Deciphering China’s Submarine Deployments in the Indian Ocean Region
Indian Navy must focus fresh attention on the challenge posed by the Pakistan-China maritime nexus in the Western Indian Ocean.
- Abhijit Singh
- July 08, 2015
The East Asia Centre is dedicated to study and research the domestic and foreign policies of individual countries of the region as well as India’s multifaceted relationships with these countries. With respect to China, the Centre’s research foci are its foreign policy (particularly towards the US, Russia, Central Asia and Asia Pacific), domestic politics, economy, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and India’s relationship with China in all its dimensions. The Centre’s research also focuses on Taiwan, its domestic politics, Sino-Taiwanese relationship and Indo-Taiwanese relationship, Hong Kong and India-Hong Kong relations. Japan and Korea are the other major focus of the Centre, with its research focused on their domestic politics, foreign policy and comprehensive bilateral relationships with India. The geopolitics of the Asia Pacific and the Korean peninsula are also studied in the Centre.
The centre brings out five monthly newsletters: East Asia Military Monitor, Japan Digest, China Science and Technology, Korea Newsletter, and China Military Digest.
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Indian Navy must focus fresh attention on the challenge posed by the Pakistan-China maritime nexus in the Western Indian Ocean.
In China’s foreign policy setting, the logic of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘history’ are employed or applied selectively as is evident from its reservation on India’s oil exploration in the South China Sea and its own plans to implement the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor through Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir despite India’s reservations.
The revised defence guidelines have added value to the US-Japan partnership and the fundamental shift in Japanese security policy complements the US call upon Japan to shoulder greater security responsibility as a partner.
As the dust settles after the visit of Prime Minister Modi to China, it is time to take a calm and dispassionate look at where we stand in the context of Sino-Indian relations.
In today’s India, the narrow nationalism, if not paranoia, built on the burden of 1962 seems only artificial. But, can Modi and Xi move beyond this burden and change the bilateral discourse? Modi needs to be metaphysical not just pragmatic.
Modi and Xi share several similarities: their rise to the top, the popular nationalism they ride, the power they wield, and their domestic as well as foreign policy priorities.
For better operational cooperation, India and China need to go beyond rudimentary agreements on combating piracy and crime in the Western Indian Ocean. They need to work out an acceptable framework for functional collaboration and create positive momentum in favour of greater strategic interaction.
India needs to shape the nature and scope of the projects the bank will finance to support the Asian Century and its own re-emergence as one of the two centres of gravity in Asia.
Xi Jinping has already recognized the inevitable by stressing that China would adjust to the ‘new normal’ of lower growth and, to ensure stability, he has already cracked down on dissent and strengthened media control measures.
During the Rajapaksa years, Sri Lanka experienced jobless growth, similar to the experience of many African countries where Chinese investment had increased exponentially in the last decade.



