Since June 2013, there has been a spate of activity on the Tibet controversy. Sparking it off was the interview of Professor Jin Wei1 from the Central Party School in Asian Weekly2 on June 6, entitled ‘Reopen Talks and Resolve Tibetan Issues’, in which she advocated engaging the Dalai Lama rather than demonising him. Soon after, the International Campaign of Tibet reported that China had lifted the 17-year ban on the display of Dalai Lama portraits in Sichuan and Qinghai.

• Dolma Tsering
• January 2014
• Strategic Analysis

Within the first year of Xi Jinping’s elevation to the presidency, China has moved further ahead on its path to achieving primacy in the world. In the last week of November 2013, Beijing imposed an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the conflicted Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, much to the consternation of its feuding neighbours such as Japan and South Korea. Their howls of protest found expression in the US attempt to challenge China to promulgate what it has done in deed.

• Pinaki Bhattacharya
• May 2014
• Strategic Analysis

It is a matter of widespread belief that on assumption of supreme power, Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s overall ambition was to emerge as an iconic figure in the same league as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. At the very outset, Xi realised this would necessitate the elimination of any political challenge and his first step was therefore to consolidate an unassailable position within the Standing Committee of the Party Politburo (PBSC). To achieve this objective, Xi chose to emulate some of the policies and methods of the late Mao Zedong, albeit with modern underpinnings.

• R. S. Kalha
• May 2014
• Strategic Analysis

This review essay examines the significance of India–China relations against the background of the current phenomenon of a multipolar world in the light of four recent publications on the subject. Tien-sze Fang’s and Jeff M. Smith’s works discuss the current facets of India–China relations, while William Antholis’s and Carl J. Dahlman’s works deal with the character and standing that India and China bring to their regional and global discourse.

• Jagannath P. Panda
• July 2014
• Strategic Analysis

In the last decade, the dynamics of inter-state relations in the Asia Pacific have changed rapidly, largely due to the rise of China. Competition rather than cooperation has become the order of the day. In the East and South China Seas, freedom of navigation, competitive claims over maritime boundaries and air space security are experiencing an evolution of new brinkmanship between the US, an established super power, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), an emerging super power, unfolding new challenges for the other potential regional players including India.

• Arun Kumar Sahu
• July 2014
• Strategic Analysis

Problems common to many Asian states suggest a pattern of crisis in Asia. The evidence suggests that the root cause is the similarity in the patterns of political development of postcolonial states. In Asia such states have attempted to reconcile state strength and internal diversity by constructing a triangular balance between identity construction, hegemonic governance and economic development. Unfortunately, this fragile balance eroded as state structures matured and economies grew, which increasingly exposed countries to escalating crises of legitimacy and instability.

• Björn Dressel , Michael Wesley
• July 2014
• Strategic Analysis

South Korean president Park Geun-hye visited India in January 2014 after India and South Korea marked 40 years of diplomatic relations the previous year.1 These developments symbolise a burgeoning relationship between two of Asia’s leading economies and democracies. However, they have added significance as Asia undergoes a shift in the strategic balance of power.

• Chietigj Bajpaee
• July 2014
• Strategic Analysis

More than a decade has passed since the European Union (EU) signed strategic partnerships with China (2003) and India (2004). The EU’s ‘honeymoon’ with China was over within a few years while cooperation on truly strategic issues with India is yet to emerge. The core of both these relationships is still economics.

• Gulshan Sachdeva
• July 2014
• Strategic Analysis

On November 7, 1950, Vallabhbhai Patel wrote his celebrated letter to Jawaharlal Nehru on India’s China policy. ‘The Chinese Government has tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intention’, he stated, referring to Beijing’s decision to move troops into Tibet. A new challenge confronted India as a result of the ‘disappearance of Tibet, as we knew it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates’. ‘Chinese ambitions … not only cover the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include the important part of Assam.

• Chandrashekhar Dasgupta
• September 2014
• Strategic Analysis

Engaging with a multilateral body requires constructive foreign policy forethought, especially for a country that is not a fully fledged member of that body. China’s overtures to the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) exemplify this approach. The Indian Ocean and India are the two most immediate elements in China’s policy approach to the IORA. With 20 member states, extra-territorial major powers as important dialogue partners, and the increasing importance of energy politics in the region, the IORA today is a significant multilateral body in China’s calculus.

• Jagannath P. Panda
• September 2014
• Strategic Analysis

Post 2015 reforms, the Western Theatre Command (WTC) of the PLA has been transforming itself into a joint theatre command that can fight wars against an adversary like India. Considering that India and China are involved in a border standoff, any strengthening of WTC’s combat capabilities is likely to have an immense impact on India.

• M.S. Prathibha
• November 09, 2021
• Issue Brief

Beijing’s intent to incorporate the polar regions within China’s greater maritime strategy, explore their resources and subsequently emerge as a polar great power is quite evident in its initiatives like the Polar Silk Road. In light of growing global ambition and resource needs, the Arctic could become another theatre of India–China competition.

• Mayuri Banerjee
• October 21, 2021
• IDSA Comments

Certain sections of the elite in China seem to be speaking out against the tightening political control under President Xi Jinping. Whether the Chinese Communist Party is failing to elicit loyalty among its own members, and resorting to widespread ideological control to retain its legitimacy is a pertinent question to ponder upon.

• M.S. Prathibha
• September 13, 2021
• IDSA Comments

With House of Representatives’ four-year term ending in October, and a general election lined up in Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party needs a leader who demonstrates statesmanship, political vision, boldness in imagining innovative policy responses, and who enjoys popular support.

• Titli Basu
• September 09, 2021
• IDSA Comments

Beijing’s stance on Afghanistan’s political crisis and its approach towards the Taliban regime is a critical variable that will shape the geometrics of the China–Taliban–Pakistan nexus versus India and the West.

• Jagannath P. Panda
• September 03, 2021
• Issue Brief

The COVID-19 pandemic has situated the policy conversation on economic security at the centre stage of national security calculus not just in US and Europe but also in Japan. For Japan, it would entail attaining “strategic autonomy” in critical supply chains at the national level, and pursuing “strategic indispensability” at the global level.

• Titli Basu
• August 25, 2021
• IDSA Comments

The Digital Silk Road can give China the power to shape global digital governance norms in its favour and the political, economic and strategic tools to be a technological hegemon, posing enormous challenges to emerging economies like India.

• Jagannath P. Panda
• August 24, 2021
• Issue Brief

Envisioned as a sustainable alternative to China’s BRI, US-led Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative seeks to narrow down infrastructure deficit in the developing world. However, with their several distinct areas of focus, BRI & B3W can possibly share both complementary & competitive equations.

• Jagannath P. Panda
• August 09, 2021
• Issue Brief

The drawbacks of over-reliance on China as a single manufacturing source has led to countries adopting “China Plus One” strategy to diversify supply networks. Whether Supply Chain Resilience Initiative by India-Japan-Australia can assist in partial decoupling from China is yet to be seen.

• Jagannath P. Panda
• July 26, 2021
• Issue Brief

The CCP has invested heavily in telling “China’s Story Well” by amplifying its discourse power. However, looking at China’s discourse politics from an absolutely narrow propaganda lens would be a folly, for the stakes for India are much higher, more nuanced and across multiple domains.

• Shruti Pandalai
• July 08, 2021
• Issue Brief