Sumit Ganguly

It is a little-known fact that Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India had proposed a ‘standstill agreement’ to prohibit the further testing of nuclear weapons as early as 1953. In effect, it was an initial step toward a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons with the aim of their eventual elimination. That goal, of course, has proven to be quite elusive. Despite the conclusion of a Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, pursuing a comprehensive test ban remained a chimera as new nuclear powers entered the global arena and a spate of nuclear tests ensued.

• Published: March 2011
• Strategic Analysis

As the United States seeks to draw down its security forces in Afghanistan, India faces a serious policy conundrum. It has made, as Vishal Chandra argues, significant developmental and infrastructural investments in the country. If the US military withdrawal is significant, even if not precipitate, it may leave the field open to a reconstitution of the Taliban within the country. Such an outcome will dramatically enhance Pakistani influence in the country and thereby place India's very substantial commitments to date at risk.

• Published: January 2011
• Strategic Analysis

Contrary to the arguments of proliferation pessimists, this article contends that the overt nuclearization of South Asia has contributed to stability in the region. To that end this article carefully examines two recent crises in Indo-Pakistani relations and concludes that in the absence of nuclear weapons they would have culminated in full-scale war. Accordingly, while Indo-Pakistani relations may remain fraught with tension, the likelihood of major war in the region has dramatically diminished.

• Published: May 2009
• Strategic Analysis