The raging Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan underlines the limits of the use of military force. The lack of visible progress on the reconstruction activity and prevailing insecurity has alienated the Afghan populace in the remote villages of South and East Afghanistan. Given that the military option alone has limited utility in Counter-insurgency (COIN), there is a need to exercise an 'out-of-the-box' option to address the present stalemate.

• Shanthie Mariet D’Souza
• March 2009
• Strategic Analysis

• Arvind Gupta , S. Kalyanaraman , Ashok K. Behuria
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis

Investigations into Mumbai's 26/11 attack made startling revelations about the militant training camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). The Mumbai perpetrators started from Baitul-Mujahideen in Muzaffarabad, the capital of the so-called ‘Azad Kashmir’, and headed for Mumbai via Karachi. They underwent specialized training in PoK for an extended period before the attack.

• Priyanka Singh
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis

In Lahore, in 1999, Pakistan dropped its 'Kashmir first' approach and agreed to discuss it with India along with other issues. Later, under Musharraf, there was an offer to move beyond UN resolutions and adopt a four-step approach to resolve the Kashmir issue. Musharraf's proposals were taken seriously and widely hailed as a sign of flexibility and pragmatism from the Pakistani side. This paper critically analyses these approaches since Lahore and argues that they were occasioned by the changing global political context and that they were more apparent than real.

• Ashok K. Behuria
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis

On May 30, 2008, the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) was adopted by 107 countries at a diplomatic conference in Dublin, Ireland. However, India was not a party to this Convention. The signing of the Convention took place in Oslo on December 3, 2008. It bans the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions, and places obligations on countries to clear affected areas, assist victims, and destroy stockpiles.

• Binalakshmi Nepram
• July 2009
• Strategic Analysis

The Jabhe-e-Melli or the National Front (NF) is largely considered inconsequential in Afghan politics. It is often dismissed as a loose mlange of elements from the former United Front or the Northern Alliance, some ex-communists, and former royalists, which is bound to wither away sooner than later. The Front is said to represent the interests of a political class which is disgruntled with the politics and the policies of President Hamid Karzai, and which is struggling to preserve its erstwhile status and relevance in the power politics of Afghanistan.

• Vishal Chandra
• July 2009
• Strategic Analysis

The rise and growth of Islamist political parties in Bangladesh has been a cause of concern as these parties have the establishment of an Islamic state as their ultimate objective. Though some of these parties, especially the Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, have tried to project themselves as 'moderate forces' and have participated in democratic elections, this article argues that the Jamaat is not a moderate force and has as its ultimate objective the establishment of an Islamic state, which does not go together with democracy.

• Anand Kumar
• July 2009
• Strategic Analysis

Religious places are being increasingly used by fundamentalists and terrorists as their hideouts and strongholds to propagate their subversive ideology and launch attacks. This has often compelled states to use the military to flush them out. This use of the army has far-reaching consequences and can even alienate the population. To check and prevent such adverse fallout, a state needs to take decisive action at an early stage.

• S. K. Saini
• July 2009
• Strategic Analysis

A new actor was inducted in the decades-old Afghan conflict when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assumed command of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in August 2003. NATO's entry into the Afghan theatre took place in the backdrop of the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003. With the United States diverting its resources and greater attention to Iraq, NATO was to expand its operations throughout Afghanistan in support of the US-led coalition force in a phased manner.

• Vishal Chandra
• September 2009
• Strategic Analysis

Integration of Maoist combatants into the Nepal Army (NA) has become a contentious issue. Although the stakeholders have agreed on the integration process, they are yet to arrive at a consensus on how to attempt it. They have changed their positions frequently over the issue, which has complicated matters further. The NA holds the view that the lack of conventional training of Maoist combatants, as well as their ideological orientation, would have a serious effect on its professional standards.

• Nihar R. Nayak
• September 2009
• Strategic Analysis

SCO will need to assume responsibility for providing security in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the withdrawal of ISAF forces.

• Ashok Sajjanhar
• June 30, 2016
• IDSA Comments

A comprehensive approach is needed to deal with the problem of illegal migration from Bangladesh. All the affected states would have to adopt a uniform policy, in the absence of which any amount of effort is bound to deliver only partial results.

• Anand Kumar
• June 24, 2016
• IDSA Comments

There is no documentary evidence to substantiate the Pakistani claim that Pakistan had entered into any voluntary safeguards agreement with the IAEA in respect of KANUPP.

• G. Balachandran
• June 21, 2016
• IDSA Comments

New Delhi is aware of Washington’s keenness to marshal India as the power that can tilt the strategic balance in Asia.

• Sarosh Bana
• May 31, 2016
• IDSA Comments

India should play a proactive role in assisting Sri Lanka in the fisheries sector and in creating conditions in the Palk Bay for the fishermen of both countries to exploit the respective fishing potential amicably.

• Gautam Sen
• May 20, 2016
• IDSA Comments

The coming to power of a democratic government in Myanmar has not only altered the political situation within but has also provided an opportunity to improve relations with Bangladesh.

• Anand Kumar
• May 18, 2016
• IDSA Comments

India needs to proactively buttress its broader position by affixing/prefixing the issue of Pakistan occupied Kashmir to the bilateral agenda every time the issue of Kashmir comes up for discussion.

• Priyanka Singh
• May 03, 2016
• IDSA Comments

Ceding PoK as part of a settlement does not comport with India’s national and strategic interests, especially in terms of dealing with the challenge posed by China-Pakistan collaboration.

• S. Kalyanaraman
• May 03, 2016
• IDSA Comments

While India may wait for full cooperation of other member countries to make SAARC a success, it must take the initiative for forging more agreements in matters concerning economic and social cooperation.

• Nihar R. Nayak
• March 22, 2016
• IDSA Comments

Maritime security challenges in the Indian Ocean Region continue to be an issue of concern and this effective regional mechanism needs to be strengthened to deal effectively with them.

• Aman Saberwal
• March 22, 2016
• IDSA Comments