Gurmeet Kanwal

Referring to the continuation of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, senior political leaders no longer in government have insinuated on national television that the Indian Army has been given a veto over the decisions of the Cabinet Committee on Security. Can this ever be true?

The army, navy and air force chiefs are not even permanent invitees to meetings of the CCS; they attend only those meetings to which they are invited by name.

It is the army chief's rightful responsibility to give his recommendations on issues on which his advice is sought by the defence minister and it is up to the latter and the prime minister to accept or reject it.

The army has been and continues to remain scrupulously apolitical and senior political leaders, whether in the government or not, must not create false perceptions.

As for AFSPA, the Act has been under review for quite some time.

While the defence ministry and Army headquarters are opposed to changes in the basic provisions of the Act, the home ministry is reported to have recommended a major overhaul of the Act to bring it in line with egalitarian human rights practices.

The Army clearly sees AFSPA as a capstone enabling Act that gives it the powers necessary to conduct counter-insurgency operations efficiently.

The Act provides army personnel with Constitutional safeguards against malicious, vindictive and frivolous prosecution.

These powers are available to the police under the Criminal Procedure Code, CrPC.

If AFSPA is repealed or diluted, it is the army leadership's considered view that the performance of battalions in counter-insurgency operations will be adversely affected and the terrorists or insurgents will seize the initiative.

However, certain sections of the civil society view AFSPA as a draconian Act.

It has been dubbed as a license to kill by Syed Ali Shah Geelani, a hardline separatist Kashmiri leader.

The Act has been opposed in the north-eastern states as well. Irom Sharmila, a Manipuri civil rights activist, undertook a long fast that began in November 2000 to force the government to repeal AFSPA from Manipur and other north-eastern states. (Sharmila ended her fast on August 9, 2016 and declared her intention to become the chief minister so that she could repeal AFSPA.)

AFSPA was promulgated in 1958 in Assam and Manipur and in 1990 in J&K. The main criticism of the Act is directed against the provisions of Section 4, which gives the armed forces the power to open fire and even cause death, if prohibitory orders are violated.

It also confers the power to destroy structures used as hideouts, training camps or places from where attacks against security forces could be launched;
the power to arrest without warrant and to use force for the purpose if necessary;
and, the power to enter and search premises without warrant to make an arrest or recover hostages, arms, ammunition or stolen property.

Human rights activists object on the grounds that these provisions give the security forces unbridled powers to arrest, search, seize and even shoot to kill.

They accuse the security forces of having destroyed homes and entire villages merely on the suspicion that insurgents were hiding there. They point out that Section 4 empowers the armed forces to arrest citizens without warrant and keep them in custody for several days.

They also object to Section 6, which protects security forces personnel from prosecution except with the prior sanction of the central government.

Critics say this provision has on many occasions led to even non-commissioned officers brazenly opening fire on crowds without having to justify their action.

Critics forget that Section 5 of the Act already mandates that arrested civilians must be handed over to the nearest police station 'with the least possible delay' along with a report of 'circumstances occasioning the arrest.'

Army HQ has laid down that all suspects who are arrested will be handed over to civilian authorities within 24 hours.

Regarding firing on civilians, the army's instructions are that fire may be opened in towns and villages only in self defence and that too when the source of terrorist or militant fire can be clearly identified.

If soldiers had been opening fire indiscriminately, there would have been hundreds of more civilian casualties in J&K since 1989-1990 when the insurgency had begun.

A committee headed by Justice Jeevan Reddy was appointed in 2004 to review AFSPA. Though the committee found that the powers conferred under the Act are not absolute, it nevertheless concluded that the Act should be repealed.

However, it recommended that essential provisions of the Act be inserted into the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967.

The key recommendations of the Reddy Committee were:

• In case the situation so warrants, the state government may request the Union government to deploy the army for not more than six months.
• The Union government may also deploy the armed forces without a request from the state. However, the situation should be reviewed after six months and Parliament's approval should be sought for extending the deployment.
• Non-commissioned officers may continue to have the power to fire.
• Arrested persons should be handed over to the civil police.
• The Union government should set up an independent grievances cell in each district where the Act is in force.
• The Second Administrative Reforms Commission headed by then Union law minister M Veerappa Moily also recommended that AFSPA should be repealed and its essential provisions should be incorporated in the UAPA. If this course of action is adopted, it would be a retrograde step that will substantially harm the national cause.
• Extraordinary situations require special handling. As the army does not have any police powers under the Constitution, it is in the national interest to give it special powers for operational purposes when it is called upon to undertake counter-insurgency operations in disturbed areas. Hence, the promulgation of AFSPA along with the Disturbed Areas Act is inescapable.

Army personnel must be given immunity but such immunity must not be absolute, nor is it so under the present AFSPA.

The central government can and has sanctioned prosecution where prima facie cases existed.

Without these powers, commanding officers and young company commanders are likely to follow a wait-and-watch approach rather than actively pursue hardcore terrorists with enthusiasm and risk being embroiled in long-drawn litigation, which may be based on false allegations.

On its part, the army must make it mandatory for its battalions to take police personnel and village elders along for operations which involve the search of civilian homes and the seizure of private property.

The practical problems encountered in ensuring transparency in counter-insurgency operations must be overcome by innovative measures.

The army must be completely transparent in investigating allegations of violations of human rights and bringing the violators to speedy justice. Exemplary punishment must be meted out where the charges are proved.

The article was originally published in Rediff.com.

• Published: 6 September, 2016

Signalling that India-Pakistan relations continue to remain mired in a quagmire, Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced after a cabinet meeting that Pakistan will observe July 19 as a "black day" to protest India’s "atrocities" in Kashmir.

He said, "Pakistan would continue to extend moral, political and diplomatic support for Kashmiris in their just struggle…"

Mian Nawaz Sharif forgets that while the Kashmiris who are part of India are ruled by a duly elected representative government, those who reside in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) are ruled from Islamabad, with the concurrence of GHQ (General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army), Rawalpindi.

He also forgets that the people of Gilgit-Baltistan have no rights and that the Baloch people’s quest for freedom has been suppressed by the military jackboot ever since independence from the British.

According to Nawab Brahumdagh Bugti, head of the Baloch Republican Party, "Balochistan is burning since the forceful occupation by state in 1948. Five major military operations had been launched by the armed forces of Pakistan and the latest of them still continues full-fledged. During this period of 66 years, Balochistan has suffered from gross human rights violations by the Pakistani forces which have been getting worse and accelerated with the passage of every single day."

Nawab Bugti had said two years ago, "140,000 Baloch had been killed and at least 20,000 Baloch were missing since 2006."

The deteriorating internal security environment has gradually morphed into Pakistan’s foremost national security threat.

Karachi remains a tinderbox that is ready to explode.

The Al Qaeda is quietly making inroads into Pakistani terrorist organisations like the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Harkat-ul-Jihad Al-Islami (HuJI), Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ).

The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has consolidated its position in North Waziristan despite Operation Zarb-e-Azb launched by the Pakistan army two years ago.

Fissiparous tendencies in Balochistan and the restive Gilgit-Baltistan Northern Areas are a perpetual security nightmare.

Sectarian violence has become almost a daily occurrence.

The organised elimination of Shias and Ahmadis has become so common that it barely makes it to the evening news.

Pakistan’s Hindus have also been receiving rather shabby treatment.

Meanwhile, creeping Talibanisation is making deep inroads into civil society. Even the armed forces have been penetrated and attacked with virtual impunity.

The naval base at Mehran, Karachi, and GHQ, Rawalpindi, have been attacked, though the attackers were gunned down at the gate of the army’s headquarters.

Nawaz Sharif would do well for Pakistan if he were to look within and come to grips with the challenges confronting the country, the job for which he was elected with a huge majority.

Despite facing the grave danger of a possible collapse of the state, the Pakistan government's counter-insurgency policy had until recently lacked cohesion.

The commencement of a peace dialogue with the TTP in February 2014, despite the abject failure of several such efforts in the past, allowed the terrorist organisation to re-arm, recruit and train fresh fighters.

In March 2014, the TTP had offered a month-long ceasefire.

The army honoured the ceasefire but soon withdrew its pledge and blamed the government for failing to make any new offers.

In the face of mounting public and army pressure, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif reluctantly agreed to approve military strikes.

He was apprehensive that General Raheel Sharif, the COAS, may unilaterally decide to launch an all-out offensive.

The PM said that he will not allow Pakistan to become a "sanctuary of terrorists" and that the military operation will continue till all the militants are eliminated.

Realisation about the gravity of the internal security situation took time to dawn on the Pakistan army as well.

Two successive army chiefs have declared publicly that internal instability is the number one national security threat.

However, the Pakistan army is relatively inexperienced in counter-insurgency operations.

General Kayani had declared 2009 as "Military Training Year" to re-orientate the army to internal security duties.

Before becoming the COAS, General Raheel Sharif had developed the training manuals for counter-insurgency.

Over the last decade, the Pakistan army has deployed more than 150,000 soldiers in the Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa and FATA areas.

It has suffered over 15,000 casualties, including about 5,000 dead since 2008.

On June 15, 2014, the Pakistan army finally launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb (sharp and cutting), its much delayed ground offensive against the TTP in North Waziristan. The army claims to have killed several thousand TTP cadres, but the restive province continues to defy the army.

Hurt by a series of Taliban successes in "liberating" tribal areas and under pressure from the Americans to deliver in the "war on terror", in the initial stages the Pakistan army employed massive firepower to stem the rot – as had been visible on television screens worldwide when operations had been launched to liberate the Swat Valley (Operation Rah-e-Rast, May-June 2009) and South Waziristan (Operation Rah-e-Nijat, Oct-Nov 2009).

Fighter aircraft, helicopter gunships and heavy artillery were freely used to destroy suspected terrorist hideouts, irrespective of civilian casualties.

This heavy-handed, firepower-based approach without simultaneous infantry operations on the ground failed to dislodge the militants, but caused large-scale collateral damage and alienated the tribal population even further.

Counter-insurgency operations against the TTP in South Waziristan earlier had driven most of the fighters to North Waziristan.

North Waziristan has rugged mountainous terrain that enables TTP militants to operate like guerrillas and launch hit-and-run raids against the security forces.

When cornered, the militants find it easy to slip across the Durand Line and find safe sanctuaries in Khost and Paktika provinces of Afghanistan.

Ahmed Rashid, the author of Taliban and Descent into Chaos, has written: "Not only does North Waziristan house Pakistani and Afghan Taliban; it is also a training ground for al-Qaeda, which attracts Central Asians, Uighurs from China, Chechens from the Caucasus and a flow of militant Muslim converts from Europe."

Quite clearly, the Pakistan army is in for the long haul and will undoubtedly suffer a large number of casualties.

Recent attacks against the army are clearly indicative of the ability of Pakistan’s terrorist organisations to strike at will and underline the helplessness of the security forces in taking effective preventive action.

Political turmoil, internal instability, a floundering economy and weak institutions make for an explosive mix.

Pakistan is not yet a failed state, but the situation that it is confronted with could rapidly degenerate into unfettered disaster.

All institutions of the state need to stand together if the nation is to survive its gravest challenge.

The Pakistan army and the ISI must concentrate on fighting the enemy within, rather than frittering away energy and resources on destabilising neighbouring countries.

The article was originally published in the DailyO.

• Published: 16 July, 2016

In a grotesque turn of events, over a dozen lives have been lost and 200 people have been injured, including about 100 police personnel, in violent protests sparked by the killing of Burhan Wani and two other terrorists belonging to the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) in an encounter with the security forces in Kashmir Valley.

Wani, described as the poster boy of new-age terrorism in Kashmir, lured many youth to join the shrinking ranks of the local militants with his charismatic appeals on social media.

Given the spontaneous eruption of a wave comprising a mixture of sympathy and anger and the unprecedented turnout for his funeral, perhaps there is a grain of truth in Omar Abdullah’s statement that Wani will recruit more young people to join the "cause" from his grave than he succeeded in doing while he was alive.

In the third decade of a violent militancy in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), centred mostly in the Kashmir Valley, what then is the cause?

In a small minority, it is a misplaced yearning for Azadi driven by a sense of alienation from the national mainstream. The root causes are not much different from any other people’s movement: poor governance, particularly deficiencies in the delivery of justice; inadequate socio-economic development and the consequent lack of employment opportunities; and the inconvenience caused by the heavy presence of the security forces and a false perception that they follow a high-handed approach in their dealings with the people.

The security environment has improved considerably over the last decade.

The road arteries are open to civilian and military traffic; schools, colleges and hospitals are functioning normally; trade and commerce have begun to gradually look up; development projects of the government are slowly gathering momentum; tourists are visiting Kashmir in droves; the annual Amarnath Yatra is attracting ever more pilgrims; and political leaders are able to freely address small crowds at street corners.

Elections are being held regularly and a coalition government is in place, though it is a dubious coalition.

The army’s three-tier deployment and vigorous patrolling, backed by modern night vision devices, has ensured that infiltration from across the LoC has been reduced to a trickle.

The number of incidents of violence has gradually come down.

This summer a large number of terrorists from LeT and JeM, terrorist organisations sponsored by the Pakistan army and the ISI – together comprising the "deep state" – have been neutralised in encounters with the army, the central armed police forces (CAPFs) and the J&K police.

However, no insurgency anywhere in the world has ever been resolved by the security forces alone.

There has been absolutely no progress in striving to reach a political solution acceptable to all the stakeholders, including the people of all the regions of J&K, the displaced Kashmiri Pandits who have become refugees in their own land, and the people of the nation at large.

Political parties continue to play vote bank politics and pander shamelessly to the least common denominator – inflaming passions, creating rifts and dividing rather than uniting people.

There is a view in India that the Kashmiri people are a pampered lot, that disproportionately large amounts of central government funds have been pumped into the state and that the people should be grateful rather than agitating for azadi.

The right wing view in India is that Article 370 of the Constitution of India – the tie that binds the Constitution of J&K with that of India – should be abrogated and that, in fact, it should have been dispensed with a long time ago, as was envisaged in the Constitution itself.

They forget that strong arm tactics do not work when stone-pelting crowds take to the streets in the thousands and refuse to buckle under pressure in this mega-media age.

International examples of the power of the people are worth recounting.

In February 1986, the Filipino people restored democracy through the People Power Revolution.

In 1989-90, Lech Walesa’s Solidarity movement in Poland beat back the mighty Soviet Union’s tanks.

The citizens of Czechoslovakia shook off totalitarian communist rule in the Velvet Revolution.

The victory of the Ukrainian people’s Orange Revolution represented a new landmark in the history of people’s movements for democracy.

The Cedar Revolution in April 2005 ended the Syrian military occupation of Lebanon after 30 years.

The Arab Spring that began with the Tunisian Revolution in December 2010 snowballed into insurgencies in Libya, Syria and Yemen and civil uprisings in Bahrain, Egypt and Iraq and minor sympathetic unrest in many other Arab countries.

Closer home, the Nepalese revolution that dethroned the King is the latest manifestation of the power of the people.

While some of the Kashmiri protesters are no doubt being paid to shout slogans demanding azadi and hurl stones at the security forces, most of them are genuinely concerned about their future and the inability of successive governments to resolve the socio-economic challenges facing the state.

The successful resolution of insurgencies requires a four-pronged approach: governance, development and security, along with perception management.

There can be no doubt that a sustained and convincing high-level political initiative is needed, but what do the people want?

Except for a very small minority that has been deeply influenced by radical extremism, the Kashmiri people do not wish to either join Pakistan or opt for independence from India.

Creeping Talibanisation in Pakistan goes against the grain of Kashmiriyat and Kashmir’s Sufi culture.

After very hard and acrimonious bargaining they will ultimately settle for a large measure of autonomy, which will allow them the right to rule themselves, within the Indian Union.

They will accept that the central government continues to deal with defence, foreign affairs, currency and communications while the J&K Assembly is left free to legislate on everything else. Surely that is not too much to concede.

Autonomy in governance is the central pillar of India’s federal structure.

The late Prime Minister Narsimha Rao had said the “sky is the limit” for autonomy.

When asked whether he was proposing to hold talks within the framework of the Constitution, former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee had said he was willing to honour the tenets of insaniyat and hold talks within a “humanitarian framework”.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had expressed his anguish over the rising tide of violence and had spoken feelingly about the people’s “dard aur mayusi”. He had made a pitch for “mutual tolerance, understanding and accommodation”.

The challenge posed by the prolonged turmoil in Kashmir Valley must not be neglected any further.

The NDA government must hold all-party talks to evolve a national consensus on resolving the problems posed by the unremitting tide of militancy.

Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti and the leaders of all political parties in the state must rise to the occasion and provide the healing touch that the situation requires.

As for the security forces, they must be allowed to conduct their counter-insurgency operations against Pakistan-sponsored terrorists in accordance with the well-established rules of engagement, but must do so with a sense of utmost restraint, even as they devote time and effort to winning hearts and minds.

Peace and stability in J&K are vital national interests, which can be neglected only with dire consequences to the unity and the integrity of India.

The article was originally published in the DailyO.

• Published: 10 July, 2016

Earlier, in July 2014, the government had permitted FDI in the defence sector up to 49% without prior approval — known as the automatic route — and beyond 49% after prior approval, provided the MNC brought in or agreed to transfer state-of-the-art defence technology. This requirement has now been relaxed to permit FDI beyond 49% even if modern technology is transferred. The government has also brought the manufacture of small arms and ammunition under the FDI in defence rules. Together, both these moves are expected to encourage the manufacture of weapons systems and defence equipment in India.

No country that is not substantially self-reliant in defence production can aspire to become a dominant military power in its region and, in due course, on the world stage. Make in India is a key feature of the NDA government’s policy for economic development. It was realised by the Modi government that it is necessary to undertake major reform of its defence procurement policies to promote indigenisation. Failing transformational changes, the import content of defence acquisitions will continue to remain between 70 and 80%.

Modernisation and upgradation

Plans for military modernisation must simultaneously lead to a transformative upgradation in the defence technology base and manufacturing prowess, or else, defence procurement will remain mired in disadvantageous buyer-seller, patron-client relationships like that with the erstwhile Soviet Union and now Russia. While India has been manufacturing Russian fighter aircraft, tanks and other equipment under licence for long, the Russians never actually transferred technology to India. New weapons acquisitions must take place with a transfer of technology (ToT) clause being built into the contract, even if it means having to pay a higher price.

The government continues to retain its monopoly on research and development and defence production through the DRDO, the ordnance factories and the defence PSUs (DPSUs). Though the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) was amended in March 2016, to reflect the new thinking on making and buying Indian, the changes were not far reaching enough and the process still favours the defence PSUs over the private sector.

No country will give India strategic technologies, such as nuclear warhead and ballistic missile technologies, know-how on building nuclear-powered submarines and ballistic missile defence (BMD) technology. It will remain the responsibility of the DRDO to conduct original R&D into strategic technologies. For the development of hi-tech weapons platforms like fighter-bomber aircraft and sophisticated defence equipment like over-the-horizon (OTH) radars, there should be no need to reinvent the wheel. These should be developed jointly in conjunction with India’s strategic partners by forming JVs with defence MNCs that are willing to transfer modern technology.

Prioritise privatisation

The privatisation of most of the ordnance factories and some of the defence PSUs should be considered on priority. The private sector has shown its readiness and technological proficiency to take up the production of weapons and equipment designed and developed by the DRDO and must be trusted to deliver.

Though FDI in defence manufacture has been increased from 26 to 49% through the automatic route, this is not considered attractive enough by defence MNCs as it is 74% for many non-defence sectors. Given the time and effort that goes into locating a joint venture partner, the risks involved and the fact that they are expected to bring in proprietary technology, the MNCs prefer to have a controlling stake. In FY 2015-16, FDI in the defence sector was limited to Rs 64 lakh.

Streamlining the procedures

Just like the government had not defined state-of-the-art technology in specific terms, it has not defined modern technology that would be eligible for FDI beyond 49% with prior approval. Broadly speaking, modern technology would be mature third-generation technology bordering on fourth generation — for example, Hellfire air-to-surface missiles and OTH radars. While exports of defence equipment have been permitted, the procedures for according the approvals that are necessary and the regulatory framework need to be streamlined.

The offsets policy has not worked to India’s advantage. The defence industry’s ability to absorb hi-tech offsets 50 or even 30% is limited at present. It may be more prudent to consider offsets only in cases where the benefits expected to accrue will outweigh the additional costs and Indian JV partners can absorb the technology that is brought in. In November 2015, the government restored ‘services’ as eligible offsets for defence contracts, opening up a business potential of over $3 billion in immediate projects. The government also added the development of software and engineering design to the list of eligible offsets, but limited it to 20% of the project cost. This will bring some relief to the maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) and software industries, as also companies involved in the upgradation of military systems and life extension projects of defence equipment.

Defence Economic Zones

The government should examine the feasibility of establishing Defence Economic Zones (DEZs) to provide incentives for indigenous defence manufacture. There is an inescapable need to establish an Institute of Defence Acquisition under the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The US has a Defence Acquisition University where all officers nominated for posts dealing with defence procurement are trained. The ‘life cycle concept’ of evaluating defence equipment for acquisition was completely alien to the armed forces till very recently.

Military modernisation has two major facets — the replacement of obsolete and obsolescent weapons and equipment with modern ones, which results in increasing combat effectiveness; and, the qualitative upgradation of combat capabilities through the acquisition and induction of force multipliers. As the defence budget is invariably much smaller than the requirement, military planners face a major dilemma — how to improve operational preparedness while simultaneously making concerted efforts to modernise. Logically, operational preparedness must take precedence over modernisation. The art of leadership lies in finding an optimum balance so that all efforts that are made to enhance operational preparedness also contribute substantively to modernisation.

As the largest importer of arms and equipment in the world, India has the advantage of buyers’ clout. This clout must be exploited fully to further India’s quest for self-sufficiency in the indigenous production of weapons and equipment. In 10-15 years India must begin to acquire most of its defence equipment needs from Indian companies under the new category Buy (Indian Designed, Developed and Manufactured) introduced in DPP 2016. Only then will the era of self-reliance in defence acquisition truly dawn on the country. It will be a difficult quest, but not one that a great nation cannot realise.

(The writer is Distinguished Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and former Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi)

The article was originally published in Deccan Herald

• Published: 4 July, 2016

The newspaper headlines highlighted the shedding of the "hesitations of history" from Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s outstanding speech to the joint session of the US Congress. The TV networks waxed eloquent on the number of standing ovations and the rounds of applause he received from the spellbound members of Congress. The photos showed some Congressmen seeking the PM’s autograph.

Only a few gave much footage or column inches to perhaps the most important policy pronouncement contained in the joint statement issued at the end of the visit: "Noting that the US-India defence relationship can be an anchor of stability, and given the increasingly strengthened cooperation in defence, the United States hereby recognises India as a major defence partner."

According to the statement, this recognition means that the US will give India "license-free access to a wide range of dual-use technologies" and that the US will support the PM’s "Make in India" initiative by facilitating "the development of robust defence industries and their integration into the global supply chain" under the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) launched in 2014.

The "hesitations of history" had stymied India-US relations for a long time. The thaw began during the Clinton-Vajpayee years. The relationship was given a fresh impetus when PM Manmohan Singh and President George W Bush signed the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement in July 2005 and the US accorded de facto recognition to India as a state armed with nuclear weapons that led to the lifting of most 30-year old sanctions.

The two countries also signed a ten-year defence framework agreement that enabled much closer defence cooperation. This agreement was renewed in 2015.

Since then, PM Modi and President Obama have taken defence cooperation to a much higher path. Joint military exercises designed to build confidence and enhance interoperability have been substantially increased.

In fact, the annual Malabar maritime security exercise, that now includes Japan besides India and the US, is being held in the South China Sea this week (June 9-16, 2016).

India has acquired over $10 billion worth of hi-tech weapons platforms and equipment; plans are being finalised for the US to help India with the design of an aircraft carrier and jet engines.

Notably, there has been no transfer of technology (ToT) yet, and India’s quest for state-of-the-art defence technology remains unfulfilled. It will take some time before India gets "license-free access to a wide range of dual-use technologies".

While the key policies underpinning the recognition of India as a major defence partner are not yet clear, it appears certain that defence cooperation between the two countries will be gradually broadened and deepened.

India and the US will join other strategic partners to formulate a cooperative security architecture for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Such a joint venture is necessary for the security of the global commons, including the freedom of navigation in the sea-lanes of communications that carry a large part of the world’s trade, security of airspace, unfettered use of cyber space and weapons-free outer space.

As a major user of the global commons, should China be willing to join hands with the nations of the Indo-Pacific as a partner in the joint efforts that are likely to be made for cooperative security, it should be welcomed. However, a militarily assertive China, afflicted with the middle Kingdom Syndrome, prefers to go it alone and is seeking to acquire primacy in the Indo-Pacific.

Logically, given the current as well as emerging threats and challenges and the mutuality of interests, the defence cooperation element of the India-US strategic partnership should be gradually propelled to the next higher orbit.

This will involve joint threat assessment, joint planning for likely contingencies and joint operations to overcome dangerous threats when the vital national interests of both countries are threatened.

India would like to limit such military interventions to its area of strategic interest extending from the South China Sea in the east to the Horn of Africa in the west. And, India would join a "coalition of the willing" only if a United Nations Security Council resolution cannot be obtained. However, even as India draws closer to the US, it must maintain its strategic autonomy.

Prime Minister AB Vajpayee had said that India and the US are natural allies. President Obama described the growing Indo-US relationship as the defining partnership of the 21st century. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had called it as India’s principal strategic partnership.

Quoting Walt Whitman, Prime Minister Modi said in Washington that "the baton had given the signal" and, "There is a new symphony in play." And, perhaps it is, but it will take some time before the orchestra plays in harmony and its music resonates across the Indo-Pacific.

The article was originally published in Daily O

• Published: 10 June, 2016

In a partisan and condescending editorial (No Exceptions for a Nuclear India, June 4, 2016) on India's application for membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), The New York Times has written: "Membership would enhance India's standing as a nuclear weapons state, but it is not merited until the country meets the group's standards."

And what does Team NYT want India to do? "India has... not accepted legally binding commitments to pursue disarmament negotiations, halt the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and not test nuclear weapons."

This is not the first time that NYT has been unfairly critical of India's efforts to enter the NSG. In early-July 2014, in a similar editorial, NYT had written: "If India wants to be part of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, it needs to sign the treaty that prohibits nuclear testing, stop producing fissile material, and begin talks with its rivals on nuclear weapons containment." NYT is consistent but factually wrong on all three counts.

At that time, the newspaper had based its criticism on a report by IHS Jane's - a US-based research group - that India was in the process of enhancing its capacity to enrich uranium - ostensibly to power the nuclear reactors on the INS Arihant and future SSBNs, but much in excess of the requirement. This was said to be causing anxiety to the Pakistanis and had raised the spectre of an arms race in southern Asia.

It is obvious that the editorial writers understand neither the background to nor the present context of India's nuclear deterrence. As stated in a letter written by then prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to US president Bill Clinton after India's nuclear tests at Pokhran in May 1998 (the letter was leaked to the media by the White House), the primary reason for India's acquisition of nuclear weapons was the existential threat posed by two nuclear-armed states on India's borders, with both of which India had fought wars over territorial disputes.

The China-Pakistan nuclear and missile nexus, including the clandestine transfer of M-9 and M-11 missiles, nuclear materials and technology from China to Pakistan, has irrevocably changed the strategic balance in southern Asia. It has enabled Pakistan to neutralise India's superiority in conventional forces and wage a proxy war under the nuclear umbrella.

Since then, the nuclear environment in southern Asia has been further destabilised. China's ASAT test, BMD programme, efforts aimed at acquiring MIRV capability and ambiguity in its "no first use" (NFU) commitment are causes for India's concern.

Similarly, Pakistan is engaged in the acquisition of "full spectrum deterrence" capability, including tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs), which invariably lower the threshold of use. Pakistan has stockpiled a larger number of nuclear warheads (110 to 120) than India (90 to 100) and is continuing to add to the numbers as it has been given unsafeguarded nuclear reactors by China. Mujahideen attacks on Pakistan's armed forces have led to the apprehension that some of Pakistan's nuclear warheads could fall into jihadi hands.

The 123 Agreement signed by India and the US in 2008 as a follow up to the civil nuclear agreement of July 2005 enabled India to gain an exemption to its nuclear weapons facilities and stockpiles of nuclear weapons fuel from inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

India has agreed to bring 14 nuclear power reactors under international safeguards. Eight military facilities, including reactors, enrichment and reprocessing facilities, will remain out of the purview of IAEA safeguards. India is at liberty to set up additional military facilities using unsafeguarded materials if these are considered necessary.

India has been a responsible nuclear power and has a positive record on non-proliferation. India has consistently supported total nuclear disarmament and is in favour of negotiations for the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).

Incidentally, it is Pakistan that is holding up the FMCT. For both technical and political reasons, it is important for India to keep its option to conduct further nuclear tests open; hence, it cannot sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at present even though it has voluntarily declared a moratorium on nuclear tests. Last week India joined the Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC) against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.

Non-proliferation ayatollahs should channelise their efforts towards identifying and shaming the real proliferators. Influential newspapers like NYT should review the progress made by the P-5 nuclear weapons states (NWS) on the implementation of the commitments made by them during the NPT Review Conferences - RevCon 2010 and RevCon 2015.

These commitments include progress in the implementation of the New Start Treaty; disposal of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) extracted from nuclear warheads; steps towards early entry into force of the CTBT, monitoring and verification procedures and its universalisation; efforts to revitalise the Conference on Disarmament (CD) by ending the impasse in its working, and the immediate start of negotiations on a legally binding, verifiable international ban on the production of fissile material by the way of the FMCT; and measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

Finally, in April 2009, in his first major foreign policy speech, popularly known as the "Prague Spring" speech that won him the Nobel Peace prize, president Barack Obama had committed the US to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons in line with the growing bipartisan consensus so eloquently expressed by Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, William Perry, and Sam Nunn, in their famous 2007 'Wall Street Journal' article. Instead of repeatedly berating India, NYT should enquire how well that commitment is being fulfilled.

The article was originally published in Daily O

• Published: 5 June, 2016

Speaking at the Raisina Dialogue earlier this month, Admiral Harry Harris, Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Command, called for quadrilateral Australia-India-Japan-US consultations for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. He said, “Together, we can develop a roadmap that leverages our respective efforts to improve the security architecture and strengthen regional dialogues. Together, we can ensure free and open sea lanes of communication...”

Harris also announced that the next set of naval exercises in the trilateral annual Malabar series, comprising India, Japan and the US, will be held in the northern Philippine Sea, close to the South China Sea. The Chinese perceive such efforts as attempts to gang up on them and, therefore, their reaction was fast and furious. A spokesperson of China’s foreign ministry said, “We urge the US government to put some restraint on them (US commanders) and stop them from irresponsible sensationalism and hyping up so as to avoid undermining regional peace and stability.”

China senses the emergence of a security vacuum in the Indo-Pacific and is rushing to fill it. Beijing has discarded Deng Xiaoping’s 24-character strategy to “hide our capacity and bide our time”. It has dropped the phrase “peaceful rise” while referring to its economic growth and military assertiveness.

China has deep internal fault lines. Its rapid economic growth, now slowing, has been uneven and non-inclusive. There is a deep sense of resentment of the Communist Party for the denial of basic freedoms. The discontent could boil over and lead to an uncontrollable spontaneous implosion. David Shambaugh, a well-known China scholar, is among those in the China-may-implode school. The recent crash of Chinese stock markets and their continuing volatility point to the possibility of a meltdown.

Most Asian leaders are apprehensive of China’s intentions and worry that it may behave irresponsibly somewhere in the Indo-Pacific. It could decide to intervene militarily in the South China Sea, or to occupy one or more of the disputed Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands or decide to resolve the remaining territorial disputes, like that with India, by using military force. Though President Xi Jinping has denied plans to ‘militarise’ the South China Sea, surely China is not building air strips there to fly in Japanese tourists.

Both the contingencies — implosion and military adventurism — have a low probability of occurrence, but will be high impact events with widespread ramifications should either of them come to pass. In such an eventuality, India and the US will both need strong partners to deal with the fallout and to manage the consequences. Hence, the India-US strategic partnership makes eminent sense as a hedging strategy.

India must join the US and other strategic partners, such as Australia, Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Vietnam, to establish a cooperative security framework for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and for the security of the global commons — air space, space, cyber space and the sea-lanes of communication — to enable freedom of navigation and free flow of trade. If China is willing to join this security architecture it should be welcomed. However, it is unlikely to do so as it believes that ‘one mountain cannot contain two tigers’ and sees itself as the lone tiger on the Asian mountain.
US leaders have expressed their support for India’s emergence as a major power several times. They have said the US is committed “to help India become a major world power in the 21st century”. President Barack Obama declared in 2010 that “India is not just a rising power, it has already risen”.

The US hopes India will soon become a “net provider of security” in the region. The expectations include India joining international counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation efforts; sharing intelligence; upholding the rules and norms governing maritime trade; providing help to the littoral states to meet their security needs; helping to counter piracy and narcotics trafficking; and, continuing to taking the lead in humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR) operations in the region. All of these expectations are unexceptionable and India has been contributing extensively to achieving these common goals.

India must not hesitate to intervene militarily in conjunction with its strategic partners if its vital national interests are threatened in its area of strategic interest. This extends from the South China Sea in the east to the Horn of Africa in the west. India would prefer to intervene under a UN flag but may join a coalition of the willing in case consensus is difficult to achieve in the UN Security Council. India must develop robust tri-Service capabilities for military intervention.

Indo-US defence cooperation, a key component of the strategic partnership, must be enhanced to take it to the next higher trajectory to enable the two countries to undertake joint threat assessment; contingency planning for joint operations; sharing of intelligence; simulations and table-top exercises — besides training exercises with troops; coordination of command, control and communications; and, planning for operational deployment and logistics support. All of these activities must be undertaken in concert with India’s other strategic partners in Asia.

Only when a cooperative security framework is in place will the India-US strategic partnership realise its true potential as a force for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.

The article was originally published in the Hindustan Times.

• Published: 31 March, 2016

Direct Indian military intervention against ISIS would depend on how the situation unfolds over the next year. As an emerging power sharing a littoral with the region, India has an important role to play in acting as a catalyst for West Asian stability.

• Published: November 23, 2015
• IDSA Comments

Launched in early-August 1965, Operation Gibraltar was designed to infiltrate several columns of trained and well-armed Mujahids and Razakars, led by Pakistan Army Majors into Jammu and Kashmir. Under the cover of fire provided by the Pakistan Army deployed on the Cease Fire Line (CFL), the columns managed to infiltrate, but failed to create large-scale disturbances and did not receive support from the people. In fact, locals often provided information about the columns to the Indian Army, which led to their being captured or neutralised.

• Published: July 2015
• Journal of Defence Studies

India’s 11th Five Year Defence Plan was completed on March 31, 2012. Throughout its currency, the plan did not receive the approval of the Union Cabinet. The ongoing 12th Defence Plan was ‘approved in principle’ by the Defence Acquisition Council of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), but has not yet been approved by the National Security Council (NSC). Also, approval without financial commitment for the full five-year term is meaningless and defence planning in India remains as ad hoc as it has been since independence.

• Published: March 2015
• Strategic Analysis