The outcome of the NSG plenary in Seoul is most likely to be the admission of India to the NSG, denial or postponement of a decision on Pakistan’s application, but deferment of both announcements to a later date.
Pakistan has been aspiring for membership of the 48-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for quite some time now, with this ambition intimately linked to its desire to gain parity with India, as New Delhi too seeks access to global nuclear commerce. China has supported Pakistan’s pursuit for membership on a rather frivolous basis, arguing that if India is accorded NSG membership even though it is not a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), then Pakistan also should be given a similar status. Irrespective of having a strong supporter in China, the cardinal issue that requires serious consideration is whether Pakistan should be allowed entry into the export control group.
Why does Pakistan seek NSG membership?
The negotiation of the India-United States civilian nuclear cooperation agreement in 2005 provided an impetus to Pakistan to seek civilian nuclear technology for meeting its energy requirements. With a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate of 4.71 percent and an estimated population of 200 million, Pakistan believes that nuclear energy is the solution to its ongoing energy crisis. To meet this challenge, Pakistan seeks entry into the NSG, which would facilitate nuclear commerce with the global community.
However, Pakistan’s suggested rationale for NSG participation is unreasonable. Several experts believe that Pakistan’s energy crisis is primarily due to poor energy governance and mismanagement. Pakistan produces electricity at unaffordable prices, with the average cost currently between 14-17 rupees per kilowatt hour, the highest in South Asia. Additionally, widespread corruption leads to distribution and transmission losses which result in 22 percent of the generated electricity getting wasted. Pervez Hoodbhoy proclaims that “non payment of electricity bills by the military and various government departments to other government departments”[1]creates ‘circular debt.’ Pakistan’s electricity crisis is further intensified by pilferage and faulty electricity grids that cause inefficient distribution, leading to wastage.[2]Thus, it appears that the crisis is a man-made problem that can be internally managed with effective governance. Pakistan may also consider energy cooperation dialogues with willing partners to deal with this shortage. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has sought assistance to resolve the energy crisis in the country. In fact, in a bid to address its neighbor’s acute energy shortage, India jointly with Pakistan “announced several initiatives to accelerate cooperation in the oil and gas sector.” However, strained political relationships have prevented any forward movement on these initiatives. Arguably then, its energy crisis is not the reason behind Pakistan’s aspirations for NSG participation.
Pakistan’s desire for entry into the NSG is rooted more in the quest for nuclear legitimacy, and parity with India. Whether these alone can be merits for entry into the NSG is debatable. Pakistan had expressed intense criticism over the 2005 India-United States civil nuclear deal on grounds that it will disturb the nuclear balance in the region. According to Pakistan, the imbalance can be restored with a similar deal that would not only provide Pakistan access to global trade in nuclear technology, but also put it at par with India. A third advantage would involve symbolic value in terms of nuclear legitimacy to Pakistan, and overshadow its past nuclear proliferation under A.Q. Khan. Pakistan believes that the civil nuclear deal has upped New Delhi’s overall nuclear clout vis-à-vis Islamabad. This weighs heavily on the psyche of Pakistani political and military establishments, which reckon that Islamabad is gradually losing influence in the region.
Pakistan and NSG Membership
To be a responsible nation, Pakistan must strive towards achieving nuclear legitimacy through more erudite means. Any fallacious presumptions of propagating controversial China-Pakistan nuclear trade as a fallout of the India-United States civilian nuclear deal cannot assist Islamabad to get entry into the NSG or obtain nuclear legitimacy. What is noteworthy is that the China-Pakistan nuclear agreement came before the India-United States nuclear deal, as shown in the timeline below.
Table 1: Chronology of India-United States and China-Pakistan nuclear trade
| May 5, 2004 | China committed to building a second nuclear power reactor (Chashma-2) in Pakistan |
| April 10, 2005 | Pakistan and China reached an agreement on two 300-megawatts-electric-capacity nuclear power reactors effective for the next ten years |
| July 18, 2005 | Official declaration of the India-United States nuclear deal |
Remarkably, the complexities inherent in Sino-Pakistan nuclear trade can never confer upon Pakistan the same nuclear benefits and global status as the India-United States nuclear deal has provided to India. This is because their controversial nuclear engagement generates global concerns and weakens the NPT. Hence, Sino-Pakistan nuclear power cooperation is not the desired pathway for Pakistan to seek nuclear legitimacy.
Pakistan’s quest for NSG membership faces complications galore. However, it may consider adopting responsible strategies and policies to gain the trust of the global community. These measures include making substantial efforts to curb nuclear proliferation, eliminate terrorism, refrain from first-use strategies, stabilize relations with India, and cooperate with India to strengthen regional nuclear security. On a more tangible level, Pakistan must:
NSG membership comes with specified objectives and responsibilities. It involves obligations to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials, and a commitment to respect and abide by the global nuclear nonproliferation agenda. Hence, before its consideration for admission into the NSG, Pakistan is required to be more forthcoming on its nonproliferation efforts.
[2] Ibid.
The article was originally published in The South Asian Voices
India’s proposed participation in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has been conditioned to two issues by China. The first concerns India’s refusal to sign the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). China has argued that India’s reticence on the NPT bars its from being a member NSG. The second issue raked by China is that India’s entry into the NSG has been linked to Pakistan. The first issue can be substantially debated and logically argued that to hold India’s entry into the NSG hostage to the NPT membership is not in the interest of the global non-proliferation efforts. The second issue is completely irrelevant as India’s participation to the export control group must not be associated with any other country.
This commentary examines the credibility of China’s proposed arguments to obstruct India’s entry into the NSG. It underscores India’s entry into the export control group must be unanimously supported by the existing NSG members as the group cannot function in isolation based on selective cooperation. Obstructing assistance from states with advanced nuclear weapons technology like India is harmful to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It also emphasises that India is interested in joining the NSG but its desire must not be linked to any matter like Pakistan, which is a non-issue.
The NSG was established in 1974 by seven nuclear supplier governments (Canada, West Germany, France, Japan, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States) following India’s conduct of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion. The seven nuclear powers concluded the NPT alone is inadequate to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology.
NSG was founded to stop illegal transfer of nuclear material, equipment or technology that encourages proliferation of nuclear weapons. The 48-member group pursues its objectives through adherence to the established Guidelines of the export control group adopted through consensus and after appropriate exchange of information related to proliferation concerns. The NSG Procedural Arrangement specifies a set of factors that a new participating government must fulfill for entry.
In 2008, India was granted the NSG waiver to meet it growing energy requirements which allowed it to enter into nuclear trade with nuclear supplier countries. The deliberations held at the plenary meetings have ended with divided opinions on India’s participation into the Group. The primary resistance is from China arguing that India is not a signatory to the NPT – a necessary factor for entry into the export control group. The Chinese position on India’s NSG participation requires reconsideration.
India successfully achieved the NSG waiver after willingly undertaking highly effective non-proliferation commitments (separating its civilian and military nuclear facilities in a phased manner; placing civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; signing and adhering to the IAEA’s Additional Protocol) under the India-US Civilian Nuclear Agreement. Added to this, India has set high standards for itself to contribute towards international efforts for halting spread of nuclear weapons of technology. These measures include ratification of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; adherence to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) of 2005; harmonising its Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies (SCOMET) list with that of the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG); enacting the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their Delivery Systems Act, 2005 that provides “overarching and integrated legislation prohibiting unlawful activities in relation to WMD and their delivery systems” and; upheld obligations under the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540 to prevent proliferation of all WMD.
India has also set up a Counter Nuclear Smuggling Team to deal with the threat of individuals or group of individuals acquiring nuclear or radioactive material for malicious purposes. India is presently in the process of setting up a specialized School on Nuclear Security under the aegis of the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP) to impart training in areas of physical protection of its nuclear materials and technology.
Given so, it is unfair that China continues to display reticence to India’s participation in the NSG. While it can be asserted that barring India’s entry into the NSG will not in any way undermine its efforts towards non-proliferation, but it can certainly affect NSG’s credibility in the future. Nuclear technology is widespread globally and it would be a prudent decision to include non-NPT states with advanced nuclear technology within the folds of the NSG as an effective hedge against nuclear proliferation. India’s rich experience in nuclear technology and future plans of becoming a “competitive” nuclear supplier makes its inclusion in the NSG an imperative necessity.
Hence, the naysayers including China must move beyond the discourse of India’s refusal to sign the NPT as a ground to prevent its entry into the NSG. Noteworthy, NSG was created because it was felt that NPT by itself would be a deficient effort to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology. This is evident from the examples of NPT states like Iraq, Iran and North Korea’s clandestine pursuit of nuclear weapons capability despite being NPT members. Earlier, in October 1974, the French company SGN and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) signed a contract for the construction of the 100 MT facility capable of separating between 100kg and 200kg of plutonium annually. As France had not signed the NPT, it was under no obligation to restrain from entering into nuclear trade with Pakistan. However, the inclusion of France within the NSG in 1974 irrespective of its non-NPT status led to the subsequent termination of the controversial nuclear agreement in 1978.
The NSG has been less than successful in preventing exports of restricted nuclear technology in present times. The infamous AQ Khan nuclear black-market and the on-going China-Pakistan nuclear trade in nuclear reactor cooperation are in total violation of the established NGS Guidelines. It is important that the NSG reviews its mandate and adopts measures that can contribute in stopping nuclear proliferation. One such measure would be to decouple NPT and NSG participation and welcome states with advanced nuclear technology like India within its fold.
As argued by the United States in a communication titled “Food for Thought” Paper on Indian NSG Membership, it has been emphasized that the “factors “should be considered by Participating Governments and are not NPT mandatory criteria that must be met by any proposed candidate for NSG.” The NSG must display like-mindedness on the core important issue i.e. be “supportive of international efforts towards the non-proliferation of WMD and their delivery vehicles and have in force a legally-based domestic export control system which gives effect to the commitment to act in accordance with the Guidelines.”
China has linked India’s participation to the NSG with Pakistan’s proposed entry into the export control group. China’s efforts can be interpreted as merely a tactical instrument to obstruct India’s entry into the NSG. India’s impeccable nuclear non-proliferation record cannot be equated with that of Pakistan. In the case of India, its non-proliferation record involves extending support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) objectives by which a moratorium was declared post 1998 tests – a stand that has been maintained till date. Unlike India, Pakistan does not merit an impeccable nuclear non-proliferation record. Its continuing ambiguity on the AQ Khan, controversial nuclear cooperation with China on reactor technology and its taciturn approach on the FMCT are major concerns that impede global non-proliferation efforts.
China must rise above petty politics and support India’s entry into the NSG in the larger global interests.
The article was originally published in the The Dialogue
China’s continuing complicity in nuclear proliferation networks would weaken the global nuclear security regime. Hence, China must cooperate with the international community for reinvesting the benefits achieved by the Nuclear Security Summit process, and help develop stronger nuclear security architecture in the Indian subcontinent.
The Nuclear Security Summit has played a dynamic role in bringing high-level political attention to the possibility of terrorists gaining hold of weapons-usable nuclear materials and the need to mitigate these risks.
Beginning 2010 and then subsequently in 2012 and 2014, the Summit successively laid out the vision for a comprehensive and effective global nuclear security system. The Summits emphasized on the possibility to undertake and implement significant steps for strengthening the global nuclear security system. Though the Summit process has been successful in effecting incremental steps towards a robust nuclear security system, there are gaps between what has been done and what more needs to be done.
With the Nuclear Security Summit coming to an end in April 2016, the international community must garner requisite diplomacy to continue the legacy of the process. This proposal seeks to explore the existing gaps that need to be addressed for a comprehensive nuclear security system. It will focus on possible areas of cooperation especially at the regional and global levels for developing a robust nuclear security regime. Lastly, the proposal will also consider possible areas of continuing the legacy of the NSS process at the regional level within the Indian subcontinent.
The existing nuclear security system is ridden with weak links within the larger structure. Thus, while effective steps have been taken to mitigate risks against illicit diversion of weapons-usable nuclear materials, unsecured nuclear materials still exist in the world.
Pakistan, ahead of the 2016 NSS had ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 2005 Amendment, but it still has not adhered to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. This is a potential gap and terrorists will exploit such gaps within the security system for their malicious purposes. Furthermore, Pakistan possesses a large stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU) estimated at 3.1 ± 0.4 tons and continues to produce HEU for its weapons purposes. This is an extremely dangerous situation and undermines efforts in securing nuclear materials in the region. Consequently, it heightens the threat of illicit diversion of nuclear materials globally.
While risk factors exist, there are potential areas where India and Pakistan can potentially collaborate to eliminate weak links within the nuclear security mechanisms existing in the Indian subcontinent. India’s nuclear centre of excellence – the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP) is a dedicated centre of excellence on nuclear security, with participation from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other foreign partners. Its primary mission is to develop a robust nuclear security culture by building a system that is intrinsically safe, secure, sustainable, and proliferation-resistant. Collaborative programs between the Indian and Pakistani centers of excellence (CoEs) can contribute towards strengthening nuclear security not only in the subcontinent, but also worldwide. Such collaboration might help develop potential for joint efforts towards a range of research synergies to strengthen regional response against any vertical proliferation. India and Pakistan are both victims of terrorism and hence there exists a common cause for both to combine their nuclear expertise and excellence in combating nuclear security threat.
Any regional nuclear security architecture within the Indian subcontinent cannot be complete without the effective cooperation of China. India may explore possibilities to negotiate with China and Pakistan to create a Regional Nuclear Security Summit process to prevent proliferation of weapons usable nuclear materials. Given potential nuclear security risks from terrorist organizations like the ISIS, increasing demands for nuclear energy, fissile material expansion, and tactical nuclear weapons, a trilateral nuclear security summit between India, Pakistan and China can contribute in increasing awareness of the potential nuclear security risks in the sub-continent. A regional nuclear security fund can be proposed to which member states voluntary contribute for improved nuclear security through training, disseminating expert guidance and other assistance. Such a tri-level political initiative holds the potential for building an improved and strengthened mechanism of nuclear security.
Nuclear security risks are one of the biggest challenges of the 21st century. The Nuclear Security Summit process effectively endorsed that states have a fundamental responsibility “to maintain at all times effective security of all nuclear and other radioactive materials, including nuclear materials used in nuclear weapons, and nuclear facilities under their control.” However, though nuclear security is a sovereign responsibility the consequences of any severe nuclear incident are transnational. Hence, international collaboration is critical in building effective nuclear security and enhancing a strong security culture. An effective nuclear security that permeates through all the agencies/departments governing nuclear security contributes in timely mitigation of the growing challenges. There is no room for complacency.
The article was originally published in the The Dialogue.
Dear Mr. President,
Greetings from India!
I welcome the dynamic role that the Nuclear Security Summit process has played in raising awareness concerning threats to nuclear security. It has significantly stimulated national actions and international cooperation for mitigating the risk of terrorists gaining hold of nuclear weapons and related materials. The success achieved has reinforced my conviction that India and the United States share the common objective of developing a robust nuclear security regime and will continue to be committed towards consistent improvement of nuclear security, domestically and internationally.
Without any complacency, the Government of India has approved the establishment of the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP), as committed at the first Summit in 2010. The GCNEP is a dedicated centre of excellence on nuclear security, with participation from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other foreign partners. Its primary mission is to develop a robust nuclear security culture by building a system that is intrinsically safe, secure, sustainable, and proliferation-resistant. The GCNEP (presently under construction) has already started conducting off-campus courses in training. It is also investing in research and development on issues such as physical protection, design basis threat, safety-security interface, and the security culture that permeates India’s nuclear establishment. The GCNEP is a signature of India’s assurances on its high and effective standards of nuclear security.
India’s nuclear security mechanisms meet global standards. This can be inferred from the fact that no extreme nuclear security incidents have occurred in the country. However, this does not mean that we are complacent about any hypothetical nuclear security situation. Given its geographical location, India has repeatedly expressed concern about the grave dangers of unlawful smuggling in nuclear materials and technology from within the region.
India is deeply concerned about the possibility of a nuclear security breach from within Pakistan. The repeated assassination attempts on former president General Pervez Musharraf perpetrated by Pakistani military personnel, and the Mehran naval base attacks highlight the degree of Pakistan’s vulnerability to insider threats. Additionally, a recent declaration made by ISIS about the possibility of acquiring “a nuclear device” from Pakistan has further raised security tensions in the region. Any likelihood of diversion of sensitive nuclear materials reflects upon Islamabad’s lacking nuclear security system. This can seriously compromise the nuclear security of not only Pakistan, but also seriously endanger the nuclear security of my country and the rest of the region.
Given so, a critical challenge for the GCNEP is to negotiate a similar outreach program, to help Pakistan in facing acute nuclear security challenges. Collaborative programs between the Indian and Pakistani centers of excellence (CoEs) can contribute towards strengthening nuclear security not only in southern Asia, but also worldwide. Such collaboration might help develop potential for joint efforts towards a range of research synergies to strengthen regional response against any vertical proliferation. India and Pakistan are both victims of terrorism and hence there exists a common cause for both to combine their nuclear expertise and excellence in combating the threat to nuclear security. However, much lies upon the future attitude of the political establishment of Pakistan and the Pakistani military towards bilateral ties with India.
Nuclear security requires consistent and continuous effort, devoid of apathy. The benefits achieved must be reinvested to continue the legacy of the summit process. As a continuation, India may explore possibilities to negotiate with China and Pakistan to create a Regional Nuclear Security Summit process with the objective of preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials. A regional summit process would help raise awareness about growing nuclear security risks emanating from within the region like the ISIS threat, increasing demands for nuclear energy, fissile material expansion, and tactical nuclear weapons.
As leaders of powerful democracies and growing economies, I urge that India and the United States undertake joint responsibility to develop a nuclear security culture that both assures the international community and inspires other nations to reiterate their commitments towards a robust nuclear security regime.
Yours sincerely,
Narendra Modi
This article was originally published in 'South Asian Voices'.
Vipin Narang offers a critical analysis of why states adopt certain strategies and postures over others and how these choices affect their ability to deter conflicts. With the world already into the second nuclear age, strategic equations are no longer defined by a ‘bipolar global superpower competition involving massive nuclear arsenals with the capability to destroy each other multiple times over’ (p. 1).
The importance of nuclear security in Asia needs to be focused upon in view of the emerging challenges of nuclear proliferation, growing nuclear arsenals, expanding civilian nuclear energy programmes, weak export controls, zones of domestic instability and terrorism in several regions within the continent. This article focuses on the factors that pose potential risks to nuclear security in Asia. It emphasises the prevailing factors endangering the security of nuclear and radiological materials in Asia.
Alan J. Kuperman’s edited volume Nuclear Terrorism and Global Nuclear Security: The Challenge of Phasing out Highly Enriched Uranium explores the prospects and challenges involved in the process of global elimination of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). Global commerce in HEU poses the inherent dangers of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Recognising the above, the volume asserts that, ‘given the vast majority of non-weapons HEU commerce persist[ing]’ (p. 3), the international community needs to undertake concerted measures to minimise the dangers of HEU commerce.
Mark Fitzpatrick’s book Overcoming Pakistan’s Nuclear Dangers makes a courageous attempt in advocating recognition of Pakistan as a ‘normal nuclear state’ (p. 12). The author asserts that the international community must now refrain from making Pakistan pay for its 2004 AQ Khan debacle and recognise that ‘the time has come to offer Pakistan a nuclear cooperation deal akin to India’ (p. 162).
