Nuclear Doctrine

You are here

  • Share
  • Tweet
  • Email
  • Whatsapp
  • Linkedin
  • Print
  • Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons and the Indian Nuclear Doctrine

    The nuclear escalation risk cannot be contained by the revision of India’s minimum deterrence policy but with a change in Pakistan’s behaviour.

    September 11, 2017

    Revisiting India’s Nuclear Doctrine

    India’s current nuclear doctrine does not call for an automatic massive retaliation for Pakistan’s use of TNWs against Indian troops on Pakistan soil. However, this does not mean that such an attack will go unanswered.

    March 27, 2017

    Is India’s Nuclear Doctrine Credible?

    Recent debates by former officials and analysts on India’s nuclear doctrine highlight certain credibility problems. Two inter-related pillars of the doctrine—the pledge of ‘No-First Use’ (NFU) and the assurance of a ‘massive retaliation’ response to a nuclear strike—have been scrutinised.1 The backdrop shaping the debate is the pressing need to discover options to produce a de-escalation or deter an escalation in Pakistan’s sub-conventional war. This is the context for the ongoing contestations around India’s nuclear doctrine.

    January 2017

    Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Deconstructing India’s Doctrinal Response

    The military and scientific leadership of Pakistan has given clear signals that tactical nuclear weapons have a vital role in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons policy. Developed to lower Pakistan’s nuclear threshold, these weapons may further deter India from launching a conventional strike to punish Pakistan for its sub-conventional war against India. This has led to a debate on the possible doctrinal responses that India could adopt to counter Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons.

    November 2015

    Revisiting India’s Nuclear Doctrine

    In principle there is nothing wrong in revisiting the doctrine but such revisions/reviews must be based on sound and valid reasons. The proponents of the doctrinal review argue that India’s existing doctrine is ill-suited to deter Pakistan from using tactical nuclear weapons against India.

    June 20, 2014

    Foreign policy agenda for the new government

    Foreign policy agenda for the new government

    India has unprecedented opportunity to follow a foreign policy to meet its developmental aspirations and security needs, both of which are complementary. Sustained economic growth is essential for India to follow a proactive foreign policy.

    May 27, 2014

    Revisiting India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Is it necessary?

    “Credible minimum deterrence” is the cornerstone of India’s nuclear doctrine. It, used in conjunction with the concepts of “No First Use” (NFU) and “Non Use” against non nuclear weapon states, clearly indicates that India envisages its nuclear weapons as only a deterrent and not as a means to threaten others.

    April 30, 2014

    Managing India’s Missile Aspirations

    The Agni-VI and Prahaar both signify unnecessary missile projects, which have been developed in the interests of DRDO technical and bureaucratic ambitions rather than the stated interests of India’s nuclear doctrine.

    February 10, 2013

    Pakistan’s ‘First Use’ in Perspective

    The article fleshes out Pakistani first use options for an informed discussion on the implied nuclear threat that Pakistan sometimes resorts to.

    May 12, 2011

    Did India Change its Nuclear Doctrine?: Much Ado about Nothing

    Fears by some analysts that India has recently altered its nuclear doctrine, and particularly its no first use policy, are unfounded.

    March 01, 2011

    Pages

    Top