Foremost on the government’s defence and national security reforms agenda should be the formulation of a comprehensive National Security Strategy (NSS), including that for internal security. The NSS should be formulated after carrying out an inter-departmental, inter-agency, multi-disciplinary strategic defence review and must take the public into confidence.
The recent violence indicates that armed groups have not disarmed and that state forces are simply unable to keep “extortion” networks in check. While the cease-fire agreement signed in 1997 has been the harbinger of the subsequent peace talks, blatant violations of the agreement by the outfit render the framework of the talks weak and question its effectiveness and legitimacy.
In a document entitled ‘Our Financial Policy’, the Maoists mention that they have three types of economic needs, viz. the needs of war, political propaganda and the people. To cater to these needs there are three broad categories of resources, viz. (a) membership fee, levy and contributions from the people; (b) confiscation of the wealth and income of the enemy; and (c) ‘revolutionary taxes’ collected in guerrilla zones and base areas.
This article seeks to make a preliminary assessment of the surrender and rehabilitation policy being adopted towards Naxalites.
China’s border intrusions have been bolstered by a steady and committed expansion of its military hardware and infrastructure in Tibet and neighbouring provinces. The improvement of surface transportation near the LAC has resulted in larger military presence and augmented rapid deployment capacities of the PLA and the PLAAF.
The importance of the road network in the north-east needs no emphasis. India is now raising the 17 Mountain Corps to augment its strategic strike capability vis-à-vis China. The BRO is the key instrument to realise the road network objective and provide the required logistical capability to this Corps.
2013 witnessed the highest ceasefire violations in eight years, accompanied by a sharp increase in security force casualties. Some sections within the media and intelligentsia have misunderstood the army’s presence in disturbed areas as a reflection of its vested interests. It is time that the reality of its role and responsibility are better understood.
The State hardly has any `balance from its current revenues` to take on additional internal security expenditure or fund its own development activities. In this backdrop, the State has perforce to depend on the Centre to maintain a security establishment and sustain it on a long-term basis.
Five years since the Mumbai terror attacks, the coastal mechanism remains weak. It is time to seriously consider the Indian coast guard as the single authority responsible for coastal security and accordingly amend the charter of the ICG.
In addition to building a 10-km fence along its border with Myanmar, India should strengthen the security of the border by deploying adequate guarding forces, revise the FMR and constructively engage with Myanmar to prevent the cross-border movement of insurgents and traffickers.