The East Asia Centre is dedicated to study and research the domestic and foreign policies of individual countries of the region as well as India’s multifaceted relationships with these countries. With respect to China, the Centre’s research foci are its foreign policy (particularly towards the US, Russia, Central Asia and Asia Pacific), domestic politics, economy, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and India’s relationship with China in all its dimensions. The Centre’s research also focuses on Taiwan, its domestic politics, Sino-Taiwanese relationship and Indo-Taiwanese relationship, Hong Kong and India-Hong Kong relations. Japan and Korea are the other major focus of the Centre, with its research focused on their domestic politics, foreign policy and comprehensive bilateral relationships with India. The geopolitics of the Asia Pacific and the Korean peninsula are also studied in the Centre.
The centre brings out five monthly newsletters: East Asia Military Monitor, Japan Digest, China Science and Technology, Korea Newsletter, and China Military Digest.
No posts of Books and Monograph.
More than a decade has passed since the European Union (EU) signed strategic partnerships with China (2003) and India (2004). The EU’s ‘honeymoon’ with China was over within a few years while cooperation on truly strategic issues with India is yet to emerge. The core of both these relationships is still economics.
On November 7, 1950, Vallabhbhai Patel wrote his celebrated letter to Jawaharlal Nehru on India’s China policy. ‘The Chinese Government has tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intention’, he stated, referring to Beijing’s decision to move troops into Tibet. A new challenge confronted India as a result of the ‘disappearance of Tibet, as we knew it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates’. ‘Chinese ambitions … not only cover the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include the important part of Assam.
Engaging with a multilateral body requires constructive foreign policy forethought, especially for a country that is not a fully fledged member of that body. China’s overtures to the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) exemplify this approach. The Indian Ocean and India are the two most immediate elements in China’s policy approach to the IORA. With 20 member states, extra-territorial major powers as important dialogue partners, and the increasing importance of energy politics in the region, the IORA today is a significant multilateral body in China’s calculus.
In his Murmansk speech in 1987, Gorbachev proposed the Arctic as the shortest sea route linking Europe to the Far East and the Pacific Ocean, triggering a new perspective on the region.1 Since then, the 1991 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), referred to as the Finnish Initiative, has been created as a multilateral, non-binding agreement among Arctic states to protect the environment by monitoring, assessment, emergency preparedness/response, and conservation of the Arctic zone.
For nearly a quarter of the past century a series of notable changes have taken place in the Arctic. All of them, whether political, economical, environmental or climate-related, inevitably had an impact on regional and global governance. This commentary mainly focuses on the role of China in Arctic affairs in the context of global change and global governance.
South Korea is not a traditional Arctic state, but it has several key interests in the region. This article explores the sources of those interests and the country’s commercial activities in the Arctic in the areas of shipping, shipbuilding and hydrocarbons. Since the country’s polar interests transcend commerce, however, attention is also paid to the importance of science and research and development in Korean culture.
The Sino-Indian border dispute is one of the longest running border disputes in the world, which has so far eluded a solution. While China has settled its territorial disputes with most of its neighbours, including Russia and Vietnam, the border dispute with India is yet to be resolved, even after 15 rounds of negotiation under the new framework of Special Representative Talks initiated in 2003 during Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to China, which indeed gave an impetus to the border talks.
Chinese economic and military growth in the last decade has heightened interest in the country's functioning and political system. The world at large is highly intrigued by the way the Chinese political system functions and there is also a curiosity regarding the strengths and weaknesses of this system.
Chinese foreign and domestic policies cannot be understood without understanding the evolving nature of Chinese nationalism. Bhavna Singh's book on Chinese nationalism deals with this issue in a detailed manner. The Communist Party of China (CCP) has relied heavily on the notion of patriotism, which overlaps that of nationalism, for domestic and international legitimacy. All eyes are on the leadership transition in China and its implications for the world. It will be interesting to see how the new leadership deals with the growing nationalistic sentiment in the country.
China is undergoing a transitional period of rapid economic and social development. The way in which this period is managed will hold significant implications for the Chinese state concerning both its internal and external security. While fundamentally resting upon progressing from a developing to a developed economy, this transition highlights deep issues and tensions affecting China—ranging from rising societal inequalities to various separatism threats to mounting individualism.
Envisioned as a sustainable alternative to China’s BRI, US-led Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative seeks to narrow down infrastructure deficit in the developing world. However, with their several distinct areas of focus, BRI & B3W can possibly share both complementary & competitive equations.
The drawbacks of over-reliance on China as a single manufacturing source has led to countries adopting “China Plus One” strategy to diversify supply networks. Whether Supply Chain Resilience Initiative by India-Japan-Australia can assist in partial decoupling from China is yet to be seen.
The CCP has invested heavily in telling “China’s Story Well” by amplifying its discourse power. However, looking at China’s discourse politics from an absolutely narrow propaganda lens would be a folly, for the stakes for India are much higher, more nuanced and across multiple domains.
Xi’s rousing words at CCP’s centenary celebrations have reaffirmed China’s intentions to make every effort in actualising its domestic goals and global ambitions—without holding much regard for the rules-based order.
Two key elections are approaching in Japan. As Prime Minister Suga seeks public mandate with just one year's report card amidst a pandemic, his political future is contingent on rapid inoculation and a successful Olympics.
The future of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) will depend on the choices that China makes.
As and when the draft Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) 2020 is finalised, it is expected to incorporate the perspectives of multiple stakeholders in a balanced manner.
Despite change in leadership in Japan, the new Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide looks set to continue the policies of his predecessor, Abe Shinzo. Both domestic and external factors may affect policies.
There is a need to widely disseminate China’s insidious role as an illegal occupier of Kashmir’s territory, including its territorial grab in the trans-Karakoram tract, in order to raise public awareness of the issue – both in India and at the international level.
Abe Shinzo made his mark as an astute statesman in international politics with intellectual bandwidth and a global vision to conceptualise grand strategic constructs such as the Free and Open Indo-Pacific anchored on universal values.
