Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
मनोहर पर्रिकर रक्षा अध्ययन एवं विश्लेषण संस्थान

Radicalisation in the Northern Caucasus

Related Posts:

The growing re-emergence of radicalisation in Russia’s North Caucasus region (Dagestan and Chechnya) must be understood within the broader framework of domestic security challenges and radicalisation trends (white supremacist or Islamist). The Russian state or the regional leaders have not come up with strategies for countering narratives on radicalisation and violent extremism spawned by radicals, which has helped non-state actors to recruit and radicalise recruits. The Islamic State has perpetrated terror attacks in Moscow in March 2024 and Dagestan in June 2024. The attack on Moscow was unprecedented in terms of scale that was not witnessed since the Beslan school tragedy 20 years ago.

Radicalisation in the North Caucasus

The Northern Caucasus region has been a hotbed of instability and conflict since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Socio-economic disparities have made it a fertile landscape for the rise of extremist ideologies, including Islamist radicalism. The evolution of the idea of global jihad and the emergence of various groups like Al-Qaeda (AQ) and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has further added to the rise of different groups which had pledged allegiance to the two terrorist outfits by exploiting multiple discrepancies and dissatisfaction due to the socio-economic disparities among the population.

The populace’s shift in ideological worldview from Sufism to Salafism in the region, with the rising presence of Salafist mosques has further fuelled radicalisation. The radicalisation has not remained confined to the region, with many North Caucasians joining Al-Qaeda and then ISIS’ ranks beyond Russian borders.1 As per reports in 2020, approximately 5,000 men, women and children travelled to Syria to join ISIS from Chechnya and Dagestan.2 The voluntary removal of radicalised and violent extremist individuals from North Caucasus allowed a sense of calm and limited stability to set in over a period of time. However, the region witnessed a resurgence in violence and instability due to the June 2024 attacks in Dagestan.

Chechnya

Chechen radicalisation occurred towards the end of the First Chechen War, with the local Chechen separatism co-opted by the radicalised elements. During the nascent stages of the Second Chechen War, the influence of Al-Qaeda transformed the once-Chechen identity based nationalist movement into a radicalised and violent extremist Salafist movement. It was during this time that the rise of jihadist tendencies took root in the republic, initiating a period of radicalisation.

The Russian counter-response during the Second Chechen War led to a reduction of radicalisation for a limited period. Russia initiated large scale counter-terror operations against violent extremists and separatist groups and individuals. It promoted alternative versions of Islam to undermine extremists’ ideologies and empowered local leaders such as Ramzan Kadyrov. Moscow also promoted welfare programmes to address socio-economic marginalisation.

Despite the collapse of the secessionist movements in the republic, radicalisation still found a conducive ecosystem to proliferate. Soon, groups emerged, such as the Caucasus Emirate (an AQ affiliate) and the Vilayet Kavkaz (an ISIS affiliate). The Caucasus Emirate was established in 2007 under the leadership of separatist radical Doku Umarov, who had vowed support to Al-Qaeda. Additionally, two Chechens—Dzhokhar A. Tsarnaev and Tamerlan Tsarnaev—inspired by AQ, carried out the infamous Boston Marathon Bombings,3 thus showing the connect between AQ and rising radicalisation during that period.

The Caucasus Emirate activities within Russia lasted only until 2014, with significant defections from the group towards ISIS.4 Resultantly, the turf war saw ISIS gain an upper hand, and the group, along with its regional affiliates, began dominating the terrorism ecosystem in the region. ISIS, similar to Al-Qaeda, tapped into secessionist tendencies within the region to foment radicalisation and advance its brand of Salafi-Jihadism. This shift in the ideological and theological understanding of the separatist movement in Chechnya, which saw the rise of the Salafist elements, had a spillover effect on other republics, including neighbouring Dagestan.

Dagestan

Dagestanis, like Chechens, sought independence from the Russian state and its local movements were also co-opted by radical elements and extremists. These developments provided extremist Chechens a critical opportunity to establish a haven in Dagestan, for example, through Kavkaz Vilayet. Similar to the past, where a civil war-like climate was evident in the republic from 2010 till 2014 due to the presence of the jihadi groups,5 Dagestan has remained rife for exploitation by radicalised elements. It recently saw a significant terror attack and a rise in antisemitic events, including an intended attack at the airport in the capital, Makhachkala, which targeted travellers flying in from Israel. This has shown that while Chechnya remains of interest for the jihadi groups, Dagestan has gained increasing prominence among violent non-state actors.

Use of Propaganda and External Conflicts

In April 2024, ISIS-affiliated Ingush militants, under the guise of mujahadeen of the ‘Ingush Jamaat of the Wilayat Kavkaz’, appealed to the North Caucasus population to join ISIS.6 Similar propaganda has gained traction since Russia’s war push with Ukraine. This can be seen as an attempt of the group to revive ISIS’ Caucasus branch, which had been inactive for years due to the heightened alertness and counter-terror measures applied by Russian forces.

Moreover, as part of its turf war with ISIS, AQ has chosen to use the events in Aleppo to disseminate propaganda hailing HTS and other rebel forces’ advance in the war-torn city and its re-emergence as a potent actor in North Caucasus. Despite HTS publicly severing ties with AQ in 2016, doubts remained about the nature of their ties. The recent pronouncements made by AQ celebrating the rebel success in Aleppo reinforced that scepticism. For example, in one of its recent posts, AQ in the Arabian Peninsula proclaimed7 its ‘support and congratulations’ for the HTS campaign and emphasised the need to fight unitedly against the regime forces and its allies (including Russians) by underlining ‘Tawhid’ (belief in oneness and unity of God).

Considering that it has failed to garner much traction through propaganda and attacks since ISIS’ rise, AQ could be looking to make inroads again into a region which has remained volatile. However, it is to be seen whether AQ can push back against the notoriety gained by ISIS, more so after the March 2024 attacks in Moscow and the June 2024 attacks in Dagestan, by tapping into events in West Asia to its advantage.

At the same time, it is necessary to exercise caution about the implications of factions such as the Turkistan Brigade8 (comprised of violent extremists from Central Asian countries like Uzbekistan and Tajikistan), which has joined hands in the offensive against Assad’s forces. Its members could adapt the lessons learned and tactics to fit the Russian landscape once this conflict recedes as the situation in North Caucasus grows more volatile. Central Asian migrants have been subject to animosity in Russia due to their brethren’s participation in ISIS-related activities9 over the years. The ‘Migrant Expulsion Regime’10 adopted by Russia’s Duma in July 2024, which eased the deportation of Central Asian migrants, especially those suspected of extremist activities, is expected to fuel terrorist propaganda due to reports of rising xenophobia, particularly by ISIS. This terrorist organisation has long expressed disdain for Russia and amplified its propaganda and recruitment efforts directed at vulnerable Central Asians.

Conclusion

Despite past attempts to curb radicalisation, the current geopolitical and geostrategic disruptions caused by events in Ukraine and Syria could equip violent non-state actors to further destabilise the North Caucasus and the wider Russian state. Rising propaganda could attract more radicalised populations to join the Islamic State or other terror groups, even giving space to AQ to re-emerge as a strong contender. Disgruntled citizens in Grozny, for instance, protested against partial mobilisation announced by the Russian government to bolster its war efforts in Ukraine. This dissatisfaction against the state’s policies stemmed from festering resentment and concern about the war’s impact on the Chechen population. The Chechen population and the Russian state finds themselves at loggerheads on security issues. Despite the Russian leadership accommodating the demands and concerns of the protestors, it is likely that the disillusionment among the locals might fester over time contributing to further radicalisation.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

Keywords: Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Radicalisation, Russia
  • Visitor No: 000058457
  • © Manohar Parikar Institute For Defence Studies and Analysis
  • XHTML validation2.0 Level Double-A Conformance
    CSS Validator
    Explanation of WCAG 2.0 Level Double-A Conformance