The East Asia Centre is dedicated to study and research the domestic and foreign policies of individual countries of the region as well as India’s multifaceted relationships with these countries. With respect to China, the Centre’s research foci are its foreign policy (particularly towards the US, Russia, Central Asia and Asia Pacific), domestic politics, economy, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and India’s relationship with China in all its dimensions. The Centre’s research also focuses on Taiwan, its domestic politics, Sino-Taiwanese relationship and Indo-Taiwanese relationship, Hong Kong and India-Hong Kong relations. Japan and Korea are the other major focus of the Centre, with its research focused on their domestic politics, foreign policy and comprehensive bilateral relationships with India. The geopolitics of the Asia Pacific and the Korean peninsula are also studied in the Centre.
The centre brings out five monthly newsletters: East Asia Military Monitor, Japan Digest, China Science and Technology, Korea Newsletter, and China Military Digest.
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Till China’s economy gallops along developing at 9 per cent annually, there is little chance that domestic dissidence will get out of hand. But China’s Gorbachov moment will arrive if either the economy begins to slow down and shows irretrievable signs of faltering or China suffers a major foreign policy and military fiasco as did the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.
The India-China relations in 2013, in spite Depsang incident, had a more positive than negative tone. Premier Li chose India as his first overseas stop and the pronouncement to deepen ties with India as “strategic choice” along with promise to make “greater efforts” to resolve boundary issue. Equally positive voice came from the Indian leadership for rejecting the relevance of “containment” in favour of “cooperation” that could bring more gains instead.
In the last one year, Xi’s has consolidated his position within the Standing Committee of the Party Politbureau, elevated information security as China’s core concern and focused on internal security as a result of slowing of the economy. Taking a cue from Mao, Xi has promoted the spirit of nationalism in China and like Mao he is finding a foreign target for nothing subsumes internal dissidence as does the promotion of xenophobic tendencies.
China’s border intrusions have been bolstered by a steady and committed expansion of its military hardware and infrastructure in Tibet and neighbouring provinces. The improvement of surface transportation near the LAC has resulted in larger military presence and augmented rapid deployment capacities of the PLA and the PLAAF.
There is no doubt that this an audacious foreign policy gambit played by China. Un-named Chinese officials have been quoted in the Chinese press to say that China is willing to instigate strategic confrontation against Japan and are prepared for it to last a 'long time'.
The primary aim of the ADIZ is to provide a lead time to the air force, in case of hostile aircraft intruding, and take appropriate actions to counter them. The establishment of the ADIZ in the East China Sea by China is a signal of its assertiveness and authority over the Senkaku/Diaoyu island and probably a readiness to escalate it.
In this final part of the Policy Paper series, P Stobdan deliberates that if India and China make a calibrated move for working together in Afghanistan, the outcome could be more harmonizing than conflicting. So when India reviews its post-2014 Afghan policy, the China factor should not be seen in a zero-sum perception for many in the West may press India playing a countervailing role to China.
China has created a furor by announcing the creation of an Air Defence identification Zone (ADIZ) over the Senkakau/Diayou islands in East China Sea. There is now little doubt that China is displaying a muscular foreign policy and most countries in Asia would be wary of a hard response because of the growing dependence of their economies on China.
In this third part of the Policy Paper series, P Stobdan argues that India should continue to remain engaged in Asia-Pacific for reasons not only confined to mercantile interest but also because it is an arena shaping the major powers behaviour. At the same, a regional rebalancing and attention to equally critical Central and West Asia will broaden India’s prospects for shaping the global order.
The Emperor of Japan and his wife are visiting India. 60-years ago they had laid the foundation stone of India International Centre. The visit will further strengthen India-Japan strategic partnership in the backdrop of major global and regional geopolitical shifts, particularly the rise of China; the US policy of ‘rebalancing’ and “pivot to Asia;” and maritime security challenges in the Indian and Pacific Oceans
