Ashok K. Behuria

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Dr. Ashok K.Behuria is a Fellow and Coordinator of the South Asia Centre at MP-IDSA. He is a Ph.D in International Relations from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. He has worked on “India-Pakistan Relationship During the Eighties” for his Ph.D. He joined IDSA in 2003 and before that he worked as Assistant Director at the International Centre for Peace Studies, New Delhi. Dr.Behuria has also been Editor of International Studies, the prestigious research journal from Jawaharlal Nehru University, and has been in the Editorial Boards of Journal of Peace Studies and Strategic Analysis, the flagship journal from IDSA. He has taught at the University of Delhi and JamiaMilliaIslamia, New Delhi. He is a close observer of developments in South Asia and has been awarded the prestigious K Subrahmanyam Award for excellence in strategic studies for his work on Pakistan in 2009. He has published many research articles on strategic issues related to Pakistan, India-Pakistan relations, Sri Lanka, Nepal and South Asian security environment in Indian and foreign journals. He has edited several books on South Asia and continues with his research on internal politics in Pakistan, evolving strategic scenario in the Pak-Af region, radicalisation of religious discourse in the region, India’s engagement with the neighbourhood, regional security, and inter-state cooperation.


Senior Fellow

Publication

Partition of History in Textbooks in Pakistan: Implications of Selective Memory and Forgetting

This article seeks to study the post-partition and especially post-1971 experimentation with history writing in Pakistan and focuses on how the revisiting of the partition has led to a reinvention of history by the selective contraction, misinterpretation and even omission of certain periods believed to be detrimental to the process of nation building in Pakistan. The article seeks to selectively apply the Hegelian approach and make a case for a common history, which it is hoped will facilitate better relations and greater mutual understanding between the nations of the sub-continent.

Mahinda Rajapaksa’s India Policy: Engage and Countervail

Mahinda Rajapaksa has emerged as perhaps the only Sri Lankan leader who has managed to secure some strategic autonomy in conducting his country's foreign policy vis-à-vis India. He engaged India effectively during the military campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and simultaneously countervailed India by improving his country's relationship with India's traditional adversaries such as China and Pakistan. In the post-LTTE scenario, he has maintained a defiant posture vis-à-vis India over the latter's persuasion to evolve a political solution to the ethnic issue.

Will the Indus Water Treaty Survive?

The Indus Water Treaty (IWT) is the most significant confidence-building measure between India and Pakistan. Despite the wars and hostilities, the IWT has functioned well since it was signed in 1960. However, one cannot ignore the challenges of future supplies of fresh water between the two countries. The article delves into a historical account of how the treaty came about, the salient features of the treaty and examines whether ‘water rationality’ will continue to govern the riparian relationship or whether ‘water sharing’ will open up a new front of contentious politics.

Rajapaksa’s Sri Lanka: Time to Move Beyond Complacency

Much water has flown down the Mahaveli since the elimination of V. Prabhakaran and decimation of LTTE, the terror outfit he led, in Sri Lanka in May 2009. President Mahinda Rajapaksa cashed in on the situation well; he called for a new presidential election two years before expiration of his term and won it convincingly in January 2010. His party secured an easy and emphatic victory in the subsequent parliamentary elections, short of a two-thirds majority, in April 2010.

Afghan Reconciliation Falling Through

Various reports on ‘Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan’ produced by the US Department of Defense, 2010 (in coordination with some other departments) have struggled to paint an optimistic picture of the Afghan situation, to maintain the morale of the troops. However, a tacit admission that the Afghan War is not going anywhere can be deciphered from the cautious language used in these reports.