Senior Fellow
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Research Fellow, IDSA, Col Vivek Chadha’s commentary on Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent currency revamp, titled ‘What scrapping Rs 500/1,000 notes means for countering terrorism’, was published in ‘Daily O’ on November 9, 2016.
India’s diplomatic offensive launched post the Uri-attacks provided the broader context in which its decision to carry out the surgical strike needs to be seen.
The events of the last week have been interpreted by some as the failure of the State to reach out to the separatist elements in Kashmir. On the face of it, this does seem to be the reality of the situation. However, a more deliberate analysis of the situation reveals an entirely different picture, which is far more disturbing for the forces of moderation.
The two visits undertaken by the Union home minister, with the second one having been as part of an all-party delegation, was an attempt at outreach to all segments of the society. While some sections did come out and interact, with a view to resolving the disturbing situation, as well as the long-term challenge, others like the Hurriyat, refused to to do so, shutting their doors on a unilateral and well-intentioned attempt at reconciliation.
If one were to relate this refusal to interact on part of the Hurriyat to the meetings that took place in 2010 under similar circumstances, which did lead to peace and reconciliation, the change in attitude can be attributed to three distinct factors, which seem to be driving their stubborn approach.
First, unlike last time, when the Hurriyat had greater control over the crowds, this time around, despite the brave face on display, the Hurriyat’s influence over the common man has receded. There is a feeling amongst certain hardline sections of the population that the Hurriyat has failed to lead them towards declared goals and objectives.
Therefore, even if they were to appeal for calm and stop protests, it is unlikely that the agitators would heed to such calls. The option that remains with the Hurriyat is either face the anger of their radical base, or ride the wave of protests.
The Hurriyat seems to have chosen the latter option. They have calculated the potential gains of emerging stronger after the crisis, since they visualise their emergence as the only separatist organisation, which will have the right to negotiate any future settlement with the government.
This might just work in the short-term. However, the long-term threat that emerges as a result of the same, has been lost sight of. And to understand that, the history of the separatist movement in Kashmir has lessons that must not be forgotten.
The first group of people who were hounded out of Kashmir were the Kashmiri Pandits. The selective killing of some and the fear psychosis that followed it, led to their mass exodus. This happened at the behest of a conniving Pakistan and freshly radicalised youth from the state.
The second wave of radical thought and rejection of moderation yet again sweeps the Valley. The target of radicalisation is not merely the Indian State, as may be seen on the streets of Kashmir. It is the voice of reason and moderation.
This voice of moderation does not only belong to the political leaders. It also represents parents who do not want their children’s future to be shrouded in darkness. It echoes in the calls for restraint.
This time around, the wrath of frenzy will not be borne by the Kashmiri Pandits. It has already started affecting the moderate Muslim families. It is these people who will look to escape the mindless violence and aimless stalling of state institutions. The common people who resented the checking of their vehicles by security forces, are facing the reality of young children stopping the same buses to frisk them for their "enemies".
This had led to some Muslims leaving Kashmir to seek normalcy beyond the state. This trickle emanates from moderate Muslims, who want their children to go to schools. It represents people who do not want the virus of radical thought to take their children on a path that will push them towards the same end as the one chosen by Burhan Wani.
It is this misdirection that the Hurriyat has indirectly encouraged in a bid to retain their relevance amongst their supporters. They have chosen the easier wrong that is reflected in the rejection of moderation to cement their position amongst their supporters and controllers across the LoC.
However, in doing so, they will continue to cede ground to rational moderate voices in Kashmir Valley, who want their normal lives back and along with it their self respect and honour.
The Hurriyat, through their stubborn and short-sighted approach has lost the faith of these moderates, who remain a vast majority in the state.
On the other hand, the radicalised youth can also see through the Hurriyat’s self-seeking ways, having been witness to their children having settled outside the state in comfortable and safe environs, even as they continue to call for others to sacrifice their lives. Thus, in the long term, the Hurriyat will not only become irrelevant for the moderates, but also the hardline youth.
Second, the Hurriyat by continuing on the path towards violence is contributing immensely to the radicalisation of Kashmiri society. Kashmiriyat, a term that is increasing being used by moderate voices today, does not merely represent the ethos of the society. It is both the shield against radical Islam and the glue, which bound different sections of Kashmiri society together.
Hurriyat’s adventurism threatens to loosen the bonds that Kashmiriyat represented. In doing so, they are unleashing the very monster that Pakistan attempted to create to contest India’s emergence, only to see it feed upon their own society.
The chimera of azadi, that is being shown to the people, is merely a tool to retain and regain power and influence. Ironically, it is a replica of Pakistan Army’s illusion of contesting India wanting to dismember Pakistan, that is sold to the population of the country in a bid to retain power.
Lastly, the Hurriyat, along with Pakistan, have underestimated the anger and disillusionment of the world at large with the employment of terrorism as an instrument of politics. It is for this reason that the diplomatic frenzy witnessed in Islamabad and Srinagar to internationalise the issue has been deflated in the face of global scrutiny.
The support of Pakistan that Syed Ali Shah Geelani uses as an anvil, is as credible as Pakistan’s own human rights record in Balochistan and PoK. This is all the more relevant, given their role in pushing small children in harm’s way in the Valley.
Pakistan has already succeeded in radicalising segments of Afghan society through their involvement there. It is surprising that sections within the Hurriyat are allowing them to play a similar role in Kashmir for their short-term gains.
It is often easier to choose the easier wrong in the face of the more difficult right. Kashmir is at the crossroads. The path being followed by the Hurriyat is likely to erode the moderate ethos of Kashmiri society, even as it will not get them the power they yearn for.
On the other hand, the option to contest what they see as injustice through dialogue, not only has better chances of success, but is also accompanied by strengthening of democratic values and traditions.
This, then, is truly the path of Kashmiriyat, Insaniyat and Jamooriyat that the Hurriyat must adopt, even it is for their parochial interest.
The article was originally published in DailyO.
The killing of Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani, yet again, exposed the fragile peace prevalent in the Kashmir Valley.
A number of attempts have been made to analyse the emotional bursting of the dam that led to the outpouring of anger and frustration.
This article does not attempt to rationalise the incidents, as, some of the past attempts seem to have become a victim of their logic. Instead, this is a modest effort at suggesting the way forward from the crossroads that the state finds itself at.
The article suggests ten steps that need to be initiated, to not only recover from the tragic events of the past week, but also take a substantive stride forward with an aim of breaking the existing cycle of violence.
This is based on the understanding that the events succeeding the death of Burhan Wani are not merely a consequence of the incident, but the manifestation of a larger issue that reflects a sense of dissatisfaction with the status quo in Kashmir.
The current incident was possibly a trigger that galvanised the people and also gave an opportunity to inimical forces in Pakistan to exploit these conditions.
1. Every attempt must be made to arrest the ongoing violence, through direct communication and outreach by political representatives, community leaders and village elders.
No major initiatives can be attempted under existing conditions, which continue to witness loss of lives.
2. Every effort must be made to provide immediate medical aid to security personnel and locals who could well be saved from either death or permanent disability, as a result of expeditious action.
3. A senior all-party delegation must visit the state, with representatives of all major parties of the central and state government.
They must seek a broad-based assessment of the situation, which must become the basis for any future steps initiated to address the existing problems.
4. Constitute a high-level political committee, as a representative of the central and state governments to undertake a two-fold responsibility.
One, analyse reports of past committees and distil the essence of their recommendations.
Two, meet all stakeholders in the state and suggest psychological, political, social, economic and security measures within a time frame of four months.
The recommendations must be made public, with an aim of broad-based discussions over a period of three months in order to seek views of the society at large, including the local population of the state.
5. The government must open channels of communication with all sections of the people within the state to discuss options for implementation of these recommendations.
This must include political parties, separatists, students, religious leaders and eminent members of the society.
6. The implementation of these recommendations must be undertaken in a time bound manner, with high priority to disbursement of financial assistance earmarked for flood relief.
7. Existing proposals which involve allocation of land for welfare projects must be deferred until the committee submits its report in consultation with the local representatives.
Also read: India will face more Burhan Wanis if it keeps ignoring Kashmir's voice
8. Existing Standard Operating Procedures for dealing with law and order situations and crowd control must be revisited for ensuring that casualties can be minimised during mass protests.
9. Measures must be strengthened to neutralise Pakistan’s attempts at interfering, instigating and exploiting local conditions, as also continuing with its proxy war in the state and beyond, through local, national and international initiatives.
The recent past has already witnessed Pakistan increasingly being questioned internationally regarding its duplicity in the fight against terrorism. This effort needs to be further augmented.
10. Extremist perceptions often get cemented when timely and judicious messaging does not emanate at the appropriate time.
At times when mob frenzy dictates thinking rather than rationality, a sane message of hope can soothe real and a perceived sense of hurt.
This is a process that cannot happen overnight, but, must nevertheless be undertaken in the right earnest.
The most important element of this initiative must focus upon the youth of the state, who have been affected the most during the two-decade old conflict.
These recommendations are neither all encompassing, nor final.
However, they represent an attempt at moving beyond the ongoing blame game to look forward rather than backwards in the hope that a solution to existing problems in the Valley can and must be found in our lifetime.
The article was originally published in the DailyO.
The recent past has witnessed China take a position on more issues than one in direct conflict with India's national interest. To name just two of these, it blocked the intended ban against Jaish-i-Mohammad chief Masood Azhar at a UN Committee on the eve of April Fool's day in 2016. This was a repeat of an earlier attempt by India to ensure action against Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi of Lashkar-e-Taiba in 2015.
More recently, China has indicated its reservations regarding India's candidature for the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a body that contributes to nuclear non-proliferation. Purportedly, China assigns its position to India not signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which India has clearly indicated as "discriminatory". In reality, it wants Pakistan to slip through the opening created for India, despite their blatant nuclear proliferation record.
These actions would seem inexplicable for a country like China, which is on the cusp of achieving great power status and a potential challenger to the US. Its insistence on remaining astride a lame horse goes against the grain of rational world opinion, which evidently and justifiably visualises Pakistan as not only the foremost jehadi factory of the world, but also a nuclear proliferator. Why then would China not only bail out Pakistan from a difficult position, but also support an embarrassingly lost cause?
China's actions must be seen from the perspective of a country which unlike other major powers is not blessed with a large number of allies and friends. It appreciates Pakistan for having stood by its side during years of isolation. This continues to drive Chinese gratitude for an ally that Pakistan has proved to be over the years.
Pakistan has also been bending backwards to facilitate Beijing's quest to achieve energy security through the Gwadar link in vicinity of the oil and gas markets of West Asia. This has further been strengthened through the road link that connects the two countries, providing China with critical connectivity into its relatively underdeveloped regions. In return Pakistan receives Chinese investments and military support, which is increasingly becoming the mainstay of its military capability aimed at India.
On the face of it, the relationship seems to be sailing the tranquil waters of mutual interest. However, a closer look will highlight certain misgivings emerging from China regarding the nature of relationship being pursued with Pakistan, especially given the self-destructive path that the country seems to have chartered.
First, terrorism which is being employed by Pakistan as state policy to contain India suits China as well. It keeps India busy fighting a slow bleed conflict with Pakistan, even as its threshold remains below the potential red lines drawn by India. However, Pakistan's policy of employing terrorism as a strategic weapon in Afghanistan is affecting China's commercial interests, where it has not been able to pursue its mining agenda and is threatened by export of terrorists into its weak underbelly of Xinjiang.
Similarly, the proliferation of these groups within Pakistan has endangered the safety and security of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) along with the $46 billion investment. Worse still, once China does make a substantial investment in Pakistan, it would have to further spend its already strained resources to protect its initial economic forays, an option it can ill afford at this juncture marked by a weakening economy. This could well give a body blow to its foremost initiative of One Belt One Road (OBOR) unveiled by Xi Jinping.
Second, a famous idiom states that a "man is known by the company he keeps". This is equally true for nations. Major powers even like the US cannot pursue their strategic agenda without partner countries and allies, as has repeatedly been emphasised by senior leaders from the country. The arraignment of partner countries in respect of the two major powers in the Indo-Pacific reflects on the quality of their alignments.
In case of the US, this includes Japan, Australia, South Korea, Singapore, Philippines and increasingly India, though as a partner country. On the other hand, China is accompanied by the weight of Pakistan's failing status, record of using terrorism as state policy and nuclear proliferation history. This is hardly the kind of counterweight that a major power contender would want in its quest for seeking parity with the US.
These factors are starting to impact China's approach towards Pakistan. And in doing so, first, it is attempting to follow a more independent policy towards Afghanistan, rather than hanging on to Pakistan's coat tails. Second, its not so subtle hint with relation to terrorism was indicated by the state run television channel CCTV 9 airing the 26/11 documentary clearly nailing the role of LeT. For a country which speaks as much through discrete actions as through words, the writing is on the wall.
While it may still be early days to expect any major change in China's policy towards Pakistan, there is evidently a hint of shifting stance that seems to be accompanying its actions. A relationship that was once described as "sweeter than honey", seems to have been affected by just a tinge of sour taste. It is hoped that actions on the eve of April Fool's day that led to giving terrorism emanating from Pakistan a new lease of life, will be guided by more mature decision making in future, as will the decision to limit India's role in multilateral institutions.
The article was originally published in the Daily O
On February 20, 2016, a Central Reserve Police Force convoy was ambushed at Pampore, just a few kilometres away from the heart of Srinagar town. The terrorists, after achieving initial success, moved into the Entrepreneurship Development Institute(EDI), in the near vicinity of the ambush site. At that time, there were a number of employees and students in the building. Thereafter began a prolonged operation that has continued since over the weekend, leading to the loss of invaluable lives of soldiers.
Amongst those martyred in the encounter are three paratroopers who belong to some of the finest special forces battalions of the Indian Army. It would seem an anomaly at first to hear of such a high casualty figure, especially since the terrorists had sought refuge in a building and had no where to escape thereafter. However, a more deliberate assessment of the situation provides an answer to the harsh reality of everyday operations conducted by the army in these areas.
The presence of civilian population in any operation makes its conduct that much more complex and difficult to handle. The possibility of losing innocent lives in crossfire or worse as a result of people being used as human shields cannot be ruled out under such circumstances.
Second, purely from an operational perspective, it limits the options available to the army to take out terrorists who seek refuge in such buildings. This is especially so when the buildings provide limited avenues of ingress and egress and further do not facilitate a top-down entry from the roof. This was exactly the case with the building in question which has a sloping tin roof and multiple rooms which can be used by terrorists to fire at incoming soldiers. This implies clearing each floor and room physically, more often than not without the knowledge of the exact location of terrorists as also the possibility of presence of civilians.
Third, the easiest solution to neutralising the terrorists is to bring down a building or a house. In this case as well, this could well have been possible. However, over a period of time, the army has deliberately take the precaution of minimising collateral damage during operations, even at the cost of casualty to its troops.
Fourth, the operation was conspicuous by the absence of heavy calibre weapons. This is unlike similar operations that have been conducted in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq, where, artillery, drone based precision missiles and rockets were used with impunity. The Indian Army's refusal to do so is again a part of its counterinsurgency ethos of minimum force and strict rules of engagement.
Fifth, the martyrdom of two officers in the operation yet again reinforces the time honoured tradition of the army, which was witnessed during the Kargil conflict as well. It is the officer class and especially the young officers who lead from the front and lead by example. This is one reason why the army continues to remain the bastion of reliability and faith that the nation reposes in it.
It is important to relate this incident to the human rights record of the army, which often gets questioned in Jammu and Kashmir(J&K). This incident clearly reflects the values, procedures and abundant caution that is taken by the army doing the conduct of operations. This is not to say that mistakes have not happened or some personnel have not been culpable of deliberate crimes. In fact, it needs to be reinforced that in approximately 25 years of counter terrorism operations in J&K, 1121 allegations have been received from various sources, including human rights organisations.
Of these the police found it fit to file a first investigation report (FIR) only in 350 cases and the army found prima facie evidence in 72 cases and initiated disciplinary proceedings. This led to conviction of 150 personnel, including 51 officers, 18 JCOs and 81 other ranks. This resulted in punishments varying from dismissal from service to imprisonment in civil jail. In addition, the army also took sou moto cognisance of offences in approximately 100 other cases, without any complaints having been filed.
This further led to the punishment of 52 army personnel. Interestingly, if an assessment of all the cases filed with the police were contrasted with those specifically related to the army, it emerges that at over 150 police stations in J&K, a mere 0.01 per cent relate to human rights violations against the army. This clearly highlights the contrived propaganda that tends to dominate the debate on this issue. It prefers to sideline countless incidents like the one at Pampore, that better reflect the reality of counter terrorism actions in the state.
The contention of some human rights groups like Amnesty International, that "In general, victims of human rights abuses in the state have been unable to secure justice, regardless of whether the perpetrator is a state or non-state actor" is divorced from reality. If these figures are inadequate to reinforce the army's respect for human rights, then the conduct of operation at Pampore, will clearly illustrate the cost of adherence to these values that the army pays on a daily basis in the pursuit of its responsibility.
This article was originally published in Daily O
If the IS has been able to successfully recruit Indians for the war in Syria and provide technical support for their travel, it is a matter of time before they find recruits willing to employ violence in India itself.
Research Fellow, IDSA, Col Vivek Chadha’s article on terrorism was published in Dainik Jagran on November 22, 2015.
Speaking at the G-20 meeting in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attack in Paris, Prime Minister Modi outlined a ten point plan. The very first issued underlined by him was the need to "curb and criminalise terror financing". Just two days later, he yet again reinforced the need for economic sanctions to curb the financing of terrorism from criminal activities. This raises some pertinent questions. Why is the finance of terrorism important? Why does this threat need to be reinforced? And finally, why have we not been able to stop it?
Financing of terrorism has been referred to as the lifeblood of terrorism. Taking this analogy further, one could say that if ideology is the soul of terrorism, finance is its lifeblood. One has to only look at some of the most potent terrorist organisations of recent years like the Islamic State (IS) and Lashkar-i-Taiba (LeT), to reinforce this reality. Both groups have succeeded in making a transnational impact beyond their immediate shores. The groups believe in the ideology of reprehensible violence and exploit and misinterpret religion to support their actions. Both terrorist organisations are also well organised, armed and led, with spectacular strikes having become their vicious calling card.
However, one of the most important factors, which reinforces their similarity, is the access to a very substantial funding, that is able to sustain their terrorist agenda. The reason finance is considered the lifeblood of terrorism, is its capacity to sustain an organisation as mammoth as the IS, which by some estimates is over a million dollars a day! Unlike popular perception, this funding is not as critical for actual terror strikes, as it is for sustaining an organisation that propagates the ideology of terror, recruits believers, pays for their sustenance, weapons, warlike material, travel and next of kin, after the death of terrorists.
In comparison, a terrorist organisation can be compared with a corporate body, which undertakes a large number of background activities in order to finally create a product which is introduced into the market. The cost of the product is not merely its market price, but the cumulative cost of its development. Just like a car company cannot produce new cars unless it can fund the life cycle cost of its product, a terrorist group will not be able to carryout strikes, unless it can generate funds for running the organisation.
There are different ways in which terrorist groups raise funds to support their activities.
In simple terms, the source of funding can be either external or internal to their base or location. It is rare for a terrorist group to physically control a geographical area and not only extract funds from it, but also administer it. The IS is one such example, which is why most of its funding remains internal. It has succeeded in extracting oil from both Iraq and Syria, tax the local people and businesses, employ kidnapping for ransom as a ploy, loot banks, sell antiquities, seek funding from supporters outside the region in the name of religion and the so called caliphate. The irony of the situation is their ability to sell oil at concessional rates, through and to neighbouring countries like Turkey, which are also fighting them on the battlefield. Both parties thus become beneficiaries of the economy of terror, having successfully quarantined their ideological differences for economic interests.
The LeT has an equally stable funding system in place, even if it is not as flush with funds as the IS. The group has successfully sold the idea of a jihad against countries like the US and India, to seek funds both from within and outside Pakistan. It has employed its front, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, in the garb of a charity and welfare organisation to support its operations. The group has employed ingenious means like selling animal skins during Eid to raise funding, besides benefitting from zakat, a voluntary donation, which is collected at a rate of two and a half per cent of an individual's income, to support jihad. Most importantly, the LeT receives its financial muscle from the ISI, which funds it and coordinates its terror action plan.
The need to reinforce these realities stems from the fact that funding of such groups is no longer limited to the local confines of their area of sustenance. Terror groups, much like corporate bodies have well and truly embraced and exploited the benefits of globalisation. If the recent Paris attacks had their origins in Syria, planning in Belgium and execution in France, globalised terrorism is a phenomenon that is in full bloom. Much like the globalised operations of these terror groups, their funding too benefits from the tools of modernisation.
From legal banking channels to money transfer service scheme (MTSS) and fake Indian currency notes (FICN), printed inside Pakistan (as related to LeT) to hawala, every possible method of transit has been exploited by terrorist groups. Most of these transfers take place in a globalised, networked world, linking a large number of countries in a financial web.
Finally, if the sources and methods of transferring funds is so well known, why are we not able to stop it? The transfer of money is much like the flow of water. It tends to take the easiest available method to meander its way to its final destination. Again, just like water, which may change its course, direction and volume of flow, to eventually fill a reservoir, terror funding also follows this example. For terrorist groups, the channels employed are not as important, as the ability to ensure that funding remains consistent with their requirement.
Take the LeT for example. It began by openly collecting funds for its so called jihad against India. After being declared a terrorist organisation, JuD took on this role, circumventing international pressure. When the JuD also comes under pressure, the Pakistani state was always there, to fill its coffers and make sure that the "strategic asset" could be maintained at optimum efficiency. Similarly, the LeT has in the past moved money through every possible channel available. Whenever it finds strict norms being placed on cash or FICN smuggling, greater reliance is placed on hawala or through overvalued/ undervalued trade transactions.
Given the nature of sources and methods for moving funds, along with the backdrop of globalised instruments, which could well emanate far from the soil of an incorrigible Pakistan or an undermined Syria, the challenge to stop funding continues to affect counter terrorism initiatives. Combine this with the fragmented international resolve, wherein countries and blocs find it more convenient to pursue their parochial interests, the fight against the finance of terrorism remains a cherished ideal, yet a distant dream. Despite acknowledging the complicity of countries like Pakistan in funding terrorism and the US designating Hafiz Saeed as a terrorist, Pakistan remains a frontline ally in the war against terrorism.
The irony of this reality and the contradiction of competing interests, ensures that the globalised threat from terrorism is faced by a piecemeal and stunted response. While India has taken a number of steps to fight the contagion of the finance of terrorism, final victory is likely to elude agencies in the absence of much needed unity of approach at the international level.
This article was originally published in Daily O
The article analyses military change in the context of the Indian Army, with specific focus on organisational innovation and change. In doing so, it analyses two case studies: restructuring of the army after the Sino-Indian War of 1962; and mechanisation based on the 1975 expert committee recommendations. On the basis of these case studies, the article assesses the drivers and desirables for organisational change in the Indian Army, with the further aim of deriving policy recommendations which are especially apt in light of the ongoing transformation of the army.
