Buy (IDDM) or Buy (Indian): Horns of a Dilemma
If a product is indigenously designed, developed and manufactured, should the percentage of indigenous content in that product really matter so much?
- Amit Cowshish
- April 29, 2016
India spends a significant amount of resources on its national defence. Efficiency in utilisation of resources is not only an economic imperative but vital for defence preparedness. In view of this, the Defence Economics and Industry Centre was created in 2006 to promote research on various economic aspects of India’s defence. Since its inception, the Centre has undertaken a number of policy relevant studies besides constantly engaging vital stakeholders (Ministry of Defence, Armed Forces and Industry) on a range of issues. The major focus areas of the Centre are:
No posts of Books and Monograph.
No posts of Jounral.
If a product is indigenously designed, developed and manufactured, should the percentage of indigenous content in that product really matter so much?
The Task Force has not extended the principle of Strategic Partnership to the whole gamut of big contracts in which the private sector is supposed to play a major role. And it visualises strategic partners as poor cousins of state-owned entities.
Introduction of the ‘Buy (Indian-IDDM)’ procurement category, the revamped ‘Make’ procedure, structural change in AAP, and higher and flexible indigenous content requirement in certain procurement categories are all likely to deepen the involvement of domestic industry in defence production.
‘Transfer of Technology’ does not magically elevate defence production capabilities to cutting-edge levels and help attain future self-reliance because technology sellers employ restrictive trade practices to prevent such an eventuality.
Defence planning has had a troubled history since its inception, in spite of several experiments with the structures and processes of planning. It will, therefore, be in the fitness of things to re-evaluate the existing architecture of planning.
Rather than continuing to harp on issues like inadequacy of defence outlays, the committee could actually bring about a tangible improvement in the state of defence preparedness by focusing on four specific micro areas.
The best of policies and procedures can come to naught because of indecisiveness in decision-making. There is little in DPP 2016 that addresses the problems which beset decision-making in the MoD.
Calculations reveal that the capital expenditure has been cut primarily to accommodate the rise in salary and pension bills arising out of the implementation of OROP scheme and the Seventh Central Pay Commission recommendations.
The two heads of expenditure which have witnessed significant growth in the defence budget 2016-17 are the salary component of the armed forces and the defence pensions.
It is time India devised appropriate tactics to meet the current threat. It is imperative that the armed forces prepare for ‘the most likely scenario’ rather than ‘the worst case scenario’. But to be fair, this can only be done when there exists a clear national military policy/strategy.



