This paper attempts to provide an overview of significant recent developments in US policy towards South Asia and their implications for India. It examines the proposed cooperation between India and the US, focusing on advanced technology issues. It also places this issue in the context of US-Pakistan ties, as this provides a relevant referent for comparison. This paper concludes that while the US and India are formally expanding their strategic cooperation, the results on the ground are still not in step with the rhetoric.

• G. Balachandran
• April 2005
• Strategic Analysis

On May 17, 2005, the Federal Interior Ministry of Germany published its annual report on the Protection of Constitution for 2004. For the last few years, the country’s domestic intelligence agency – Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) – under the Federal Interior Ministry, has been publishing such reports on its website.

• Alok Rashmi Mukhopadhyay
• April 2005
• Strategic Analysis

I welcome this opportunity to present to such a distinguished audience some views on issues relating to nuclear non-proliferation and international security. At the outset, I would like to thank the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) for inviting me to deliver this address. The Institute has a well deserved reputation as our premier strategic think tank and quite appropriately, they have focused on a subject that not only has a strong contemporary relevance but represents a long term challenge for India and the international community.

• Shyam Saran
• July 2005
• Strategic Analysis

The post-Cold War period saw North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) being expanded not once but twice. In foreseeing the security threats of the 21st century, NATO is seeking to recast its strategic response. The EU and the US are united in their opinion about the need for a stronger and cohesive NATO, and a wider out-of-area role for the alliance. If both the sides start working together and address future challenges, it may bring about a ‘symbiosis’ in the Atlantic Relationship.

• Prasad P. Rane
• July 2005
• Strategic Analysis

In a significant turn of events, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on September 24, 2005, adopted a resolution (22-1 with 12 countries abstaining) calling upon Iran to accelerate its cooperation with the Agency in terms of revealing its ‘secret’ nuclear programme failing which the issue will be referred to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).1 Althoug

• Manish
• July 2005
• Strategic Analysis

The popular perception in India is that with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of one of the two Superpowers, the bipolar international system has become unipolar. The United States is now assumed to be an unchallenged sole Superpower. Consequently, it is felt in some quarters that the Indo-US Joint Statement of July 18, 2005 is a case of US recruiting India as one of its allies for possible future containment of China. Such a perception nurtures suspicion about the US and its motivation about its attempts to befriend India.

• K. Subrahmanyam
• October 2005
• Strategic Analysis

Much of the current debate on India’s decision to evolve a set of agreements with the United States and engage the international nuclear technology control regimes in order to promote civilian nuclear cooperation unfortunately has not focused on some of the key questions involved and the available options before the country. Clearly, the country needs to take decisions from a subset of options that are i) politically feasible and ii) most desirable/least undesirable from the viewpoint of national interests.

• G. Balachandran
• October 2005
• Strategic Analysis

Nuclear transfers to a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) are conditioned on IAEA safeguards on all current and future peaceful nuclear activities, what are called the full-scope safeguards (FSS) or comprehensive safeguards. Since India is a NNWS according to the NPT definition, the NSG Guidelines as currently implemented would, therefore, invoke FSS if India seeks nuclear technology or nuclear power plants – even on a turnkey basis – or nuclear fuel from any NSG membercountry.

• R. Ramachandran
• October 2005
• Strategic Analysis

The 18 July Bush-Manmohan Agreement is currently being implemented, in bits and pieces. At the time of the signing of the agreement it was stated by different officials that both governments would proceed to unilaterally implement the provisions that pertained to them and there would be no expectations of reciprocity.

• Raja Menon
• October 2005
• Strategic Analysis

Different views have been expressed by the American non-proliferation lobbyists on possible loss or gain from the Indo-US nuclear agreement. Would the agreement complicate global non-proliferation efforts as the critics argue or would it lead to a stronger front to deal with emerging non-proliferation challenges? To answer these questions it is necessary to examine the merits of the arguments put forward by the US non-proliferation lobby carefully.

• Rajesh Kumar Mishra
• October 2005
• Strategic Analysis

Nuclear force development is at present an attractive means for Pakistan to attract international political and financial assistance, while salving the paranoias of its security establishment. Improvement in the state-society relationship could reduce the domestic appeal of endless nuclear expansion as other, more sustainable, resources become available to the state for building economic growth and security.

• Yogesh Joshi , Frank O’Donnell
• March 08, 2013
• Issue Brief

The second Chinese BMD test has a message for India: propel the development of long-range (exo-atmospheric) interception capabilities to mitigate the possibility of further asymmetry on strategic forces.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• February 22, 2013
• IDSA Comments

Although PNEs were surrounded by ambiguity of intent from the very onset, retroactive measures after May 1974 have ensured that an underground nuclear test could be ‘peaceful’ only when conducted by or with the assistance of the superpowers.

• Jayita Sarkar
• February 20, 2013
• IDSA Comments

Both the government as well and the strategic community are convinced that India must not join the Australia Group without a road map for the MTCR and the NSG.

• Rajiv Nayan
• December 19, 2012
• IDSA Comments

At the core of the standoff over Iran’s nuclear programme is the challenge to West Asia’s balance of power from Iran’s growing sphere of influence, which now stretches through Iraq towards the Mediterranean.

• Rajeev Agarwal
• November 09, 2012
• IDSA Comments

The Right of Recourse embedded in the Indian nuclear liability law has ensured that more than four years after the NSG granted exemption to enable nuclear commerce with India, India has not been able to finalise a single contract with any of the countries with which it has signed nuclear cooperation agreements for any nuclear facility.

• G. Balachandran , Kapil Patil
• November 09, 2012
• Issue Brief

Normative credibility bestows on the Indian and French quest for foreign policy independence the uniqueness not granted to any other bilateral nuclear relationship operating in opposition to the non-proliferation regime.

• Jayita Sarkar
• October 10, 2012
• IDSA Comments

There is a need to debate both the necessity and desirability of nuclear disarmament without being burdened by India’s idealistic aspirations and unfounded assumptions about the heft that this premature superpower carries in international politics.

• Yogesh Joshi
• October 10, 2012
• Issue Brief

Given the fact that there is a lot of noise being made to prod India into doing more on nuclear disarmament counter-intuitively suggests that India is actually doing very less on the issue. What explains India's reluctance?

• Yogesh Joshi
• September 05, 2012
• IDSA Comments

The treaty needs to be capable of addressing existing and perceived threat of the world; at the same time, it should be flexible enough to meet emerging security challenges.

• Rajiv Nayan
• July 27, 2012
• Policy Brief