Over the past few years there has been a move by some of the member states of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to induct China into the regional organisation. China, in turn, has indicated its desire to join. Since other extra-regional states were also keen to be involved, SAARC has opened its doors since 2007 for out-of region states through a new arrangement.
The responses to the arguments that I forwarded in my initial essay, ‘China in SAARC? To What Effect?’, have introduced interesting dimensions to this debate. While most of the respondents have agreed with my proposition that it is premature to think about China's entry into the South Asian regionalist project and that it would introduce complex challenges that would be difficult to manage, they disagree with some of the reasons that I have cited.
Indian decision makers played down the problems in the India-China relationship for the past decade in the expectation that deepening engagement would influence attitudes at the top level in China and thereby enable hardened positions to soften.
In recent years, China has again publicly revived its territorial claims over India's northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh. However, by insisting on these claims, China is making a settlement of the territorial issue virtually impossible and seriously misperceiving public opinion trends in India. China has failed to appreciate that if Arunachal is claimed to be the southern part of Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), India cannot accept Tibet to be within China.
India’s September 24 vote in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supporting the resolution moved by Britain, France and Germany (EU-3) on Iran’s nuclear programme has a raised a significant debate within the strategic studies community on the value and wisdom of the policy stance.
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India would be noted for three landmark steps: The establishment of a strategic and cooperative partnership, the agreement on the political parameters and guidelines for settling the territorial/boundary issue, and the decision on a comprehensive economic partnership and regional trading arrangement.
Globalisation and regionalisation of trade and investment are drawing in all countries and becoming an irresistible trend in Asia. China is at the centre of this new structure. Since 1992 in particular, as investments in labour-intensive manufacturing from Taiwan, Hong Kong, the US, Japan, Europe and Southeast Asia have moved in a rising wave though the open Chinese door, steeply raising its trade profile.
China’s maritime territorial claims, and its diplomatic and military measures to attain them, have caused much regional concern in recent years. The expansive maritime sovereignty claims of China in the South China Sea flow from three key goals: the completion of its incomplete nationalist project of territorial consolidation and unifying the state; the desire to control the contested maritime periphery; and the garnering of sea-based resources such as oil and gas that have assumed critical importance for fuelling the economy of a rapidly modernising China.
