The East Asia Centre is dedicated to study and research the domestic and foreign policies of individual countries of the region as well as India’s multifaceted relationships with these countries. With respect to China, the Centre’s research foci are its foreign policy (particularly towards the US, Russia, Central Asia and Asia Pacific), domestic politics, economy, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and India’s relationship with China in all its dimensions. The Centre’s research also focuses on Taiwan, its domestic politics, Sino-Taiwanese relationship and Indo-Taiwanese relationship, Hong Kong and India-Hong Kong relations. Japan and Korea are the other major focus of the Centre, with its research focused on their domestic politics, foreign policy and comprehensive bilateral relationships with India. The geopolitics of the Asia Pacific and the Korean peninsula are also studied in the Centre.
The centre brings out five monthly newsletters: East Asia Military Monitor, Japan Digest, China Science and Technology, Korea Newsletter, and China Military Digest.
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Integrating the restive Tibetan minority with China has been the primary domestic challenge for Beijing. Thus far, its Nepal policy has been crafted essentially to address the Tibetan question. The idea of trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China apparently floated by Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) in April 2013 was, in effect, first made by the former Chinese ambassador to Nepal, Yang Houlan, in 2012.
Trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China needs to be seen from the perspective of how beneficial it is for all three countries. However, such cooperation cannot be divorced from India’s security concerns and its close relations with Nepal. Moreover, there are several issues that come into question, too. Are there any objectives behind this proposal? Does it involve only developmental cooperation? Does it undermine India’s security interests?
Prachanda’s proposal for trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China seems reasonable on the face of it. However, both China and Nepal should be aware that it will create a lot of misunderstandings in India. The reasons for this are as follows:
Pushpa Kamal Dahal, alias Prachanda, made the trilateral proposal during his official visit to India in April 2013. This was the third time since 2010 that Prachanda had raised this issue. This concept seems to be a modified version of his earlier ‘equidistance policy’, which was declared after he became prime minister in September 2008. He proposed trilateral cooperation for the first time in October 2010 after visiting Beijing.
Pushpa Kamal Dahal, alias Prachanda, the chairman of the United Communist Party of Nepal (UCPN) (Maoist), visited India on April 27–30, 2013, shortly after he had returned from a week-long visit to China. During his visits to China and India, Prachanda proposed trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China. Although he assured India that this trilateral cooperation would be founded on the bilateral relations that Nepal already shares with India, he clearly did not elaborate on the nature of this trilateral cooperation and the issues that need to be discussed within this framework.
This article examines the EU weapons embargo on China as a major foreign policy challenge that China’s new leadership has inherited. The article argues that the continuation of the embargo constitutes a failure of Chinese foreign policy to project China as a responsible global player. The article examines the legal framework and the political debate within the EU to emphasise that the embargo has been largely ineffective in its objective of denying advanced military technology to China.
Although the nature of warfare has changed beyond recognition since the 1920s and 1930s when Chairman Mao Zedong penned his main military writings, his military thoughts are still a point of reference for any discussion on military thinking in modern China. Developments in warfare have superseded Mao’s operational principles and tactics visualised in his three-stage warfare; however, his philosophical and political understanding of war has value that transcends time and space.
Two new factors have appeared on the Tibetan political scene after the recent leadership change in China. First, the ‘spiritualisation’ of politics: paradoxically, the atheist Chinese Communist Party (CCP), also known as The Communist Party of China (CPC) seems increasingly interested in ‘spiritual’ matters. The CCP has started promoting reincarnated Lamas, known in China as ‘Living Buddhas’, in a big way. The purpose is to prepare for the post-Dalai Lama era. The second new development is the emergence of a ‘Tibet Gang’.
Though the original focus of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was primarily economic cooperation, the adoption of the ASEAN charter in November 2007 officially included cooperation on human rights. This article examines three hypotheses to determine the causes of cooperation problems: regime type, non-interference policy, and absence of an enforcement mechanism in the ASEAN charter.
China is a thirsty country desperately in need of water—a lot of it. In order to meet its water and energy requirements in the densely populated and fertile northern plains, it is successively making interventions in the Tibetan rivers in the southern part through dams and diversions. While China is well within its riparian rights to do so, a set of externalities involving the principles of water-sharing and lower riparian needs—stretching from Afghanistan to Vietnam—raise concerns.
The PLA’s approach to COVID-19 has shown that the military reforms have im-mensely benefited their coordination and response. It has intensified China’s desire to maintain military preparedness and the resolve to demonstrate it too.
Whether Abe can turn the battle against the COVID-19 pandemic into an opportunity to demonstrate decisive leadership will define Japan’s future course, as the resilience of the economy and good governance is at stake.
President Xi’s Kathmandu visit sets a new parameter for the China-Nepal ties, moving away from the traditional interstate relations based on simple bilateral modes of engagement. Beijing seems to be orchestrating a Himalayan approach in its relations with Kathmandu – revealing a grander Chinese policy in making.
Given China’s stated policy of using its rare earth dominance for strategic purposes, countries have been looking for ways to diversify their sources of supply. India too needs to acquire expertise in valorising rare earth minerals and shift to developing its downstream sector.
The incremental and calibrated improvement in the India-China defence ties has withstood the test of time. The next step in building M2M relations could provide the required impetus to further accelerate the process of strengthening peace and stability along the LAC.
The current impasse in Hong Kong poses the most serious challenge to the Chinese leadership since the territory’s integration with the mainland. The “One Country, Two Systems” arrangement appears to be at crossroads, set to be consigned to the archives well before its expiry date.
While Japan envisions its role as a leading promoter of rules-based liberal international order, the G20 tested Japan’s leadership in championing the cause of trade liberalisation and resisting protectionism.
While still in the evolution stage, BRI has the potential to be a game changer in China’s quest to shape a ‘Sino-Centric’ Global Order.
The decade-long effort to list Azhar showcases the pragmatism that marks India's multilateral diplomacy and questions the general perception that India's multilateral approach is ambivalent and inconsistent.
It is neither the Wuhan spirit nor India’s zero tolerance on terrorism but China’s own vulnerability to terror that caused Beijing to ultimately take on board New Delhi’s concerns on terrorism.
