022.
• 17. Ibid. Wu Huaizhong “Japan's China Policy Has Reached a Critical Crossroads”, Aisixiang, 11 June 2022.
• 18. He Sishen, “The Direction of Sino-Japanese Relations Under Kishida's Diplomacy of Leaning Toward the United States and Resisting China”, Aisixiang, 18 April 2023; Huang Jichao, “Japan's Multi-faceted Hedging Strategies in the Taiwan Strait Under the New Pattern of Sino-US Asia-Pacific Competition”, Aisixiang, 8 April 2022.
• 19. Sun Moon Tan Tian, “Beware! “If Taiwan Has Problems, Japan Has Problems? Japan Has Taken a Dangerous Step”, CCTV, 15 April 2024; Yang Bojiang, “Two Major Variables in Sino-Japanese Relations”, Aisixiang, 7 April 2022; Wu Huaizhong, “Japan's China Policy Has Reached a Critical Crossroads”, Aisixiang, 11 June 2022.

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पाकिस्तान में नृजातीय बलोच पिछले कई दशकों से अपने अलग अस्तित्व के लिए संघर्षरत हैं| सन 1947 में भारतीय उपमहाद्वीप के बँटवारे और तत्पश्चात पाकिस्तान के अस्तित्व में आने से पहले ही कलात (वर्तमान बलूचिस्तान) के शासक, जिन्हें ‘खान’ कहा जाता था, ने अपने स्वतंत्र अस्तित्व की स्वीकार्यता के लिए औपनिवेशिक शासन से बात-चीत कर रहे थे| पाकिस्तान के जन्म से तीन माह पहले, कलात के कानूनी सलाहकार की हैसियत से मुहम्मद अली जिन्ना स्वयं ब्रिटिश शासन से इस मुद्दे पर बात-चीत (Negotiate) कर रहे थे|

Networked information systems ensure comprehensive information acquisition, massive data transmission, real-time update of battlefield situations, efficient data analysis and deduction, extremely fast decision-making and integration and coordination between different services of military through advanced technology.

With the intention of building an efficient and effective networked information system, China established the PLA Information Support Force (信息支援部队) on 19 April 2024. At the foundation ceremony, President Xi Jinping stated that the Information Support Force (ISF)

“is a newly created strategic branch of the PLA and a key support for the coordinated construction and use of the network information system. It has an important position and heavy responsibility in promoting the high-quality development of our army and winning modern wars. We must effectively support operations, adhere to information dominance and joint victory, smooth information networks, integrate information resources, strengthen information protection, deeply integrate into joint combat system of the Chinese military, accurately and efficiently implement information support.”1

His statement reflects China’s urgency for the informationisation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) given that grey zone tactics in modern warfare have become a decisive factor.

The PLA Strategic Support Force (战略支援部队), which was established in December 2015, was disbanded in April 2024. The PLA Units under the Strategic Support Force (SSF) were shifted to three newly created independent branches of the PLA, namely, Information Support Force, Military Aerospace Force (军事航天部队) and Cyberspace Force (网络空间部队).

All the units of the Information Support Force (ISF) will be directly under the Central Military Commission (CMC). The senior PLA officials serving in the SSF were transferred to the newly created ISF. PLA General Bi Yi (毕毅) was appointed Commander of the PLA ISF and PLA General Li Wei (李伟) was appointed Political Commissar of the PLA ISF. Both of them were serving in the PLA SSF with Bi Yi being Deputy Commander and Li Wei was Political Commissar.2 The PLA has not yet announced the senior PLA officers to lead the Military Aerospace Support Force and Cyberspace Force.3

Network Information System for Joint Combat Capability

Information has always been the key factor in making decisions at the time of war and it has become a decisive factor in winning wars. The military with a high-quality network information system will always have the advantages of faster access to information, storage of data, processing of data, and use of information or data to outplay the adversaries. After the Gulf War of 1990–91, the United States established a joint operations command, and Russia formed a joint operations command system at the national and theatre level.4  

China began to work on developing the fundamental concepts of its information warfare forces after the Gulf War. After working through a number of doctrinal iterations, by the end of 1990s the PLA successfully developed its fundamental concepts for information warfare.5 The PLA ISF is also responsible for conducting China’s electronic warfare. While the ISF is an outcome of the PLA military reforms in April 2024, the initiative can be traced back in the report of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) released in October 2022.

The report highlighted the need to coordinate the construction and application of network information systems. The report noted that in order to improve the joint combat capability and all-domain combat capability based on network information systems, China must attach great importance to the construction and application of network information systems. The report pointed out that China saw network information construction as an important increment to improve the combat effectiveness of troops. The report noted that electronic information field is the key in the modern warfare and whoever mastered the high technology in related fields such as electronic information will be able to gain the upper hand on the battlefield.6

Qiushi, CPC journal and news magazine published an article on 4 May 2024 that noted that the significance of the coordinated construction and application of the network information system was emphasised at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Network information technology has become the ‘biggest variable’ in improving the combat effectiveness of troops.7 The article notes that the establishment of the ISF will surely help improve the PLA’s joint combat capability and all-domain combat capability based on the network information system, and will help in achieving the PLA’s goal of becoming a world-class armed force.

The establishment of the Strategic Support Force (SSF) was the major initiative by the Central Military Commission (CMC) to build a military apparatus to develop China’s information warfare capabilities. The SSF included five major areas, namely, intelligence, technical reconnaissance, electronic countermeasures, network attack and defense, and psychological warfare. The SSF had two major departments, namely, Space System Department and Network System Department, which are responsible for space operations and information warfare.8

PLA Strategic Support Force and Information Warfare Capabilities

At the time of its creation, the SSF incorporated units from the General Armament Department (GAD), General Staff Department (GSD) and General Political Department (GPD). For instance, the 2nd Department of the General Staff Department (GSD) responsible for ‘space operations capabilities development’ and ‘strategic intelligence supply’, 3rd & 4th Departments of the General Staff Department (GSD) and 311 Base of the General Political Department (GPD), responsible for psychological warfare and ‘network-electronic capabilities integration’, and ‘cognitive warfare capabilities promotion’, were placed under the SSF in 2015.

The objective behind the creation of the SSF was to enhance PLA joint operations capabilities and attain ‘winning informationized war’ objectives.9 The SSF subordinate bases were aligned with the five theatre commands of the PLA. Previously, psychological warfare units were under the SSF and the opinion warfare and legal warfare were under the CMC. After the April 2024 reforms, all units responsible for the ‘Psychological Warfare’, ‘Opinion Warfare’ and ‘Legal Warfare’ are placed under the CMC.10

The subdivision of the military services in the PLA is benchmarked with the corresponding military reforms in the United States, such as the Military Aerospace Force benchmarking the US Space Command, and the Cyberspace Force benchmarking the US Cyber Command. However, compared with the United States, China has reformed them into independent branches of its military rather than into new services/arms as in the case of the US.

Exigency of Information Support Force

One of the reasons behind the establishment of the ISF is China’s goal to establish a complete joint combat system, which required a new military structure and layout.11 The PLA units based on information warfare are a key factor for the integration of China’s joint combat system. China is also promoting the deep integration of the joint combat system. It was confirmed by Xi Jinping in his speech in April 2024 at the founding ceremony of the PLA ISF when he stated that the PLA ISF will have great responsibilities in promoting the high-quality development of the PLA and in winning modern wars.12

Analysts note that the reorganisation was unlikely to be related to an anti-corruption purge and is more likely the result of the Chinese military’s ongoing review of how to better achieve its strategic goals by improving command and control.13 The PLA’s latest structural reform reflects that the PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) was not effective in coordinating the units under SSF Space Department and SSF Network Information Department. From an operational perspective, as the new branches are directly under the jurisdiction of the CMC, it could improve the functioning of the joint combat system.

Second, with the establishment of the SSF in December 2015, a large number of units dealing with information and intelligence apparatus were shifted to the armed forces (PLA) from the national defense organisation (CMC). This had created a confusion in management and command.14 The CMC did not have direct authority over the crucial units for decision-making such as Network System Department and Cyberspace Department of the SSF. The SSF HQs was the intermediary between the CMC and these Units. The reorganisation of the PLA Units may be a decision therefore to overcome bureaucratic inefficiency.

Third, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense (MND) stated that the establishment of the ISF will have a far-reaching significance in accelerating the modernisation of the national defence and armed forces.15

Conclusion

The Information Support Force is focused more on improving the informationised combat capabilities of the PLA. The PLA military reforms of April 2024 bring about major change in the structural layout of the Chinese military, to improve bureaucratic efficiency. It is expected to support the coordinated use of China’s Network Information System, and also help in achieving military modernisation of the PLA. Secondly, it will bring all key military units/subjects crucial for decision-making such as cyber, information, network, communication, electronic, under the CMC. These reforms are expected to help in the further modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “中国人民解放军信息支援部队成立大会在京举行 习近平向信息支援部队授予军旗并致训词 (The founding ceremony of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Information Support Force was held in Beijing. Xi Jinping awarded the military flag to the Information Support Force and delivered a speech)”, Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Beijing, 19 April 2024.
• 2. Lin Huizhi, “林煇智), “中国解放军成立信息支援部队 分析：聚焦提升信息化作战能力 (Analysis of the establishment of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Information Support Force: Focus on improving informationized combat capabilities)”, April 20, 2024.
• 3. Sun Cheng, “(孙承), "从战略支援部队到信息支援部队 习近平的决定令人费解 (From Strategic Support Force to Information Support Force, Xi Jinping's decision is puzzling)”, Voice of America, 4 May 2024.
• 4. “国防部举行信息支援部队成立专题新闻发布会 (The Ministry of National Defense holds a special press conference on the establishment of the Information Support Force)”, Xinhua Daily Telegraph, 20 April 2024.
• 5. John Costello and Joe McReynolds, “China's Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era”, China Strategic Perspectives, No. 13, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, U.S., October 2018.
• 6. “【紫荆专稿】揭秘中国全新战略性兵种 解放军信息支援部队直属中央军委 (Revealing the Secrets of China's New Strategic Arms: The PLA Information Support Force is Directly Under the Central Military Commission)”, Bauhinia Magazine, 29 April 2024.
• 7.   “解放军报评论员：努力建设一支强大的现代化信息支援部队 (PLA Daily commentator: Strive to build a strong modern information support force)”, PLA Daily, Beijing, 4 May 2024.
• 8. “Chinese People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (中国人民解放军战略支援部队)”, Baidu, China, December 2015.
• 9.   Wen-chung Chai, “(翟文中), “中國戰略支援部隊的組織與任務 (A Study of Organizational Structure and Missions for PLA Strategic Support Force)”, Assistant Research Fellow, Division of Defense Strategy and Resources, Institute for National Defense and Security Research, Taiwan, October 2023.
• 10.   Chen Jinping, “(陳津萍),"習近平軍改前後「三戰」組織架構轉變研析 (Analysis of the changes in the organizational structure of the ‘three wars’ before and after Xi Jinping's military reform)”, Army Academic Bimonthly, Vol. 54 No. 559, Taiwan, June 2018.
• 11. “信息支援部队是全新打造的战略性兵种 (Information Support Force：a Brand-New Strategic Arm of the PLA)”, Ministry of National Defense, PRC, 19 April 2024.
• 12. Ren Yilin(任一林)、and Liang Qiuping (梁秋坪), “中国人民解放军信息支援部队成立大会在京举行 (The founding ceremony of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Information Support Force was held in Beijing)”, People's Daily, Beijing, 20 April 2024.
• 13. Song Ren (松仁), “习近平组建信息支援部队调整军种格局的战略算计与意图 (Xi Jinping's strategic calculation and intention to set up information support forces to adjust the military structure)”, Voice of America,28 April 2024.
• 14. Zheng Haoyu, “(郑浩宇),"分析：中共新建信息支援部队有何图谋 (Analysis: What is the CCP’s intention in establishing a new information support force?)”, The Epoch Times, 28 April 2024.
• 15. Colin Clark, “China Creates New Information Support Force, Scraps Strategic Support Force in ‘Major’ Shakeup”, Breaking Defense, Washington DC,22April 2024.

On 7 August 2024, the Spokeswoman of the Russian Foreign Ministry claimed that Ukraine had opened a second front in the Russia–Ukraine war in Africa1 . The statement highlights the growing attention Ukraine is paying to the African continent since the onset of the conflict. Ukraine's recent initiatives, though ambitious, reflect a hopeful yet perhaps overly optimistic approach in seeking to counter Russian influence in Africa, a region where Moscow's ties are deeply entrenched and longstanding.

Ukraine's strategic shift towards Africa marks a significant change in its foreign policy. Between February 2022 and February 2024, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy participated in over 30 high-level meetings with African leaders and the African Union, reflecting a growing interest in strengthening both bilateral and multilateral relationships.2 These diplomatic initiatives were further solidified by the December 2022 announcement of plans to establish 10 new Ukrainian embassies across Africa.3 Prior to Russia's invasion, Ukraine had a limited diplomatic infrastructure in Africa, with just 10 embassies.4

The momentum of Ukraine's engagement was notably accelerated by the ‘New Horizons’ strategy, under which the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs embarked on four extensive diplomatic tours across Africa between 2022 and 2023. These tours, covering 12 nations including Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya and Morocco, highlighted Ukraine's strategic interest in forging partnerships across diverse regions of the continent. On 30 December 2023, Ukraine unveiled its first communication strategy for Africa for 2024–2026, aimed at bolstering its image, advancing its interests and countering Russian influence5 . Recognising Africa's pivotal role in the United Nations General Assembly as the continent with the largest voting bloc, Ukraine’s strategy reflects its awareness of Africa's critical importance in shaping the dynamics of the Global South.

Challenges

Ukraine faces significant challenges in increasing its influence in Africa, primarily due to Russia's well-established connections on the continent. Between 2018 and 2022, Russia was the leading arms supplier to Africa, accounting for 40 per cent of the continent's weapon sales.6 Over the years, Russia has developed robust relationships with African nations through its embassies, media presence and cultural connections.

A major aspect of Russia's influence stems from the Wagner mercenary group, now known as the Africa Corps, which operates under the Russian Ministry of Defence. Since 2017, this group has extended military support to nations such as Mali, the Central African Republic, Mozambique and Sudan in return for financial compensation or access to resources like gold. Since Vladimir Putin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Kremlin has accumulated over US$ 2.5 billion from trading African gold.7

One of Ukraine's key initiatives in Africa is the ‘Grain from Ukraine’ programme, launched by President Zelenskyy in partnership with the World Food Programme. Started on 26 November 2022, during the International Food Security Summit in Kyiv, this programme aims to address food shortages caused by the Russia–Ukraine war. With about US$ 220 million in support, the programme is expected to grow as more countries and organisations get involved. Working with the UN World Food Programme, Ukraine focuses on delivering grain to countries facing severe food shortages, including Ethiopia, Somalia, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. This initiative not only shows Ukraine's commitment to humanitarian aid but also strengthens its ties with African nations.8

Ukraine's strategy in Africa involves both economic and military initiatives. Economically, Ukraine aims to transition from merely exporting raw material like grains and oil to exporting processed goods and agricultural technologies. However, this economic engagement may be overshadowed by Ukraine's military activities on the continent. Early in the Russia–Ukraine war, some African countries strongly condemned Ukraine's call for African fighters to join the ‘international legion’ against Russia, with nations such as Nigeria, Senegal and Algeria expressing strong opposition.9

Recently, Ukrainian Special Forces have reportedly been active in Sudan, supporting General Abdel Fattah Burhan, the leader of the country’s regular armed forces, in their fight against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by General Mohammed Hamdan Daglo (Hemedti).10 The RSF has been supported by the Wagner group since 2017. Ukrainian forces have used advanced weapons like drones and guided missiles to try to reduce Wagner’s influence in Sudan. Despite these efforts, Ukraine’s support hasn’t been enough to change the situation in Sudan’s favour. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have even started cooperating with Russia, offering Port Sudan in exchange for Russian security support, which makes Ukraine’s efforts futile.11

The limited success of Ukraine's strategy was further highlighted at the peace summit earlier on 16 June 2024. Out of the 82 states that signed a communique on a peace framework, only 11 were from Africa.12 Maksym Subkh, Ukraine's Special Representative for the Middle East and Africa, urged African nations to participate in the second Peace Summit to help achieve a just resolution to the conflict.13

Additionally, Ukraine’s actions in Africa could cause concern among countries that don’t want to become involved in a proxy war between Russia and Ukraine. Mali and Niger have cut diplomatic ties with Ukraine. Other West African countries have criticised Ukraine after some Ukrainian officials claimed to support Tuareg separatist rebels in northern Mali. These rebels, connected to both separatist movements and al-Qaeda’s affiliate in the Sahel region, successfully pushed back a Malian-Russian offensive in northern Mali in late July, resulting in significant casualties for both Russian and Malian forces. Following this, Mali cut ties with Ukraine, accusing Ukraine of supporting the rebels and echoing Russian claims that portray Ukraine as a supporter of international terrorism. Ukraine later denied any involvement in the attacks, calling Mali’s decision short-sighted.14

In addition, Senegal reprimanded the Ukrainian ambassador for a video that contradicted its policy of neutrality in the Russia–Ukraine conflict. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)15 also condemned any foreign interference that threatens peace in the region, signalling that Ukraine’s actions could strain its relationships with these African nations. ECOWAS member countries, which have strong partnerships with Western nations and have imposed sanctions on the Russian-backed governments, might see Ukraine's actions as a threat to their efforts. Senegal, which is leading efforts to bring these countries back into the ECOWAS fold, could find its efforts undermined by Ukraine’s military activities in Africa.

Conclusion

Ukraine's renewed focus on Africa starkly contrasts with Russia's entrenched relationships across the continent. While Russia has strengthened its ties with governments like those in Mali and Niger—countries that have recently cut diplomatic relations with Ukraine—Ukraine views its engagement in Africa as a vital part of its broader strategy to counter Russian aggression and secure global support.

However, empowering African nations should not come at the cost of exacerbating their existing vulnerabilities. Ukraine's military intelligence chief, in an interview with The Washington Post,16 emphasised Ukraine's intent to challenge Putin's influence wherever possible, including in Africa. Although this approach aligns with Ukraine's objectives of weakening Russia's military capabilities, it risks alienating African nations by dragging the conflict into their region.

The US and Europe must caution Ukraine against expanding the battlefield into Africa, particularly the Sahel, where countries are already embroiled in conflict. West Africa and the Sahel region have faced persistent and escalating terrorist violence for over a decade, with the central Sahel states of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger being hardest hit. Groups like Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, affiliated with al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) frequently target security forces and civilians, seize territory and blockade towns. Supporting factions like the Tuareg rebels, who are linked to al-Qaeda, could further destabilise the region and cause ripple effects in neighbouring countries. As the Ukraine–Russia conflict persists, Ukraine's engagement in Africa will require a delicate balance between its strategic goals and the need to maintain stable, constructive relationships with African nations.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s Answer to a Question from Rossiya Segodnya regarding Mali Severing Diplomatic Ties with Ukraine due to the Kiev Regime's Support for Terrorism”, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 7 August 2024.
• 2. “Ukraine -African Countries Communication Strategy”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ukraine, 30 December 2023.
• 3. Ibid.
• 4. Kate Hairsine, “How Ukraine is Combating Russia's Influence in Africa”, DW, 27 June 2024.
• 5. “Ukraine -African Countries Communication Strategy”, no. 2.
• 6. Pieter D. Wezeman, Justine Gadon and Siemon T. Wezeman, “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2022”, SIPRI, March 2023.
• 7. Jessica Berlin, David Clement, Lanre Peter Elufisan, Elizabeth Hicks and Zoltán Kész, “How the Kremlin is Using Wagner to Launder Billions in African Gold”, The Blood Gold Report, December 2023.
• 8. “Grain From Ukraine”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 14 March 2024.
• 9. Chrispin Mwakideu, “Ukraine Bid to Enlist African Fighters Slammed”, DW, 3 August 2022.
• 10. Ian Lovett, Nikita Nikolaienko and Nicholas Bariyo, “Ukraine is Now Fighting Russia in Sudan”, The Wall Street Journal, 6 March 2024.
• 11. Pius Adeleye, “Sudan/Russia: Will Port‑for‑Weapons Deal Bring an End to the Civil War?”, The Africa Report, 22 July 2024.
• 12. “Joint Communiqué on a Peace Framework”, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA, Summit on Peace in Ukraine,16 June 2024.
• 13. “Maksym Subkh Held a Meeting with a Group of African Journalists”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 5 August 2024. 
• 14. Paul Melly, “Was Ukraine’s Role in Big Wagner Defeat an Own Goal in Africa?”, BBC, 12 August 2024.
• 15. “Communique on the Violent Attacks Against Members of the Malian Defense and Security Forces in Tin Zaouatine”, Ecowas – Cedeao, 6 August 2024.
• 16. David Ignatius, “This Defiant Ukrainian General Has No Smile and Surprising Remarks on Trump”, The Washington Post, 17 April 2024.