The Centre focuses on issues related to strategic technologies that have a potential impact on national security. Its main focus is on critical technologies and space technologies. The Centre is engaged in tracking and trend analysis of issues related to Space Security and Cyber Security. The other mandate of the Centre is to undertake research on Biological and Chemical Weapons with a focus on studying the dangers of proliferation and terrorism. The Centre is responsible for the publication of the CBW Magazine – a bi-annual magazine which covers a wide range of issues related to Chemical and Biological Weapons.
No posts of Books and Monograph.
The article makes an attempt to bring to the fore the various factors which are considered in the due process of attribution of a cyber-attack and the correlation of credible attribution with cyber deterrence. The focal point of the article is a three-step approach to model the decision-making process behind attribution of cyber-attacks using Bayesian Belief Networks and a case study to elucidate on the functioning of the model.
A dominant paradigm for militarised cyber operations, owing to a growing interest in such actions, is seeking an ability to strike back and launch cyber counter attacks immediately after being attacked. This commentary challenges view based on the argument that it leads to a contra-productive tit-for-tat game with no decisive or deterrent outcome. It argues that cyber attacks are information, which an initially passive targeted society can gather to refine and consolidate its cybersecurity and over time receive an advantage over the initial attacker.
The term ‘hybrid warfare’ has been used by American military experts for more than a decade already. However, until recently, there was no officially accepted definition of the term, and, thus, an ambiguity existed over its meaning. As per the analysis of recent local conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine by the US political and military elite, hybrid warfare is a conflict where actors blend techniques, capabilities and resources to achieve their objectives.
India, the IT nation, did not make a news splash at CyberTech 2014. That is worth a passing thought. Because cyber is the fifth and new domain of warfare, after land, sea, air and space.
In this commentary, I will use strategic cyberwar theory1 to explain why India has a higher level of cyber resilience than several of its potential adversaries. Even if India has challenges in its government-led cyber defence,2 there are cyber resilience benefits to be drawn from the way Indian society operates, functions and is constitutionally designed and accepted by its constituents, independently of any cyber defence efforts. First, the concept of strategic cyberwar.
The pressing issues around cyberspace revolve around internet governance, cybersecurity and drawing up rules of the road for the new domain of cyberwar. While each of these is at a different stage in its evolution cycle, cyberspace itself is facing a watershed moment as insecurities mount. The fragmentation of cyberspace seems inevitable unless there is accelerated movement on resolving the fundamental issues of internet governance and cybersecurity that have been hanging fire for well over a decade.
The UNGGE process is the least bad option to keep open channels and maintain continued focus on securing cyberspace.
India can play an essential role in mitigating the risks and maximizing the benefits on account of rapid growth of AI enabled technologies.
The dexterity with which Japan handles this case and the follow-up measures it adopts will strongly influence other countries to either liberalise the use of cryptocurrencies or strictly forbid them in the interest of consumers, law enforcement and national security.
After decades of false starts, AI/ Robotics technologies today appear to be at an inflection point, making rapid advancements which are considered significant enough to usher in a new revolution in military affairs
Weapon development programs are successful when technological innovations are matched with national strategic goals. Further development of the Agni-5 should be based on the objectives of adding to the overall combat potential and augmenting deterrence.
The standoffs in Doklam and North Korea offer insights on how crisis stability remains subject to the complexities of deterrence, especially in theatres with multiple nuclear-armed states, and what this entails for disarmament.
China and to a lesser extent Pakistan have helped North Korea with its nuclear and missile development programmes.
Besides military targets, a number of strategic civilian targets, like urban data and communication centres, stock exchanges, factories and other centres of gravity could also be attacked by e-bombs.
While thermonuclear weapons are not necessary for maintaining a credible deterrent, they serve the purpose of enabling India to make effective use of its relatively limited fissile material stockpile.
The US decision to elevate its Cyber Command to that of a Unified Combatant Command sends a strong signal to entities and countries inimical to its interests to recalibrate their security calculus.