Namrata Goswami

So, what exactly is the plot in Syria? For years now, the country, known to the world for the ancient Palmyra ruins, now in the hands of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), has been lying in tatters. The golden ancient city of Damascus could fall into the hands of ISIS as well, or any other terrorist front led by Jabhat al Nusra, an affiliate of al Qaeda, ironically linked with the so-called moderate Syrian opposition to President Bashar al-Assad. Among those fighting against Assad are the Tajamu al-Ezzeh or the Ezzeh Gathering in Hama province of Central Syria, the Army of Conquest, an Islamist faction that includes the Nusra Front, al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate and the Free Syrian Army. This Syrian opposition to Assad has received arms from the US as well.

Then in September 2015, Russia entered the picture in aid of its ally Assad. The US position on the Syrian imbroglio is that in order to succeed in its fight against ISIS, the dictatorial Assad has to go. The Russian position, backed by Iran and the Hezbollah of Lebanon, is quite the contrary: Assad has to continue for some semblance of order in this conflict-afflicted land; and for that they have to work with Assad to fight against those who threaten the regime in Damascus, including the Syrian opposition and the ISIS. These contradictory objectives have the potential of pitting the Russian intervention at the request of Assad against the NATO and US in Syria into a much larger conflict for influence. Sadly, with the increasing flow of refugees from Syria into Europe and desperate people dying while crossing the Mediterranean from Turkey to get to Europe, the fight for influence in Syria between the Russians and the Americans may only aggravate the situation.

So how is this emerging scenario playing out to the world outside of the West. For those in South Asia or Central Asia, in direct physical proximity to an unstable Middle East, the pictures of Russian Sukhoi warplanes hitting ISIS targets successfully demonstrates Russian hard power of military technology (which is then packaged as soft power and broadcast to the world by channels like Russia Today. The ISIS phenomenon, strategy and propaganda of taking over territory in Iraq and Syria and the declaration of the Caliphate by its leader Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi, the visuals of beheadings, the use of social media to spread their word, their films based on radical Islamic ideology in which every non-believer is a target, has created deep seated anxieties across much of the developing world. Already up close, on 28 September in Bangladesh, ISIS claimed responsibility for the killing of an Italian Aid Worker This had been preceded by attacks on liberal bloggers by Islamic radicals in the country.

A Japanese agriculture worker had also been killed in Bangladesh and ISIS claimed responsibility. ISIS, in its map depicting the areas in which it aspires to establish its presence includes almost the whole of India. Such declarations followed by ISIS's ability to take over territory and establish itself in countries like Iraq where NATO forces and the US had presence is deeply worrying. Moreover, the absence of any visible US air strikes on ISIS headquarters at Raqqa, Syria, except perhaps an unknown and rather mysterious Syrian opposition made up of extremist terror outfits like al Nusra fighting ISIS does not give confidence to those who want ISIS to be defeated. The criss-crossed objectives of the US-backed Syrian opposition and ISIS, both of whom view Assad as the enemy, raises a legitimate concern: how can we trust the Syrian opposition which is fighting alongside al Qaeda affiliates like al Nusra? Moreover, closer to home in Afghanistan, the Taliban's sudden resurgence and success in taking over Kunduz city also adds fuel to such fearful apprehensions.

So what is Russia achieving for itself in its intervention in Syria? For one, it is successfully using its hard power (by showing a steady stream of military visuals of Russian jets attacking ISIS) to create space for soft power and support for itself in the larger geopolitical space for influence in the Middle East and Asia. People are watching Russia Today for news on the Russian intervention and seeing Sukhoi fighters bombing terror camps. Cheers went up when Russian jets attacked ISIS positions close to the Palmyra, the ancient Syrian ruins that the ISIS are bent on destroying.

Here is the bottom-line: for people in Asia, Assad is not the problem; it's the ISIS that they are deeply concerned about. Assad is not the one threatening to take over their countries and turn them into the medieval ages with public beheadings. With steady streams of young men and women, including many from Central Asia, to ISIS camps, the Russian intervention even back home is described as necessary if perhaps not sufficient to deter ISIS. With President Putin now planning to send around 150, 000 Russian ground troops to Syria to fight ISIS, the space for policy discourse on Syrian seems to shift towards Russian leadership.

While the NATO-US coalition has not been written off, it is important to understand is that this space for Russian intervention in Syria to fight terror has been created by the US-led coalition's inability to stop the spread of ISIS in Iraq and Syria due to their ill-advised aim of destabilising the regimes in the Middle East (Read Iraq, Libya and now Syria) without concrete alternate plans for leadership in these countries. As a result, these nations have been rendered chaotic and ungovernable. It is in these conditions, with the ISIS planting its parallel governing structures in Raqqa, that Russia has given itself the chance to intervene, though implicitly, in support of Assad.

And one should never forget that the demonstration of successful hard power will be followed by an increase in soft power for Russia, provided it succeeds in Syria.

This article was originally published in Huffington.

• Published: 14 October, 2015

For a few weeks now, I have been watching Star Trek: The Original Series, a TV show so innovatory and far reaching in its inspiration in the 1960s that it impacted a whole generation of people to dream of exploring the unknown. Starting with an exciting tag line -- "Space the final frontier, these are the voyages of the Star Ship Enterprise... to boldly go where no man has gone before", the series exposes us to stimulating political ideas amid its themes of owning responsibility to manage the space system, mutual cooperation with alien species, withstanding asteroid attacks, and spread understanding of the earth species amongst alien populations in deep space. And most importantly, to take responsibility in maintaining freedom of space for all to enjoy and utilise for their own benefits in an inclusive manner.

So, how is this space story connected to aspirations of Great Power status, much sought after by countries like India and China? In more ways than one, I think. I will get to that later.

There are a few clear criteria that make countries great. Two of the well-established ones are military and economic power.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) yearbook 2015, the United States continues to lead the pack with a gross military expenditure of USD610 billion followed by China with USD 210 billion. India's military spending is also rising with USD 50 billion. With conflicts ranging from Ukraine to the rise of ISIS in West Asia, there is little possibility that the US Budget Control Act of 2011 would limit spending or that the US Overseas Contingency Fund will slow down as was predicted in 2012-2013 due to sequestration.

In economic data available and debated worldwide, the US led again with a USD 18.1 trillion economy, followed by China at USD 11.2 trillion. India's economy also entered the trillion club at USD 2.3 trillion.

With regard to nuclear weapons, it was Russia that led with approximately 8400 warheads followed by the US (7600), UK (225), China (240), India (110), etc.

Other criteria that matter as much are demographics, education and employable population pool equipped with skillsets. In this, Asia leads the pack, with China taking top place with a population of 1.4 billion, followed by India with 1.2 billion. Demographics, that too when young, skilled and educated, can bode well for a country's future. India with a youthful population of 356 million has the world's largest followed by China with 269 million, Indonesia with 67 million, US with 65 million, Pakistan with 59 million, etc. These youthful bulges are viewed as the "demographic dividend" that can propel China and India to lead the world in innovation, capital and start-ups. Already, the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's courting of the Indian diaspora is well documented, including his push for a Digital India in his recent visit to the United States with major tech giants like Google, Tesla, Facebook and Apple meeting with him. Chinese President Xi Jinping also met up with major multinational companies during his US visit promising to clear obstacles to further reform in China. China and India are aspiring for more power and influence at the world stage, to which end India is bidding for a UN Security Council seat.

So let us now get back to the narrative of responsibility that Star Trek highlights frequently, and how it ties into what it means to be a Great Power in the present international context. For one, it means taking responsibility to maintain the international system, including ensuring that Global Commons like Sea Lanes of Communication are free for use of all, contributing to the building of norms and adhering to universal standards of behaviour. In this, how do China and India, two of the foremost contenders for Great Power status, meet up?

China has the military and economic power to shape the global system but it appears to be far more imbedded in its own nation-building process, evident in its claims to islands in the South and East China Seas, Taiwan, and some parts of Indian territory. As a result, instead of maintaining and leading a peaceful regional system, it has thrown up risky security challenges in its regional vicinity, including its declaration of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea and its land reclamation activities in the South China Sea. These policy postures by China reflect that it is very keenly aware of its asymmetry of power with the United States, the lead player in the system. China continues to therefore engage in brinkmanship vis-à-vis the US, while aggressively demonstrating its power to smaller neighbours like the Philippines and Vietnam. Consequently, its influencing power is limited by its tactical proclivity for demonstrating its growing power. I wonder deeply how much of Sun Tzu's advice of action-positioning-knowing-vision (in the realm of strategy) are actually followed by Chinese leaders -- or do we misappropriate Sun-Tzu's wisdom to the present generation?

India seems to be a reluctant player when it comes to taking global responsibilities in maintaining the international system. While it wants to enjoy the benefits of being thought of as a Great Power, it still continues to fight for inclusion in international forums, and feels vindicated when perceived by the United States as a power of eminence. I believe such recognition already exists; we do not need further joint statements reminding us of our shared values and that our democratic systems bring us together. What we require now is the real deal: Indian capacity.

So the question that stares India in the face is this: does it have the naval systems that enable it to play the role of a Great Power in the oceans? Does it have capacity to fight rising threats emerging from West Asia like ISIS? Does it have the capability to deploy its forces to stop the spread of transnational terrorism? And finally, is it willing to stake its resources to maintain a rules-based international system. For long, India kept citing its desire for strategic autonomy to carve its own path, and this confused many. The lack of a white paper on its foreign policy strategy and goals kept many in the dark.

It appears India is adopting a multi-alignment strategy which is focused on ensuring its own internal development while taking up very little responsibility for the health of the international system, the peaceful maintenance of which is directly linked to its own internal prosperity and growth. Significantly, Asia is fast emerging as a core world region, vital to the health of the international system. Therefore, countries like China and India, with their aspirational societies and their exciting economic growth stories, will inexorably find in their paths to greatness the responsibility to maintain an inclusive space in their vicinity and beyond; how they achieve this skilfully will depend largely on the leaders they choose to lead their political systems.

And as James T. Kirk, Captain of the U.S.S Enterprise stated, "You know the greatest danger facing us is ourselves, an irrational fear of the unknown. But there's no such thing as the unknown -- only things temporarily hidden, temporarily not understood."

This article was originally published in the Huffingtonpost.

• Published: 2 October, 2015

For too long now, the Northeast of India is known and talked about in other parts of India not because of its turquoise blue skies or the wild orchids that graze your path as you venture into its lush forests or the hornbill that flies into the distant horizon with a song, but because of its multiple ethnic conflicts. Most national dailies report about the violence: the several state closures on a daily basis, the inter-ethnic violence that plagues day to day lives; so much so, that the space for discourse has little that broadcasts the potential of the region: its tourism potential, its talented musical people and their sense of pride and self-worth, and the energy and resourcefulness of its youth. In response to the conflicts, the Indian state has taken pride in "the effective management of conflicts in the Northeast", as one former National Security Adviser put it, in a recent op-ed in The Hindu.

I would like to argue that this pride is rather misplaced if one analyses the situation from 1955 to date as it has unfolded in the Northeast. In 1955, the Naga Hills came alive with Naga National Council (NNC) violence led by A Z Phizo. In response, the Assam Rifles were sent in and the Assam Disturbed Areas Act was imposed that same year on the Naga Hills, later replaced by the Armed Forces (Special) Powers Act, 1958. Slowly, this Act was imposed and extended to other states and Union Territories of the Northeast over the years, including Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura and some parts of Arunachal Pradesh. If indeed, the management of conflicts was so effective, then the question that begs a rather serious answer is: why is it then that instead of staying limited to the Naga Hills and being eventually lifted, the Act was actually extended and imposed on all the seven states of the Northeast, and continues to be levied in some parts of Assam, Nagaland and Manipur (leading to a so far 15-year-long "fast unto death" by Irom Sharmila in Manipur). So, while this framework of conflict management has effectively frozen conflict zones, maintaining status quos of violence, despair, hurt, and a life without dignity for the common people, it has served vested interests who benefit from continuing the present state of violence, illiberal governance mechanisms and corruption.

And this is the reason why we need to give up this so-called effective conflict-management framework as a justification to continue the present state of ethnic unrest in the Northeast. While conflict management maintains the status quo, conflict resolution changes it for the better in the long run. Hence, the goal behind conflict resolution is long-term health of a society. And it is in this light that the recent attempt to resolve the Naga conflict assumes significance. For long, we have gotten used to complaints about how the Naga peace negotiations between the Government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim led by Isak Chisi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah (NSCN-IM) have been continuing for years since 1997 without any positive movement. Most writings have emphatically criticised how the Government is not serious about resolving the issue.

Now, suddenly, when we are confronted with some movement, where a framework agreement has been endorsed by both Thuingaleng Muivah and Isak Chisi Swu (NSCN-IM) and the Government of India that aims to establish long-term peace in Naga areas, we are confronted with a barrage of articles on how this is all wrong. Ironically, most of these articles are now highlighting Naga differences, the inability to get all different ethnic communities together, and the impact it will have on other states which have a sizeable Naga population.

Poignantly, those in Nagaland who have committed their lives to Naga peace like Niketu Iralu, while conscious of the importance of bridging differences, are more hopeful, While it is true that the absence of clarity on what the final framework agreement will result in has created anxieties in states affected by the Naga territorial unification demand, yet the unusual spread of misinformation that the NSCN (IM) is a dying organisation, or that it does not have the sanction of the Naga Hoho (the apex Naga organization) is leaning on the side of falsehood. If indeed Muivah did not enjoy the sanction of the Naga Hoho, why then did Naga Hoho General Secretary (Administration), Chitho Nyusou, warmly receive Muivah when he arrived in Dimapur airport on 13 August and stated that NSCN (IM)-India framework agreement has indicated to them a positive movement on the Naga solution, that "Naga nationalism had started with the NNC and Muivah's appreciation of its pioneers was a welcome step towards unity among the Naga groups".

So, the question is not whether Muivah has sanction or not; the facts show that he and the NSCN (IM) do have that, as the strongest armed group to represent the Nagas in talks with the Government of India. The question that actually needs more emphasis is how to get on board the other armed factions like the NSCN (Khole-Kitovi), the NSCN (Reformation), and the NNC. These groups have their own representative base and it is critical that they believe the peace process is inclusive. All three factions have deep societal connections to the Naga Hoho and are in turn able to present their views to that body. One has to wait and see how the Naga Hoho succeeds in getting their support for the framework agreement to which it has given its support. Finally, while the Government of India banned the NSCN (Khaplang) on 16 September due to its continued attacks on Indian security forces, the group is not without support from some sections of eastern Nagaland. So, it has to be made clear to its supporters that they will not be left in the lurch just because the armed group they owe allegiance to is banned but will be reached out to by the peace process so that their issues -- mainly of being neglected by western Nagaland -- are resolved.

The signing of the Naga framework agreement has raised hopes amongst people living in these conflict zones and India cannot disappoint them once again. Failure is not an option.

This article was originally published in the The Huffington Post

• Published: 25 September, 2015

On September 16, the Indian government banned the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) or NSCN(K) under the Unlawful Activities and Prevention Act for five years for its role in the June 4 ambush in Manipur which killed 18 Indian security personnel.

Since abrogating the cease-fire with the government of India on March 27, the NSCN(K) has repeatedly targeted Indian security forces, the latest being the showdown on September 12 in Nagaland’s Koki village on the India-Myanmar border.

That the ceasefire signed between the Indian government and the NSCN(K) in 2001 would eventually breakdown was predictable due to the Indian government’s growing concern that NSCN(K)’s Naga Self-Administered Zone in Myanmar was becoming a safe haven for armed groups like the anti-talk United Liberation Front of Asom faction led by Paresh Barua, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland led by IK Songbijit, and the Meitei armed groups like the People’s Liberation Army of Manipur.

The NSCN(K) was unhappy that its repeated demands for inclusion in the Naga peace talks between the NSCN (Isak-Muivah) and the Indian government had not been accepted.

Western vs eastern Nagas

The question that begs an answer is this: why was the NSCN(K) insistent that it be included in the peace process with the Indian government?

This has much to do with its claim to represent the eastern Nagas, historically sidelined by western Naga tribes like the Aos and the Tangkhuls, the latter dominating the rank and file of the NSCN(IM).

The NSCN(K) claims to represent eastern Naga tribes like the Konyaks (in both Nagaland and Myanmar), the Phoms, the Changs, the Khiamniungans, the Yimchungrus and the Sangtams in Nagaland, as well as the Tangsa in Arunachal Pradesh. These eastern Naga tribes have long accused the Western Naga tribes like the Aos, Angamis, Tangkhuls, and Semas of discriminating against them with regard to development, education, healthcare, political representation.

In fact, the genesis of the NSCN split in 1988 into the NSCN(IM) and NSCN(K) was the perceived mistreatment of the eastern Nagas by the western ones. The Nagas in Myanmar are economically the weakest, as are the Indian eastern Nagas this side of the border.

Myanmar politics

NSCN(K) also realises that it is very unlikely to get a respectable political deal for the minuscule Naga ethnic community in Myanmar. So then, why is the NSCN(K) not fighting the Myanmar government but is combative in India for the Naga cause, in spite of much larger Naga-claimed lands in Myanmar as compared to India?

The answer lies in Myanmar politics. The truth of the matter is that when the NSCN(K) signed a "bilateral ceasefire" agreement in 2012 with the Myanmar government, it resolved not to join in any political talks for the Naga areas with the Myanmar government. The NSCN(K) has also not taken up arms against the Tatmadaw (the Burmese military) for an independent "Nagalim" in Myanmar, though it does have such territorial demands there. In exchange it was allowed to keep its armed camps in the newly created Naga Self-Administered Zone in Myanmar governed by a retired Naga military officer of the Tatmadaw.

In other words, the Myanmar Nagas are committed to give no trouble to the Myanmar government and to fully support whatever political decisions are unilaterally made by the government for the Nagas in Myanmar.

For instance, when the Myanmar government arbitrarily redrew the administrative units of the Sagaing division, six Naga inhabited townships – Tamu, Molaik, Phouwnpin, Homalin, Khamti, and Tanai – were lost to Sagaing division and Kachin state. Only Layshi, Lahe and Namyung (or NSAZ) were left to the Nagas to form the Autonomous District Council. At that time, Khaplang did not raise much of a protest against this arbitrary redrawing of territory by the Myanmar government.

It is thus evident from the NSCN(K)'s actions that they are prepared to make a massive compromise of Naga territory and political rights in Myanmar. In return, the NSCN(K) obtained safe sanctuary, while waging war against India, which makes perfect sense from a tactical military perspective of not fighting two powerful enemies together. It realised that it would get squeezed if India and Myanmar came together against it. That this is the strategy of the NSCN(K) is further evident from their renewed discussions with the Myanmar government under a National ceasefire peace process underway in that country to be signed by all ethnic insurgent groups next month.

There have been reports of internal dissensions within the NSCN(K) in arriving at a "consensus" at the discussions underway now with Myanmar government under the aegis of the Myanmar Peace Centre. Interestingly, the NSCN(K) is anxiously negotiating for protection from the Myanmar government against attacks from "foreign country", meaning Indian military operations against the NSCN(K) along the Indo-Myanmar border. And not surprisingly, there are zero discussions about the future of the Naga areas in these discussions, which far exceed the Indian one in size in Myanmar.

The Myanmar government too has not shown any visionary foresight in discussing political autonomy with any of the 18 ethnic insurgent groups, being more focused on a ceasefire to freeze the humongous ethnic issues in Myanmar. This is the perfect recipe for greater disaster and ethnic strife in Myanmar if these pressing issues are not earnestly addressed in the near future. So the NSCN(K), being a much smaller stakeholder in Myanmar, is just playing along with the rest of the herd, which leaves it free to train its guns in Indian Naga areas.

What can India do about it?

Militarily purging the NSCN(K) might suppress its activities in India as a short term, stop-gap measure. That said, the key to the pacification of the NSCN(K) lies with the Naga people themselves, so that it agrees to be peacefully included in discussions on the Indo-Naga peace accord. To this effect, the Naga Mother’s Association has made efforts to reach out to the NSCN (K), as have the Naga Hoho and other Naga civil society bodies.

Instead of a blanket ban on the NSCN(K), the government of India must strictly check the outfit's military operations while allowing total freedom to the Naga people to engage politically across the Indo-Myanmar border. That is the only viable road forward for India to protect itself from the fallout of the political myopia being practiced in Myanmar.

This article was originally published in the scroll.in

• Published: 23 September, 2015

A resolution of one of the oldest armed ethnic conflicts in the Northeast offers a way forward to resolving many other ethnic conflicts in the region such as those involving Kukis, Meiteis, Bodos, Dimasas, Hmars, and Karbis.

• Published: August 07, 2015
• IDSA Comments

Obtaining Myanmar’s help to counter covert Chinese connections with insurgent groups like the UWSA and by extension with anti-India militant groups such as the NSCN (K) is important for long term stability in the Northeast.

• Published: June 11, 2015
• IDSA Comments

To prevent the recurring violence in Bodo areas, establish a land record system, improve the presence of both the state civil administration and the law enforcement agencies, and collate credible data on the flow of migrants.

• Published: December 29, 2014
• IDSA Comments

These repeated incidents of border trouble and deaths bring into sharp focus the lack of serious border law enforcement. It is, therefore, critical that we do four important policy interventions fast.

• Published: August 21, 2014
• IDSA Comments

Myanmar’s 2,276 km long coastline in the Bay of Bengal has the potential to provide the ‘second coast’ to China to reach the Indian Ocean and achieve strategic presence in the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. Especially transportation logistics to the ‘second coast’ from landlocked south west Chinese provinces like Yunnan have both economic and strategic benefits

• Published: June 19, 2014
• IDSA Comments

It is imperative that the government immigration agencies generate reliable verified data on the number of people coming in from Bangladesh into Assam. It is also the government’s constitutional obligation to maintain the veracity of electoral rolls listing only citizens with the right to vote.

• Published: May 09, 2014
• IDSA Comments