Since there is no evidence to suggest that the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile has degraded India’s retaliatory capability, India should retain its no-first-use doctrine.
The emerging changes in the security calculus within the Korean Peninsula are forcing Japan to revisit its existing position on the nuclear issue. The changing security environment has triggered several debates within Japan on the nuclearisation of the island nation. Although, at present, domestic opinion within Japan is opposed to exercising the nuclear option, there has been a break in the hitherto established taboo to have an open debate on the country's nuclear policy.
In order to construct an operational nuclear device, terrorists need to obtain the requisite fissile materials - Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) or plutonium. It has been proved that, generally, it is much simpler to devise a crude nuclear bomb with HEU than with plutonium. Hence, terrorists can have 'reasonable confidence' in the performance of weapons-grade HEU bombs. The magnitude of the threat of nuclear terrorism from Pakistan's HEU-based nuclear weapons programme is assuming alarming proportions. However, adequate preventive steps can be taken to minimize the danger.
In the aftermath of North Korea's second nuclear test and the launch of three short-range missiles on May 25, 2009, followed by the launch of seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan on July 4, there has been widespread speculation on Japan's principled position on non-proliferation and disarmament and whether it will abandon its nuclear abstinence and acquire nuclear capability. This possibility has been echoed recently by the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates.
Why India should retain its No-First-Use policy?
Since there is no evidence to suggest that the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile has degraded India’s retaliatory capability, India should retain its no-first-use doctrine.