Comments & Briefs

The participation of the PLA Navy in escort missions in foreign waters is a radical departure from the historical point of view because this is the first time that the PLA Navy is carrying out such tasks not in national waters.

The point of significance is that even as the Army prepares for the worst case, it would be a political-diplomatic-strategic exercise to ensure that such a scenario does not arise.

To assuage fears, Japan might see merit to take India on board in the form of a naval cooperation framework to secure peace at sea. Developments in the past 4-5 years in India-Japan relations point towards that direction.

Given the divergence of views in the industrialized and industrializing countries as was demonstrated at Copenhagen, it is too early to expect any comprehensive result from the Copenhagen Accord. One needs to wait till June 2010 if the UN meeting at Bonn will yield a different outcome.

The Copenhagen Accord is weak and a step back from the Bali Action Plan which talked about four pillars of negotiations – mitigation, adaptation, financial support and technology transfer.

The Internet’s blurred boundaries and its existing vulnerabilities have led to unhealthy trends, which, if not addressed adequately, could pose severe problems.

Vietnam’s third national defence white paper shows its commitment to greater transparency in defence modernization and strategic planning.

It would appear that for the moment at least the TINA factor operates in favour of the Zardari/Gilani combine especially if they continue to occupy their offices without wielding any real power.

Commanders and troops must understand that they are operating in a No Win situation and their overall aim will always remain achievement of a more perfect peace.

After Yukio Hatoyama assumed the office of Prime Minister, Japan’s foreign policy has begun to look different with an element of assertiveness and a greater focus towards Asia.