The East Asia Centre is dedicated to study and research the domestic and foreign policies of individual countries of the region as well as India’s multifaceted relationships with these countries. With respect to China, the Centre’s research foci are its foreign policy (particularly towards the US, Russia, Central Asia and Asia Pacific), domestic politics, economy, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and India’s relationship with China in all its dimensions. The Centre’s research also focuses on Taiwan, its domestic politics, Sino-Taiwanese relationship and Indo-Taiwanese relationship, Hong Kong and India-Hong Kong relations. Japan and Korea are the other major focus of the Centre, with its research focused on their domestic politics, foreign policy and comprehensive bilateral relationships with India. The geopolitics of the Asia Pacific and the Korean peninsula are also studied in the Centre.
The centre brings out five monthly newsletters: East Asia Military Monitor, Japan Digest, China Science and Technology, Korea Newsletter, and China Military Digest.
No posts of Books and Monograph.
Writings on India–China relations in recent years are increasingly seen to be imputing Machiavellian realism to the political and, increasingly, economic sphere of interaction.
China is gradually increasing its economic and commercial presence in Eastern Europe by signing bilateral agreements with countries that are still in transition, some of which are members of the European Union (EU).
The recent fad among Western security commentaries is to portray India as a natural member of East Asian political life.
In recent years, China's strategic community has emerged as an increasingly vocal and influential constituent of Chinese policy debates. This article focuses on Chinese analysts steeped in the realpolitik tradition. These intellectuals and strategists discern a troubling trend towards intense competition and zero-sum interactions in the Indian Ocean. In their view, a progressively assertive India will set the pace of the impending maritime rivalries among the great powers.
The Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s recent accomplishments are impressive but have not gone beyond ‘pocket excellence’, as its overall structure and equipment are still out of date. However, the PLAN now has ships and powerful weapons that enable it to extend its combat range and engage its foes in a relatively large-scale maritime campaign beyond the Yellow Sea—its traditional battlefield. Depending on the nature of operations, it may already be able to carry out blue water missions around the first island chain in the West Pacific.
The Indian Ocean has long been a hub of great power rivalry and the struggle for its domination has been a perennial feature of global politics. It is the third largest of the world's five oceans and touches Asia in the north, Africa in the west, Indo-China in the east, and Antarctica in the south. Home to four critical access waterways—the Suez Canal, Bab-el Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca—the Indian Ocean connects the Middle East, Africa and East Asia with Europe and the Americas.
China and India are two of the fastest growing economies of the world today. While it may seem like the proverbial hare and tortoise race, with China way ahead, there is no denying the fact that both economies will be looking for additional energy resources, mineral resources, secure lines of communication, higher productivity at lower cost and finally, of course, larger markets to sustain this growth.
The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is becoming increasingly significant in the world arena, with the United States, India and China—the most important stakeholders in the region—playing substantial roles. Judging from the three countries' strategic thought, concerns, interests and power balances, it is the US–India potential competition for maritime dominance in the IOR that demands the most attention. However, competition does not mean confrontation.
India's rise as a regional and global power could potentially alter the geopolitical landscape of the Asia-Pacific. With its economic growth and concomitant investments in military modernisation, many see India as evolving into a strategic pole in Asia. David Brewster in this volume sets out to examine ‘the consequences of India's rise on the Asia Pacific strategic order’ (p. ix) and asks whether India will indeed join the ranks of major powers in the coming years.
AResurgent China: South Asian Perspective, edited by Tan Tai Yong and S.D. Muni, is a timely book. The simultaneous rise of India and China is a defining reality of the Asian and global order. The trajectory of Sino-Indian relations will have an impact on South Asia. Since the mid-1980s, the two countries have made efforts to unfreeze the relationship, and in the last 10 years the Sino-Indian bilateral relationship has been transformed politically and economically.
As the East Asian regional order becomes fragmented, how is Prime Minister Shinzo Abe managing Tokyo’s strategic interests within the US-Japan-China relations?
China has managed to establish an edge in solar energy manufacturing and technology, and any shift in its solar policy is likely to affect countries looking to increase their solar energy capacity.
There is a need to close the perception gap in India’s assessment of the state of Chinese politics, to distinguish between transformation and conflict, and respond accordingly.
While broad agreement at the top leadership level has been easy to achieve, negotiations relating to defence equipment and technology cooperation have proved to be difficult, shaped as these are by a complex interplay of variables like cost-competitiveness, technology transfer and domestic politics.
India must jettison the attempt to maintain a balance between China and the US and instead take advantage of China’s internal and external vulnerabilities to gain an upper hand in the asymmetric power equation that has developed.
While the US may be able to ensure the security of its homeland, it is bound to gradually yield strategic space to China in the region. All said, prevailing alignments in the region are in for a definite reset.
The summit brought out ambiguities in America’s policy towards denuclearisation of Korean Peninsula. To translate outcomes of the summit into concrete deliverables, Trump administration would not only have to clearly define its denuclearisation action plan in terms of goals, methodology and timeline but also bolster its alliance with South Korea and Japan.
While the recent Korean Summit marks the beginning of the new era, to achieve lasting peace will require intense diplomatic efforts.
It may be time for India and China to discuss nuclear issues bilaterally with a view to mediating the uncertainties borne of their differing perspectives and postures.
Kim will drive the hardest bargain possible and be willing to make only small concessions like maintaining some type of a freeze on future tests of missiles and nuclear weapons.
