The East Asia Centre is dedicated to study and research the domestic and foreign policies of individual countries of the region as well as India’s multifaceted relationships with these countries. With respect to China, the Centre’s research foci are its foreign policy (particularly towards the US, Russia, Central Asia and Asia Pacific), domestic politics, economy, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and India’s relationship with China in all its dimensions. The Centre’s research also focuses on Taiwan, its domestic politics, Sino-Taiwanese relationship and Indo-Taiwanese relationship, Hong Kong and India-Hong Kong relations. Japan and Korea are the other major focus of the Centre, with its research focused on their domestic politics, foreign policy and comprehensive bilateral relationships with India. The geopolitics of the Asia Pacific and the Korean peninsula are also studied in the Centre.
The centre brings out five monthly newsletters: East Asia Military Monitor, Japan Digest, China Science and Technology, Korea Newsletter, and China Military Digest.
No posts of Books and Monograph.
Democracy came to Taiwan under the leadership of Chiang Ching-Kuo, which brought an end to almost four decades of one-party dictatorship. Chiang Kai?Shek had harboured the dream of overtaking the whole of China and establishing the rule of Kuomintang (KMT). But with the passage of time and a shift in the international political scenario, he realized that this would not be possible.
This article explains how growing economic interests have made China and India more prone to various non-traditional security threats in their neighbourhood. It examines whether this evolution has led both countries to mitigate their struggle for influence in favour of security cooperation, and found that despite shared security interests, China and India are not able to overcome mutual distrust. The conclusions are that the quest for short-term gains impedes substantial security cooperation and that economic ambitions have added new impetus to the regional struggle for influence.
One of the most notable attempts by Japan towards fostering regionalism in recent years has been through its active and positive participation in the East Asia Summit (EAS), envisioned to be a stepping stone towards the formation of an East Asian Community (EAC). The idea behind regionalism and efforts towards the EAS and EAC are to be perceived within the broader context of Tokyo's attempts to shape the regional environment and influence policies in the region. Its primary goal is to neutralize and dilute the influence of China.
This article highlights the changing dynamics of relations between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People's Liberation Army under the current leadership. While the military in China still remains politically loyal to the Communist Party, specification of the role of the military in the Chinese Constitution, generational changes in the CCP, factional politics, and relative depoliticization of the military are some of the factors suggesting a 'bifurcation' between the party and the military.
The rapid speed of globalization and increasing economic interdependence has had a direct impact on defence policies and countries are constantly seen fine-tuning their priorities. Walden Bello argues in his book Dilemmas of Domination that the declining US hegemony would prompt US allies in Asia to alter their defence planning and strategies vis-à-vis emerging powers like China.
In the aftermath of North Korea's second nuclear test and the launch of three short-range missiles on May 25, 2009, followed by the launch of seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan on July 4, there has been widespread speculation on Japan's principled position on non-proliferation and disarmament and whether it will abandon its nuclear abstinence and acquire nuclear capability. This possibility has been echoed recently by the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates.
China's efforts to build 'nodes' of influence in the Indian Ocean Region have been increasingly discernible in recent years. This endeavour, many argue, is driven by Beijing's military-strategic ends. However, such an argument remains a speculation, backed by frail and somewhat disjointed evidence. At least in the public domain, it may be too early to marshal tangible evidence to prove or dismiss the hypothesis.
India and Indonesia, the two major regional powers, have in the recent past initiated intimate bilateral relations. With globalization as a key driver, the two countries have reconfigured their relationship particularly in the economic and defence spheres. The signing of the strategic partnership in 2005 has been critical to strengthening of the bilateral ties. Security relations are complimentary. While India needs to safeguard its interests in Southeast Asia, Indonesia needs a benign power like India for its security concerns.
AIIB is a Chinese dominated bank and the Chinese excitement about AIIB is based on the control and strategic clout that Beijing, the bank’s main architect, wields over its functioning.
India should seek to ‘redefine’ OROB to add a strong component for a ‘Digital Asia’, as that is where our comparative advantage lies, and for Asian connectivity to have two nodes, in China and in India, as has been the case throughout history.
India needs to engage more pointedly with South Korea, Japan, the United States and even bilaterally with DPRK to convey its concerns regarding the latter’s strategic cooperation with Pakistan.
Furthering the premise of an increasingly severe security environment, Japan’s latest defence white paper has accorded relatively more space to its ‘strong concerns’ over China’s ‘active maritime expansion’ as well as progress in North Korea’s missile development programme.
ROK is employing an effective combination of gifting equipment combined with joint ventures with local industry, which has the dual effect of increasing exports and forging partnerships with domestic industries in a region where it has hitherto had a very minimal defence relationship.
China’s push for influence among the Caribbean political elite has been replicated with an equally determined effort to court the military and the bureaucratic elite in the region, often deftly stepping in to take advantage of senseless overreactions on the part of the United States.
As the need for a modern and capable naval force grows ever more urgent, it remains to be seen if the Philippine Navy’s latest modernisation plans will become a reality or be still-born as was the case with earlier efforts.
Whether the ruling would induce China to adopt a fresh look at the dispute or it would only further complicate the domestic and regional political situations will depend on the domestic, regional and international responses in the coming days and weeks.
While using unexceptionable language, India has actually not supported the Chinese position in the South China Sea and has called upon China to adhere to the limits laid down in the UNCLOS.
The Hague Tribunal’s decision and China’s take on it are unlikely to compel Duterte to ignore economic interests that can be furthered through cooperation with China.
