India needs to start thinking about seeking a greater transformation in China from authoritarianism to embrace the culture of Buddhism and the impact such a change may entail for enduring relations between India and China.
India was always aware of the enormous energy reserves within its geographically proximate Central Asian region that could potentially fulfil its energy demands. The recent visit by Prime Minister Modi to the region has proved critical in paving the way for India to finally acquire a long awaited energy stake in the region. The new developments could not have been possible without the evolving undercurrents of the new geopolitical balance of power in the region. Russia seems to be playing a conspicuous role in nudging both India and Pakistan towards cooperation in the energy pipeline.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi is scheduled to visit Moscow December 24-25 for a Summit with President Vladimir Putin. A year ago, Indo-Russian relations were bit frosty, the Russians complaining that the US had become India’s main arms supplier, ending the arms blockade to Pakistan in return, while the Indians were frustrated by Russia’s failure to meet delivery schedules, raising costs and failure to transfer technology and spares.
Under Manmohan Singh, nuclear and defense deals with Russia were only on paper, but Putin and Modi seem intent on getting things back on track, with big new deals on the table. Modi has inked a string of robust defence and security agreements with the US, France, Germany, Israel, UK and Japan, while Russia, though suffering Western economic sanctions and lower oil prices, is showing remarkable resilience, bombing ISIS in Syria and standing firm in disputes with Turkey, standing up to the West and rebounding on the world stage.
The fact that Modi has not sided with the West vis a vis Russia, taking a position on Russia’s combat mission in Syria or the standoff with Turkey, signals Russia’s unique significance in its geo-strategic calculus.
India has escaped the ramifications of its policy, however Russia’s pivot to Asia has so far only boosted China. Similarly, in the face of Western sanctions, Putin could turn to the old-trusted friend India as a fast-growing outlet for exports, benefiting from Modi’s ‘Make in India’ drive to regain market share, even as the US pushes several big-ticket items for co-production and co-development in India.
Last year, Modi hinted that Russia had been unable to respond to the ‘Make in India’ call. Now Moscow is diversifying its economy and seeking high-value-added products markets, with more possibilities in food production, agriculture, metals, chemical and textile products.
Modi and Putin met during the year at several forums like the BRICS/SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation), G20 and others, and now, Modi’s visit to Moscow could help plug critical strategic holes in India’s military arsenals. Sukhoi is willing to supply spares for the existing 220 Sukhoi-30MKI fighter jets and even set up a regional servicing and maintenance unit in India, while manufacturing components for the Sukhoi Superjet (SSJ) 100 with Tata.
Soviet aircraft carrier, now INS Vikramaditya, was modernized for the Indian Nav? at the Russian Sevmash nuclear submarine facility| Foto Maxim Vorkunkov
The replacement of the vintage 129 Cheetah/Chetak helicopter was long overdue and a $1 billion project for India to manufacture 200 Kamov-226T light helicopters is ready to sign. Other manufacturers like Reliance and Mahindra are cooperating with Russian technology firms to build weapons.
A big item would be the procurement of 5 units of Russian Triumf anti-ballistic missile system, and the leasing of a second 12,000-tonne Akula-class nuclear submarine is also under discussion.
To bypass its nuclear restrictions, India could have Russia build six nuclear reactors of 1,200 megawatts (MW) in Andhra Pradesh. and cooperation in outer space and satellites technologies could also be significant.
Negotiations with the West to advance his “Make in India” campaign involve delays that Modi cannot afford, while the situation in Russia is more conducive.
Synergy between the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and China’s gigantic One Belt/One Road (OBOR) project to facilitate the flow of goods and investments across Eurasia is facing several roadblocks, and trade with China recently fell over 36% due mainly to recession in Russia and a Chinese slowdown. On the eve of Modi’s visit, India approved the purchase of a $1.26 billion, 15% stake in Russia's Vankorneft operation in the Vankor oilfield, the first overseas energy deal since Modi came to power.
The challenge now is to shift from mainly defence oriented ties to a long-term economic and trade partnership. India’s trade turnover with Russia, targeted to achieve $20 billion by 2015, still hovers around a paltry $9 billion. Cooperating against terrorism aside, Modi should seek opportunities for Indian firms to enter a Russian market vacated by Turkish and other European companies. India enjoys a niche market in pharmaceuticals, fertilisers, agriculture, and leather products, and with Russia restricting imports from the West, it could boost its food, dairy and meat items.
A joint study group (JSG) proposes a FTA (free trade agreement) between India and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) that could potentially revive the old India-Soviet trade pattern. With almost $3 trillion GDP, the EEU market could pick up the slack in European markets.
The Modi government could suggest creating a joint innovation fund to attract fine Russian scientists to work in Indian scientific centres. It’s also time for India to acquire some of Russia’s colossal technological and strategic assets. Russia’s natural resources, spanning a mammoth territory, are mined by Chinese and South Korean workers instead of Indian entrepreneurs and workers. Finally, only a blockbuster energy deal and a long-distance pipeline from Russia to India can restore a sense of balance in relations.
Russia offers little traction for investment, business and education, while an Indian diaspora in Russia that could push for stronger ties is tiny compared to elsewhere. Russian politicians and bureaucrats refer to the need to strengthen each other’s potentials (technology, skill, resources and market), yet Indian businessmen tell horror stories about their business experience in Russia, starting with language barriers and stiff travel regulations.
There is also a growing gap in perceptions. Russian think tanks are poorly funded and Indologists have little influence in policy-making.
Russia could benefit from its experience in India, from managing heavy industries, nuclear plants to producing SU-30 aircrafts, T-90 tanks and the BrahMos missiles, to step up its investments in India which currently stand at only around $3 billion, by Sistema, Rusal and a few others. Rosneft wants to invest in India’s huge potential solar energy market, promising to produce up to 20,000MW, and Russian investments are needed in areas other than diamonds, IT and pharmaceuticals.
Clearly, the political trust and comfort level with Russia hasn’t disappeared, despite all the rhetoric over India’s growing ties to the US, and Russia’s increasing proximity to China and Pakistan. Although the government still tends to lean toward the West, the Indian public still favours Russia, with Modi telling Putin that “When asked, even an Indian child will say that India’s best friend is Russia.”
New Delhi can understand that Moscow’s courting of Islamabad could be linked to Afghanistan, but it needs to know Moscow’s thinking regarding talks with the Taliban and the situation in Kunduz.
In coming years, Russia’s pivot to India will become more urgent, while India will walk a fine line in Russia’s standoff with the-West. Modi sees India playing a far more strategic role than simply being a balancing factor in the strategic competition between Russia and the West similar to what it is doing in the Sino-US competition. In fact, a balanced Delhi-Moscow-Washington relationship could have a huge impact on the world.
Both Modi and Putin are strong, nationalist leaders with similar approaches to domestic and foreign policy, although Modi may be more savvy in dealing with other world leaders. The Indian Prime Minister wants to transform the relationship with Russia in a big way, but he and Putin will have to build chemistry more like that between Putin and Xi Jinping.
Modi does not need to conduct road shows in Moscow as Russians sing awara, but he does need to adapt India’s soft power to the new Russian generation. Happily, Putin also likes soft power: as Russian aircrafts bombed ISIS hideouts in Syria, he found time to visit the Russian Buddhists in Buryatia. and Modi could engage the Buddhist heritage in his Moscow diplomacy.
This article was originally published in Russia Insider.
Modi and Putin are all set not only to straighten the loose ends of existing projects but also bring new big items on the table.
No matter what the critics say, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has ably taken India to the global stage. He has certainly aroused expectations both at home and abroad about India’s rise in the global scene in the 21st Century with the most imaginative way and a clarity of purpose
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has taken the world by storm in 2015. He has reached out to a remote country like Mongolia, island nations like Seychelles and Mauritius, and to major powers like the US, China, France, Germany and UK. His tours abroad this year included countries like Canada, UAE, UK, Turkey and others where no Indian Prime Minister visited for decades. The visit to Moscow on December 24-25 will be his 23rd foreign trip in 2015.
At home, PM Modi received many world leaders in 2015 starting with a big-bang diplomacy by inviting US President Barack Obama as the chief guest at the Republic Day celebrations in January to end with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s extraordinary visit to New Delhi in December. The visits had very large strategic and economic content for India to achieve concrete economic, diplomatic, and strategic goals.
The world leaders gave high priority to Modi at the UNGA, BRICS Summit in Ufa, ASEAN-India and East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur, G-20 Summit in Turkey and Climate Summit in Paris. All these helped energise India’s foreign policy to raise its profile on the world stage.
More remarkably, PM Modi not only managed to reset India’s foreign policy but also transformed its discourse. In fact, India rarely made rapid turns in its foreign policy and never fluctuated with the change in Governments. But Modi subtly changed the widely perceived notion of India being a reluctant power in its exercise of realpolitik. What we are seeing is a dramatic shift away from the ideological fantasies of ‘non-alignment’ policy to pursuing a more practical self-interest driven approach in world affairs. This well-thought-out change aims to project India as a ‘rising power’ rather than a ‘balancing power’ in the matrix of global power politics.
There is a strategic content and clarity when Modi sells India’s potential to the world. Modi used the best possible tools of statecraft for pursuing multiple relationships simultaneously with confidence, energy and style remarkably different from previous leaders.
The new methodology he found includes changing India’s global narrative ie drawing attention to India’s sacrifices in WWI, its contribution to UN peacekeeping operations, and forcefully reiterating India’s right for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.
To make diplomacy more robust, his Government created new metaphors — whether it is Act East policy or projecting India as a ‘first responder’ in humanitarian assistance and post-disaster operations in Yemen and Nepal.
But the keystone of Modi’s foreign policy objective is economic development — skillfully linking diplomacy and national development for leveraging international financial and technological support to speed up his ‘Make in India’ campaign. The imperatives of his domestic reforms agenda to promote business, trade, tourists, national security, employment et al are craftily embedded into diplomacy, this in part because Modi came to power with an electoral mandate for domestic reforms. In fact, Modi used his political mandate as a tool to reach out to the world.
Modi’s energy and his commitment to push economic growth grabbed the world’s attention. His international visits have seen burst of activities, especially his engagement with the Indian diaspora abroad, amid a lot of publicity, glamour and fanfare.
Modi’s road shows continue apace this year in Toronto, Berlin, Muscat, London, Singapore and elsewhere. He spoke to 17,000 Indian-Americans at the SAP arena in San Jose, and over 70,000 British Indians received Modi in Wembley Arena, billed as the “biggest reception for any foreign leader” in Britain.
Interestingly, Modi used diasporic pluralism as a strong constituency to resonate his economic agenda and to blunt the growing intolerance voice at home engineered by adversaries to derail economic plan and damage Modi’s rising global popularity.
His visits abroad at times greeted with street protests helped deflate pent-up anger against him outside India. Instead, he used the international settings to remove misperceptions built around his image as he also promised to protect the rights of every citizen. On the contrary, Modi’s own persona has become a factor in world politics. More Western leaders, executives and celebrities put the past behind and welcomed Modi.
Playing on India’s ethereal values-based soft power was his another diplomatic craftsmanship. Modi understood that no country can match India’s benign and non-threatening image, which he thought could be advantaged into hard strategic and economic gains. He has fine-tuned India’s soft power to suit the present times, for example by getting a global tag for International Yoga Day.
Moreover, Modi also passionately tried to revive India’s own lost Buddhist heritage for geopolitical and economic interests. As he learnt to grapple with the challenges of international diplomacy, Modi understood that Buddhism occupies critical space in the Asian balance of culture, economics and politics. Aside from the market factor of Buddhism, Modi has grasped the threat of China taking over the foremost role over Buddhism in Asia. Worried about India losing the leadership role, Modi has been trying hard to reconnect India with every Asian Buddhist institutions, including the Chinese ones built by Xuanzang and Faxian.
On the economic front, he has inked big deals — from nuclear deals to mammoth infrastructure investment accords — with key countries. On the diplomatic front, Modi has stabilised our relations with major economies, and the core of his diplomacy included strengthening ties with the US that had drifted away from the track under the previous Government.
In 2015, the partnership has been raised to US-India Strategic and Commercial Dialogue (S&CD) that aims to increase bilateral trade from its current level of over $100 to $500 billion in the coming years.
The framework for the US-India defence relationship is being renewed and envisaging collaboration in defence, intelligence, maritime security, cyber security and space exploration among others. That accord signed under the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) includes developing militarily useful technologies in 17 new areas, possibly manufacturing fighter aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and aircraft carriers.
Modi’s imaginative diplomacy took him to the world’s high-tech Capital, the Silicon Valley, primarily to showcase the role of Indians as well as to highlight his ‘Digital India’ campaign. He met top executives from Google, Apple, and Tesla Motors and held a town hall meeting with Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg. Of course, the trip to Silicon Valley was viewed as a charm offensive and at the same time a business opportunity.
Consolidation of ties with the US has been one of Modi’s marvels, but there are still thorny issues in bilateral relations, for example over intellectual property rights, trade barriers in Indian market etc, which are enough to threaten the future of Indo-US ties.
The US, for now, sees Modi as a partner to counter China. Modi seems to be going along with the American understanding of China as long as it helps in the interim for empowering India without having a formal alliance with the US. Clearly, the US is far more committed today for enhancing India’s strategic capabilities than before.
But it is clear that Modi visualises the role for India as far more strategic than simply being a balancing factor for the US, for he also knows the growing importance of China in global policy and for India to catch up with China would require time.
Despite having a complex relationship with China, Modi has not been averse to reaching out to Beijing overtly. China, too, has certainly revised its attitude towards India slightly after Modi came to power. There is a clear atmosphere of change in relationship. Both Xi Jinping and Modi are more committed to finding a solution to the contentious border issue.
Modi is also seeking Chinese investments in India’s major infrastructure projects, therefore, he cannot afford to have sides, neither in India-China relations nor in India-US relations. Modi’s foreign policy is, therefore, neither pro-US nor anti-China, but to make best use of US-China competition in the economic, military and geopolitical realms. What we are witnessing is not India balancing against China but trying to seek a balanced Delhi-Beijing-Washington triangular relationship.
Of course, ambiguity in relationship with China will remain, which stems from China’s consistent support to Pakistan primarily aimed at needling India. India has not yet responded to joining China’s Silk Route connectivity projects and also remains lukewarm on the Bangladesh-India-China-Myanmar (BICM) Economic Corridor promoted by China. But Modi has certainly shown a diplomatic finesse while dealing with China. Without giving any concession to China, he has at least managed to tone down hostility while at the same time embarked on India’s expanding military capability to counter any threat from China.
Modi’s visits to France and Germany were aimed at getting support for improving India’s digital infrastructure, healthcare and clean environment, upgrade information and services and plan for building Smart Cities in the country. Here, he has succeeded in attracting European investors in India’s manufacturing sector to translate his ‘Make in India’ initiative into success.
Of late, many observers felt that Modi’s international image will be dented by the Bihar results. Instead, he found no reason to slow down on his expansive diplomacy and immediately embarked on a visit to the UK, Turkey, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. Modi attended the Climate Summit in Paris and even found time to talk to Nawaz Sharif.
Modi’s visit to the UK is certain to bring mutual economic, military and diplomatic gains for both sides. Britain’s advocacy for a UN Security Council seat for India will be critical to ensure India’s future recognition.
Modi has ensured that India is not left on the sidelines of the dynamics occurring in East Asia. He followed the Act East policy more robustly when he attended two important summits — the ASEAN-India and East Asia Summits.
Modi also visited Malaysia as the “core” of India’s Act East policy to discuss the threat of terrorism, and in Singapore, Modi focused on building private sector interest in the ‘Make in India’ initiative besides strengthening the defence and security cooperation.
The relationship with other countries like Vietnam and the Philippines has improved as Modi has become more outspoken on maritime and territorial disputes, particularly in South China Sea.
Africa too has amazingly caught Modi’s imagination. His Government unveiled India’s Africa policy by gathering 54 African countries to the third India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) in October this year. He used no declarative words or the third world solidarity rhetoric, instead he focused on the partnership of pragmatism and potential as well as to confront global challenges together.
To be sure, it helps to cultivate Africa, whose nations count India as a responsible global leader, offer India economic opportunities and finally their support is critical for India to secure a permanent seat in the Security Council. But soon after the Delhi Summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping offered African countries $60 billion to help them build projects in railways, highways, ports and power.
While Modi has largely pursued a US-centric approach, he has also not given up on the multi-polarity of maintaining closer coordination between India, China and Russia. He attended the BRICS meeting in Ufa and joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) along with Pakistan to change the balance of forces in the Eurasian region.
Modi’s ‘neighbourhood first policy’ too has become pragmatic and even muscular in 2015, thus breaking the traditional notion of India being unable to resolve problems with smaller neighbours. The land boundary agreement with Bangladesh has been a historic milestone achievement for Modi. Ties with Dhaka have now entered a new phase, with collaboration on issues from economy to tackling terrorism.
The failure to influence Nepal’s Constitution-making and the ensuing impact of the crisis on India is being marked as one of Modi’s failures. Many have argued that de facto blockage of fuel supplies pushed Kathmandu into China’s arms. But Modi’s Government seemed to understand correctly that the old tendency to raise the spectre of India’s image as a regional bully has been tried by vested interests.
Normalising ties with Pakistan proved difficult and complicated even for Modi, but his Government has made some tactical changes in dealing with the problematic neighbour. The decision to retaliate aggressively with disproportionate force against Pakistan’s repeated cross-border firings seemed to have worked well. Also, the decision to call off official-level talks on the grounds that Pakistan either deals with the Government or the separatists has been yet another significant shift.
Towards the year-end, Modi succeeded in cracking the Pakistan puzzle following a surprise pull aside meeting between him and Nawaz Sharif in Paris on November 30, followed by talks on terror between the two NSAs in Bangkok. The decision to resume a comprehensive dialogue has been announced after the visit by Sushma Swaraj to Pakistan recently to attend the Heart of Asia conference.
A beginning of thaw with Pakistan is certainly an extra achievement for Modi in 2015, but to be sure, prospects for any proactive engagement with Pakistan will remain ambiguous, and Modi perhaps knows that.
The last on Modi’s guest list this year was his “personal friend” Premier Shinzo Abe. The two have set a concrete action plan and signed major deals on military weapon and technology transfer to India, building high-speed trains, upgrading India’s infrastructure and on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The strategic pact with Japan is the most unprecedented that may have far reaching results for the success of Modi’s domestic and international plan for India.
The memorandum on civil nuclear energy cooperation, an agreement for commerce and clean energy symbolised a new level of strategic partnership between India and Japan.
The agreements on transfer of defence equipment and technology and on protection of classified military information and the Japanese decision to join as a formal partner in Malabar naval exercises are high points in the security relationship.
To boost the ‘Make in India’ programme, Japan will import cars manufactured by the Japanese in India. Additionally, Japan has created $11-12 billion fund to promote Make in India. All said and done, Abe’s extraordinary $12 billion package on very easy terms for building bullet trains will touch the hearts of millions in India.
Now, Modi will visit Moscow for a summit meeting with President Vladimir Putin. Surely, India’s ties with Russia remain strong, but Modi is yet to capitalise on various opportunities to work on the revival of this bond.
Russia’s pivot to Asia after Western sanctions is mainly benefited by China. Russia’s capacity to rebound on the world politics is glaring after Putin ordered to launch military strike against the Islamic State in Syria.
Cooperating on terror aside, Modi should be seeking fresh opportunities for Indian companies in the Russian market against the backdrop of Western sanctions and Russia’s current conflict with Turkey.
Russia seems keen on transferring technology in aerospace sectors, defence sector ie manufacturing Kamov-226K helicopters, spare parts for Sukhoi jets to contribute to the Make in India initiative. But let us wait to see what new surprise Modi will bring to the Indo-Russian relationship.
Finally, considering Modi had little experience in foreign affairs, he has performed remarkably well for taking India at the global stage in a spectacular manner. He has infused new energy into India’s relationship with major powers that had lost momentum in the past decade.
While dealing with the world, Modi Government stuck to its position of not accepting commitments on climate change that would jeopardise its development plan. The landmark Paris Agreement finally came as a victory for his “climate justice” and sustainable development demand as the final text took into account the differentiation and responsibility of developing countries in fighting climate change.
All said and done, Modi became the only Prime Minister after Jawaharlal Nehru to evoke India’s image as one of the world’s major civilisations. He has been able to implement the vision with all instruments of power especially backed by confidence of an economically resurgent society.
Of course, his foreign policy encountered criticism from various quarters for being hyperactive, too loud and at times abrasive that goes beyond established norms and process. Veteran diplomat Shyam Saran finds Modi’s foreign policy more “project based” than “process based”. Many have also found his achievements abroad less in substance but more in symbolism that would risk disappointing results in the end.
For now, Modi’s India is benefiting from the plunge in the price of crude oil, and the relative slowdown of economy in the West and China, giving an impression that India’s moment has come. But no matter what his critics say, Modi has ably taken India to the global stage. He has certainly aroused expectations both at home and abroad about India’s rise on the global stage in the 21st century with the most imaginative way and a clarity of purpose.
Yet his apparent dream to rebuild India on its glorious past in a most imaginative way faces formidable domestic political resistance that aims to derail his vision. To be sure, most people welcome Modi’s efforts rather than viewing them with scepticism. The final compliment for Modi came from Shinzo Abe who said “his vision and speed of implementing policies is like a bullet train”!
This article was originally published in The Pioneer.
The global political scenario is amazingly changing in China’s favour. Nowhere is this so symptomatic than the way Beijing is able to win the war against its arch-enemy the Dalai Lama. It appears Beijing has finally managed to pin the Tibetan leader down by deploying every political prowess and economic arsenal to constrict his global outreach.
The Chinese leaders hated him for knocking China’s global image for decades. They called him names like snake, demon, evil and “splittist” for plotting China’s breakup.
Until recently, international pressure worked to get a dialogue between the Dalai Lama and Beijing going. No longer now. The leaders in the West, who propped him up once as an “ascetic Buddhist superstar” and used him for domestic electoral gains, as also to win market access in China, are abandoning him one by one.
They know Tenzin Gyatso is ageing and he can no longer give strong punches to Beijing. As he has turned 80 this year, he is left to fight his lonely battle at the fag-end of his life.
No wonder the Dalai Lama had to be admitted to Mayo Clinic in Rochester in September when the world leaders including Pope Francis met for the annual UNGA meeting in New York. No details came about his mystery health probe except advised him to rest.
The West’s economic downturn turned the game for China. Beijing no longer feels compelled to entertain anyone on Tibet. Instead, it calls the shot; frowns on those who meet the Tibetan leader and punish them through an assortment of coercive diplomatic measures. Call it bully-diplomacy or realpolitik, no country, big or small, wants to face Beijing’s wrath. Instead, they prefer the “quiet diplomacy” to win over China.
The world has seen how the United Kingdom, the epitome of freedom and democracy, grovelled to Beijing recently. David Cameron mended his way after rebuked by China for meeting the Dalai Lama in 2012. Unable to jeopardise billions of dollars of investment and trade, he afforded red carpet treatment to Xi Jinping. Even Prince Charles bowed before what he once called China’s “appalling old waxwork” leader.
In 2001, a dozens of leaders received the Dalai Lama; 21 between 2005-2008; since 2009 that count dropped to two. In 2013, he met only the heads of Lithuania and Poland.
Germany and France no longer provoke China. Australia, the Netherlands, and New Zealand stopped entertaining him since 2007. Those who snubbed him recently include Denmark, Pope Francis, South Africa and even Norway that conferred him with the Nobel Prize 26 years ago.
Except Japan, no other Buddhist countries invite the Dalai Lama. Even Mongolia, from where the title Dalai (Ocean) was conferred by Mongol Khan in the 16th century, stalled his visit last year.
Strangely, the United States under the Barack Obama administration has been giving a frosty welcome to the Dalai Lama; getting him to the White House through a side entrance and exit him through back doors — at times into a “mound of trash.”
In a first, Obama met with the Dalai Lama publicly in September, but at the National Prayer Breakfast where the US President referred to him only as a practitioner of “compassion”. It seems even the photo-op practice was dropped. What a comedown indeed.
Tibet was once a strong pretext for the foreign powers to block China out of international forums, but they are today afraid to bring up Tibet even in discussions with China.
The issue bears so much on China’s sensitivity that Beijing doesn’t even spare artists and singers who have links with the Tibet campaign. The list of those whose shows are nixed included the Los Angeles band Maroon 5, Icelandic singer Bjork, Oasis Gigs, Elton John and others.
In his host nation India, the BJP initially shocked Beijing by inviting a Tibetan delegation to the swearing-in ceremony of the new government. The Dalai Lama and PM Modi had an extremely guarded meeting in August last year. The Dalai Lama was escorted into 7, Race Course Road through a side entrance. The media reported the meeting had gone off badly and the Dalai Lama looked “shaken” by the encounter.
Clearly, the Modi government seems to be carefully weighing the “Tibet card”, i.e., the utility, sustainability, strategic costs and benefits of the Dalai Lama’s presence vis-à-vis the need for opening a new page with China, etc. Interestingly, Modi is keen to re-energise India’s own Buddhist heritage to make an impact in Asia including China.
At the same time and in a marked departure, the Modi government has taken a nuanced position by sending Cabinet ministers to Dharamsala to attend the Tibetan events.
Surely, the Dalai Lama must be sensing the change and would be annoyed as well. He might have pointed out something when he went to California to celebrate his 80th birthday this year. He told India Today in a veiled manner that he would rather “go home to Tibet, as well as meet his friend Xi Zhongxun’s son, President Xi Jinping”. The Dalai Lama also flagged the boundary issue with a thinly guised signal to both Beijing and New Delhi.
It must be a troubling phase for a man who achieved such phenomenon popularity as a famous global star. The Tibetan leader spent life in the midst of Hollywood celebrity backers like Richard Gere, Paris Hilton, Russell Brand and Sharon Stone, among others. Surely, he made Tibetan Buddhism famous worldwide. But his vociferously-led Tibet campaign reached nowhere. He seemed to understand this reality and sought to settle for autonomy status within the Chinese Constitution, but Beijing remains blasé and even stopped talking to his interlocutors since 2010.
A glimmer of hope was raised when Xi Jinping came to power. The Dalai Lama had reasons to embrace a sense of optimism, for he hoped that his past association with President’s father Xi Zhongxun, coupled with the President’s fascination for the Tibetan culture and Buddhist members in his family would help a gentle embrace. The plan by him for a pilgrimage tour to the Wutai Shan in Shanxi Province gained fresh currency. In fact, many concluded a propitious condition for a settlement had arrived.
Quite the reverse, a new hardening of policy got illustrated this year: during the 50th anniversary of TAR, the Sixth Tibet Work Forum (TWF) and White Paper on Tibet gave no indications of Xi changing tack on Tibet. He, in fact, wanted a “war” against the Dalai’s “clique” and preparations for choosing the Dalai Lama’s successor.
For China’s top leadership, Tibet has entered a “golden age”, and stability there has to be placed above “economic development”.
For the Chinese media, the Dalai Lama is a “cruel ruler in exile”, a “cheater” whose “imaginary Tibet” perhaps the “world’s longest lie” does not exist. The Western forces that “plotted” a Nobel Prize for him always wanted Tibetans to remain as “aborigines”, therefore, rejecting modernity in Tibet as a “destruction”. The “lie will disappear” once China takes the centre-stage, the media believed.
Unfortunately, the clock is ticking for the Dalai Lama. To be sure, he has a plan and so does China as to what lies next. But for now, the two seems to be playing the game of patience and playing for time. For its part, China would wait for the 14th Dalai Lama to die and perhaps hopes to get his soul transferred to China according to its plan.
The Dalai Lama certainly disavowed a violent course, but patience would be fraying among his followers. Exploring their disruptive potential is a possibility and this could start with the succession crisis and when grief among believers takes a frenzied turn. Many Tibetans like to forewarn China that it will regret not settling matters with this Dalai Lama.
A sentiment of this sort is also prevalent among many Chinese who doubt Beijing’s current policy would bring about long-lasting stability and, therefore, favour a settlement now. In fact, in a game of manoeuvring, the Dalai Lama is seemingly galvanising support among the Chinese Buddhists. But hoping to get political support from them would be a fallacy.
The prospects for the future are indeed bleak. The decades of negotiation remain futile and have not reached anywhere and the Dalai Lama seems left with no cards to bargain with Beijing.
Clearly, the Communist leaders remain unyielding as they still nurture a deep anger against the Tibetan leader for hurting them badly, and hold him responsible for denting the legitimacy of China’s global rise. Any further conciliatory posture by him can hardly be a smart move, considering Beijing has withstood the worst.
Beijing, in its last move on the chessboard, may possibly allow him to return to Tibet, provided he accepts Tibet and Taiwan as parts of China and that he comes back only as a spiritual leader. Concession for the Dalai Lama then would be to have a say in choosing his successor.
Clearly, Tibet for China means the inclusion of Arunachal Pradesh. The Dalai Lama’s endorsement of this position, for whatever quid pro quo, would hit the bottom of India-China boundary negotiations on the basis of the McMahon Line.
The stakes for the Dalai Lama’s future are big in geopolitics. His health report is already a major intelligence secret for many countries.
The Chinese understand that the post-Dalai Lama ramifications could risk further instability in Tibet. They have a mechanism under Order No. 5 in place to regulate the reincarnation process, but complexity involved in refreshing the dead soul, steeped in centuries of Tantric tradition, plus the rhetoric around it could also make China’s task difficult. The party has been holding “closed-door” meetings. Xi Jinping has ordered to pick the next Dalai Lama and “take corrective action” if things do not go well.
For the world outside, little can be done to keep the hopes of the Tibetans up. The subtext of the future of the Dalai Lama is as the Americans finally conveyed to him at the National Prayer Breakfast in Washington that his significance lay in him being an undisputed spiritual world leader.
And as for the long-term future of Tibet, much would depend on how much he could raise the “profile of Tibetan culture in exile”. That is why he is asserting his influence in a spotted place like Ladakh where he feels comfortable and where he visits regularly.
This article was originally published in Sunday Guardian Live.
New Delhi has recently made a subtle move by trying to reverse the Kashmir discourse hitherto scripted and played by Pakistan for seven decades. The new move is accompanied by a sudden spurt in video clippings showing Pakistani atrocities in Gilgit-Baltistan. Hopefully, this is not a propaganda stunt and the policy shift will gain seriousness from now on.
New Delhi’s move comes against the backdrop of China’s renewed push into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir through its $46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) initiative. The subsequent “Karamay Declaration” of August 2015 defined Pakistan’s role in China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative. The nexus is nothing new but the motivation, significance and implications of CPEC needs careful analysis.
The plan seemingly aims to build a crucial two-way bridge-link for China to access the Indian Ocean and conversely for Pakistan to reach out to Eurasia. But it is likely to deepen the already complex strategic ties between the two “iron brothers”, dubbed now as equivalent to the U.S.-Israel links. China expects CPEC will yield far-reaching economic benefits and regional security is instrumental for this purpose.
First, the Karakoram (land) with Gwadar (sea) alignment has both commercial and military significance to serve as strategic chokepoints vis-à-vis India.
Second, the CPEC is suspected to be about offsetting the growing U.S.-India intimacy as also in China’s quid pro quo to counter India’s “Act East” policy.
Third, it seems linked to preventing the Afghan-Pak area from potentially becoming a safe haven for Uighur militants once the U.S. troops leave Afghanistan. Beijing’s frantic initiatives for Afghan reconciliation talks explain that.
Clearly, Beijing seeks new opportunity to fill up gaps where India has largely failed. Considering PoK’s strategic location, it could have many ramifications for India. It is here that CPEC is linked to Pakistan’s recent attempts at manipulating the legal and demographic profile of Gilgit-Baltistan (GB). Islamabad wants to make GB the fifth province of Pakistan. As speculations go Pakistan could lease additional areas in GB to China like the Shaksgam Valley that was surrendered in 1963. Opening a Chinese Consulate is also in the offing. This is too serious for India to ignore.
Meanwhile works under the CPEC have started, ranging from building of hydro projects, roads and tunnels to leasing land in Gwadar. While Beijing has justified CPEC as a “livelihood project”, Pakistan is going the whole hog to get the landlocked Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) members to join the corridor and offering them access to the Indian Ocean. For India, China’s OBOR plan posed a dilemma: joining it raised fears of getting sucked into China game plan, but not joining is inconsistent with New Delhi’s broader diplomatic strategy. New Delhi also seems more peeved over the way Beijing announced the plan without prior discussion.
India’s non-endorsement of OBOR has raised eyebrows on the future course of India-China relations. China’s plan obviously carries security undertones, but staying outside it seems short-sighted.
Clearly, India requires a two pronged strategy. First, New Delhi should start placing Gilgit-Baltistan plus Ladakh (82 per cent of J&K) on the centre-stage as a keystone policy to blunt both the Kashmir rhetoric and CPEC. It is also time to start working on Pakistan’s domestic resistance i.e. in Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Gilgit-Baltistan. The “Modi effect” seems to be already working as these regions are now abuzz with pro-freedom slogans.
Second, India should explore opportunistic aspects in the OBOR especially for regaining access to the northern axis, prevented by loss of GB to Pakistan. Therefore, India needs to weigh the option of getting a physical entry into GB, Sinkiang and Wakhan areas hitherto remained out-of-its-way — it can’t be in India’s interest to support the project and not reap all the economic benefits. Further considering the region remains a critical focus of India’s threat perceptions, being on the road would be beneficial for tracking regional terrorism and developing capabilities to respond to future uncertainties Opting out is a diplomatic risk as Pakistan may exploit India’s absence. As in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Pakistan would be on the lookout to place India in the role of the spoiler within the SCO. Clearly, Russia and others would want India in the OBOR as a counterweight to Chinese influence. Regardless of economic interests, India can’t ignore the symbolic significance as it was along the Silk Route that Indian trade and philosophy (Buddhism) once travelled to the rest of Asia.
It’s an open question whether this type of diplomacy will be successful, but India’s philosophy should be is clear: travel on the road. This is a tricky balancing act, but the challenge is to re-conceptualise and seek new economic, diplomatic and security realities on the ground. Just as India joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a wise approach would be to creatively join the Silk Route.
In fact, a countervailing strategy would be to offer a mollifying connectivity plan for a direct transport, energy, trade, fiber optics and communication highway connecting Persian Gulf with China through Indian Territory under the rubric India-China Silk Route Corridor. It could serve multiple interlocking advantages for India from infrastructure building to buying guarantee against Chinese misadventures. The idea could help open a new path and become a masterstroke counter-strategy in India’s long-term home and foreign policy.
This article was originally published in The Hindu.
An India-China Silk Route Corridor could have multiple advantages for both countries without at the same time compromising their security concerns.
The central theme of Korybko’s article is to highlight the pivotal importance of Pakistan and the Russian eagerness to build a foundation of political trust with the Pakistani leadership.
Modi would find the Eurasian dynamics at odds with his vision of containing China along with the United States. He will have to display pragmatism for building greater convergence with China and Russia.
