The India-China relations in 2013, in spite Depsang incident, had a more positive than negative tone. Premier Li chose India as his first overseas stop and the pronouncement to deepen ties with India as “strategic choice” along with promise to make “greater efforts” to resolve boundary issue. Equally positive voice came from the Indian leadership for rejecting the relevance of “containment” in favour of “cooperation” that could bring more gains instead.

• P. Stobdan
• December 30, 2013
• IDSA Comments

In this final part of the Policy Paper series, P Stobdan deliberates that if India and China make a calibrated move for working together in Afghanistan, the outcome could be more harmonizing than conflicting. So when India reviews its post-2014 Afghan policy, the China factor should not be seen in a zero-sum perception for many in the West may press India playing a countervailing role to China.

• P. Stobdan
• December 02, 2013
• Policy Brief

In this third part of the Policy Paper series, P Stobdan argues that India should continue to remain engaged in Asia-Pacific for reasons not only confined to mercantile interest but also because it is an arena shaping the major powers behaviour. At the same, a regional rebalancing and attention to equally critical Central and West Asia will broaden India’s prospects for shaping the global order.

• P. Stobdan
• November 30, 2013
• Policy Brief

In this second-part of the Policy Paper series, P Stobdan suggests that in the recent Indian strategic discourse, commentators have been exulting the US ‘Asia Pivot’ and seriously hoped that the idea will offset China’s regional outreach, for it also appeared similar to India’s own ‘Look East’ policy, which to an extent enabled New Delhi to ruffle a few feathers in the East Asian region.

• P. Stobdan
• November 28, 2013
• Policy Brief

In a 4-part series of Policy Papers, P Stobdan analyses India's response to the global shifts and how India’s strategic perception seems to have altered dramatically in the recent years. What it essentially means is that embracing the cold-war perception or adopting any containment strategy is unlikely to be enduring in the longer run.

• P. Stobdan
• November 26, 2013
• Policy Brief

India-Russia ties will continue to be mutually beneficial. While defence cooperation remains the mainstay, the two countries can explore common synergies in co-developing more weapons platforms with cutting edge technology and organise more joint military exercises.

• Rajorshi Roy
• October 21, 2013
• IDSA Comments

Into its third year, the Syrian conflict has been fuelled by a multiplicity of interest groups and countries, overshadowing the initial cause of the protests. Gains for either side in Syria have come to mean corresponding losses for different regional and international stakeholders.

• Melissa M. Cyrill
• July 08, 2013
• Issue Brief

Developments in Afghanistan are a key objective of Russia’s increased engagement with Pakistan. However, Russia and India share a time tested relationship that is unlikely to be affected by these overtures.

• Rajorshi Roy
• June 04, 2013
• IDSA Comments

The military sector reform is a top priority for Vladimir Putin, who believes that these reforms will go a long way in achieving Russia’s military and comprehensive national power objectives. The on-going military reforms have come a long way since they were first introduced in 2008. Most of the structural reforms have already been implemented. The material reforms, which are necessary to ensure that the structural reforms deliver, are progressing well, notwithstanding difficulties such as corruption, availability of limited resources, and recession.

• Amit Kumar
• May 23, 2013
• Issue Brief

BRICS is not challenging the existing world order. It is seeking a place in the sun for developing countries. It is looking at alternative approaches but there is no desire to seek confrontation with the West.

• Arvind Gupta
• April 01, 2013
• IDSA Comments