The article reviews the Cold Start doctrine in light of the limited war doctrine. It argues that the launch of strike corps entails a risk prone war expansion. War termination should therefore be short of the launch of strike corps offensives. It suggests a 'Cold Start and Stop' strategy with limited offensives by integrated battle groups being used to coerce Pakistan. Pakistani amenability to Indian war aims would be dependent on India offering incentives diplomatically alongside. India's limited war doctrine, currently not articulated, must be informed by such a war waging strategy.
In rethinking Cold Start as a default option and working towards proactive ‘contingency’ options, India is a step ahead in doctrinal shadow boxing.
The present paper analyses and examines the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in respect of legal aspects. It first discusses it in terms of domestic law, international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law. Given India’s obligations under international human rights instruments going beyond domestic law is necessary in any such discussion. Ensuring complementarity between the Act in its application in armed conflicts and IHL, would contribute towards making the Act more ‘humane’. The second part discusses the Act from security perspectives.
The Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations (DSCO) is due for review this year. This Brief suggests directions in which the Doctrine can better address the Human Rights factor.
The threat of extremism has been used too long to deny democracy. Instead, democratisation is a possible antidote for extremism.
A shift in strategic thinking over the past two decades has now led to India being poised between the strategic doctrines of offensive and defensive realism.
Military diplomacy has not figured significantly in India-Pakistan relations with ample reasons. Military to military engagement between the two states is confined to CBMs of varying significance. Even as both militaries have several regional and extra-regional engagements falling under the rubric of military diplomacy, the ones between the two are restricted to the routine exchanges of military advisors in respective missions in national capitals. However, there is a case for expansion in military diplomacy between the two.
Workable options short of war, as ‘Cold Start Minor’ suggests, would serve as deterrent to informed by the logic of leaving something to chance.
The US needs to take direct charge of the peace talks prong of strategy to meet the mid-2011 deadline of beginning its troops withdrawal as well as to enable NATO departure by 2014.