The global thrust on economic integration has certainly accrued greater space to India that the non-alignment actually stands for. It allows India to reach out to both the US and China without fear of taking sides and draw in the benefits from both of manufacturing, investments, trade and commerce.

• Abanti Bhattacharya
• June 29, 2014
• IDSA Comments

The principal opposition of the Chinese on the McMahon line is that it is illegal and a mere product of British imperialistic designs on China. Such assessments completely disregard the fact that the McMahon line is entwined with the Tibet issue – the lynchpin of China’s territorial sovereignty and party legitimacy

• Abanti Bhattacharya
• June 05, 2014
• IDSA Comments

The prospects for new states becoming SCO members seem remote. The new clause that requires all heads of the member states to sign the membership document is the main obstacle and the members appear careful about the intentions and behaviors of the observers-states as they see expansion could against the organizational interests.

• P. Stobdan
• May 26, 2014
• IDSA Comments

A Sino-Japanese conflict is not in the US interest and certainly not in Japan’s. Stability in the regional security landscape cannot be solely guaranteed by reaffirming the US-Japan security alliance, which provides space for the US to flaunt its military might through deployment.

• Titli Basu
• May 20, 2014
• IDSA Comments

A re-look of the intentions of the Chinese is important because according to long-term economic trends around 2030 Asia will be the world’s powerhouse just as it was prior to 1800. China is expected to surpass the US by 2016 to become the largest economy, and India’s GDP is expected to exceed that of the US by 2060.

• Mukul Sanwal
• May 07, 2014
• IDSA Comments

The Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) is a small but positive sign towards better communication channels between navies to reduce tension in the seas. But for CUES to become a reality many issues need to be resolved including the time frame for implementation.

• Sarabjeet Singh Parmar
• April 29, 2014
• IDSA Comments

The naval exercise at Qingdao does not detract from the fact that the India-China maritime relationship is essentially an uneasy one. Each side is uncomfortable with the other’s presence in its own theatre of nautical influence, but both recognise the other’s dominance in their respective maritime ‘backyards’.

• Abhijit Singh
• April 28, 2014
• IDSA Comments

Following on Xi Jinping vision of ‘fight war, win war’, the Chinese military spending is shifting towards higher technology weapons and equipment and training and also illustrates its aim to institute reforms related to troop’s operational commands, organisation and training.

• M.S. Prathibha
• April 21, 2014
• IDSA Comments

This work reviews the significance and progress of Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) in India-China relations. But addressing macroeconomic subject matters that concern the two countries’ strategic interests requires methodological deliberations that must be balanced and nuanced. The SED needs to be upgraded to a level of equal deliberation mechanism, where Beijing must address India’s economic and strategic concerns.

• Jagannath P. Panda
• April 03, 2014
• Issue Brief

At its core is Beijing’s fear of having a chief executive in Hong Kong who is locally popular and vocally critical about Beijing's policies. Fear perhaps also emanate from Beijing’s concerns of spillover effects on the mainland if a full-fledged democracy in Hong Kong were to succeed since at home the CCP continues to grapple with the problems of corruption, inequality and inflation.

• Avinash Godbole
• March 28, 2014
• IDSA Comments