Dr. Abanti Bhattacharya is Associate Professor at the Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi. Prior to this she was Associate Fellow at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.
It is neither the Wuhan spirit nor India’s zero tolerance on terrorism but China’s own vulnerability to terror that caused Beijing to ultimately take on board New Delhi’s concerns on terrorism.
India must jettison the attempt to maintain a balance between China and the US and instead take advantage of China’s internal and external vulnerabilities to gain an upper hand in the asymmetric power equation that has developed.
The global thrust on economic integration has certainly accrued greater space to India that the non-alignment actually stands for. It allows India to reach out to both the US and China without fear of taking sides and draw in the benefits from both of manufacturing, investments, trade and commerce.
The principal opposition of the Chinese on the McMahon line is that it is illegal and a mere product of British imperialistic designs on China. Such assessments completely disregard the fact that the McMahon line is entwined with the Tibet issue – the lynchpin of China’s territorial sovereignty and party legitimacy
Soft border is neither an option nor a means to resolve the India-China border dispute. In Chinese conceptualization where borders are innately strategic frontiers, the idea of soft border is a misnomer. India should keep a distinction between the notions of soft border and boundary resolution.
There have been many studies on US foreign policy towards China dwelling specifically on the efficacy of the US strategy of containment. Donald Gross’s book is an addition to this genre. It basically challenges the wisdom of the current US policy of containing China and offers a ‘new paradigm’ for ‘stable peace’ as an alternative approach for dealing with China and yet keeping US dominance in the Asia-Pacific intact. This new paradigm provides for greater cooperation, co-existence and accommodation with the rising dragon to ensure long-term peace in the international system.
Integrating the restive Tibetan minority with China has been the primary domestic challenge for Beijing. Thus far, its Nepal policy has been crafted essentially to address the Tibetan question. The idea of trilateral cooperation between India, Nepal and China apparently floated by Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) in April 2013 was, in effect, first made by the former Chinese ambassador to Nepal, Yang Houlan, in 2012.
The Chinese prime minister’s visit was in no way intended to offer solution to the vexed issue of border incursion. Li came to pursue China’s national interest and not to enrich India-China bilateral ties.
On territorial and sovereignty related issues, China is likely to increasingly display unilateral tendencies. This is commensurate not only with China’s growing power but also with the relative decline of the United States.
Sixty years for a human being may mean looking back, 1 taking stock of things and preparing to retire from active life. But for a nation it means more than just looking back to the path traversed. It involves looking to the future with confidence. Sixty years of India–China relations raises the significant question whether the two Asian giants could look to their bilateral relations with confidence.
China’s vulnerability to terrorism behind its support for Azhar ban
It is neither the Wuhan spirit nor India’s zero tolerance on terrorism but China’s own vulnerability to terror that caused Beijing to ultimately take on board New Delhi’s concerns on terrorism.