Patrick C. Bratton

Dr. Patrick Bratton is an Assistant Professor of political science and the Program Chair for Political Science and International Relations at Hawai‘i Pacific University (HPU). At IDSA he is working on the use of coercive diplomacy during Indo-Pakistani crises.

At HPU, he teaches courses in international relations, comparative politics, contemporary France, national security, and foreign policy. His research focuses on strategic studies, security in Europe and Asia, foreign policy decision-making, and alliances and transatlantic relations.

He graduated from the University of Alaska, Fairbanks, and then completed graduate studies at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth (UK), and the Université de Rennes 2 (France). He finished his Ph.D. at The Catholic University of America, in Washington, DC. He has worked at The Catholic University of America, the National War College, and Washington College.

International Visiting Fellow
Email: pbratton@hpu.edu
Phone: +91 11 2671 7983

Publication

The Creation of Indian Integrated Commands: Organisational Learning and the Andaman and Nicobar Command

India took an unprecedented step 10 years ago by setting up a joint theatre operational command for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANC). This article seeks to examine the following questions: why did India decide to establish its first joint operational command? Why has the creation of this and other unified commands been so incremental in the Indian context? What are the arguments for and against jointness, integration and joint operational commands in the Indian context?

Signals and Orchestration: India’s Use of Compellence in the 2001–02 Crisis

How effective was the Indian government in sending clear, coercive signals and orchestrating them into coherent messages during 'Operation Parakram' in 2001-02? This study finds that compellence was hampered by three factors: (1) the government kept changing its demands; (2) the lack of adequate civil-military coordination; and (3) the government engaged in a dual-track policy of direct coercion of Pakistan, while simultaneously engaging the United States to put pressure on Pakistan. Ultimately, these two policy strands worked at cross-purposes to each other.