Asia’s New Dawn: The Challenges to Peace and Security 2001
Publisher: IDSA and Knowledge World
ISBN: 81-86019-28-6
Rs. 650
- Jasjit Singh
- 2000
East Asia
About Centre
Members:
The East Asia Centre is dedicated to study and research the domestic and foreign policies of individual countries of the region as well as India’s multifaceted relationships with these countries. With respect to China, the Centre’s research foci are its foreign policy (particularly towards the US, Russia, Central Asia and Asia Pacific), domestic politics, economy, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and India’s relationship with China in all its dimensions. The Centre’s research also focuses on Taiwan, its domestic politics, Sino-Taiwanese relationship and Indo-Taiwanese relationship, Hong Kong and India-Hong Kong relations. Japan and Korea are the other major focus of the Centre, with its research focused on their domestic politics, foreign policy and comprehensive bilateral relationships with India. The geopolitics of the Asia Pacific and the Korean peninsula are also studied in the Centre.
The centre brings out five monthly newsletters: East Asia Military Monitor, Japan Digest, China Science and Technology, Korea Newsletter, and China Military Digest.
Publisher: IDSA and Knowledge World
ISBN: 81-86019-28-6
Rs. 650
Publisher: IDSA and Knowledge World
ISBN: 81-86019-20-0
Publisher: IDSA and Knowledge World
ISBN: 81-86019-18-9
Publisher: Sanchar Publishing House
ISBN: 81-7203-033-9
Rs. 350
Prof P. Stobdan (Senior Fellow, IDSA)’s reading of history fails to predict Tibet’s future from the beginning. The Dalai Lama has informed the Tibetan people about his thinking on the succession issue since as early as 1969. Later on September 24, 2011, the Dalai Lama took a definite position on the succession issue, where the Dalai Lama made it very clear that the decision to continue or not continue with the institution of the Dalai Lama lies with the Tibetan people. The real reason for ‘Younghusband’s visit’ to Tibet was not to lay a telegraph line.
This article examines how the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) conflict management process in the South China Sea (SCS) has been conducted and whether the ASEAN way can effectively manage the dispute, in which China is a prime and important actor. It argues that rising tensions in the South China Sea are a direct result of the changed balance of power in the region given the asymmetry between China and ASEAN members. China has taken advantage of ASEAN efforts to develop a code of conduct that is premised on the ASEAN way.
With the take-over of power by the military on May 22, 2014, under General Prayuth Chan-O-Cha, the chief of army, Thailand has gone full circle in coup d’états, from democratic deficit to fractious political struggle between different social groups leading to acute and irreconcilable political instability that gives leverage to the army to finally intervene and seize power by suspending the constitutional processes. Democracy in Thailand is not only a recent phenomenon, but is also periodic and short-lived.
An investigation into the prospects for including political talks in the cross-strait dialogue enables a better assessment of cross-strait relations. China’s push for political talks and Taiwan’s resistance to them imply that their political positions on the fundamental issues of sovereignty and ‘living space’ for Taiwan remain unchanged. Considering Taiwan’s complex domestic political scenario, which is largely against unification with Mainland China, the likelihood of Taiwan agreeing to political talks for unification is remote.
In November 2012, soon after the conclusion of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), President Xi Jinping put forward for the first time the idea of the ‘Chinese Dream’. In March 2013, Xi further elaborated on this concept at the closing ceremony of the First Session of the 12th National People’s Congress.
Will India and China resolve their boundary dispute during the tenure of Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping? The strategic communities in both countries are optimistic, particularly after the high tension prevailing along the border during President Xi Jinping’s tour of India in September 2014. Both Prime Minister Modi and President Xi are seen as decisive leaders.1 Both are expected to hold power in their respective countries for a few years to come. Personalities and personas matter greatly for scoring political brownie points. The boundary dispute, quintessentially, is political in nature.
After a successful visit by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Colombo in March, Indian policy elite are hopeful that the new Sri Lankan government will roll-back some of the geopolitical concessions made by the Rajapaksa regime to Beijing, thereby restoring India’s primacy in its near neighbourhood. India’s policy elite are hopeful that Maithripala Sirisena, the new president, will roll back some of the geopolitical concessions made by his predecessor to Beijing, thereby restoring Indian primacy in its near neighbourhood.
China has reoriented its foreign policy strategy since Xi Jinping became president. This could significantly recast China’s relations with Asian countries. The process that began with Xi Jinping’s coming to power in 2012–2013 reached, in a sense, a definitive moment, with the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs held in Beijing in November 2014.
Sino-Indian relations were governed by concerns about an unsound bilateral bonhomie, internal as well as external strategic and political considerations, and in addition, national interests and priorities not necessarily oriented towards pacifying the bilateral relations.
Several Belt and Road Initiative projects pass through ecologically sensitive areas and in countries with weak environmental laws and governance.
Beijing’s pushback against the Washington-backed Indo-Pacific Economic Framework is likely to result in an intense regional geo-economic competition.
Hydropower cooperation between India and Bhutan should not only help achieve the larger aspirations of the Bhutanese people for peace, prosperity and happiness but also further strengthen bilateral bonds.
The Chinese news media has peddled dual narrative of vilifying the West and glorifying China’s supposed mediatory role in the Russia–Ukraine crisis.
Japan is likely to play a decisive role in positioning Northeast India as a powerhouse through improved connectivity, opening up trade corridors and driving better economic integration.
As Yoon Suk-yeol takes charge amid global disorder and deep domestic divide, his legacy will be defined by how well he succeeds in effectively walking the talk of positioning Seoul front and centre in shaping a rules-based order in Indo-Pacific.
Recent developments indicate that the pro-China lobby has turned weak within Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party. The changed internal party dynamics is likely to immensely help Prime Minister Fumio Kishida carry forward his defence and foreign policy agenda.
China’s varied winter planning logistics show a broader strategy to gain mastery over high-altitude conditions and increase combat preparedness against India.
Prime Minister Kishida Fumio gave a resolute call for pursuing “realism diplomacy for a new era” in his Diet deliberations. How strategically innovative and politically effective will it prove in pursuing Tokyo’s national interests in the US–China–Japan calculus?
Xi Jinping’s New Year address implicitly underlined his intent of directing China to look inward. While this strategy to turn inward may have been triggered more by domestic exigencies than by external systemic pressure, the implications will be felt both domestically and internationally.
