Counter Insurgency

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  • Obama’s Afghan Strategy: Surge or Retreat?

    Obama’s signal that the United States seeks to exit in 18 months will be viewed with scepticism by fence sitters in Afghanistan who will identify the victor as the one who endures.

    December 14, 2009

    From FATA to South Punjab: The Looming Leap of Islamic Radicalism in Pakistan

    A disturbing aspect of the current phase of Islamist militancy in Pakistan is that the terrorist acts outside FATA and NWFP are not being staged by ethnic Pashtun elements but by local Punjabi cohorts.

    November 30, 2009

    North-East India as a Factor in India's Diplomatic Engagement with Myanmar: Issues and Challenges

    In recent years India, along with China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, has been following a policy of diplomatic engagement with Myanmar. India has also clarified its diplomatic stand that such a policy engagement will positively serve its national interests.

    November 2009

    Trends in Thinking about Warfare

    Militaries the world over need to study and understand lessons from the ongoing military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon, and the new knowledge needs to be placed in context. Neglected military history itself provides enduring lessons. This article attempts to capture the trends and debates in the understanding of current warfare and outlines how lessons of war are interpreted with a focus on future trends in war-fighting. The article concludes with some policy suggestions and areas for further inquiry.

    November 2009

    US-Induced Privatization of Security in Pakistan

    Pakistan faces a new challenge with the United States advocating privatization of security to deal with the country’s internal security challenges, a move that would also increase the level of American monitoring and supervisory capabilities.

    October 13, 2009

    The Indian Experience of Conflict Resolution in Mizoram

    The case of Mizoram in India provides informative lessons for conflict resolution. Factors such as addressing the root causes of the conflict, de-escalation in violence, empathizing with the conflicting actor, surrender policy for insurgents, indigenous mediators, absence of peace-spoilers, strengthening of local institutions, formation of a pan-Mizo identity and limited 'use of force' policy all played a role in establishing peace in Mizoram.

    July 2009

    Lawlessness in the Hills of Assam

    Following the arrest of one of the most wanted insurgent leaders of Assam, the state government must immediately act tough against other insurgent groups operating in the hill districts of the state.

    June 12, 2009

    The Case for Employing Non-Lethal Weapons

    At first glance, ‘Non-Lethal’ and ‘armed forces’ do not seem to go along, considering that the primary role of the military is to preserve national interests and safeguard territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of India against external threats. However, changes in the security dynamics have embroiled the Indian Army more and more in the secondary task of providing assistance to government agencies to cope with internal threats as part of ‘Aid to Civil Authority’ when requisitioned for the purpose.

    June 03, 2009

    Learning the right lessons on the just concluded counter insurgency operations in Sri Lanka

    The death of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eeelam (LTTE) leader Prabhakran closes a chapter in the first counter insurgency success of the 21st century by military means. A greater challenge in nation building now faces the Sri Lankan people - integrating the Tamils in their society dominated by Sinhala Buddhists.

    Purely from a military point of view some important lessons and some areas of further inquiry emerge. In brief they are:

    May 22, 2009

    Talking to the Taliban: Will it Ensure 'Peace' in Afghanistan?

    The raging Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan underlines the limits of the use of military force. The lack of visible progress on the reconstruction activity and prevailing insecurity has alienated the Afghan populace in the remote villages of South and East Afghanistan. Given that the military option alone has limited utility in Counter-insurgency (COIN), there is a need to exercise an 'out-of-the-box' option to address the present stalemate.

    March 2009

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