The recent BWC Review Conference faced various challenges emanating from a range of developments that took place during the last five years, alongside with lingering issues already existing for a long period of time. The related contents and interfaces are here presented and assessed briefly.
This study attempts to profile China’s biological warfare programme (BWP), with special reference to biological weapons (BW) capabilities that exist in facilities affiliated with the defence establishment and the military. For that purpose, a wide variety of facilities affiliated with the defence establishment and with the military are reviewed and profiled. The outcome of that analysis points at 12 facilities affiliated with the defence establishment, plus 30 facilities affiliated with the PLA, that are involved in research, development, production, testing or storage of BW.
Pakistan is a state party to the Biological Weapons Convention, yet at least part of its related outward conduct is rather exhibitory, aiming to foster the image of an obedient, sheer science- and protection-oriented profile. Although it is publicly accentuated that an ongoing Pakistani biological weapons (BW) programme cannot be proved, it is fairly clear that some Western intelligence agencies possess classified information that is highly supportive of such an active programme taking place in actuality.
Egypt has for long possessed chemical weapons (CW) and biological weapons (BW), and was unable to make much progress in the nuclear weapons (NW) domain, at least as yet, Qaddafi's Libya on the other hand produced CW, developed BW, neared nuclear capacity as well, eventually, but shifted to total deproliferation in due course.