The East Asia Centre is dedicated to study and research the domestic and foreign policies of individual countries of the region as well as India’s multifaceted relationships with these countries. With respect to China, the Centre’s research foci are its foreign policy (particularly towards the US, Russia, Central Asia and Asia Pacific), domestic politics, economy, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and India’s relationship with China in all its dimensions. The Centre’s research also focuses on Taiwan, its domestic politics, Sino-Taiwanese relationship and Indo-Taiwanese relationship, Hong Kong and India-Hong Kong relations. Japan and Korea are the other major focus of the Centre, with its research focused on their domestic politics, foreign policy and comprehensive bilateral relationships with India. The geopolitics of the Asia Pacific and the Korean peninsula are also studied in the Centre.
The centre brings out five monthly newsletters: East Asia Military Monitor, Japan Digest, China Science and Technology, Korea Newsletter, and China Military Digest.
No posts of Books and Monograph.
Chinese economic and military growth in the last decade has heightened interest in the country's functioning and political system. The world at large is highly intrigued by the way the Chinese political system functions and there is also a curiosity regarding the strengths and weaknesses of this system.
Chinese foreign and domestic policies cannot be understood without understanding the evolving nature of Chinese nationalism. Bhavna Singh's book on Chinese nationalism deals with this issue in a detailed manner. The Communist Party of China (CCP) has relied heavily on the notion of patriotism, which overlaps that of nationalism, for domestic and international legitimacy. All eyes are on the leadership transition in China and its implications for the world. It will be interesting to see how the new leadership deals with the growing nationalistic sentiment in the country.
India's rise as a regional and global power could potentially alter the geopolitical landscape of the Asia-Pacific. With its economic growth and concomitant investments in military modernisation, many see India as evolving into a strategic pole in Asia. David Brewster in this volume sets out to examine ‘the consequences of India's rise on the Asia Pacific strategic order’ (p. ix) and asks whether India will indeed join the ranks of major powers in the coming years.
AResurgent China: South Asian Perspective, edited by Tan Tai Yong and S.D. Muni, is a timely book. The simultaneous rise of India and China is a defining reality of the Asian and global order. The trajectory of Sino-Indian relations will have an impact on South Asia. Since the mid-1980s, the two countries have made efforts to unfreeze the relationship, and in the last 10 years the Sino-Indian bilateral relationship has been transformed politically and economically.
China's emergence as a global actor has fuelled much speculation over its ‘intentions’ in the long term. Arguably, debates on the issue have centred around China's growing military and economic power and concurrent challenges to the maintenance of the existing status quo in the international system. This article seeks to understand China's foreign policy motivations by studying the conceptualisation of ‘national interest’ within China.
The strum and drang that has accompanied China's arrival as a major economic and diplomatic actor in Africa has divided the continent into advocates, alarmists and analysts. 1 For the advocates, the integration of China into the African architecture is one to be promoted as an alternative to the tired policy pronouncements of an increasingly enervated West, not least because of the practical rationale that Beijing has the financial means and political will to invest in Africa's future.
China and India are two of the fastest growing economies of the world today. While it may seem like the proverbial hare and tortoise race, with China way ahead, there is no denying the fact that both economies will be looking for additional energy resources, mineral resources, secure lines of communication, higher productivity at lower cost and finally, of course, larger markets to sustain this growth.
The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is becoming increasingly significant in the world arena, with the United States, India and China—the most important stakeholders in the region—playing substantial roles. Judging from the three countries' strategic thought, concerns, interests and power balances, it is the US–India potential competition for maritime dominance in the IOR that demands the most attention. However, competition does not mean confrontation.
In recent years, China's strategic community has emerged as an increasingly vocal and influential constituent of Chinese policy debates. This article focuses on Chinese analysts steeped in the realpolitik tradition. These intellectuals and strategists discern a troubling trend towards intense competition and zero-sum interactions in the Indian Ocean. In their view, a progressively assertive India will set the pace of the impending maritime rivalries among the great powers.
The Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s recent accomplishments are impressive but have not gone beyond ‘pocket excellence’, as its overall structure and equipment are still out of date. However, the PLAN now has ships and powerful weapons that enable it to extend its combat range and engage its foes in a relatively large-scale maritime campaign beyond the Yellow Sea—its traditional battlefield. Depending on the nature of operations, it may already be able to carry out blue water missions around the first island chain in the West Pacific.
As Yoon Suk-yeol takes charge amid global disorder and deep domestic divide, his legacy will be defined by how well he succeeds in effectively walking the talk of positioning Seoul front and centre in shaping a rules-based order in Indo-Pacific.
Recent developments indicate that the pro-China lobby has turned weak within Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party. The changed internal party dynamics is likely to immensely help Prime Minister Fumio Kishida carry forward his defence and foreign policy agenda.
China’s varied winter planning logistics show a broader strategy to gain mastery over high-altitude conditions and increase combat preparedness against India.
Prime Minister Kishida Fumio gave a resolute call for pursuing “realism diplomacy for a new era” in his Diet deliberations. How strategically innovative and politically effective will it prove in pursuing Tokyo’s national interests in the US–China–Japan calculus?
Xi Jinping’s New Year address implicitly underlined his intent of directing China to look inward. While this strategy to turn inward may have been triggered more by domestic exigencies than by external systemic pressure, the implications will be felt both domestically and internationally.
Japan is manifesting refreshing confidence drawing from its resolve to push the envelope of positive pacifism while determining the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific.
Showing readiness to sign the SEANWFZ treaty seems to be a low-cost, high-return proposition for Beijing. It could be a calculated symbolic gesture having no bearing on the region’s precarious security situation.
As India’s strides in the renewable sector are increasingly gaining pace, it gives an opportunity to assess what potential challenges and opportunities arise for India in the face of China’s growing dominance in the renewable energy industry.
Post 2015 reforms, the Western Theatre Command (WTC) of the PLA has been transforming itself into a joint theatre command that can fight wars against an adversary like India. Considering that India and China are involved in a border standoff, any strengthening of WTC’s combat capabilities is likely to have an immense impact on India.
Beijing’s intent to incorporate the polar regions within China’s greater maritime strategy, explore their resources and subsequently emerge as a polar great power is quite evident in its initiatives like the Polar Silk Road. In light of growing global ambition and resource needs, the Arctic could become another theatre of India–China competition.
