Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN 978-11-0705-662-6
Price: Rs.895/-
The book describes India as a unique case of an outlier surviving outside the regime’s overarching system, as a nuclear-capable state with prolonged record of resistance (and selective adherence), but ending up seeking opportunities to engage with its normative structures. The ideological and policy shifts that had shaped India’s transformative journey from a perennial outlier to one seeking greater integration with the regime, though, also exemplifies the underlying strategic paradoxes and dogmatic incongruities. The book assesses how these dynamics will determine India’s role in global anti-proliferation and its status in the emerging global nuclear order.
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Prime Minister Gillard's decision to reverse the uranium export policy not just indicates a dramatic shift in Australia’s strategic outlook, but also could endow a decisive fillip to its crisis-hit uranium industry.
The nuclear non-proliferation paradigm 1 has rarely remained static. Its logic or the underlying principle has however been singular – non-proliferation should lead to nuclear disarmament, and eventually total elimination. It is the approach to the paradigm that has evolved over the years, often accentuated by, and many a time succumbing to, the transformations in the global security environment. Milestones in this evolution have often been construed as shifts in the paradigm, as newer security imperatives necessitated augmentations in existing approaches to proliferation challenges.
15-Years after Pokhran II: Deterrence Churning Continues
Fifteen years after the nuclear tests, it is relevant to examine if deterrence remains weak in South Asia or has consolidated towards greater stability.