The India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) forum, which was formalised in June 2003 through the adoption of the Brasilia Declaration based on the spirit of South–South solidarity, turns a decade old in 2013. The event will be celebrated at its first decadal summit in New Delhi. At the same time, this event needs to be juxtaposed with the fifth consecutive leadership summit of Brazil–Russia–India–China–South Africa (BRICS) in Durban in March 2013. Both IBSA and BRICS are in the limelight for their cross-continental politics.

• Jagannath P. Panda
• May 2013
• Strategic Analysis

The article seeks to assess the evolution of the Tibet question against the backdrop of the problems associated with the succession of the Dalai Lama. It also discusses the implications of all this for India and provides policy recommendations the Indian authorities could use to deal with this situation.

• Adrien Frossard
• July 2013
• Strategic Analysis

Over the past few years, ‘trilateral economic cooperation’ and ‘vibrant bridge’ have become buzzwords in Nepal’s foreign policy discourse, and have also caught the popular imagination at home in India. These proposals have generated both curiosity and anxiety in Delhi’s diplomatic and academic circles that are otherwise largely indifferent to Nepal. The Chinese diplomats in Delhi also raising the issue with the Indian officials has added to India’s anxiety all the more. With some notable exceptions (e.g., C.

• Post Bahadur Basnet
• September 2013
• Strategic Analysis

Integrating the restive Tibetan minority with China has been the primary domestic challenge for Beijing. Thus far, its Nepal policy has been crafted essentially to address the Tibetan question. The idea of trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China apparently floated by Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) in April 2013 was, in effect, first made by the former Chinese ambassador to Nepal, Yang Houlan, in 2012.

• Abanti Bhattacharya
• September 2013
• Strategic Analysis

Trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China needs to be seen from the perspective of how beneficial it is for all three countries. However, such cooperation cannot be divorced from India’s security concerns and its close relations with Nepal. Moreover, there are several issues that come into question, too. Are there any objectives behind this proposal? Does it involve only developmental cooperation? Does it undermine India’s security interests?

• Smruti S. Pattanaik
• September 2013
• Strategic Analysis

Prachanda’s proposal for trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China seems reasonable on the face of it. However, both China and Nepal should be aware that it will create a lot of misunderstandings in India. The reasons for this are as follows:

• Arvind Gupta
• September 2013
• Strategic Analysis

Pushpa Kamal Dahal, alias Prachanda, made the trilateral proposal during his official visit to India in April 2013. This was the third time since 2010 that Prachanda had raised this issue. This concept seems to be a modified version of his earlier ‘equidistance policy’, which was declared after he became prime minister in September 2008. He proposed trilateral cooperation for the first time in October 2010 after visiting Beijing.

• Nihar R. Nayak
• September 2013
• Strategic Analysis

Pushpa Kamal Dahal, alias Prachanda, the chairman of the United Communist Party of Nepal (UCPN) (Maoist), visited India on April 27–30, 2013, shortly after he had returned from a week-long visit to China. During his visits to China and India, Prachanda proposed trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China. Although he assured India that this trilateral cooperation would be founded on the bilateral relations that Nepal already shares with India, he clearly did not elaborate on the nature of this trilateral cooperation and the issues that need to be discussed within this framework.

• Editorial Board
• September 2013
• Strategic Analysis

This article examines the EU weapons embargo on China as a major foreign policy challenge that China’s new leadership has inherited. The article argues that the continuation of the embargo constitutes a failure of Chinese foreign policy to project China as a responsible global player. The article examines the legal framework and the political debate within the EU to emphasise that the embargo has been largely ineffective in its objective of denying advanced military technology to China.

• Sonika Gupta
• September 2013
• Strategic Analysis

Although the nature of warfare has changed beyond recognition since the 1920s and 1930s when Chairman Mao Zedong penned his main military writings, his military thoughts are still a point of reference for any discussion on military thinking in modern China. Developments in warfare have superseded Mao’s operational principles and tactics visualised in his three-stage warfare; however, his philosophical and political understanding of war has value that transcends time and space.

• Prashant Kumar Singh
• September 2013
• Strategic Analysis

With Chinese unilateral efforts altering the maritime status quo on the one hand and lack of progress on denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula on the other, Japan is revisiting its strategic options.

• Titli Basu
• August 20, 2020
• Issue Brief

The ruling DPP Government in Taiwan is likely to further build on the gains made in domestic politics and in ‘pragmatic diplomacy’ internationally, occasioned by COVID-19, without indulging in any geopolitical exuberance.

• Prashant Kumar Singh
• July 20, 2020
• Issue Brief

Considering that the US, Japan, Australia and India are committed to working for a free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific, it is time for India’s strategic partners to review their cartographic positions on India’s borders.

• Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy
• July 03, 2020
• Policy Brief

The PLA’s approach to COVID-19 has shown that the military reforms have im-mensely benefited their coordination and response. It has intensified China’s desire to maintain military preparedness and the resolve to demonstrate it too.

• M.S. Prathibha
• June 01, 2020
• Issue Brief

Whether Abe can turn the battle against the COVID-19 pandemic into an opportunity to demonstrate decisive leadership will define Japan’s future course, as the resilience of the economy and good governance is at stake.

• Titli Basu
• April 12, 2020
• Issue Brief

President Xi’s Kathmandu visit sets a new parameter for the China-Nepal ties, moving away from the traditional interstate relations based on simple bilateral modes of engagement. Beijing seems to be orchestrating a Himalayan approach in its relations with Kathmandu – revealing a grander Chinese policy in making.

• Jagannath P. Panda , Mrittika Guha Sarkar
• November 04, 2019
• IDSA Comments

Given China’s stated policy of using its rare earth dominance for strategic purposes, countries have been looking for ways to diversify their sources of supply. India too needs to acquire expertise in valorising rare earth minerals and shift to developing its downstream sector.

• Shebonti Ray Dadwal
• September 27, 2019
• IDSA Comments

The incremental and calibrated improvement in the India-China defence ties has withstood the test of time. The next step in building M2M relations could provide the required impetus to further accelerate the process of strengthening peace and stability along the LAC.

• Mandip Singh
• September 16, 2019
• IDSA Comments

The current impasse in Hong Kong poses the most serious challenge to the Chinese leadership since the territory’s integration with the mainland. The “One Country, Two Systems” arrangement appears to be at crossroads, set to be consigned to the archives well before its expiry date.

• G.G. Dwivedi
• August 27, 2019
• IDSA Comments

While Japan envisions its role as a leading promoter of rules-based liberal international order, the G20 tested Japan’s leadership in championing the cause of trade liberalisation and resisting protectionism.

• Titli Basu
• July 12, 2019
• IDSA Comments